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Abstract 
Oracles in Sophoclean tragedies are consistently misunderstood, not because the gods speak in 
out-and-out lies, but because they communicate in a decidedly non-human mode that appears to 
violate the unwritten rules of effective human conversation. I use pragmatic linguistic theory to 
examine how oracles are misunderstood, since pragmatics is concerned precisely with these 
unwritten rules—how context, inferences, and implications complement the basic semantic 
content of language. These non-semantic elements are conspicuously absent from oracular 
communication, which leads to misinterpretation. I examine how the liminality and strangeness 
of oracular speech afford Sophocles the flexibility to explore the different components of 
language. Oracular speech—precisely because it is not bound by the rules of “normal” speech—
offers a context in which pragmatic principles can fail and artificially constructed 
miscommunications can “break” pragmatic rules. By exploring the limits of communication and 
miscommunication, Sophocles illustrates exactly those guiding principles that underlie effective 
communication.  
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Introduction 
In this project, I examine all seven of Sophocles’ surviving tragedies with a focus on the 
oracles and prophetic speech—features found in all seven plays. Although scholars have pointed 
out that these oracles fundamentally defy understanding, my work explains exactly how mortals fail 
to understand and argues that this failure is central to Sophocles’ conception of language. This 
theory of language, I argue, is a sophisticated one that engages with and resists many of the 
sophistic rhetorical trends in Athens in the 5th century BCE in a way that has not been fully 
appreciated by previous studies. By focusing on the specific linguistic mechanisms that generate this 
oracular ambiguity, I show that oracles in Sophocles communicate in a way that seems to violate 
unwritten rules that govern effective human conversation. To do this, I draw on pragmatic 
linguistic theories, which study the ways language gives rise to meaning and understanding, to 
examine how and why these prophecies are misunderstood.  
Because pragmatic theory deals with the role that things like context, inferences, and 
implications play in generating meaning and augmenting the basic semantic content of language, it 
offers a very useful and promising approach to oracles—though, thus far, a sadly underutilized 
one. The deceptive nature of these oracles has often been understood as either a sign of malicious 
intent by the gods or some sort of failure by the mortal listeners: scholarship on these oracles has 
either treated the problems with oracular language as a dramatic convenience or as a theological 
issue, or they have used deconstructionist approaches to conclude that language is fundamentally 
unintelligible. I instead focus on the ways these oracles show things about language—things that 
are entirely separate from the gods’ intentions. I argue that these intentions are in fact inaccessible 
within the context of the play, and that the language itself is much more the object of Sophocles’ 
interest.  
Oracles present a unique opportunity for Sophocles to explore language because they are, 
by their very nature, liminal and strange. This, I argue, allows Sophocles to play with language to 
create artificial exceptions to pragmatic principles, where deceptive language need not be 
intentional or malicious, but can arise simply from a fundamental divide between mortals and the 
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divine. Precisely because it is not bound by the rules of “normal” speech, oracular speech offers a 
context for Sophocles to explore the ambiguity of language, as he can present artificially 
constructed miscommunications that seem to “break” these pragmatic rules. By exploring the limits 
of communication and miscommunication, Sophocles illustrates exactly those guiding principles 
that underlie effective communication. Put another way, by creating situations in which integral 
parts of human communication are stripped away, Sophocles can highlight these aspects of 
communication through their conspicuous absence.  
Only after closely reading all of these plays can I widen my examination to explore 
Sophocles’ broader purpose for including ambiguous oracles and other prophetic utterances in all 
of his extant plays. By highlighting the failures of communication between mortals and gods, 
Sophocles comments on the relationship of language to meaning—a particularly salient topic in 
5th-century Athens, when Sophists were introducing more relativistic and deconstructionist ideas 
about language into the intellectual discourse. Rather than simply accepting or rejecting these 
concepts, as has often been suggested, Sophocles makes a much more subtle point about how 
language functions. After examining the competing theories of language in Athens at the time, I 
suggest that Sophocles uses the opportunities provided by oracles in his plays to argue that there is 
some intrinsic meaning in language and communication. Language’s slippery nature does not prove 
that there is no stable meaning to language, but simply that the rules that govern meaning are more 
complex than people often realize.  
 
Sophocles and Linguistics 
 
In the analysis which follows, I seek to focus on the consistent presence of oracular 
misunderstanding in all of Sophocles’ extant plays and to use these moments of miscommunication 
to formulate a theory of language that emerges from these plays. Oracles are unique in that they 
seem to present a moment of linguistic communication between gods and mortals. Contrary to 
other sorts of divination, such as augury or reading entrails, once oracles are derived and placed 
into a verbal form by some sort of priest or priestess, they appear to be intelligible. The words of 
the gods are in the Greek language and can presumably be understood by anyone who speaks (or, 
in some contexts, reads) Greek.  
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The often fatal misunderstanding of these oracles is surprisingly constant throughout the 
extant Sophoclean corpus, however, and points to a persistent interest in this idea. The question of 
how and why these oracles are misunderstood is not a new question—scholars have wrestled with 
this at great length and often concluded that Sophocles’ works convey a constant message of “late 
learning” and the inability of mortals to fully understand themselves and their own natures or 
circumstances until it is too late to avert disaster.  
This motif is certainly present in Sophocles’ tragedies, but my analysis will focus on a 
different aspect of this oracular misunderstanding. In Sophocles, the oracles are misunderstood in a 
peculiarly linguistic way that does not, I argue, leave us with the inescapable conclusion that the 
gods are malicious or knowledge is unattainable. These readings are certainly available within these 
plays, but the linguistic mechanics of these oracles point to another, subtler point. Oracles are 
misunderstood for the same reasons human communication is properly understood—the tragic 
outcome of these plays hinges upon the fact that humans approach oracular language with the 
same linguistic and pragmatic tools that they use to approach human language. These tools fail 
spectacularly when applied to communication from the gods, but, in their failure, these plays also 
highlight what these tools are. To put it another way, these plays offer a sophisticated set of 
linguistic theories and the ambiguity of oracles specifically flouts these linguistic principles. By 
creating artificial language and situations that “break” these linguistic principles, Sophocles’ plays 
in fact construct and promote a theory of language that is conspicuously delineated by the unusual 
situations in which it fails. 
These theories are implicitly embedded within the language of these plays and require a 
certain amount of excavation before we can look at them clearly. The best tools to do this are those 
furnished by pragmatic linguistic theory—particularly, recent work on implicature. I provide here 
an overview of the linguistic concepts that will be most relevant to my analysis in subsequent 
chapters. Many of the more precise and technical aspects of pragmatics are not directly applicable 
to my project and I will often turn to a less precise definition or theory when the more precise 
version will not fundamentally alter my reading of Sophocles. Many of the precise details of these 
theories, it is worth noting, are still controversial and hotly contested among the linguistics 
community1 and the precise boundaries between pragmatics and semantics are not well delineated. 
For my purposes, however, I am less concerned with the precise boundaries between the two and 
                                                   
1 For example, Bach 1999 has claimed that conventional implicature is a myth. 
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more concerned with the theoretical implications of these ideas, as a lens through which to examine 
the linguistic theories put forth in the extant Sophoclean corpus. For a more detailed presentation 
of these ideas or a concise summary of terms and examples presented here, please see Appendix B. 
 
Gricean Maxims and Implicature 
Implicature—an aspect of what is meant by a speaker that is not a part of what is explicitly 
said by that speaker—will pervade my analysis of Sophocles’ works. The term originates with Grice 
but has since been picked up by many neo-Gricean linguists, in addition to other linguists as well. It 
is worth noting, however, that the concept of a contrast between what is said and what is meant 
(the roots of the idea of implication) dates back a great deal further than Horn or Grice, and in fact 
finds its roots in antiquity. Horn2 cites the 4th century CE grammarians Servius and Donatus, in 
their discussion of litotes, on this point: minus dicimus et plus significamus. Since a great deal of 
work has been done on this topic since Grice’s seminal work in 1961, I will begin with an overview 
that Horn provides,3 which summarizes and draws upon Grice heavily, but also makes use of more 
recent advances.  
The underlying premises that inform pragmatic theory (and concepts of implicature in 
particular) stem from Grice’s seminal Cooperative Principle and his Maxims of Conversation: 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Maxims of Conversation (Grice 1989: 26-7) 
Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange.”  
Maxims of Conversations:  
QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false [i.e., Do not lie]. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
QUANTITY: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
RELATION: Be relevant. 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
                                                   
2 Horn 2006 cites Hoffmann 1987 and Horn 1991 
3 Horn 2006 working closely with Grice 1961. This work of his is an introductory chapter in a handbook to pragmatics 
and is intended as an uncontroversial overview of implicature for a non-specialist audience. While many of his claims 
(here and elsewhere) are not accepted by all contemporary linguists, this particular work is not very controversial and I 
feel comfortable adopting his presentations and analysis of implicature: unless specifically noted, nearly all of the 
terminology and linguistic theory provided here is drawn from his analysis. 
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3. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity.) 
4. Be orderly. 
Critically, these maxims are not prescriptive or meant to guide ethical action. They are instead a 
collection of default assumptions that are shared by speakers and which give rise to the implicatures 
upon which pragmatic analysis rests. These conventions are a guide which can be observed, 
violated, or apparently violated (when a speaker counts on the hearer to recognize the violation 
and incorporate that knowledge into their context-based interpretation). In all these circumstances, 
the underlying principles still function, just in different ways. 
Out of these, Grice himself and many other linguists4 have given the most importance to the 
maxim of Quality. To emphasize this, I would like to include a critical passage from Grice’s original 
formulation of these ideas that will be relevant throughout my analysis of Sophocles’ texts (though 
I do not claim that it maps onto Sophocles’ own ideas, but merely that it is a critical element of this 
pragmatic framework that I bring to bear on Sophocles’ plays):  
The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision of contributions which are genuine rather 
than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a 
number of recipes for producing contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference 
between something’s being, and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of contribution at 
all. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information.5 
There is something critically different about statements that are known to be false, and this 
distinction will prove extremely important throughout the rest of this analysis. It is a persistent 
misunderstanding of Grice’s ideas6 to think that consciously delivered lies “disprove” this basic set 
of maxims. In fact, these maxims are most useful as an analytical tool precisely when they are not 
observed. 
Building on the foundation of these maxims, Grice developed the idea of implicatures and 
separated them out into specific subtypes. Horn’s illustrative examples (closely following Grice 
1961: § 3) will be extremely useful for exploring how exactly implicature functions. The second 
member (b, and in italics) below is deducible (at least in certain contexts) from the first version (a): 
                                                   
4 e.g. Levinson 1983, Horn 1984a 
5 Grice 1989: 371, emphasis my own. 
6 For a small selection of these misunderstandings, see Keenan 1976 and Campbell 2001, 
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Subtypes of Implicatures (after Grice 1961: §3)7 
1a Even KEN knows it’s unethical 
1b Ken is the least likely [of a contextually invoked set] to know it’s unethical 
2a [in a recommendation letter for a position as a philosophy professor]  
Jones dresses well and writes grammatical English 
2b Jones is no good at philosophy 
3a The cat is in the hamper or under the bed 
3b I don’t know for a fact that the cat is under the bed8 
Looking at sentences 1a and 1b, we can see that the word even plays a critical role in 
generating 1b from 1a. Even without emphasizing the word KEN, we still understand from the use 
of even that Ken is the least likely (of the contextually-invoked set) to know that it is unethical. We 
could express the same truth-conditional content9in a way that does not generate 1b (“Ken knows 
it’s unethical too,” for example). This depends on a particular word (which is complemented by 
stress placed on the word KEN). 
In 2a and 2b, something very different is occurring. Here, it is entirely context-dependent. 
In a different context, Jones dresses well and writes grammatical English would be a compliment. 
This implicature has nothing to do with the conventional lexical meaning of the words (as was the 
case in 1b), but rather from the utterance of those words in a particular context and the implicature 
rests entirely on the context and what could have been said but was left unsaid. Convention dictates 
that a recommendation letter will say positive and polite things about the applicant (see the 
Principle of Politeness, addressed later). Returning to Grice’s maxims, the Principle of Relation 
would dictate that the speaker should be relevant and comment on the applicant’s qualifications for 
a job—a hearer will infer that the speaker has flouted this maxim for a reason (here, in the interest 
of politeness) and by extension, will infer that the speaker has nothing positive to say about the 
applicant’s qualifications.  
Looking now at 3a and 3b, we see a similar situation. These inferences (as noted, an equally 
valid option here would be I don’t know for a fact that the cat is in the hamper) are also context-
dependent. 2a requires a very specific context to generate 2b, whereas 3b is always generated, 
                                                   
7 For a more technical analysis of these implicatures, please see Appendix B. 1b is a detachable, non-cancelable 
inference and illustrates a conventional implicature. 2b and 3b are non-conventional non-detachable, cancelable 
inferences. All of these concepts are defined and explained in more detail in the appendix.  
8 An equally valid implicature here would be “I don’t know for a fact that the cat is in the hamper.”  
9 By “truth-conditional content,” I refer to the conditions (of the world) under which the utterance is true. If the truth 
conditions obtain, the utterance is true. For my purposes in this example, this simply refers to Ken’s knowledge that it is 
unethical (at which point the utterance and also the inference become valid. 
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without a specific context to block this implicature.10 This is a much more generalized version of 
the same context-based implicature11 we saw in 2b. 3a and 3b also illustrate an application of 
Grice’s maxims, since the speaker implicates—by their use of or—that they do not have definite 
knowledge either way. If the speaker knew that the cat was in one of those two discrete locations, 
the Maxim of Quantity would dictate that (assuming the precise location of the cat is relevant to 
the given conversation) they should provide as much information as they can. A hearer will infer 
that the speaker does not know more relevant information because they did not disclose more 
relevant information. The use of or implicates that the speaker does not have enough information 
to make a stronger, less ambiguous claim.  
In all these types of implicatures, however, it is crucial to note that the proposition or 
sentence does not produce the implicature—implicatures are produced by the speaker or the 
utterance. Implicatures are critically not a feature of sentences. Before going any farther, I would 
like to distinguish between a few critical (and unfortunately similar) terms: implication, 
implicature,12 inference, presupposition, and entailment. For my purposes, I will be using fairly 
standard and traditional definitions for all these terms.13 Grice was deliberate in his choice of 
implicate rather than imply to describe what speakers do. If a sentence is true, then what it implies 
is necessarily true. Implication (what is implied) depends on semantic content (what actually is said) 
whereas implicature (what is implicated) involves what is not said and depends on pragmatic 
                                                   
10 “Block” is the term of art generally used for this process. An implicature is blocked when some sort of contextual 
clue overrides the default pragmatic process that we would expect to occur. The cat is in the hamper or under the bed 
always generates (as a default) the implicature I don’t know for a fact that the cat is under the bed unless context 
prevents the implicature from occurring. We could, for example, imagine the following scenario: 
A: I’ve looked everywhere for the cat, except in the hamper and under the bed 
B (looking in the hamper while giving no indication that the cat is there): So, the cat is in the hamper or under 
the bed… 
In this scenario, the implicature generated would in fact be I know for a fact that the cat is under the bed, since Speaker 
B’s actions have just conveyed that the cat is not in the hamper, and must therefore be under the bed. In this very 
specific situation, the implicature I don’t know for a fact that the cat is under the bed is said to have been blocked, since 
the default implicature is not generated, because context precludes it.  
11 This is in fact a contrast between a particularized conversational implicature and a generalized conversational 
implicature, which are described in more detail in Appendix B. 
12 I will not be using the term impliciture (playing off of implicIT, as opposed to implicATE) at all. There are some 
(e.g., Bach 2006) who prefer this term, particularly in the context of scalar implicatures, on the grounds that there is a 
fine distinction between the two and that nuance is lost by using the term implicature for all of these situations. This 
argument would see implicitures as situations in which the meaning is supplied implicitly through completion and 
expansion, rather than explicitly. See Bach 2006: 28-9 for an argument in favor of this distinction. Although his 
arguments have merit, the subtle distinction he draws is irrelevant for my purposes and only complicates the already-
complicated terminology. 
13 These, and all other technical linguistic terms that I introduce, can be found in Appendix B, which is a glossary with 
examples of these different terms which will hopefully be useful for readers as a handy reference. 
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elements instead. To return to the examples above, Jones dresses well and writes grammatical 
English implies simply that Jones dresses well and writes grammatical English. The context is 
irrelevant. However, in the context of a letter of recommendation for a philosophy position, what 
the speaker (or writer) is understood to mean—that Jones is no good at philosophy—is the 
unstated implicature. These terms will need additional refinement, and there is certainly debate 
about the extent to which implicature can be extricated from grammar14 and this is a simplistic 
overview, but it will suffice for the moment.  
Inferences are also distinct from implicature, though they are often conflated with one 
another.15 The critical distinction here is that an inference is something that a hearer makes and an 
implicature is something that a speaker intends. A speaker can implicate something without a 
hearer making the intended inference and a hearer can infer something that the speaker did not 
implicate. In a world of perfect and complete communication, these ought to line up with one 
another, but the two terms describe opposite sides of unspoken communication.  
Entailments can occasionally have the same truth-conditional content as implicatures,16 but 
they are generally distinct. A sentence can entail something, whereas a speaker implicates 
something. Entailment is the relationship between two sentences when one demands the truth of 
the other. For example:  
A) That urn contains the ashes of Orestes 
B) Orestes is dead 
Sentence A entails sentence B. If sentence A is true, sentence B must be true. This relationship has 
nothing to do with the utterance of the sentences or the speaker’s intentions or the context. 
Sentence A simply requires the truth of sentence B. 
Presuppositions are also a feature of a sentence, but they work slightly differently from 
entailments. A presupposition (as one might imagine) involves a presupposed truth that is taken for 
granted. For example, That urn contains the ashes of Electra’s brother presupposes that Electra 
                                                   
14 Chierchia 2004 argues compellingly that implicatures are far more grammatical than has often been acknowledged 
and that—particularly with indirect and embedded implicatures—it is inadequate to think about implicatures as a 
distinct aspect of an utterance. 
15 See Bach 2006 (”The Top 10 Misconceptions about Implicature”) on this misunderstanding of Gricean and neo-
Gricean theories (among many others, as the title of his article would indicate). My discussion of this distinction, as well 
as many of my definitions, draws heavily on his explanations (esp. 23-25). 
16 See Bach 2006: 24 on this situations in which the two can correspond exactly. 
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has a brother. The simplest way to distinguish entailments from presuppositions is through 
negation. Presuppositions still hold true under negation, but entailments do not: 
Presupposition: That urn does not contain the ashes of Electra’s brother still presupposes 
that Electra has a brother.  
Entailment: That urn does not contain the ashes of Orestes does not entail that Orestes is 
dead (though he certainly could be, with his remains in an undetermined state and 
location). 
Building upon these, scalar implicature is another important term to introduce here. I 
include Horn’s well-chosen illustrative example from the film When Harry Met Sally, partly due to 
its great clarity and partly due to its entertainment value (in the midst of a rather dry discussion of 
linguistic theory). In this scene, Harry is setting up a blind date between his friend Jess and his 
friend (but not yet girlfriend), Sally: 
Jess: If she's so great why aren't YOU taking her out? 
Harry: How many times do I have to tell you, we're just friends. 
Jess: So you're saying she's not that attractive. 
Harry: No, I told you she IS attractive. 
Jess: But you also said she has a good personality. 
Harry: She HAS a good personality. 
Jess [Stops walking, turns around, throws up hands, as if to say “Aha!”] 
Harry: What? 
→Jess: When someone's not that attractive, they're ALWAYS described as having a good 
personality. 
Harry: Look, if you had asked me what does she look like and I said, she has a good 
personality, that means she's not attractive. But just because I happen to mention that she 
has a good personality, she could be either. She could be attractive with a good personality, 
or not attractive with a good personality. 
Jess: So which one is she? 
Harry: Attractive. 
⇒Jess: But not beautiful, right? 
Horn marks (with the single arrow) the moment where Jess incorrectly reanalyzes a 
particularized implicature as generalized, at which point Harry stresses the content-dependent 
nature of that inference. More than a gratuitous movie reference, however, this also provides an 
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example of another critical term for my linguistic analysis of Sophocles. At the end of this scene, in 
the line marked with the double arrow, Jess draws a separate inference. Here, the inference is 
generalized, but it demonstrates provides an example of scalar implicature.17 Jess here assumes that 
the weak claim that the speaker makes indicates that the speaker is not in a position to make a 
stronger claim.  In short, scalar implicature works from a scale of strength of predication and 
assumes (based on Grice’s maxims, which I shall explore below) that a speaker will make the 
strongest claim they are in a position to make. “Attractive” is here the upper-bound of an assertion, 
and Jess then infers that the woman in question is not anything beyond attractive (i.e. beautiful, 
gorgeous, etc.). Scalar implicature works on the assumption that terms can generally be ranked in 
terms of their strength and a speaker will make the strongest claim that they are in a position to 
make. As another example, a speaker would not say that their food is warm when they really mean 
that it is very hot. It would not necessarily be wrong to say that it is warm (it is, after all, at least at 
the minimum threshold to be considered warm), but it would be misleading. Perhaps more clear is 
an example with numbers, where a scale of strength is essentially just a number line. If a speaker 
says that she has four children, and it turns out that she in fact has five children, her claim to have 
four children is not false, but a listener would be justified in thinking that her answer was not 
entirely accurate either. This is, of course, context-dependent as well. If a large group were asked 
to split into two smaller groups, based on the number of siblings they have, and people with fewer 
than three siblings were asked to form one group and people with three or more siblings were asked 
to form another group, then it would no longer be misleading for a woman with four siblings to say 
that she has three siblings, since three siblings is the most relevant piece of information and is—in 
this specific context—functionally equivalent to “three or more siblings.” 
 
Scalar Implicature 
Scalar Implicature, to delve in a little more deeply, stems largely out of Grice’s Quantity 
maxim and, more precisely, out of the first submaxim he lists under Quantity: Do not say what you 
believe to be false. This submaxim is used to derive “upper-bounding generalized conversational 
implicatures associated with scalar values.”18 This idea can be seen much more clearly with an 
                                                   
17 Though Horn modestly does not refer to it this way in his summary which I am drawing heavily upon here, this 
phenomenon is often described in terms of Horn Scales and refers to the idea that he developed in his thesis and later 
work, though Horn himself protested vigorously against that term for them (Birner and Ward, 2006: ix-xi). 
18 Horn 1972, 1989; Gazdar 1979; Hirschberg 1985 
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examination of the uses of some in English, which can conceivably mean at least some (the 
indefinite use) or some but not all (the semi-definite use).19 If a speaker were to say “I like some of 
the people at this party,” a hearer would be justified in thinking that the speaker does not like all of 
the people at the party. Without additional context to suggest otherwise, the hearer will reasonably 
assume that if the speaker liked all of the people at the party, they would say all. One can 
reasonably suggest, however, that perhaps the speaker does not know everyone at the party and 
does not feel as though they can pass judgment on people they have not met. To reduce ambiguity, 
a speaker in that situation might say something like “I like at least some of the people at the party.” 
In fact, this is precisely what Grice addresses with his Modified Occam’s Razor: “Senses are not to 
be multiplied beyond necessity.”20 This effectively negates the “lower bound” of the semantic 
possibilities that would otherwise be in play; put more simply, it means that the speaker will give as 
much relevant information in the most comprehensible way, and the hearer is authorized to 
eliminate the less obvious understanding.  
This lower bound is often called a one-sided reading, as opposed to the two-sided reading, 
which combines what it actually said with what is implicated. If we schematize this, it looks like the 
following: 
One-Sided and Two-Sided Understanding (Horn 2006: 10) 
 “One-sided” “Two-sided” 
I like some of the people at the party. “...some if not all...” “...some but not all...” 
The water is warm. “...at least warm...” “...warm but not hot...” 
 
So, combining Grice’s different theories, we come to a conclusion that the best understanding of an 
utterance, without other context, will be this two-sided meaning. If the speaker has all the relevant 
information at their disposal (i.e. they do in fact know how they feel about everyone at the party or 
what the temperature of the water is), then they would say “all” or “hot” if that were the better 
choice. By not using the stronger word, they effectively implicate the weaker reading and cancel the 
stronger reading.  
                                                   
19 Horn 2006: 9 lays out the scholarly history of debating this point, including De Morgan 1847 and Mill 1867. Mill’s 
formulation draws on the principles that underlie the idea of scalar implicature. 
20 Grice 1989: 47. 
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This, then, is where the “scalar” aspect comes into play.21 Working from the two examples 
above, we can see a pattern that gets generalized more broadly into the idea of scalar implications. 
We can order descriptive words into a ranking of relative informativity. The scales (often called 
Horn Scales, from Horn’s seminal 1972 work on the topic) are not entirely accepted in any given 
form, but Levinson provides a useful sampling of scales as follows: 
Sample Horn Scales (Levinson 1983: 134) 
〈 all, most, many, some, few 〉 
〈 and, or 〉 
〈 n, . . . , 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 〉 
〈 excellent, good 〉 
〈 hot, warm 〉 
〈 always, often, sometimes 〉 
〈 succeed in Ving, try to V, want to V 〉 
〈 necessarily p, p, possibly p 〉 
〈 certain that p, probable that p, possible that p 〉 
〈 must, should, may 〉 
〈 cold, cool 〉 
〈 love, like 〉 
〈 none, not all 〉 
 
The direction of the scales will vary based on context (temperature, for example, will 
depend largely on the desired temperature and the stronger version will be very different when 
talking about iced tea as opposed to hot coffee). The critical element here is that they are arranged 
in ascending/descending order of informativity. So when a speaker chooses a word (to return to my 
previous example, some of the people at the party), the hearer can assume that the speaker has a 
reason for not using a word higher up that particular scale. There can be a range of reasons that 
the speaker made this choice, but the underlying assumption is that the speaker did not intend for 
                                                   
21 For a much more elaborate exploration of this, see Horn 2006: 11, where he provides a square of opposition that 
visually constructs the possibilities and lays them out in a hierarchy from universals to particulars and affirmations to 
negations. 
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that “some” to be understood as “more than some” (i.e. all, most, or many). This, in effect, cancels 
those semantically viable meanings and the speaker implicates “some not all.” 
To introduce a final bit of relevant terminology here, items higher up (more informative) on 
a scale entail things below them. This is, to some extent, the flip side of how scalar implicature 
works. So, to take the following example: 
〈 necessarily p, p, possibly p 〉 
“Necessarily p” entails “possibly p” and not the other way around. This is why saying “possibly p” 
implicates the negation of anything higher on that list. The utterance of “possibly p” means, once 
the implicature is taken into account, “possibly p, but not necessarily p,” or the speaker would have 
used the stronger term. Hirschberg 1991 has also shown that this pragmatic approach to meaning 
applies not only to scales or the sort that are listed above, but in fact any partially ordered set. So in 
a chronologically-arranged history book, if someone were to say that Sarah has made it to the 
Middle Ages, knowing as we do that this is a chronologically ordered set of topics, that utterance 
would implicate that she has not yet made it to the Industrial Revolution, though this implicature 
could be canceled by its modification to something like “not only has Sarah made it to the Middle 
Ages, but also to the Industrial Revolution” (which might, depending on the context, be 
preferred). 
A few other constraints apply to this framework as well. For example, in the context of 
negation, this process is complicated.22 In addition, there are many reasons why someone might not 
provide as much information as he or she potentially could, including a concern with style or 
politeness. Things like irony and sarcasm or understatement or hyperbole seem to flout these 
principles in a way that undermines their usefulness. Davis is quite succinct on this point: 
We use irony and other figures, of course, in part because we have conversational goals 
other than the efficient communication of information. We observe not only the Cooperative 
Principle, but also the Principle of Style. 
Principle of Style: Be stylish, so be beautiful, distinctive, entertaining, and interesting. 
Clear and simple prose—“just the facts, please”—can be boring, tedious and dull. We liven 
up our writing with figures of speech and other devices. In the process, we sacrifice 
perspicuity (violating Manner). We sometimes “embellish” a narration to make it more 
                                                   
22 Chierchia 2001 addresses the way that this works in more detail, in the context of what are known as “downward-
entailing operators,” such as negation. Horn 1989:234 also addresses how scalar implicature can be blocked and “scale 
reversal” occurs. Levinson 2000 challenges some of Chierchia’s conclusions about scale reversal, and the issue is 
certainly a complicated and unresolved one, but it does not directly pertain to my arguments and is perhaps best left to 
qualified linguists to resolve. 
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interesting (violating Quality) and delete boring or ugly details even when they are 
important (violating Quantity).23 
Further, as Davis notes, drawing on Leech, Grice’s maxims often come into conflict with the 
Principle of Politeness: 
Principle of Politeness: Be polite, so be tactful, respectful, generous, praising, modest, 
deferential, and sympathetic. 
Speakers frequently withhold information that would be offensive or disappointing to the 
hearer, violating Quantity. Speakers often exaggerate in order to please or flatter, and utter 
“white lies” in order to spare the hearer's feelings, violating Quality. People pick “safe 
topics” (e.g., the weather) to stress agreement and communicate an interest in maintaining 
good relations—but violating Relation. Euphemisms avoid mentioning the unmentionable, 
but in the process violate Manner and Quantity.24 
As we can see, then, there are a great variety of principles that can come into conflict with one 
another and complicate the emergence of meaning.  
 
Implicature conclusions 
In closing this section on linguistic theory, I would like to raise some objections that are 
perhaps obvious to any application of these theories to literary texts—particularly texts written in a 
different time and language. The emphasis in pragmatic theory is placed squarely on the speaker 
and the hearer and implicatures are only properties that can properly be spoken of in relation to a 
speaker or an utterance. A sentence, as I have noted, does not implicate anything. It would seem, 
then, that this is a purely spoken phenomenon that is entirely contingent on the assumptions that 
the speaker and hearer bring to bear on the conversation. It is not obvious how one might apply 
these theories to an ancient literary text.  
Although these theories can be applied to a wide range of literary texts, drama is a 
particularly apt place to apply them, since drama recreates spoken communication, albeit in an 
artificial form. Further, the aspects of these plays which I am focusing my analysis upon are 
instances of communication that is intrinsically connected to spoken language. Oracles are a 
fundamentally language-oriented form of communication. As opposed to augury and other similar 
                                                   
23 Davis 2014 
24 Davis 2014, drawing on Leech 1983 as well as directing readers toward Lakoff 1977; Brown and Levinson 1978; 
1987; Horn 1989: 360; Matsumoto 1995: §2.4. Contrast Huang 2007: 37, fn. 12; Pinker 2007. Grice 1975: 28, he notes, 
“acknowledges the Principle of Politeness, and suggests that it generates implicatures that are both nonsemantic and 
nonconversational.” 
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means of divination (reading entrails of an animal, for example), oracles are a linguistic means of 
communication and they seem, at least, to be intelligible in the same way that normal Greek 
linguistic communication is. While we do not always learn where a prophecy originated in the plays 
I will examine, they are all vocalized and we see characters within the plays interact with these 
oracles as utterances of the god(s). In this way, pragmatics are a viable means of interpretation and 
analysis.  
The other obvious objection is that pragmatics is fundamentally concerned with the context 
of an utterance and the sorts of psychological mechanisms that allow the speaker and hearer to 
minimize the effort involved in effective communication. Can we, as moderns, effectively 
approximate the sorts of assumptions that shaped ancient communication? If we are to 
pragmatically analyze communication between characters within plays (and the ways the 
playwright’s own ideas might shape those depictions), then a certain understanding of ancient 
psychology is a requisite. As I will show, however, we do have a great deal of information both 
within and without the plays and we have literary characters as well as ancient philosophers and 
other authors who provide an extensive frame of reference. Characters voice their own 
expectations and analyze the ways in which their expectations were incorrect and the ways their 
assumptions of meaning proved not to be accurate. In this way, we have the tools that we need to 
effectively and reasonably bring pragmatic linguistic theory to bear on these ancient texts.  
 
Ambiguity 
Because this project deals so much with ambiguity, it is worth laying out precisely what I mean by 
ambiguity. Linguists recognize several discrete types of ambiguity: lexical ambiguity, syntactic 
ambiguity, and pragmatic ambiguity.  
Lexical Ambiguity: this sort of ambiguity involves words that are homophonous (such as read and 
reed) and/or homographous (βίος meaning life and βίος meaning bow). Lexical ambiguity will 
vary between written and oral communication, since written lexical ambiguity only arises from 
homography, whereas oral lexical ambiguity arises from homophony.25  
                                                   
25 This can also vary by dialect, in oral communication—for instance, the word been is pronounced differently 
throughout the United States, and been/bin are homophonous in some regions, whereas been/Ben are homophonous 
in others, and been/bean are homophonous in yet other regions. See Katz 2016 for an extremely accessible visual 
representation of regional linguistic variants in the United States. See Hickey 2014 for a more scholarly approach.  
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Syntactic ambiguity26: this type of ambiguity refers to ambiguity that occurs on the sentence level, 
when the relationship between words and phrases is unclear (often involving modifiers whose 
referent is not clearly identified).  
Phrasal ambiguity, a major subset of syntactic ambiguity, refers to a something like 
superfluous hair remover, which could either mean something that removes superfluous 
hair or a hair remover that is not necessary (that is, superfluous could modify either hair or 
remover).27  
A relevant and extremely problematic sort of syntactic ambiguity occurs with 
multiple connectives, as in the sentence Tonight, he will get drunk and rowdy or 
sad, in which there is a lack of clarity about which connective has the broadest 
scope. Does this mean that either he will get drunk and rowdy or he got sad? Or 
does it mean that he got drunk and then he either got rowdy or sad? While math 
and propositional logic use brackets to make these distinctions, in written and 
spoken communication, the distinctions are not so clear.  
Modals are also likely to introduce ambiguity, as in John should be at home by now 
(depending on context, this could mean something like I don’t know for a fact where 
John is, but I strongly suspect that he is at home at this time of night or it could 
mean John is not home, and I have no idea where he is, but he is under an 
obligation to be home or You must eat a piece of cake (the range is less extreme 
here, but this could suggest a moral imperative, as in you are obliged to eat this 
cake, or else you risk offending someone, or worse or you really should eat this cake 
because you will certainly like it).  
Scopal ambiguities: A second sort of syntactic ambiguity is a question of what are called 
“scopal ambiguities”—these involve operators and quantifiers. All that glitters is not gold is 
syntactically ambiguous, in that it is unclear whether this means that not everything that 
                                                   
26 Examples here are taken from Sennet 2016, with minor modifications, since his examples are concise and effective 
and there is no reason to reinvent the wheel, so to speak.  
27 This can also occur when a phrase is not clearly connected to another part of the sentence, as in Mary took the boat 
between the rocks, which could refer either to Mary piloting a boat in such a way that it passes through two rocks 
(between the rocks modifies the verb took, in this case) or it could refer to Mary seizing a boat that was located 
between two rocks (between the rocks modifies the object the boat, in this case). 
 17 
glitters is gold (but some of it is) or that everything that glitters is not gold (i.e., nothing that 
glitters is gold). Another sort of syntactic ambiguity occurs with pronouns whose referent is 
unclear, as in His mother loves John, where we might assume that this is John’s mother, but 
that is not necessarily true.28 This is the type of ambiguity we will see surrounding a passage 
in the Oedipus Colonus in which it is unclear who the referent of κείνων is. The ability of 
Ancient Greek to omit the subject of the verb (as with φασὶ) can cause similar ambiguities, 
as will occur at OC 392. 
Pragmatic ambiguity:  
One of the largest categories of pragmatic ambiguity has to do with speech acts and 
ambiguity as to what type of speech something is. Anyone with a particularly pedantic 
friend who has been asked Can you pass the salt? and responded smugly with I don’t know, 
can I? is familiar with this sort of ambiguity. Can you pass the salt? can be intended either 
as an actual question (imagine, say, that someone’s hands are full, and there’s an actual 
question about their ability to pass the salt, under those conditions) or a request that is 
synonymous with Please pass the salt. This ambiguity, then, is one about the nature of the 
speech in question.  
The broadest and most interesting type of pragmatic ambiguity (for my purposes) is 
presuppositional ambiguity. As an example, consider the ambiguity introduced by too in 
the intriguing case of I love you too. 29 This can mean one or more of the following:  
• I love you (just like you love me) 
• I love you (just like someone else does) 
• I love you (and I love someone else) 
• I love you (as well as bearing some other relationship (i.e. liking) to you) 
These ambiguities are not a syntactic sort of ambiguity, but arise rather in relation to 
presuppositions.30 This is the sort of ambiguity that occurs in τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος 
                                                   
28 In a sentence like Every woman loved a man, this could mean that for every woman, there is at least one man that 
she loved, or [∀x:Wx][∃y:My](x loved y) in logical notation. It could also mean that there is at least one man whom 
every woman loved, or [∃y:My][∀x:Wx](x loved y) in logical notation. Similarly, the scope of negation can cause 
problems of this sort. 
29 This example and an exploration and analysis of the ambiguity here can be found in Bach 1982. 
30 A second example can be found in the statement Maria solved the problem too. This could either mean Maria 
solved the problem, in addition to Sarah, who also solved it or it could mean Maria solved the problem in additional to 
other things she’s done. Tone of voice might help distinguish these two in a spoken communication, as could contextual 
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ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, in which it is unclear with what ἀεὶ should be 
understood (an ambiguity Aristotle complains about at Rhet. 1407b).  
Two final types of ambiguity31: are the sorts known as collective-distributive ambiguity and ellipsis 
and complement ambiguity.  
Collective-distributive ambiguity arises when talking about a group of individuals, such as in 
Natalie and Sara brokered deals, in which it is unclear whether Natalie and Sara worked 
together to broker several deals or they each brokered one or more deals individually (or, 
as a third option, they may have brokered deals with one another, as in they were the two 
parties to a negotiation).  
Ellipsis and complement ambiguity describes something like Sam loves Jess more than 
Jason, in which it is unclear whether this means Sam loves Jess more than Sam loves Jason 
or if it means Sam loves Jess more than Jason loves Jess. The ambiguity here arises from the 
words which are not written, and ambiguity occurs within that ellipsis (and the words that 
the reader/listener supplies to fill that ellipsis). The listener must decide whether Jason is 
another subject or object of the understood loves. Similarly, in a sentence like John loves his 
mother and Bill does too, this could mean John loves his mother and Bill also loves John’s 
mother or John loves John’s mother and Bill loves Bill’s mother. This type of ambiguity has 
been given the name “strict-sloppy identity” and there is an extensive linguistic debate 
about precisely what sort of ambiguity this is,32 for which reason I have not included this in 
a particular category, though I tend to agree with those who classify this as a sort of 
syntactic ambiguity.  
                                                   
clues provided by what was said immediately before this, but taken in a vacuum, the meaning of the initial utterance is 
unclear. 
31 I have omitted discussion of “truth conditional pragmatic ambiguity” because linguists are not convinced that this 
necessarily exists. For those who think that such ambiguity is impossible, see Kripke 1977 and Searle 1979: 150 fn. 3. 
For an opposing view, see Donnellan 1966 (esp. p. 297) and Recanati 2010. 
32 See Fiengo and May 1994, Sag 1980, Williams 1977, and Hardt and Stone 1997 for three different interpretations 
about precisely where the ambiguity is generated, in a psycholinguistic sense. For my purposes, this discussion is not 
terribly relevant, though it is fascinating.  
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All these types of ambiguity33 fall under the larger linguistic umbrella of polysemy. Polysemy has 
been a popular topic in linguistics recently, primarily in computational and cognitive linguistics34 
and psycholinguistics has also treated the topic extensively, in terms of things like word recognition, 
semantic priming, and lexical decision tasks.35 Intentional polysemy has long been overlooked in 
linguistics, though this has changed more recently. The earlier approaches to polysemy relied on 
the assumption that in normal speech, we resist multiplicity of meanings and avoid ambiguity. To 
examine instances when conversational maxims are flouted, Lehrer 1990 introduces the principle 
of conventionality (see also Clark 1993 on this), which Lehrer separates into two different closely 
related principles (Lehrer, 1990: 210): 
1. If a word already exists to express a meaning, use it; don't use or construct another one 
2. If a word lexicalizes a meaning (concept), don't use it to mean something else, even if that 
meaning would fit the patterns of the language 
Critically (and this is where she departs from linguistic approaches like Grice 1975 and Sperber 
and Wilson 1986), she notes that these principles "can, of course, be overridden when there is a 
good reason for doing so, for example, to be entertaining, literary, shocking, or simply to be 
unconventional" and that "[w]henever a principle of conventionality is violated, the hearer, in 
addition to computing the meaning of the words, must figure out what, if anything, is being 
implicated by the unconventional choice as well" (1990: 210). As with the more fundamental 
Gricean maxims, the principle of conventionality is most useful when it is not followed. Because 
these guidelines do provide general descriptions of how communication functions, they are 
generally followed. When they are not followed, effective pragmatic analysis demands that we 
                                                   
33 There are some additional cases which do not fit neatly into one category and others which are niche enough (and 
which do not pertain to my analysis in this project) that I did not treat them here. For a fuller list, see Sennet 2016. 
One sort which I would like to mention in brief is often called pros hen ambiguity and is detailed in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics (Γ.2, 1003a-b), where he discusses ambiguity inherent in words like being (τὸ ὂν), healthy (τὸ ὑγιεινὸν), 
and medical (τὸ ἰατρικὸν). These are all used in relation to something—in the case of health, for instance, “healthy” 
can mean related to health or producing health or in good health, etc.—but it is not always clear which meaning is 
intended, which can generate ambiguity (Τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ 
οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ 
τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ’ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν 
ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), ὁμοιοτρόπως 
δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτοις, — οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ’ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν 
ἀρχήν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ’ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ 
στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰοὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς 
ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν).  
34 See Pustejovsky 1995, Brugman 1997, Cuyckens and Zawada 2001, Nerlich 2003. 
35 See Nerlich and Clark 2001: 3. 
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examine precisely how and why these principles are disregarded. In actual conversations, this can 
be due to a variety of factors, ranging from complex theory of mind and psycholinguistic 
considerations to far simpler explanations such as accidental mishearing (perhaps by a listener who 
is distracted) or language barriers. In literature, however, choices are far more conscious and 
random accidents do not occur in scripted, literary conversations. This makes a pragmatic analysis 
of literary ambiguity that much more valuable.  
This dissertation proposes a pragmatic linguistic reading of the oracles in Sophocles and 
takes precisely the approach that Lehrer suggests. Sophocles crafts oracular language which is 
intentionally ambiguous, and we must ask why he does this. Why are the oracles formulated in that 
way, and why specifically do humans chose the interpretation that they choose? The linguistic 
analysis required to answer these questions provides useful insight into Sophocles’ own ideas about 
how language works, as I will show in the following chapters.  
 
Linguistic Case Study: Orestes and Electra’s Recognition Scene (El. 1098-1230) 
To illustrate what these tools can offer us, I turn now to the extended recognition scene 
between Orestes and Electra at El. 1098-1230, since this scene offers ample opportunity to 
examine how human characters miscommunicate and are forced to revise their language in a 
shared endeavor to arrive at meaning. Scholars have generally been quite unconcerned at the 
unusual length, slow development, and abundant miscommunications that we find in this scene. For 
the few who think there is anything worth commenting on, theatrical effect or suspense has been 
enough to explain the prolonged scene.36 
As the scene opens, Orestes and Pylades have arrived at Argos in disguise and are bringing 
false proof of the fabricated story of Orestes’ death. The moment when the scene becomes much 
more interesting, for my purposes, is at 1174, when Orestes realizes that he is speaking to Electra—
he exclaims “Oh gods, what should I say? What words can I—who am at such a loss—turn to? I 
am no longer able to control my tongue!” (φεῦ φεῦ. τί λέξω; ποῖ λόγων ἀμηχανῶν / ἔλθω; 
                                                   
36 Jebb describes the scene as a “delicately gradual process” (ad 1176-1226) and Wright 2005 notes that this is 
elaborate and the recognition is postponed (from the prologue, where it conceivably could have occurred) in order to 
build suspense or excitement. Kells (ad 1176-1231) describes this scene as one of “great art and mounting excitement . 
. . due to its naturalness.” 
 21 
κρατεῖν γὰρ οὐκέτι γλώσσης σθένω, 1174-5). For the rest of the scene, in a prolonged 
exchange, Orestes slowly reveals his identity to Electra.  
As Orestes confirms his realization that he is speaking to Electra, the two begin 
communicating at cross purposes. Orestes is reacting to Electra’s life and the sad conditions she has 
faced, and he laments the wretched misfortune that he has just fully come to understand (οἴμοι 
ταλαίνης ἆρα τῆσδε συμφορᾶς, 1179). At this point, we understand that he is upset at learning 
how terrible his sister’s life has been, and her misfortune becomes his own. We can also see her own 
confusion in her response, since she is not aware of any reason why her pain would directly affect a 
stranger with whom she presumably has no particular connection and she responds with “surely 
you are not upset about me, stranger?” (οὐ δή ποτ᾽, ὦ ξέν᾽, ἀμφ᾽ ἐμοὶ στένεις τάδε; 1180). Kells 
suggests that this is because “Electra is not accustomed to having strangers feeling concern over 
her. So she finds it hard to believe that it is herself that is the object of Orestes’ pity” (ad 1180). 
Kells is not wrong on this point, but the source of the confusion is somewhat more nuanced. It is 
not the sadness of her plight in the abstract that strikes Orestes, but rather the personal connection 
that he has to this misfortune—he has just learned that his sister has suffered terribly.  
Even just in these first few lines, however, we can see clearly how understanding takes so 
long to emerge. Orestes asks if he is looking at the “famous form of Electra” (σὸν τὸ κλεινὸν εἶδος 
Ἠλέκτρας τόδε; 1177). Here, we see some important pragmatic nuances. His formulation of the 
question is highly wrought and reflects the “dignity and solemnity” (Kells ad 1177) that is 
appropriate to the moment and to the genre. However, Orestes flagrantly breaks the Gricean 
Maxim of Manner, which suggests that speakers ought to be perspicuous and avoid ambiguity or 
obscurity or prolixity. Rather than explain who he is or why he feels Electra’s own pain so deeply, 
which would be the most relevant pieces of information at this point, Orestes instead obliquely 
laments for the wretched misfortune (ταλαίνης . . . συμφορᾶς, 1179), her body, which has been 
treated dishonorably and impiously (ὦ σῶμ᾽ ἀτίμως κἀθέως ἐφθαρμένον, 1181) and her 
unmarried and ill-fated life (φεῦ τῆς ἀνύμφου δυσμόρου τε σῆς τροφῆς, 1183). Throughout, we 
can see Electra struggling to determine the missing information, though her persistent questions go 
largely unanswered—after her initial confusion at 1180, she explicitly asks Orestes why he is so 
upset about her plight (τί δή ποτ᾽, ὦ ξέν᾽, ὧδ᾽ ἐπισκοπῶν στένεις; 1184). Interestingly, she 
addresses him as ξένος here, as she has at 1180 and 1182 already, clearly identifying him as 
something without a particular stake in her own plight and someone with whom she does not have 
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a pre-existing connection.37 We can see the ways Electra moves forward in her attempts to 
understand what is going on, starting from her reasonable (though ultimately inaccurate) 
assumption that a speaker has not concealed his identity and that he would identify himself, if he 
were a friend or kin of some sort. When Orestes finally answers her question about why he is 
lamenting, Orestes’ identity (known only to him) separates his interpretation of this conversation 
from Electra’s and we can see how the same words are interpreted in two very different directions 
by the two participants in the conversation.  
If we were to paraphrase Electra’s reasoning, it would rest on these underlying 
presuppositions and logical progression: 
Presupposition: (extreme) pity for suffering is something that only reasonably affects friends 
or family of the sufferer 
Electra’s assertion that her interlocutor is a stranger (ξένος) with no personal connection to her 
then produces the following: 
Entailment: My pain should not affect you [so much] 
As such, we can now improve upon Kells’ reading of this scene and understand that Electra’s 
reaction is not primarily a response to anyone expressing concern or pity for her, though we 
understand that she has not received a great deal of sympathy lately. Instead, we can understand 
her statement at line 1184—literally, “Why then, stranger, do you lament so much when you look 
at me?”—as actually meaning something more like “Why did my sad story make you so upset? You 
are a stranger and my suffering presumably has no connection to you.” The difference in the 
amount of information that Electra and Orestes possess leads to radically different interpretations 
of the same exchange. 
 
Ἠλ: τί δή ποτ᾽, ὦ ξέν᾽, ὧδ᾽ ἐπισκοπῶν στένεις; 
Ὀρ: ὡς οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ᾔδη τῶν ἐμῶν οὐδὲν κακῶν. 
Ἠλ: ἐν τῷ διέγνως τοῦτο τῶν εἰρημένων; 
Ὀρ: ὁρῶν σε πολλοῖς ἐμπρέπουσαν ἄλγεσιν. 
1184-7 
El: Why then, stranger, do you lament so much when 
you look at me? 
Or: How, in fact, I knew nothing of my own woes! 
El: In which of the things that have been said did you 
come to realize this? 
Or: Because I am seeing you, conspicuous in your 
myriad woes.  
                                                   
37 The context makes quite clear that this is a use of ξένος that equates to “stranger” as a term of address (LSJ II and, 
in particular, III.b) and not “guest-friend” (LSJ I). Electra has expressed suspicions that this stranger might in fact be 
related to her, but she has phrased those suspicions in language related to συγγενής, as at 1202, and ξένος here refers 
to his unknown, stranger status. For more on this, see Dickey 1996. 
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Orestes’ perspective Electra’s perspective 
El: Why are you so sad? 
Or: I understand now how much you, my 
sister, suffered and by extension, I was/should 
have been suffering all these years! 
El: How so? 
Or: Seeing you and your suffering made me 
understand that.  
El: Why are you so sad, stranger? You don’t 
even know me! 
Or: How ignorant I was of my own woes! 
El: What that either of us has said in this 
conversation possibly made you think that any 
of these woes should affect you personally? 
Or: Seeing you and your suffering made me 
understand that. 
 
At the end of this scene, just before Orestes finally reveals his identity, we see another 
illustrative moment that corroborates this interpretation. Electra is still clearly operating under the 
assumption I highlighted earlier, that only a relative of some sort would reasonably be this pained 
on her behalf.38  
Ὀρ: ὦ δύσποτμ᾽, ὡς ὁρῶν σ᾽ ἐποικτίρω 
πάλαι. 
Ἠλ: μόνος βροτῶν νυν ἴσθ᾽ ἐποικτίρας 
ποτέ. 
Ὀρ: μόνος γὰρ ἥκω τοῖσι σοῖς ἀλγῶν 
κακοῖς. 
Ἠλ:οὐ δή ποθ᾽ ἡμῖν ξυγγενὴς ἥκεις ποθέν; 
1199-1202 
Or: Poor wretch! How I pity you, as I look at 
you! 
El: Know, then, that you alone among mortals 
has ever pitied me.  
Or: For I alone have come here, feeling grief at 
your woes.  
El: Surely you have not come as a relative of 
ours from somewhere? 
Again, Electra’s inferences are readily apparent in this scene. In the face of Orestes’ own 
cryptic and oblique statements, Electra’s attempts to make sense of his words foreground her own 
interpretive process. She is still unable to ascertain why this stranger takes such pity on her and, 
                                                   
38 Electra is not being entirely realistic here, and her claim that Orestes alone has ever pitied her is hyperbolic, since 
the Chorus certainly pities her (as Kells notes, ad loc., “But what of the Chorus?”). Her hyperbole does serve at least 
two purposes, however. Most obviously, this emphasizes the extent of her grief and despair, even if she overstates the 
reality facing her.  Simultaneously, her claim that Orestes alone has ever pitied her draws rhetorical attention to how 
unusual his care is. As Electra describes things, Orestes is more concerned for her than her entire household, and even 
though her statement is not entirely accurate, her claim nonetheless has the same rhetorical effect, in the heat of this 
highly emotionally charged moment. The audience is unlikely to carefully weigh the merits of a claim like this and will 
instead feel the effect of Electra’s claim, which highlights Orestes’ concern and kinship (known only to the audience in 
this exchange). 
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adopting Jebb’s preferred reading of τοῖσι σοῖς rather than τοῖς ἴσοις  at 1201,39 we can see 
Electra apply the same basic assumption—that only kin would truly share in pity and suffering—to 
try to solve her confusion in this scene.  
Just looking at this isolated facet of this scene, we can already see how pragmatics—
combined with other interpretive tools—can help us to make sense of a complicated scene that 
hinges on failed attempts to convey meaning effectively. As we can see, Grice’s maxims and the 
other underlying principles I have detailed need not be followed for them to be useful tools. In fact, 
they are most useful when they are not followed, since they can serve as a diagnostic tool to 
determine how failures of communication occur. By looking at the statements and responses of the 
two interlocutors, and knowing as we do that Orestes is more informed than Electra, we can 
identify what realistic human impulses are at play. It does a disservice to this scene to simply 
attribute its length and convolutions to dramatic suspense or some other theatrical effect. Similarly, 
to look at Orestes’ wording and Electra’s confusion and conclude that this is a generic, tragic 
convention of elevated language and tense stichomythia misses the point in many ways. To be sure, 
all these analyses are accurate, but they are also insufficient. As I will also argue in the context of 
oracular misunderstandings, Sophocles presents a complex and nuanced picture of how people 
communicate with one another and the ways meaning and understanding can be compromised.  
In the end, Electra’s assumption proves valid and Orestes reveals his identity as the kinsman 
that she suspected he must be all along. The assumptions and her grounds for making them are 
validated, and the lengthy process of recognition serves to highlight both the logical inferences that 
Electra is making as well as the complicating factors that can further obscure meaning. Orestes is 
not sure whom he can trust and his plan for revenge hinges on the element of secrecy. When 
combined with dramatic conventions of lofty, tragic language, there are multiple psychological and 
generic reasons for Orestes to be cautious about revealing his identity. In this scene, Sophocles 
combines these motivations in a way that requires readers to employ multiple heuristic approaches 
in order to make sense of it fully.  
                                                   
39 I adopt Jebb’s reading here of τοῖσι σοῖς rather than τοῖς ἴσοις. Either variant produces coherent meaning, but I 
am persuaded by his argument that ξυγγενὴς in the following line suggests that something must have prompted 
Electra’s assumption and τοῖσι σοῖς does that far more effectively than τοῖς ἴσοις. 
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Although I focused mostly on this particular assumption of Electra’s to explore the value of 
pragmatic analysis, the final lines of this scene offer a bizarre series of circumlocutions on Orestes’ 
part, while Electra struggles to make sense of his cryptic and riddling language. I provide it here 
because Orestes’ ambiguous language shares a great deal with the ambiguous and cryptic language 
of oracles, which will be my primary focus throughout the following chapters. However, because of 
two critical differences between Orestes’ speech and oracular speech, Orestes can (eventually) be 
understood effectively: (1) Orestes and Electra can continue to ask questions and clarify meaning in 
a way that is impossible with oracles and (2) even though Orestes is proceeding in a strange and 
confusing way, he is nonetheless aiming at comprehension. Because of this, despite the comically 
circuitous path they take,40 Electra and Orestes do eventually reach a shared understanding. The 
conclusion of this scene represents a particularly flawed attempt at communication, but one which 
nonetheless resolves into meaning, which is an interesting comparandum for oracular speech.  
Ὀρ: μέθες τόδ᾽ ἄγγος νῦν, ὅπως τὸ πᾶν μάθῃς. 
Ἠλ: μὴ δῆτα πρὸς θεῶν τοῦτό μ᾽ ἐργάσῃ, ξένε. 
Ὀρ: πείθου λέγοντι κοὐχ ἁμαρτήσει ποτέ. 
Ἠλ: μή, πρὸς γενείου, μὴ 'ξέλῃ τὰ φίλτατα. 
Ὀρ: οὔ φημ᾽ ἐάσειν. 
Ἠλ: ὦ τάλαιν᾽ ἐγὼ σέθεν,  
       Ὀρέστα, τῆς σῆς εἰ στερήσομαι ταφῆς. 
Ὀρ: εὔφημα φώνει· πρὸς δίκης γὰρ οὐ στένεις. 
Ἠλ: πῶς τὸν θανόντ᾽ ἀδελφὸν οὐ δίκῃ στένω; 
Ὀρ: οὔ σοι προσήκει τήνδε προσφωνεῖν φάτιν. 
Ἠλ: οὕτως ἄτιμός εἰμι τοῦ τεθνηκότος; 
Ὀρ: ἄτιμος οὐδενὸς σύ· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐχὶ σόν. 
Ἠλ: εἴπερ γ᾽ Ὀρέστου σῶμα βαστάζω τόδε; 
Ὀρ: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Ὀρέστου, πλὴν λόγῳ γ᾽ ἠσκημένον. 
Ἠλ: ποῦ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἐκείνου τοῦ ταλαιπώρου τάφος; 
Ὀρ: οὐκ ἔστι· τοῦ γὰρ ζῶντος οὐκ ἔστιν τάφος. 
Ἠλ: πῶς εἶπας, ὦ παῖ; 
Ὀρ: ψεῦδος οὐδὲν ὧν λέγω. 
Ἠλ: ἦ ζῇ γὰρ ἁνήρ; 
Ὀρ: εἴπερ ἔμψυχός γ᾽ ἐγώ. 
Ἠλ: ἦ γὰρ σὺ κεῖνος; 
1205-1222 
Or: Hand over this urn now, so that you can learn 
everything.  
El: No, by the gods, do not do this to me, stranger! 
Or: Listen to what I tell you to do and you will never err.  
El: No, I beseech you at your knees, do not take this thing 
which is most dear! 
Or: I say that I will not allow that.  
El: Alas for me and for you, Orestes, if I am to be deprived 
of your burial! 
Or: Say well-omened things! You are not justified in 
lamenting.  
El: How am I not justified in lamenting my dead brother? 
Or: It is not appropriate for you to say these things. 
El: Am I so dishonored of the dead? 
Or: You are dishonored of no one. This is not yours.  
El: It certainly is, if this is Orestes’ body I am holding. 
Or: It is not Orestes’, except insofar as it has been 
decorated with that story.  
El: Then where is the tomb of that wretched man? 
Or: There is none; there is no tomb for the living.  
El: What are you saying, boy? 
Or: I say nothing that is a lie.  
El: Then the man is alive? 
Or: If, in fact, I am breathing. 
El: Are you he? 
 
                                                   
40 I am thinking specifically of comic routines such as Abbott and Costello’s "Who's on First?” in which similar gaps in 
knowledge and linguistic ambiguity are exploited to great comedic effect.  
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In the face of seemingly nonsensical demands from Orestes, Electra responds in precisely 
the way that we would imagine, from both a psychological perspective and from a pragmatic 
perspective.41 She has trusted all of Orestes’ previous words and believes that the urn contains the 
ashes of Orestes—a claim which she has had no reason yet to doubt.  
I would like to replicate the example I provided of entailment from above: That urn 
contains the ashes of Orestes entails that Orestes is dead. As I mentioned above, a sentence can 
entail something, whereas only a speaker can implicate. We are now in a better position to see the 
clear application of these to an actual passage. When Orestes (in disguise) says that he and Pylades 
come carefully bearing the meager remains of dead Orestes, in a small urn (φέροντες αὐτοῦ 
σμικρὰ λείψαν᾽ ἐν βραχεῖ / τεύχει θανόντος, ὡς ὁρᾷς, κομίζομεν, 1113-4) and that this urn is 
the container for Orestes’ body (τόδ᾽ ἄγγος ἴσθι σῶμα τοὐκείνου στέγον, 1118), he has 
implicated that Orestes is dead. The actual circumstances—that Orestes is alive—are not a secret, 
clever potential meaning hidden in the language, as we will see is the case with oracular speech. 
Electra’s interpretation is exactly as it should be here and she has correctly understood the words 
that were spoken to her. The issue here is that the speaker was aiming at deception. Nonetheless, 
pragmatics provides a useful mechanism for determining how and where this misunderstanding 
occurred.  
Linguistic Conclusions 
In the example above, both speakers are humans who can question one another and 
ascertain more details and eventually reach a shared understanding. This provides a useful example 
to demonstrate the ways these theories can illuminate Sophoclean tragedy which is, as I will show in 
the subsequent chapters, deeply concerned with the process of communication and language. 
Characters in Sophocles’ plays are fundamentally rational actors. Their actions are motivated by 
events in the play (or events external to the play which we have access to in some capacity) and, 
                                                   
41 There is a great deal more going on in these lines then I have detailed here. One particularly interesting feature is 
the subtle linguistic shift that occurs throughout this passage, as Orestes’ identity comes to light. At the start, Electra 
addresses Orestes as ξένε and describes Orestes (in the third person) as ἀδελφὸν. When Electra addresses Orestes as 
ὦ παῖ at line 1218, she is addressing someone who is ξένος to her and, with παῖς, she is using a term reserved for 
either children or servants/slaves. While she may be commenting on his age or his status in her eyes (as a reflection of 
her frustration), this is nonetheless not a term that suggests respect. As it becomes clear that she is speaking to Orestes 
(that ξένος and ἀδελφός are one and the same), his identity is also elevated from παῖς to ἀνήρ, linguistically marking 
his recognition and his newly-elevated status. More than simply a recognition scene, this is also the moment where 
Electra realizes that her brother, who was a παῖς the last time she saw him, is now an ἀνήρ. The shift from παῖς to 
ἀνήρ gives a linguistic form to both these changes in Orestes’ identity.  
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while we may not agree with their actions, we understand why they choose those actions. We can 
analyze the characters using things like theory of mind, because these characters have minds that 
can be read, to use Zunshine’s terminology (Zunshine 2006), and things like cognitive science and 
psychology can yield useful insights when applied to literary characters.  
Though tragedy is a heavily stylized genre and tragedians are not aiming for perfect 
verisimilitude, the interactions between characters in these plays nonetheless conform broadly with 
what we would expect from interactions between real people. Characters in these plays 
communicate in ways that do accord with the pragmatic principles that I have laid out in this 
introduction, as we saw in the exchange between Orestes and Electra. When characters talk to one 
another, unless they have reason to be suspicious of their interlocutor, they both assume that they 
are part of a cooperative conversation which aims at comprehension. As such, if the person they are 
speaking to says something that initially seems not to comply with these maxims, the listener tries to 
reinterpret the speaker’s words in a way that does fulfill the Gricean maxims, and seeks to confirm 
their interpretation. If that proves impossible, then the listener asks clarifying questions or expresses 
their confusion, and the two parties work to eliminate misunderstandings and arrive at 
comprehension.  
However, in the context of oracular speech, there is not the opportunity to work 
cooperatively to negotiate meaning. Instead, the god speaks—ungoverned by human linguistic 
conventions—and the hearer(s) must interpret the oracle without any additional context. Unlike 
Orestes, whose motivations are at least somewhat clear (desire for revenge, fear of discovery, etc.), 
gods who are issuing oracles are often inscrutable. Even when Zeus communicates with his own 
son, Heracles, we will see that the communication is not straightforward or easily intelligible. In 
stark contrast to communication between mortals, when communicating with a god, the hearer 
cannot apply the contextual and linguistic tools that are at their disposal when communicating with 
other humans. Gods, it seems, abide only by semantic rules and not pragmatic ones.  
As I will show, the characters in these tragedies are unaware of this and persist in 
interpreting divine, oracular speech as though it were human speech. This is not because 
Sophocles wants to show that the gods are necessarily malicious or cruel (though that may well be 
the case). Rather, by depicting gods who only speak the same language as mortals in strictly 
semantic terms, Sophocles highlights all the non-semantic elements that contribute to meaning. 
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Because the gods almost never physically appear in Sophoclean tragedy, they exist purely in a 
linguistically-mediated form. Put more simply, the only concrete presence that the gods have in 
these plays is through their words. In this sense, we can know very little about the gods qua gods 
and I will generally avoid the question of how the gods are characterized. Instead, I will approach 
their oracular pronouncements as an instance of non-human language which can be usefully 
juxtaposed with human language. By seeing the ways (which can be most effectively analyzed 
through a pragmatic framework) that humans fail to accurately interpret divine (non-human) 
language, we can learn a great deal about the basic underlying assumptions and structures that do 
effectively govern human communication.  
Other Aspects of Oracles in the Ancient World 
My focus in the subsequent chapters will be on literary oracles in Sophocles. This excludes 
two major categories of oracles: non-Sophoclean literary oracles and actual oracles (i.e., non-
literary oracles). A striking feature of literary oracles is, as will be clear, how fundamentally different 
they are from historical oracles. For this reason, it will be worthwhile to look at what we know of 
actual oracular and divinatory practices in Ancient Greece. Further, we should question why such a 
discrepancy exists between historical and literary oracles and what this discrepancy tells us about 
conventions for oracular speech 
Historical Oracles 
The definitive studies of historical Delphic oracles are Parke 1939 (rev. 1956 with Wormell) 
and Fontenrose 1978. For more recent work, see Johnston 2005 and 2008. Because Delphic 
oracles are the most famous, I will focus primarily on them, but see also Parke 1967 for oracles of 
Zeus at Dodona, Olympia, and Ammon. Parke and Wormell provide a broad, historical overview of 
the Delphic oracle from its mythohistorical origins (detailed in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the 
Pythia’s speech in the prologue of the Eumenides, and Euripides’ account, in the mouth of the 
Chorus in Iphigenia in Tauris). These accounts do not corroborate one another, though there are 
points of similarity, and since material culture suggests that the region of Delphi was inhabited as 
early as 1500 BCE, our literary sources do not give a clear picture of Delphi’s actual foundation.  
What seems likely is pre-Apolline cult activity which was associated with some sort of 
chthonic deity, likely an earth goddess. This is corroborated by the archaeological record, and we 
see hints of this in the mythical foundation stories of Apollo killing a snaky monster and supplanting 
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a female deity at Delphi—Minoan religion also suggests a connection between a female deity and 
snakes (cf. the so-called “Minoan Snake Goddess”). Rituals and local myths at Delphi may 
commemorate Apollo needing to atone for killing the snake (by exile in Thessaly, in some 
accounts).  
Actual divinatory practices at Delphi seem to have mirrored the overall trends in Greek 
divination. Our first alleged oracular consultations at Delphi date to the 8th century42, but legends 
are preserved which reflect augury43 as well as divination via entrails (extispicy or haruspicy) and 
interpretation of dreams (oneiromancy).44 Divination by fire is attested as well (pyromancy),45 as is 
divination by lots (cleromancy).46 Parke and Wormell suggest that the term commonly used to 
describe the Pythia giving oracles, ἀναιρεῖν, relates to picking up (and then casting) lots or a 
divinely inspired selection of lots (Parke and Wormell 1956: 9-10).47 By the archaic period, 
however, cleromancy was the only other form of divination that survived at all, and the 
overwhelming majority of oracles were given by direct utterances from the Pythia (with a male 
priest who presided over the ceremonies).48  
                                                   
42 These are all responses Fontenrose classifies as Quasi-Historical, however, and include accounts like Pausanias’ story 
of King Iphitos being told to renew the Olympic Games (Q1 in Fontenrose, 485 in Parke and Wormell, Paus. 5.4.6), 
which would have to date to sometime before 776 BCE. Similarly, we have an account of Lycurgus of Sparta, King 
Iphitos of Elis, and Cleosthenes of Pisa consulting the Delphic oracle about the Olympic festival (Q2, 486 in Parke and 
Wormell, Phlegon Ol. 1.3 and schol. vet. On Plato Rep. 465d) which would date to sometime before 776 as well 
(Fontenrose dates it 884-776 BCE, but also declares it not to be genuine). The earliest extant responses Fontenrose 
considers genuine are from c. 440-430 BCE (H1, 123 in Parke and Wormell, IG 12.77 = Oliver 1950: 13, lines 7-11) 
and relates to people receiving public maintenance in the prytaneion, though the text is not preserved well enough to 
tell the specifics of the response. For what we can know about the early history at Delphi, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1979. 
43 Paus. 10.6.1 attributes the invention of augury to Parnassus, namesake of the mountain (see also Str. Byz. s.v. 
Παρνασσός). Pliny also attributes knowledge of augury, though not its invention, to Phemonoe the Pythia (HN 
10.21). Flacelière 1938 argues (based on h.Merc. 543) that augury was once used to tell if the oracle could be 
consulted with good results.  
44 Pliny HN 7.203 attributes the invention of haruspicy to Delphus, namesake of Delphi, and attributes the 
interpretation of portents and dreams (interpretationem ostentorum et somniorum) to Amphictyon, namesake of the 
Amphictyony.  
45 Paus. 10.5.6 and Hsch. s.v. πυρκόοι. This is likely connected in some way to the fire in the temple at Delphi. 
46 The ancient evidence is more oblique on this point. For an overview, see Parke and Wormell 1956: 15 as well as 
Bouché-Leclercq 1879, Halliday 1913, Robbins 1916, Amandry 1950. For cleromancy as the original form of 
divination at Delphi, see Nilsson 1906: 155-159. 
47 This interpretation is shared by others and uses as evidence the many mentions of lot oracles and mantic ψῆφοι in 
late sources. The lateness of these sources (Nonnus, Hesychius, Stephen of Byzantium) does make their testimony less 
reliable, however. For a thorough list of sources on the possibility of lots, see Fontenrose 1978: 219, fn. 33. 
48 There has been debate about the role that the priests played and some have posited that the priests were actually 
bards in practice, and they would translate the Pythia’s words into verse. However, it is now the consensus opinion that 
the Pythia herself delivered the oracles. On this point, see Maurizio 1995. 
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As I noted above, this move from augury and pyromancy and other such methods of 
divination toward verbal oracles is not unique to Delphi. In general, literary evidence suggests that 
Greek divinatory practices shifted in this direction.49 In Homer, for instance, the future is told 
either through dreams50 or through natural omens. Though gods do appear to mortals and speak 
with them directly, this is treatment reserved for exceptional heroes. Heroes of the more common 
sort (the supporting characters of the Homeric epics, as it were, who inhabit the heroic era but are 
not as kingly or famous as men like Achilles, Hector, and Odysseus) rely primarily on things like 
bird signs to discern the will of the gods. 51 To take the example of signs from birds, we know that a 
bird is not always an omen, but that it takes on specific meaning in certain contexts.52 Once the bird 
is recognized as a form of communication, then an interpreter can divine the meaning it intends to 
convey (as Calchas does at Il. 2.308-20). Ornithomancy, at least in Homer, is not available to 
everyone53 and it seems as though the ability to interpret birds and other omens is one of the 
defining characteristic of a Homeric prophet.54 The prophet then “reads” the sign which has likely 
occurred in the context of a sacrifice or some other moment when mortals are attempting to 
                                                   
49 For a general overview of this process, see Bushnell 1988. It might be more accurate to say that literature points to 
this sort of development over time. It seems reasonable to infer that literature is reflecting something about the 
development of actual divination practices, but there is a great deal that is artificial about literary divination, as I will 
examine throughout this dissertation. Because of this, I do not think that we can comfortably assume that the move 
from sign- or omen-based divination that we see in our literary texts is necessarily a reflection of actual practices.  
50 These can be either accurate or misleading and can also be straightforward or involve interpretation. For an 
example of a misleading dream, see Agamemnon’s dream at Il. 2.1-34. For a dream requiring interpretation, see 
Penelope’s dream at Od. 19.535-50. In effect, this is a bird sign within a dream. 
51 For discussions of bird signs, see Bouché-Leclercq 2003, or Thompson 1936 (for specific birds and their connection 
to particular divinities). See also Bloch 1963 on the types of omens found at Od. 2.146-55 or Il. 2.308-20, which feature 
natural signs (animals) behaving in unnatural, portentous ways.  
52 As Eurymachus states at Od. 2.181-2, many birds make their way beneath the rays of the sun, but they are not all 
portentous (ὄρνιθες δέ τε πολλοὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο / φοιτῶσ᾽, οὐδέ τε πάντες ἐναίσιμοι). The weight of this line 
should be colored by the fact that Eurymachus is wrong about these birds, which the narrator has just told us were sent 
from Zeus, and Eurymachus uses his flawed reading of the birds (despite insisting that he is a better reader of bird signs 
than Halitherses, who has in fact just read the omens correctly) to argue that Odysseus is dead, which is also false. This 
is all to say that we cannot take this line entirely at face value, but the gnomic sentiment expressed in these two lines 
seems accurate, even if Eurymachus does not apply this principle correctly to these particular birds.  
53 Though, it should be noted, this is not exclusive to prophets. Helen, for instance, is able to read omens, even though 
she is not a prophet. For the process of interpreting omens and the transmission of omens as a type of messenger scene, 
see Ready 2014.  
54 It is unclear what the cause-effect relationship is between these two attributes, though it does not matter in any 
substantive way, for my purposes. We do not know if there is something else about Calchas that makes him a prophet, 
and by virtue of that, he can read bird signs, or if the ability to read bird signs is what grants him his status as a prophet. 
That is to say, ἡ μαντική is not explicitly defined. See Bouché-Leclercq 1879 and Halliday 1913 (in response) on the 
development of a more rigorous system of orthinomancy by the Hellenistic period. At that point, there are clearly 
defined codes for interpreting the direction, species, and action of birds. Homer paints a very different picture, 
however, or at least chooses not to include the technical details involved in interpreting bird signs.  
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communicate with the divine,55 and the prophet can even be seen as a participant in a conversation 
of sorts, in which the bird is a divine answer to the (explicit or implicit) request that the mortals 
have just made.  
Significantly, however, these conversations are only available to priests and prophets (those 
conducting sacrifices and reading omens) and all the other Greeks must rely on them to 
communicate effectively and reliably. As Bushnell has detailed nicely, however,56 Greeks shift away 
from the sort of divinations that rely on the interpretation of signs (such as birds, entrails, or dice) 
in the 5th century BCE. These sorts of divination are relegated to a secondary position and Greeks 
move toward what Vernant (following Crahay) calls the “oracular dialogue.”57 The effect of this 
shift is seemingly to make communication from the divine accessible to everyone—once placed into 
the Greek language, prophecies would seem to be equally accessible to any speaker of the Greek 
language.58 As I will explore in subsequent chapters, this accessibility is only apparent in the context 
of Sophocles’ plays, and the language of oracles is subtly different from the normal Greek language 
(so subtle as to be indiscernible to the characters within the play, though not to an external viewer 
or reader), and this subtle difference is one that can only be effectively understood by the 
application of pragmatic linguistic analysis. However, in actual oracles, this is not the case, and we 
have no reason to think that oracles were transmitted in anything other than the standard Greek 
language. For Greek people who consulted oracles, the responses they received were in a form that 
they (or anyone else) could readily interpret effectively. A shift from other sorts of divination to 
oracular divination marks a democratization of the divination process. The natural signs were 
replaced by linguistic signs (signs in a Saussurean, semiotic sense) which needed no special 
expertise to interpret.  
To return to the form and content of the oracles dispensed at Delphi, Fontenrose collects a 
total of 535 Delphic responses, divided into Historical Responses (75 examples), Quasi-Historical 
Responses (268 examples), Legendary Responses (176 examples) and Fictional Responses (16 
                                                   
55 Stockinger 1959 suggests that omens appear at times when mortals are in some sort of contact with the gods (during 
a prayer or a sacrifice). 
56 See Bushnell 1988: 1-42. 
57 Vernant 1974: 18-19, following Crahay 1956. 
58 With Bushnell 1988: 14, I am somewhat skeptical of the claim made by Fontenrose 1978 that the Pythia “was not 
seized by a frenzy” or that she “spoke coherently, and it was she, not the prophets, who gave the response in final form 
to the inquirer” (224).  
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examples).59 Though some of his classification choices have been questioned,60 this remains the 
most thorough and complete catalogue of oracular responses (95 entries from Parke and Wormell’s 
catalogue have been removed and 15 additional entries added—Fontenrose includes only 535 
entries, as opposed to 615 in Parke and Wormell, due in large part to reclassification and 
rearrangement of the responses. I am generally persuaded by Fontenrose’s classifications and 
conclusions, which were controversial at the time of publication but have become increasingly well-
accepted since then.  
Fontenrose’s Historical category includes responses which are recorded in contemporary 
records. Among this category, he distinguishes between the most genuine, which are recorded by 
the person who received the oracle or someone close to them. Less genuine are the oracles 
reported by hearsay, such as the oracle Chairephon received about Socrates (item H3 in his 
catalogue). Fontenrose is careful to note that historical does not mean genuine. His Quasi-
Historical category includes oracles which are alleged to have been delivered in historical times 
(i.e., non-mythological/legendary) but which were not recorded until after the lifetime of the 
person who received the oracle. Legendary responses are responses which are transmitted as part 
of a “legendary narrative,” which he defines as stories about events which took place before the 8th 
century BCE. Finally, Fictional responses are responses invented by poets and playwrights for 
works of fiction. His final words on this subject is useful: “The inventors did not intend that anyone 
think them authentic; their audience or readers were not likely to believe them genuine. These 
responses are important only in so far as they reveal ancient conceptions of Delphic oracles” 
(Fontenrose 1976: 9).  
His conclusion is that these Historical questions are commonplace and are generally posed 
as a simple yes/no or Choice A/Choice B questions (we might think of these as questions in a 
multiple-choice format), generally on matters of public interest, such as political or religious affairs. 
Significantly for my purposes in this study, he concludes that 
A) Ambiguous and riddling phrasing is not an authentic feature of genuine oracles 
                                                   
59 At times, Fontenrose combines two responses into one two-part response; elsewhere, Fontenrose omits responses he 
thinks come from Didyma or another non-Delphic oracle 
60 See for instance Maurizio 1997. 
 33 
B) Many of the famous oracular responses (found in Herodotus and later authors) are 
inauthentic or at least dubious 
and he further suggests that the characteristics of fictional oracles (ambiguous wording, misleading 
or incomplete predictions, etc.) become dominant characteristics of literary oracles, such that 
traditional riddles and proverbs are laterattributed to the Delphic oracle, reiterating this image of 
the Delphic oracle as a source of unclear prophecy. Once the trope of riddling, unclear oracular 
communication was established, any sort of riddle or wordplay could then be attributed to an 
oracle, reinforcing the reputation of oracles.61  
For additional reading on historical oracles, see also Rosenberger 2003, Friese 2010, and 
Eidinow 2013, and for divinatory practices in the Roman time period, Busine 2006 is a useful 
starting point, though she focuses on Roman Asia Minor. For a general epigraphical study (i.e., not 
one confined to a particular site), see Guarducci 1978. Among smaller sites not covered here, 
Klaros is perhaps the most significant. For information on oracles at Klaros, see Parke 1985:112-
170, Merkelbach and Stauber 1996 and Oesterheld 2008. Additionally, Oracle consultations were 
an involved process and there was often extensive travel required to get to the oracle.62 Once at the 
oracle, there was often required sacrifice of a costly πελανός cake, the proceeds from which went 
to the temple itself, and there could be additional fees.63 The process was also often conducted or 
mediated by priests or temple attendants.64  
                                                   
61 As a few final notes on historical oracles, Delphi was not the only site of an oracle, and prominent oracles were also 
located in Didyma (another oracle of Apollo) and Dodona (an oracle of Zeus). For details about Didyma, see Parke 
1985: 1–111, Fontenrose 1988, Morgan 1989, Oesterheld 2008. Turning to Dodona, Parke’s pronouncement that 
“The material found at Dodona…is not of a kind which would greatly reward the effort of collecting it into a corpus” 
(Parke 1967: 259) was thankfully not the last word on the subject and there have been several recent studies which have 
advanced our understanding of consultations at Dodona significantly. For details about Dodona and a collection of 
inscriptions, see Lhôte 2006 and Eidinow 2007. For the latest edition of these inscriptions, see the 2013 edition by 
Dakaris, Vokotopoulou, and Christidis (DVC). Each of these three works contains a slightly different selection of 
inscriptions as well as different interpretations of the fragmentary findings and are worth consulting in tandem. See also 
Parker 2016 on oracular consultation at Dodona. 
62 For pilgrimages to Delphi, see Arnush 2005 (in Elsner and Rutherford 2005) and for pilgrimage in antiquity more 
broadly, see the rest of Elsner and Rutherford 2005. 
63 For financial considerations and demands at Delphi, see Rosemberg 1999 
64 On temple personnel in general, see Georgoudi 1994. There is extensive debate about the role of priests or 
attendants at both Delphi and Dodona. At Delphi, the debate centers on whether the Pythia gave oracles directly to 
questioners or if she pronounced oracles in a secluded portion of the temple and then the oracles were transmitted via a 
third party. On the Hosioi at Delphi, see Jay-Robert 1997. There is also debate about what form the oracles were in. 
The main alternatives are that the Pythia delivered oracles directly in hexameters; she raved while in a trance, and the 
priests translated her ravings into hexameters; or the oracles never took actual hexameter form and that is an 
exclusively literary convention. For more on the Pythia’s role, see Fontenrose 1978: 126-228, Versnel 1992, Price 1985, 
and Suarez de la Torre 1998. This question connects to the controversial debate about the Pythia’s mental state while 
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It is worth considering not only what the oracles said, but also what the oracle was asked. 
Literary oracles are not always given in response to a question, but actual oracular consultations 
were always in a question/answer format. We do not always have corresponding questions and 
answers, but of those that survive, none presents an oracle who does not answer the question that is 
posed to it. Unlike unprovoked oracles which often occur in literary contexts, actual oracles do not 
provide answers to anything but what they are asked. As to the sorts of questions posed to oracles, 
Beerden 2013 concludes (working from the 75 oracular responses in Fontenrose’s Historical 
category) that Delphic oracles are expected to function predominantly in an advisory capacity,65 as 
opposed to an instructive, indicative or predictive capacity.66 An analysis of Dodona provides 
similar results: working from Lhôte’s 152 questions from Dodona, nearly half of the responses are 
advisory.67 
As an example of what constitutes an advisory question, I include an example from Dodona: 
Τύχα ἀγαθά. ῏Η τυγχάνοιμί κα ἐμπορευόμενος | ὅπυς κα δοκῆι σύμφορον ἔμειν, καὶ 
ἄγων, τῆι κα δοκῆι | ἅμα τᾶι τεχναι χρεύμενος. 
Good fortune. Whether I would do better travelling to where it seems good to me, and 
doing business there, if it seems good, and at the same time practicing my craft.68 
                                                   
delivering oracles and the possibility of some sort of hallucinatory agent (gas fumes or drugs). For a small portion of the 
extant scholarship on this question, see Holland 1933, Chirassi Colombo 1991, Maurizio 1995, Strauss-Clay 1996, and 
Lehoux 2007. At Dodona, there is debate about the precise role of the attendants (the Selloi). On the Selloi, 
Georgoudi 1994: 335– 340 provides a useful treatment. Beerden 2013 omits them from her examination because she 
does not think they are manteis.  
65 Beerden’s classification is useful for analyzing these responses. Advisory questions are ones here the questioner asks 
whether he ought to perform a particular task or make a particular decision. These usually take the form of “Will it be 
better if I do X or Y?” Instructive questions ask for specific instructions, such as “To which god should I sacrifice?” 
Her indicative category refers to general questions about the future, such as “Will I be happy?” Though these are 
similar to predictive, Beerden makes these into a separate category, though I find her rationale for this to be flawed: 
“They contain a predictive element but the supernatural is not specifically asked to look into the future: the question is 
general and the timeframe vague” (Beerden 2013: 212). I think that these do form a useful classification, not for the 
reasons Beerden lists, since any question about the future necessarily asks the god to look into the future—to determine 
whether the questioner will be happy, the god must look into the future and see what their lot in life is. However, I do 
think that this is useful as a distinct category from predictive, since these questions are not connected to any sort of 
action and are not about a specific time. The vagueness of these questions does seem to distinguish them from what 
Beerden classifies as predictive oracles. The final category is predictive, which includes requests for specific information 
about the future as well as the past. Though I think it would be useful to separate questions about the past from those 
about the future, Beerden combines these two. Here, she includes questions like “Who are my parents?” or “What will 
happen if I do X?” These ask for specific knowledge that is currently unknown by the questioner.  
66 She finds that 33 of 75 (44%) are advisory, 31 are instructive (41.3 %), 4 are indicative (5.3 %), and 2 are predictive 
(2.7%). The finds that 5 (6.7%) cannot be placed into one of these classifications (Beerden 2013: 213).  
67 There are in fact 187 responses from Dodona, but 35 are illegible. Of those 152, Beerden finds that 73 are advisory 
(48%), 35 are indicative (23%),31 are instructive (20.4 %), and 11 are predictive (7.2%), and 2 combine prediction and 
instruction (1.3%) (Beerden 2013: 2013-4) 
68 Text and translation taken from Eidinow 2007: 97, number 9. 
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At its heart, this is a yes/no question: Should I take this action? This is the sort of question which 
forms the overwhelming majority of the questions posed to oracles.  
To conclude, our extant material evidence suggests that historical oracle consultations 
involved a structurally simple, yes/no (or, rarely, a multiple choice) question posed either to a 
temple functionary or to the priest or priestess directly. The questions generally involved advice 
about the best course of action and responses were straightforward and direct,69 and rarely gave 
precise, detailed predictions about the future. Further, there are no examples from Delphi, 
Dodona, or Didyma which are widely held to be authentic which are written in meter.70 How, then, 
do literary oracles take such a vastly different form? And what should we make of all the oracles in 
verse which are preserved in the literary record,71 if not the archaeological record?  
It will be useful to look at Herodotus as an intermediary between actual oracular practice, 
as detailed here, and the literary oracles in Sophocles. Herodotus purports to be providing an 
accurate history and ethnography, and yet his History features oracles which bear little 
resemblance to the sort of oracles I have detailed here.  
Oracles in Herodotus 
Crahay 1956 remains the most thorough and exhaustive study of Herodotean oracles. He 
concludes (as does Fontenrose 1978) that very few of the oracles in Herodotus provide a verbatim 
account of an actual oracle given at Delphi (or elsewhere). Of the few oracles that he deems 
authentic, the majority are related to cult, and they are almost entirely instances in which Delphi 
confirms an extant cult, rather than prescribing the formation or introduction of a new cult. Crahay 
concludes that the false oracles were political inventions, whereas others (e.g., Defradas 1954) have 
suggested that these stories were generated by the priests at Delphi (whom he characterizes harshly 
                                                   
69 Naerebout and Beerden perform their own analysis, using (with some reservations) the oracle collections compiled 
in Eidinow 2007 (for Dodona) and Fontenrose 1978 (for Delphi). Based on these, they calculate that at least 96% of 
the historical Delphic oracles are unambiguous, and they find no evidence of truly ambiguous oracles at Dodona 
(Naerebout and Beerden 2012). 
70 On Dodona, Eidinow concludes that “Although none of the texts seems to offer traces of poetry, and the literary 
evidence suggests a prose format, the possibility still remains that the answers were given in verse” (Eidinow 2007: 
138). For methodological problems with these studies, see the following section.  
71 In addition to Herodotus and Sophocles, Plutarch’s On the Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse (Plut. 
Mor. 394d-409d) presents a very detailed description of the shift away from overwrought oracles and Plutarch in fact 
suggests that Apollo caused this shift in oracular style because people were unable to understand the oracles in their 
earlier, poetic form (406f: ἀφελὼν δὲ τῶν χρησμῶν ἔπη καὶ γλώσσας καὶ περιφράσεις καὶ ἀσάφειαν οὕτω 
διαλέγεσθαι παρεσκεύασε τοῖς χρωμένοις ὡς νόμοι τε πόλεσι διαλέγονται καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι δήμοις 
καὶ μαθηταὶ διδασκάλων ἀκροῶνται, πρὸς τὸ συνετὸν καὶ πιθανὸν ἁρμοζόμενος.). See also Parke 1945 for a 
collection of metrical oracles which are in non-hexameter verses.  
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as ambitieux et avisé and impérialiste et usurpateur), in order to elevate the Delphic oracle’s status. 
Yet others, such as Amandry 1956, have suggested that they were exaggerations of an underlying 
oracle which was actually delivered. The broad issues with all these studies,72 however, is 
encapsulated in a review of Crahay’s work, which asks “How many oracles are genuine? How, and 
by whom, were the false invented?” before reluctantly concluding that we cannot answer those 
questions conclusively (Forrest 1958). Forrest is quite right that Crahay’s work does not effectively 
answer these questions (as I will discuss below, I do not think that these are the most useful 
questions to be asking in the first place), nor does it provide an answer to the question of how to 
balance the clearly fictionalized, literary oracles with all the evidence to suggest that Delphi did 
play a very real role in Greek political discourses.  
To address these issues, I turn to work done by Oswyn Murray and Lisa Maurizio,73 both of 
whom treat Herodotus as more of an oral history than a purely literate history. When looking at 
oracles in particular, this approach is very illuminating. Murray moves away from the 
authentic/fake dichotomy and concludes that there is a great deal of space between real and 
fictional, in terms of Herodotus’ narrative structures (Murray 2001 [1987]). The fact that stories in 
Herodotus resemble one another or folktales or other traditional stories does not mean that the 
story is entirely made up, Murray argues, and we need not discount an entire story based on 
elements like a suspicious resemblance between contemporary events and events in the distant past. 
Instead, Ionian storytelling conventions rely on certain tropes and conventional forms, and that 
Herodotus’ work demonstrates many of the techniques of the professional storytellers in what he 
refers to as the “moralizing Eastern Greek tradition.” Murray argues that the very features of 
Herodotean history which have caused many scholars to question their veracity—things like 
common folktale tropes, such as the wise advisor who is not heeded (Demaratus, Artabanus)—are 
hallmarks of a storytelling style that Herodotus adopted from the Ionian tradition. Murray 
concludes that “to one brought up in the traditions of storytelling in Ionia it was the obvious way to 
present the Great Event. It is in fact this moralizing East Greek tradition which created Herodotus 
as a historian, and which moulded his attitudes towards the patterns in history, the narrative 
techniques of his art, and the roles of creativity, accuracy, and invention. For we must recognize 
                                                   
72 And here, I would include several other works (primarily but not exclusively by French scholars) that were roughly 
contemporaneous, such as Amandry 1950, Defradas 1954, Delcourt 1981 (first edition published in 1955), Parke 1956 
73 Maurizio 1997 and Murray 2001 [1987] and 2001. 
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that ultimately truth in Herodotus is a question of aesthetics and morality, as much as of fact” 
(Murray 2001 [1987]: 34). Conformance to a story type does not mean that these stories are 
fabricated, he argues, but simply that Herodotus took events as he learned about them and shaped 
them into the narrative forms he knew (which were largely oral performances by professional 
storytellers). He took the facts, as we might think of them, and formed them into a story.74  
Maurizio too takes an approach that focuses on the role that oral histories and oral 
transmission play in Herodotus’ work.75 To begin, she provides a useful overview of the approach 
to Delphic oracles which was long taken by literary scholars. This process, as exemplified in the 
previous section, generally involves establishing an oracle’s authenticity, “where authenticity 
implies that it is a fact that there was a consultation of the Delphic oracle, that a response was given 
and that the account of these events reports the occasion of the consultation and the response 
verbatim” (Maurizio 1997: 309). She (rightly, I think) attributes the longevity of this type of 
scholarship both to positivism as well as to the legacy of the major works on Delphic oracular 
responses: Parke and Wormell 1956 and Fontenrose 1978. Both these works aimed at systematizing 
approaches to the question of authenticity and developing some objective criteria on which to base 
these classifications. Crahay 1955 uses a fundamentally similar approach and reaches a similar 
conclusion to Fontenrose,76 which is that an overwhelming majority of the oracles which have 
survived are inauthentic. These approaches have been criticized,77 but Fontenrose remains the 
authoritative collection of Delphic responses, and it seems likely that the structure of his collection, 
organized by authenticity, cannot help but predispose scholars to think of oracles in those terms (if 
only subconsciously).  
                                                   
74 I should note that Luraghi 2001 raises objections to this interpretation (namely, that this posits an Ionian storytelling 
tradition for which there is no actual evidence), though Murray remains committed to the central premise of his 1987 
article, which he revisited in a 2001 postscript.  
75 It corroborates her approach that the only two instances in Herodotus when writing is clearly attested at Delphi are 
the “wooden wall” oracle (Hdt. 7.142, …συγγραψάμενοι ἀπαλλάσσοντο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας) and when Croesus tests 
the oracles (Hdt. 1.48 explicitly describes the messengers writing their oracles down for Croesus to read: ταῦτα οἱ 
Λυδοὶ θεσπισάσης τῆς Πυθίης συγγραψάμενοι…ἐνθαῦτα ὁ Κροῖσος ἕκαστα ἀναπτύσσων ἐπώρα τῶν 
συγγραμμάτων).  
76 Crahay distinguishes the oracles which are found in prose summaries in Herodotus from the oracles in hexameters. 
He concludes that the former, which relate to religious matters, were told to Herodotus by priests at Delphi, and are 
therefore authentic, whereas the latter category come from romanticized biographies of eastern rulers and are 
fictionalized.   
77 While Mikalson praises Fontenrose’s "precise historical and philological methodology" with its "cold hard realism" 
(Mikalson 1980/1981: 179-80) and Dietrich 1980: 238-39 follows suit, many others have objected to the methodology 
as well as the conclusions Fontenrose draws, including Robertson 1982, Brenk 1980, and Maurizio 1997.  
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As noted above, the stories in Herodotus conform largely to traditional story patterns, and 
nowhere is this more true than in oracular stories. Many have been tempted by the similarities in 
narrative structures to disregard all the oracles as fictionalized, and Homeric echoes and other 
stylistic elements have caused suspicion as well (on the grounds that these are evidence of conscious 
manipulation by the author to include allusions and other stylistic embellishments).78 Maurizio goes 
further than Murray in suggesting that authenticity (in the sense of the Pythia’s ipsissima verba) is 
simply not the correct focus for studies of Herodotean oracles,79 and she points out that even 
inscriptional evidence is not a reliable source of authenticity, since inscriptions reflect inscriptional 
practice and are not necessarily even intended to be verbatim copies of what the Pythia said. She 
instead uses oral historian Jan Vansina’s concept of “structuration” to make sense of these plot 
similarities. 80Structuration describes this process, common in oral traditions, to fit events into a 
familiar pattern to make a memorable and coherent narrative structure: 
Sequential order is imposed and the ordering made easier to remember by patterning 
successive accounts in one of the basic ways in which the mind patterns-by oppositions, or 
by strong sequential association.... Finally there is the known tendency of the mind in 
memory to construct a coherent discourse. This leads to structuring the same topics over 
and over again so that they become more meaningful in terms of world view of the culture 
in question (Vansina 1985: 171). 
Maurizio notes that the sheer number of what Fontenrose terms the Quasi-Historical Delphic 
oracles (oracles which were recorded after the lifetime of the recipient of the original oracle) 
suggests that the oracles are “oral derived,” meaning that the written form is the product of a long 
process of oral transmission.81 She also suggests that our ideas about truth may not correspond to 
those of Herodotus and his audience and that all of the oracles attributed to Delphi were all 
                                                   
78 Crahay, for instance, makes this argument about many oracles. Though I think Crahay (and Parke and Wormell and 
Fontenrose) are taking a fundamentally flawed approach to these oracles, I would also comment that even using their 
approach, Homeric echoes are not necessarily a disqualifying element. If the priests at Delphi (or, less likely, the Pythia 
herself) were trained as oral poets, then we could expect oracles to share many similarities with other popular oral 
poetry.  
79 Her parallel to Homer is useful here: “In the same way that it is not possible to recover the "original" songs of 
Homer (or "Homer"), it is not possible to recover the Pythias' original words, their ipsissima verba. No oracle in the 
Delphic tradition can be proven to be such. Nor can oracles which originated from the Pythias in Delphi be easily 
distinguished from those which did not” (Maurizio 1997: 312). She draws upon Homeric scholarship on oral 
performance throughout her article, and the general principles which shape studies on Homer and oral composition 
are illuminating when applied to Herodotus.  
80 On the process of structuration in oral traditions, see Vansina 1985: 71-79, 165-73. See Peradotto 1974: 822-25 for 
an analysis of the narrative patterns of oracular tales. 
81 On the term "oral-derived," see Foley 1990. 
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considered to be “true,” in the sense that the audience deemed them all to be authentic and 
fulfilled.82  
The picture that emerges from Maurizio’s approach is one in which an oral oracle genre 
emerges, and oracle stories are expected to include certain features.83 When we view Herodotus as 
recounting oral-derived stories which have been transmitted through several intermediaries who 
considered these to be authentic oracles, we must resign ourselves to the idea that whatever 
original form the Pythia’s words took, they have been altered at least somewhat in the transmission 
process (as each subsequent storyteller recomposes the oracle to fit their own narrative). The 
repetition and interchangeability of elements of oracles or even the entirety of those oracles84 is not 
a sign of forgery so much as a sign of the Delphic genre, which begins to look very similar to 
                                                   
82 Maurizio’s argument includes a fluid concept of author and audience in the transmission process. E.g., “Since 
oracles were accepted (or rejected), interpreted (and during this process re-worded), remembered and recited by a 
community of believers, their author, properly speaking, was the community itself, not the Pythia, nor the author who 
recorded them in writing. Thus, a recognition of the oral transmission of oracles requires us to revise our notions of 
authenticity and authorship, two interrelated concepts” (Maurizio 1997: 313). Her argument is compelling, but the 
details of it are not necessary for this overview, so I have omitted much of this from my summary of her work. The basic 
premise is that at each stage of transmission (Pythia to the theoros/theoroi, theoroi to the community who sent him, 
and community members among themselves, and eventually—often with additional intermediate steps—someone 
telling Herodotus, who then wrote down a form) there is a separate author and a separate audience and the audience 
needs to confer authority and legitimacy to the oracle at each stage of the process. She cites instances in which the 
audience does not grant that legitimacy or cautions an ambassador not to exercise any authority in changing the 
oracle’s form to support this interpretation, which is quite compelling. For instance, Theognis 805-810 explicitly state 
that a theoros should not meddle with the oracle he receives, suggesting that this was something that some theoroi did: 
Τόρνου καὶ στάθμης καὶ γνώμονος ἄνδρα θεωρόν 
εὐθύτερον χρὴ <ἔ>μεν, Κύρνε, φυλασσόμενον, 
ὧιτινί κεν Πυθῶνι θεοῦ χρήσασ’ ἱέρεια 
ὀμφὴν σημήνηι πίονος ἐξ ἀδύτου·  
οὔτε τι γὰρ προσθεὶς οὐδέν κ’ ἔτι φάρμακον εὕροις,  
οὐδ’ ἀφελὼν πρὸς θεῶν ἀμπλακίην προφύγοις. 
Theog. 805-10 
Cyrnus, a man who is a theoros needs to be careful 
that he is more straight and upright than a carpenter’s 
compass, his rule, and his square, the man to whom 
the priestess at Delphi gives an oracle and reveals the 
voice of the god, from out of the rich adyton. For you 
would not be able to find any remedy, if you make any 
addition, nor would you be able to avoid offense 
before the gods if you remove anything. 
Further, Croesus’ demand that his ambassadors write down what the oracles tell them, when he is testing the oracles 
(Hdt. 1.48) reflects a concern that theoroi might not faithfully transmit the oracles they receive. She also cites an 
account of Oenomaus, a Cynic philosopher, in which an oracle is not confirmed and thereby has no conferred 
legitimacy (Eusebius Praep. Evang. 5.22.214Aff.). 
83 For elements of Herodotus which reflect oral composition, see Immerwahr 1966 and Lang 1984 in addition to 
Murray 2001 [1987].  
84 See Maurizio 1997: 323-4 on an oracle (PW1) which is preserved in several sources and which is said to have been 
given to several different people and by several different oracles. Ion of Chios says that it was delivered at Delphi to 
Aegium (FGrH II 51) on the topic of the First Sacred War, but it is also said to have been given to the Megarians 
(Mnaseas recounts that Callimachus says this at FGrH III 157). The version in Dinias substantively changes the content 
of the oracle, as does a version attributed to Oenomaus (in Eus. P.E. 5.29.4). Plato alludes to yet a different version 
(Hp. Ma. 288b) (see Parke and Wormell 1956: I 82-4 and their full apparatus criticus on PW1 for all the attested 
variants).  
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Homeric poems: accounts of oracles are expected to be in meter (usually hexameters)85 and often 
feature recycled phrases and motifs which are flexibly and easily repurposed for a particular 
setting.86 If we understand these folk motifs and recycled elements as markers of oracles rather than 
purely literary fictions, then we are forced to reconsider what it means to talk about an oracle being 
“authentic” at all.  
As an extended case study of both Herodotean oracles and the history of scholarship on 
them, I will look at the “wooden walls” oracle from Herodotus, since it has been the focus of many 
recent studies: Georges 1986; Holladay 1987; Robertson 1987, Vernant 1991, Manetti 1993, and 
Maurizio 1997.  
Herodotus recounts how the Athenians went to Delphi for advice, and the Pythia, 
Aristonice, gave them the following oracle: 
Ὦ μέλεοι, τί κάθησθε; Λιπὼν φύγ’ ἐς ἔσχατα γαίης 
δώματα καὶ πόλιος τροχοειδέος ἄκρα κάρηνα. 
Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ κεφαλὴ μένει ἔμπεδον οὔτε τὸ σῶμα,  
οὔτε πόδες νέατοι οὔτ’ ὦν χέρες, οὔτε τι μέσσης 
λείπεται, ἀλλ’ ἄζηλα πέλει· κατὰ γάρ μιν ἐρείπει 
πῦρ τε καὶ ὀξὺς Ἄρης, συριηγενὲς ἅρμα διώκων. 
Πολλὰ δὲ κἆλλ’ ἀπολεῖ πυργώματα, κοὐ τὸ σὸν οἶον· 
πολλοὺς δ’ ἀθανάτων νηοὺς μαλερῷ πυρὶ δώσει,  
οἵ που νῦν ἱδρῶτι ῥεούμενοι ἑστήκασι,  
δείματι παλλόμενοι, κατὰ δ’ ἀκροτάτοις ὀρόφοισιν 
αἷμα μέλαν κέχυται, προϊδὸν κακότητος ἀνάγκας. 
Ἀλλ’ ἴτον ἐξ ἀδύτοιο, κακοῖς δ’ ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν. 
Hdt. 7.140 
Wretched ones, why are you still seated here? Leave, flee to 
the ends of the earth, flee your homes and the heights of the 
circle of Athens 
For the head will not remain secure, nor will the body, not 
the lowest feet, nor its hands, nor will anything in the middle 
remain, but all is in ruins. Fire and Ares, driving swiftly a 
Syrian chariot, rushes down upon it. He will demolish many 
other citadels, not only yours, and he will give many temples 
of the immortal gods to the fierce fire. They now stand, 
dripping with sweat, pallid with fear, and black blood is 
poured upon the peaks of their roofs, A harbinger of the 
inevitable evil. Leave, then, from the adyton, and cover over 
your woes with a courageous spirit.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Athenians did not like this oracle, which painted a very bleak picture, so they 
returned to Delphi to ask for another oracle, and refused to leave Delphi until they were given one. 
At this point, they receive a second oracle: 
 
                                                   
85 There is no evidence to suggest that this is the case at Dodona, though this is very likely a result of having very few 
literary accounts of oracles from Dodona (although the material evidence from Dodona does not reveal any metrical 
oracles, the same can be said about the material evidence at Delphi.). Any argument about the oracular conventions at 
Dodona is largely an argumentum ex silentio.  
86 See Maurizio 1997: 324-6 for a series of oracles and oracle stories which are about ravens (many are about white 
ravens being a sign, though what they signify varies) and many of which are explicitly connected to the phrase ἐς 
κόρακας (go to the ravens). White ravens are also a proverbial descriptor of an unlikely event (AP 11.417; Luc. Epigr. 
43; Arist. HA 519a6, though Aristotle presents them as a real phenomenon and not merely a proverb). Idiom, folk tale, 
aetiology, and oracle overlap here, blending the genres somewhat.  
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Οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί’ Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι, 
λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ·  
σοὶ δὲ τόδ’ αὖτις ἔπος ἐρέω, ἀδάμαντι πελάσσας. 
Τῶν ἄλλων γὰρ ἁλισκομένων ὅσα Κέκροπος οὖρος   
ἐντὸς ἔχει κευθμών τε Κιθαιρῶνος ζαθέοιο, 
τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς 
μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ’ ὀνήσει.  
Μηδὲ σύ γ’ ἱπποσύνην τε μένειν καὶ πεζὸν ἰόντα  
πολλὸν ἀπ’ ἠπείρου στρατὸν ἥσυχος, ἀλλ’ ὑποχωρεῖν  
νῶτον ἐπιστρέψας· ἔτι τοί ποτε κἀντίος ἔσσῃ. 
Ὦ θείη Σαλαμίς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν  
ἤ που σκιδναμένης Δημήτερος ἢ συνιούσης. 
Hdt. 7.141 
Pallas is unable to propitiate Olympian Zeus 
Praying with many words and shrewd counsel. 
But I will tell you this word, made strong like adamant,  
For after everything is taken, which the Cecropian border 
holds within it, and the valley of holy Cithaeron, 
May wide-seeing Zeus grant to the Trito-born a wooden wall, 
which alone shall be unassailable, which will profit you and 
your children. 
Do not wait quietly for the cavalry or the great infantry on 
their way from Asia, but turn your back and withdraw.  
There will yet be a day when you meet face to face.  
Divine Salamis, you will destroy the women’s children, either 
when the grain is scattered or when it is gathered.  
 
This second oracle, Herodotus tells us, “seemed to be and actually was more favorable than the 
previous one” (ταῦτα σφι ἠπιώτερα γὰρ τῶν προτέρων καὶ ἦν καὶ ἐδόκεε εἶναι, Hdt. 7.142).  
Crahay notes several Homeric echoes87 and comments upon how many of these details are 
too vague to be meaningful predictions and that the only precise detail, the mention of Salamis, has 
often been excised on the grounds that it is an ex eventu addition, though Crahay does not feel the 
need to remove the last two lines. He does characterize this double oracle as propagandistic though 
(301) and is skeptical of its verisimilitude. Parke and Wormell take a similarly “historical” approach 
and note that the Pythia’s behavior (seeming to respond before a question is asked) is more typical 
of legend than history, but they conclude that “there can be no doubt that we have here the 
original utterances of Delphi before the event” because “[n]o forger would have perpetrated such 
a mistake as to show Apollo induced to change his mind about one of the most decisive events of 
Greek history” (Parke and Wormell 1956: 170). They allow that the Athenians may have tampered 
with the oracular process by privately requesting a specific prophecy from the Delphic authorities. 
They reiterate Crahay’s point that the oracles are vague and full of ambiguities that would allow 
the oracle to seem to be confirmed by a wide range of outcomes.88 Fontenrose categorizes both 
these oracles as Quasi-Historical, though with some qualms, since he concludes that too little time 
                                                   
87 Crahay 1956: 296 fn. 1 and 297 fn. 1-2, though he includes several Hesiodic, Pindaric, and Aeschylean echoes as 
well 
88 Crahay : “elles sont trop vagues…Les prodiges décrits dans le premier oracle sont purement conventionnels ; c’est 
le type de présages qui, dans l’Antiquité, constituent l’accompagnement classique de toutes grandes catastrophes “ 
(298). Parke and Wormell: “Delphi gave qualified support to Themistocles’ plan, but guarded itself by the insertion of 
ambiguities. The ‘wooden wall’ pointed fairly clearly to the navy; but even it could be interpreted otherwise. The 
reference to Salamis is almost absurdly equivocal” (171). 
 42 
has passed (c. 40 years) for anyone to viably circulate false oracles. However, he points to several 
factors which incline him to think that this oracle is not truly a Historical oracle.89  
Georges 1986 examines 7.132 through 7.145 and concludes that there is not any reason to 
assume that there is a “clear sequential link” (19) between the oath the Greeks take against 
Medizers, the oracular responses from Delphi, and the military deliberations which take place at 
7.145.1. Though this is the order that events are presented in Herodotus, Georges finds this an 
implausible chain of events and suggests instead that “the more economical hypothesis is that the 
same meeting is referred to at both 132.2 and 145.1, at which the oath was deliberated upon and 
sworn as one of the pledges exchanged. On this hypothesis, chapters 133-44 are enclosed by a 
narrative loop within a factual context to which they bear no readily apparent connection” (19). 
On his reading, the Delphic consultation could have taken place either earlier or later than people 
generally assume, since it has no causal or temporal connection to the events surrounding it in 
Herodotus’ account, and he concludes that the consultation may well have taken place after 
Thermopylae and Artemisium.90 His primary objective, however, is to square Herodotus’ account 
with military history (a great deal of his approach can be seen in the title alone: “Saving Herodotus' 
Phenomena: The Oracles and the Events of 480 B.C.”) in order to defend Herodotus’ honor as an 
historian.  
Robertson 1987 meanwhile takes Herodotus’ account at face value and takes great issue 
with those91 who (as Georges does) suggest that the oracle consultation took place at any other time 
than in 481, as the most natural reading of Herodotus would suggest. He argues vehemently that 
these oracles are not a vaticinium ex eventu (11) and suggests that the problems historians have 
had with this passage stem from their inability to think that the oracle might mean something else 
by the "wooden wall," beyond the two options that the Athenians generate (a wooden wall on the 
Acropolis or the Athenian fleet). The “wooden wall,” he suggests, is the Spartan Isthmus wall and 
                                                   
89 He points to the length (12 lines, long for what he considers an authentic Delphic response, and longer than most 
inauthentic responses), the mode (what he calls mode E2, or a clear historical prediction, which is uncommon in most 
of his Historical responses), and the strange nature of the requests (for the first oracle, the Pythia speaks without being 
asked a question and for the second, the Athenians simply ask for another oracle, but still without any actual question). 
These, combined with the unusual combined form of the requests, parallels between this account and Croesus’ oracles 
(Hdt 1.55 and 1.91 in particular), and stylistic features more common in Bacid oracles. 
90 Among other rationales, he draws on Plutarch’s Life of Themistocles and gives particular credence to Plutarch’s 
opinion that this was all a ruse of Themistocles’ because Plutarch was himself a priest at Delphi, though in a much later 
period.   
91 Georges 1986, but also Evans 1982. 
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the oracle’s advice to “flee to the ends of the earth” meant that they should flee to the 
Peloponnese. Though he vehemently opposes Georges’ interpretation, he too attempts to defend 
Herodotus and he is right to conclude that “[t]his reconstruction vindicates both Herodotus and 
the Delphic oracle” (20)—his interpretation does in fact allow that the words Herodotus provides 
are the Pythia’s word verbatim.  
Finally, Holladay 1987 offers a third interpretation. Like Georges, his title makes his 
interpretation quite clear: “The Forethought of Themistocles.” Also like Georges, he is extremely 
skeptical of Herodotus’ implied timeline and attributes the oracles to Themistocles’ own scheming, 
in order to persuade the Athenians to follow his proposed course of action: “it is tempting to think 
that he must have put pressure through the envoys at Delphi to secure what he needed” (186). 
Holladay attributes a great deal of this oracular story to “patriotic mythmaking” (186) while 
simultaneously defending Herodotus again, since Herodotus accurately reported the story he 
received, though that story was colored by Themistoclean propaganda.  
It is against these interpretations (and others like them) that Maurizio argues. All these 
approaches are still rooted in the approaches that Fontenrose takes, or attempting to measure the 
historical accuracy of the oracular tales. Did the Pythia say those exact words? Did she say them 
when Herodotus suggests that she did? If not, how close to the actual oracle is the version he 
provides? Her approach usefully switches the focus away from these questions and instead presents 
an oral-derived model. On these oracles, she identifies a secular and a sacred thread to the story, as 
Herodotus recounts it, and focuses on the body motif in the first oracle to conclude that the oracles 
taken together force the Athenians to debate what actually makes up Athens, “its population or its 
physical territory, filled as it is with the living temples of the gods” (331). The oracles, she 
concludes, “reflect a crisis in the very definition of Athens as a city. Whether they reflect particular 
historical details and can be mined for them, as many scholars have tried to do, is unlikely” (331).  
My own approach to Herodotean oracles is very much based on Maurizio’s, and I concur 
with her that while these oracles reflect something important about the events that were happening 
in Greece at the time, they are certainly not verbatim. This fictionalized aspect does not undermine 
the overall impression that Herodotus provides about the oracle—the Delphic oracle’s role in 
politics is well-attested, both in material and literary evidence. The precise form that these oracles 
take, however, is shaped by Herodotus’ own narrative demands and, as Murray observed, 
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aesthetics and morality shape these stories as much as historical fact. Things like the hexameter (or 
other metrical) form are not so much a representation of the way that the Pythia or her priests 
delivered the oracles, but rather a stylistic marker to show that these words are different and are set 
off from ordinary, secular language. Similarly, Herodotus’ oracles are not always readily 
intelligible, and his most famous oracles are those which are ambiguous and misinterpreted. 
Though I will depart somewhat from her interpretations in the subsequent chapter, Maurizio’s 
conclusion about is useful here:  
Tellers of oracular tales were interested in how oracles were divine utterances which eluded 
human comprehension because of their tropic nature. That is, they were interested in the 
interstices of language, its capacity to hold multiple meanings that can make manifest the 
presence of the divine breaking in on the human world. These authoritative tale tellers 
created oracular narratives that emblematized their Sitz im Leben, which always involved 
human and divine interaction, the gap between human and divine intelligence, and the 
tragedy of the human condition that resulted, as it inevitably did, in the space where human 
strivings to hear and comprehend the divine on earth often failed (331-2). 
The primary purpose of an oracular tale is not to transmit an oracle verbatim but to convey the 
importance and effect of that oracle, which is to emphasize the awesome power of the gods and the 
insurmountable divide between mortals and humans. Oracles in Herodotus are often 
misunderstood, I would argue, to reinforce the power of Apollo and the gap between gods and 
mortals. Maurizio’s linguistic and theological conclusions will be useful to keep in mind when 
turning to Herodotus’ contemporary, Sophocles, whose work shows the influence of Herodotus at 
times and whose oracles share some important features of Herodotean oracles.  
 
Other Literary Oracles 
Herodotus is not the only other source of literary oracles, and there are many relevant 
examples in Thucydides, such as Thuc. 2.54, which recounts an ancient oracle (described as 
πάλαι) ostensibly phrased as ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ, though the 
Athenians debate whether the oracle mentioned λοιμός (plague) or λιμός (famine). This occurs in 
the midst of the plague at Athens, and Thucydides explains that they eventually chose to recount 
the oracle as saying λοιμός because “people make their memory accord with what they are 
experiencing” (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο), but that if another 
Dorian war took place in the future, and it was accompanied by famine, the Athenians would very 
likely re-remember this oracle with λιμός instead (ἢν δέ γε οἶμαί ποτε ἄλλος πόλεμος 
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καταλάβῃ Δωρικὸς τοῦδε ὕστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμόν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως 
ᾁσονται).  
Euripides also offers another example in his Ion, in which Ion and Xuthus misinterpret 
Apollo’s oracle to (at times) comic effect, as Xuthus bursts out of the temple of Apollo and 
addresses Ion abruptly as his son (ὦ τέκνον, χαῖρ᾽· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου πρέπουσά μοι, 517) 
while Ion is concerned that Xuthus has perhaps gone mad (εὖ φρονεῖς μέν; ἤ σ᾽ ἔμηνε θεοῦ τις, ὦ 
ξένε, βλάβη; 520). The play as a whole offers an extended study of the process of misinterpretation 
and reinterpretation (and re-misinterpretation) of oracles, before Athena eventually resolves things.  
These literary oracles are sporadic moments in a much larger body of work by both 
Thucydides and Euripides. These reflect the sort of oracular conventions that Maurizio discusses, 
but oracles are not a central part of these authors’ works. With Sophocles, as we shall now see, 
oracles play a central role in the Trachiniae (Chapter 1) and the Oedipus Tyrannus (Chapter 2) 
and at least one prophetic or oracular utterance occurs in the other five extant Sophoclean 
tragedies (Chapter 3). As I will show, these oracles are carefully constructed linguistic phenomena 
and are designed to elucidate subtle aspects of how language works. Reading these oracles from a 
pragmatic linguistic perspective helps highlight how and why these oracles are misunderstood and 
we can use our findings to construct a loose theory of language for Sophocles, which accounts for 
the nonsemantic aspects of language and presents a sophisticated linguistic perspective operating 
beneath the dramatic form.  
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Chapter 1: The Trachiniae and Tragic Misunderstandings 
Introduction 
Ezra Pound famously identified line 1174 of the Trachiniae, which he translates as 
“SPLENDOUR / IT ALL COHERES,” as “the key phrase, for which the play exists.” I hesitate 
to endorse many of his interpretations of the play, but on this point he is quite correct. The play 
revolves around disparate oracles and prophetic utterances given to different characters and 
understood in different ways. It is only at this late moment in the play that Heracles finally connects 
all the oracles. Though he has only two prophecies to draw upon directly—both given to him by 
Zeus in the distant past—the audience has had a much broader range of oracles and prophecies at 
their disposal. In this final moment, it is clear that the constantly-shifting oracle from Dodona, 
which has appeared throughout the play, is accurate in all its incarnations. Additionally, Nessus’ 
riddling words to Deianeira at the moment of his death prove to be accurate as well, and to 
coincide with a prophecy from Zeus. At this moment, all the prophecies do in fact cohere into the 
only possible outcome that could fulfill them all—the death of Heracles.  
The plot of the Trachiniae is a particularly salient place to explore how oracles function in 
Sophocles, which is why I have chosen to begin here. This central oracle appears five times in 
different forms throughout the play—lines 43-8, 76-85, 164-74, 821-6, and 1159-73—in addition to 
the second prophecy from Zeus that appears at the end of the play (1159ff.) and the dying 
prophecy from Nessus (568ff.).92 This play has been studied less than some of Sophocles’ other 
plays, though that has begun to change. 93 There has been some very useful recent scholarship on 
the subject, but the ways in which the different prophetic utterances shift and interact has still not 
been adequately explored. The utter failure of communication and understanding that lies at the 
                                                   
92 Unless otherwise noted, I am using Davies’ 1991 text throughout this chapter. 
93 Davies provides a useful discussion of this shift from the 19th century’s general consensus that it was an inferior work 
in which Sophocles did not rise to his usual level of mastery. Davies opens his introduction to the text with: “The 
rehabilitation of the Trachiniae’s reputation is one of the more impressive achievements of twentieth-century classical 
scholarship” (Davies 1991: xvii). Writing approximately a decade earlier, Easterling notes that the play must have been 
admired in antiquity to have survived, but it was largely neglected in the middle ages and 19th century, though more 
recent studies (Segal 1977, Albini 1972, Winnington-Ingram 1980, Fuqua 1980, and Easterling 1981) have been more 
sympathetic to the play (Easterling 1982: 1). 
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center of the Trachiniae prompted some scholars to understand this as a play about late-learning94 
and epistemological uncertainty, even imputing a radical skepticism to Sophocles.95 Further, this 
play has been cited as the “greatest stumbling block” to “the humanist view of Sophocles as a 
dramatist of emotion and character.”96  
Most recently, this play has prompted a thorough, deconstructionist reading by Heiden, 
who suggests97 that “there is no knowledge, only interpretation.”98 Returning to this argument 
later, Heiden reiterates that this play “lures audiences through familiar myth into a deep and 
troubling aporia where it leaves them to draw what wisdom they can from it.”99 As I will note 
throughout this chapter, I adopt many of Heiden’s (and others’) nuanced readings of the text, but I 
draw a different conclusion. Heiden focuses on the very real issue of the elusive and slippery nature 
of language and knowledge within this play, and his deconstructionist approach points out the 
myriad places in which this text resists an easy interpretation and where the possibility of knowledge 
is called into question. This text does, however, offer more than simply aporia; a concept of how 
meaning does emerge and how language does function can be drawn from a confusing and 
complicated web of misunderstanding.  
In this chapter, I trace the central prophecy, received by Heracles from Zeus’ shrine at 
Dodona, through the play and closely examine how it expands and changes, based on the context 
and the speaker who is recounting the oracle. I also look at the dying words of Nessus and the 
second prophecy from Zeus, to see how these prophecies interact with one another and to show 
how one can help us understand the other. Nessus’ dying words are not a prophecy per se, but they 
provide a linguistic comparandum for Zeus’ words, and they demonstrate many of the linguistic 
features which cause Zeus’ words to be misunderstood. Thus, Nessus’ words—situated in the 
middle of four different versions of Zeus’ oracular words—can serve as a key that can “unlock” 
these oracles. To establish why these oracles are misunderstood in the first place, I draw on 
pragmatic linguistic theory, which allows me to conclude that the oracles are careful linguistic 
                                                   
94 Most famously, Whitman 1951. 
95 Lawrence 1978. 
96 Segal 1977/1995: 26. 
97 He here argues against many previous Sophoclean scholars, but most directly against those such as Whitman 1951, 
who would seek to find some stable truth amidst the rampant misunderstandings and whose entire reading, in Heiden’s 
words, “[d]espite the textual self-contradictions of which he is well aware . . . is based upon a passionate belief in the 
possibility and desirability of truth” (Heiden 1989: 7).  
98 Heiden 1989: 13 
99 Heiden 2012: 132.  
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constructions and the characters’ misinterpretations and (eventual) correct reinterpretations 
showcase how language and interpretation functions in the play.  
There is, I argue, a subtle difference between the deceptive speeches, elusive language, and 
misguided interpretations employed by the mortal characters in the play (and here I include 
Heracles, on the assumption that his suppressed apotheosis has, at the very least, not yet happened 
at the time of the dramatic events100) and those at work in oracular language. The play undoubtedly 
presents a complicated, shifting landscape of language and meaning, but a great deal of the 
confusion can be understood by looking at how communication functions among humans as 
opposed to divine, oracular language. By showing how understanding and communication break 
down (a particularly salient topic in any examination of oracles), Sophocles also demonstrates how 
language normally functions and how speakers and listeners normally interact. In this way, oracles 
highlight how people interpret and misinterpret language and offer a useful look at the theories of 
language advanced by this text. Knowledge may be impossible for tragic characters, but that does 
not imply that knowledge is impossible, in broad terms. Rather, the tragic example—a negative 
example—has a great deal to show us about how language and communication do function 
between humans.  
 
Pragmatic Theory 
The tragedy of the Trachiniae can be framed in terms of a mortal failure to understand the 
terms of the “oracular conversation.” If we want to approach this play through Aristotle’s theory of 
tragedy, there is a tangible mistake (ἁμαρτία) that drives the trajectory of this play: mortals 
                                                   
100 Segal and Easterling have both argued in favor of the choice to supplement the ambiguous ending of this play with 
the external mythological tradition (i.e., to assume his apotheosis is implied by Sophocles) (Segal 1977: 138-40 and 
Easterling 1981: 67-9). Segal has suggested that lines 1206-10 in particular, as well as the persistent emphasis on the 
oracles and Heracles’ relationship to Zeus, combined with the pyre at the end, “strongly suggest that Sophocles means 
us to view Heracles’ sufferings against the larger framework of the legend” (Segal 1981: 99-100). Both Segal an 
Easterling make compelling points, and the audience almost certainly supplies Heracles’ apotheosis as a sort of 
postscript to this play, which makes the absence of any clear reference to his apotheosis that much more striking. As 
Whitman 1951: 120 points out, “if Sophocles had wished to refer to Heracles’ apotheosis on Mount Oeta, he could 
have done it more clearly. Instead, he studiedly suppresses it.” While I do feel that an audience would assume that 
Heracles’ apotheosis would follow the shortly after the events of the play, I side with Hoey 1977 and Heiden 1989 in 
reading the play’s ending as a very aporetic moment. While this is not to say that Sophocles denies the apotheosis of 
Heracles, which is clearly taken as a fact in his Philoctetes, he does conspicuously suppresse any clear allusion to 
apotheosis—Heracles, Hyllus, and the Chorus do not have the consolation of apotheosis to balance the suffering at the 
end of the play. If we are to understand an apotheosis, it is not a concern of this play and it is not anything that the 
characters have access to—as with all knowledge of the future in this play, any anticipation of apotheosis is perhaps 
accessible to Zeus and to the audience, but to none of the characters within the tragedy.  
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interpret divine communication in the same way that they interpret mortal communication. Their 
misunderstandings stem from applying an entirely reasonable set of linguistic rules and assumptions 
to a type of communication that simply does not follow those rules.  
As I will argue, the crucial linguistic issue that keeps Deianeira from properly understanding 
the meaning of the oracle from Zeus is her assumption that ἢ . . . ἢ represents an exclusive or (that 
is, A or B, but not both). Only in the end is the oracle’s true meaning revealed as “both A and B,” 
since A and B (death and happiness) prove to be the same thing in the end. Similarly, Heracles and 
the Chorus do not anticipate the riddling nature of their version of the oracle. They take a 
straightforward interpretive approach to something that proves to be far more enigmatic than they 
had anticipated. Sophocles provides two different examples of each type of interpretive misstep, 
offering multiple case studies for how language can fail to communicate meaning effectively.  
On this point, the tools from linguistic theory that I laid out in the introduction will be 
extremely helpful. Drawing on the work of Grice and many neo-Griceans,101 we can provide a more 
analytical justification for these misinterpretations. However, any theoretical approach that uses 
Grice as a starting point presents a clear problem when applied to oracles in tragedy—pragmatic 
theory rests on the cooperative principle, which suggests that both members of a conversation are 
engaged in a shared attempt to convey meaning. In this and subsequent chapters, I will argue that 
the gods are not bound by these conventions, and that gods are not participating in a cooperative 
conversation, not through any uncooperative intent, but simply because the gods are not part of the 
mortal world and are not bound by human linguistic conventions. Nessus, however, has a decidedly 
uncooperative intent, and his speech is motivated by malice and a desire for revenge. His words to 
Deianeira are carefully crafted to mislead her, flouting several of the Gricean Maxims (manner, 
quality, and select submaxims of each) so that she will infer something that is not true, even though 
his words are not an outright lie. Pragmatic theory gives us the tools to analyze Nessus’ words 
effectively in light of the context in which he delivers them, and this analysis can, in turn, help us 
make sense of how and why Zeus’ oracles are misunderstood.  
Pragmatic theory, then, provides not only a way to identify what goes wrong in mortals’ 
attempts to understand the gods but also a way to make sense of why the gods so consistently 
communicate in this cryptic manner in Sophocles. From the perspective of the mortal characters, 
there is no reason to think that the characters within the play are aware of the dramatic conventions 
                                                   
101 See the Introduction or Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of these theories 
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surrounding oracles and their potential for misinterpretation. At the very least, characters within 
the play are convinced of the accuracy of the oracles (Deianeira refers to them as μαντεῖα πιστὰ 
at line 77) and they express no qualms about their clarity or the potential for misinterpretation. At 
no point is there any sort of metatheatrical reference to the elusive, slippery nature of oracles. For 
all intents and purposes, the characters seem unaware that they are likely to be tricked by the 
oracles. It is worth noting here that the characters within the play do communicate with one 
another in a way that accords with Grice’s and Levinson’s theories. Despite being mythological 
characters, they exhibit realistic psychological and emotional responses to the events of the play 
and frame their own interpretive processes in a way that assumes cooperative conversations and 
accords with pragmatic theory. As such, while the methods that mortal characters employ will 
prove to be ineffective tools for understanding the oracles themselves, the theoretical framework 
laid out by neo- Gricean theories of pragmatics will be extremely helpful in understanding precisely 
how and why mortals interpret oracles ineffectively.  
 
The Multiform Prophecy from Zeus 
43-8: Deianeira's ominous δέλτος 
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σχεδὸν δ᾽ ἐπίσταμαί τι πῆμ᾽ ἔχοντά νιν·  
χρόνον γὰρ οὐχὶ βαιόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη δέκα  
μῆνας πρὸς ἄλλοις πέντ᾽ ἀκήρυκτος μένει.  
κἀστίν τι δεινὸν πῆμα· τοιαύτην ἐμοὶ  
δέλτον λιπὼν ἔστειχε, τὴν ἐγὼ θαμὰ  
θεοῖς ἀρῶμαι πημονῆς ἄτερ λαβεῖν. 
43-8 
I know for near certain that he is experiencing 
some sort of suffering, for it has not been a brief 
stretch of time, but he has been unheard from for 
ten months, plus five more in addition. 
It is some terrible suffering. He went off and left 
me with a tablet of the sort that I am constantly 
praying the gods that I received it free of 
misfortune.  
When the play opens, we begin to learn about these prophecies in an entirely piecemeal 
way; as the play develops, more (and at times, contradictory) details about the oracle come to light. 
The content of the oracle, though it is often described as a fixed entity, paradoxically proceeds to 
grow and change throughout the course of the play. Even when the content stays fundamentally 
similar, the language used to express that content still shifts. In fact, even the language used here to 
describe this must necessarily be ambiguous—it is difficult to know whether we ought to speak of 
an oracle or oracles (plural), since the different accounts depart so significantly from one another. 
Significantly, both the language used to talk about the oracle and the language used to convey the 
contents of the oracle shifts throughout the play, as we shall see.  
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The first mention of any prophecy is in Deianeira’s ominous final words of her opening 
speech (lines 46-8), in which the audience learns of the writing tablet (δέλτον), which Deianeira 
connects to the dreadful misfortune of some sort (τι δεινὸν πῆμα), recalling the πῆμα from a few 
lines earlier (σχεδὸν δ᾽ ἐπίσταμαί τι πῆμ᾽ ἔχοντά νιν, 43).102 As Deianeira’s opening speech 
concludes with her constant prayer that she will have taken the tablet without misfortune (πημονῆς 
ἄτερ), we are left with very little information about the content of the tablet but a distinct 
impression that it contains something foreboding and calamitous.103  
 
76-85: Deianeira's first account 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
Δηιάνειρα 
ἆρ᾽ οἶσθα δῆτ᾽, ὦ τέκνον, ὡς ἔλειπέ μοι  
μαντεῖα πιστὰ τῆσδε τῆς χώρας πέρι; 
 
Ὕλλος 
τὰ ποῖα, μῆτερ; τὸν λόγον γὰρ ἀγνοῶ. 
 
Δηιάνειρα 
ὡς ἢ τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου μέλλει τελεῖν  
ἢ τοῦτον ἄρας ἆθλον εἰς τό γ᾽ ὕστερον  
τὸν λοιπὸν ἤδη βίοτον εὐαίων᾽ ἔχειν.  
ἐν οὖν ῥοπῇ τοιᾷδε κειμένῳ, τέκνον,  
οὐκ εἶ ξυνέρξων, ἡνίκ᾽ ἢ σεσώμεθα  
[ἢ πίπτομεν σοῦ πατρὸς ἐξολωλότος]  
κείνου βίον σώσαντος, ἢ οἰχόμεσθ᾽ ἅμα;104 
76-85 
Deianeira 
Do you know, my child, that he left me  
reliable oracles about that land [sc. Oechalia]? 
 
Hyllus 
What are they, mother? I do not know the account.  
 
Deianeira 
That either he will achieve the completion of his life, 
or, having accomplished this labor, in the future 
he will have a happy life, for the rest of it. 
With his life laying in the balance like this, child, 
Aren’t you going to help him, since either we are 
saved 
[or, with your father destroyed, we fall] 
If his life is saved, or we perish together with him?  
 
                                                   
102 I am not persuaded by T. von Wilamowitz’ suggestion that this repetition is the product of corruption and the text 
should instead read χρῆμα. While I would not rule out the possibility of corruption, there does not seem to be a 
problem with the text that the manuscript provides. Rather, when joined with πημονῆς in line 48, this repetition seems 
to reflect an obsessive concern about potential misfortune. 
103 The seeming contradictions between this account and later accounts have caused many to try to excise portions of 
these lines. T. von Wilamowitz 1917 and Wunder 1841 find fault with lines 44-8 and delete them, as an actor’s 
interpolation; Nauck 1880 largely follows them, declaring 46-8 to be interpolated. Reeve 1970 goes farther and 
removes line 43 as well. Davies’ text includes all these lines and defends their inclusion effectively, however. Their 
apparent contradictions can be resolved with a more nuanced approach to the text and the characterization that 
Sophocles employs. With Davies (who builds on Kranz 1921), I find these lines to be dramatically effective and a 
means to reveal the truth slowly and progressively throughout the play.  
104 This passage nearly mirrors the oracle (78-80). With her exhortation to Hyllus in the middle, Deianeira and Hyllus’ 
fate mirrors that of Heracles. The structure is almost chiastic, and this neat symmetry may have contributed to the 
interpolation of line 84 (cf. Easterling and Davies on the arguments for its deletion, following Bentley). Heracles’ death 
(τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου μέλλει τελεῖν) is mirrored by Deianeira and Hyllus’ destruction (οἰχόμεσθ᾽ ἅμα). Working 
inward, we have the preferred fate for Heracles (τὸν λοιπὸν ἤδη βίοτον εὐαίων᾽ ἔχειν) and Deianeira and Hyllus 
(σεσώμεθα), arranged neatly around the scale imagery (ἐν οὖν ῥοπῇ τοιᾷδε) and forming a scale-like balance of the 
outcomes of all the people involved. 
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At line 77, however, we learn more about Deianeira’s concerns—oracles (μαντεῖα) left to 
her by Heracles. Though the verbal echoes105 might suggest that these are at least connected to the 
tablet from before, Easterling correctly notes (ad loc.) that we are not yet explicitly told whether 
these μαντεῖα πιστὰ are in fact inscribed on the tablet. To further complicate things, the 
prophecy seems to have shifted from being about a time (in 44ff.) to being about a place (τῆσδε 
τῆς χώρας πέρι).106 This is an effective means of introducing more information about the oracle 
and characterizing Deianeira’s mental and psychological condition. Her preoccupation with 
Heracles’ prophesied fate is evident in her interactions with Hyllus—at the mention of Oechalia (a 
location that is not explicitly mentioned in any of the incarnations of this prophecy), Deianeira 
recounts the oracle. As we will see below, Oechalia could potentially be Heracles’ “labor” 
(ἆθλον), but there is no necessary connection between those two, based on the information we 
learn about the oracle. Three scenarios could explain Deianeira’s interpretation.107 Potentially, the 
version of the oracle she recounts here omits a reference to Oechalia that was in the original oracle, 
and her segue is not as tenuous as it seems. Another option is that she has chosen to interpret the 
oracle as being about Oechalia, which is perhaps a logical assumption, given that it is the closest 
ἆθλον to the oracle’s deadline and the most natural way to understand the reference to a labor. 
Finally, perhaps Deianeira is simply so obsessed with this ominous oracle that she is making 
connections where there may not necessarily be any. For now, let us leave this as an open question, 
noting only that while all three incline us to interpret Deianeira’s mental state in slightly different 
ways, they all fundamentally reflect her own mindset. Deianeira’s own mental state will be the lens 
                                                   
105 ὡς ἔλειπέ μοι here echoes the ἐμοὶ . . . λιπὼν from less than 30 lines before. As noted above, Deianeira is obsessed 
with Heracles’ fate in a way that her language and interactions persistently reflect. Rather than a simple coincidence of 
phrasing, this wording certainly suggests that the tablet and the prophecies are essentially the same. 
106 The manuscripts read χώρας here. Hense suggests the intriguing χρείας (printed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson’s 
2000 text), a word that would fit the sense here nicely, but there is no clear reason why the transmitted text needs to be 
emended and χώρας provides an entirely acceptable reading. Dronke reads ὥρας instead, in order to align this 
account of the oracle with the previous mention at 44ff., when the thrust of the oracle was the time of fulfillment and 
not the place. This oracle is protean in nature though—in all five iterations of it, the wording and focus change. There 
is no reason to emend the passage on these grounds, when the manuscripts provide a reading that is perfectly 
acceptable.  
107 My preferred interpretation here follows closely from Easterling (ad 77): “it is dramatically more effective at 76 for 
Hyllus’ comparatively casual mention of Eurytus’ city to strike a chord in D.’s mind than for here merely to interrupt 
him.” Jebb ad 76 makes essentially the same argument, as does Kranz 1921: 35. Kamerbeek ad 76 and Martina 1980: 
70-1 disagree: Kamerbeek argues that Oechalia was in the actual oracle but that Sophocles does not allow Deianeira to 
mention it earlier for dramatic effect, and Martina argues that this reference to Oechalia is not Deianeira’s 
interpretation of the oracle, but instead that of Heracles. This line of reasoning does not, as Heiden 1989: 35 n. 47 
points out, explain the fact that Oechalia is never mentioned in association with the oracle, even after this scene. It is 
much more plausible that this passage instead reflects Deianeira’s mental state. 
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through which we view prophecy throughout much of this play and, as will be noted later, it is 
nearly impossible to extricate Deianeira’s own condition from the prophecy. Language cannot be 
considered in a vacuum and Deianeira’s versions of this prophecy provide a case study of sorts to 
examine the factors that inform and complicate how language works.  
In the first explicit formulation of the prophecy (78-80), Deianeira outlines a bifurcated fate 
for Heracles: either he will die (ἢ τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου μέλλει τελεῖν), or he will accomplish the 
labor and live a peaceful existence afterward (ἢ τοῦτον ἄρας ἆθλον εἰς τό γ᾽ ὕστερον / τὸν 
λοιπὸν ἤδη βίοτον εὐαίων᾽ ἔχειν). The language here is particularly critical, because while the 
semantic range of ἢ . . . ἢ allows for inclusive or exclusive uses,108 the most natural reading of this 
passage assumes that either option 1 or option 2 will come about, but not both. Clearly, Deianeira 
has interpreted the ἢ . . . ἢ to be an “exclusive or,” since she invokes the imagery of a scale or a 
balance (ἐν ῥοπῇ, 81).109 To her mind, as reflected in the imagery she chooses, this is the critical 
moment upon which his fate hinges, and it could be tipped in favor either towards option 1 or 2 
(but presumably not both, or the scale imagery falls apart). It is only after the tragic events of the 
play unfold that the ἢ . . . ἢ is revealed to be an “inclusive or.” 
In general, there does not seem to be a clear way in which ἢ . . . ἢ constructions function in 
Greek, and Appendix A includes a more thorough analysis of the different ways that ἢ . . . ἢ can 
function in Greek. In short, looking at examples from Homer through Euripides and Sophocles 
(excluding fragments, since the context is often unclear with fragments and it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the implications of the “or” structure), I conclude that ἢ . . . ἢ primarily suggests 
an exclusive interpretation, but there are several ways in which this disjunction is used with an 
inclusive meaning. In addition to uses that are more readily distinguished, there are also many uses 
of ἢ . . . ἢ which are vague enough that they cannot be easily classified as inclusive or exclusive. 
With this range of meanings available to this construction, the context and the expectations and 
assumptions of the speaker and the listener shape the way that disjunctions are interpreted, since 
there are many potential interpretations of items connected with ἢ . . . ἢ and the process of 
selecting one of those interpretations is complicated.  
                                                   
108 I am here adopting the logical (and computing) terminology of inclusive and exclusive or (and inclusive and 
exclusive disjunctions). I am using “exclusive or” to refer to a disjunction in which only one of the two options can be 
true, but not both. “Inclusive or” refers to a situation in which one or both of the alternatives can be true.  
109 Ῥοπή is etymologically connected to ῥέπω, which implies the inclination of a balance (Beekes). The meaning of 
ῥοπή is tied to the idea of a scale tipping and the metaphor implies one outcome (or side of the scale) prevailing to the 
exclusion of the other. 
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Drawing further on pragmatic theory, theories of scalar implicatures are particularly 
helpful here. As described earlier,110 scalar implicature suggests that a hearer assumes a speaker will 
provide as much information as they are in a position to provide and so, when a speaker makes a 
weaker claim, it is because they cannot make a stronger claim. In my previous discussion of 
implicatures, I provided the following sentence: 
The cat is in the hamper or under the bed, 
as well as the implicature that it generates: 
I don’t know for a fact that the cat is under the bed. 
This implicature is generated because a hearer assumes that if the speaker has definite knowledge 
where the cat is, then the speaker would simply provide that location rather than offering two 
alternatives, if they knew one was certainly false. This rests on an underlying scale of informativity, 〈 
and, or 〉, in which and is a stronger or more informative claim than or, and a hearer naturally 
assumes that the speaker will make the strongest possible claim they can, in an attempt to remove 
ambiguity and convey meaning effectively.  
As will be discussed in greater detail below, this question of interpretation is at the center of 
the tragedy. There is nothing inherently wrong with the way Deianeira interprets the oracle—that 
is, her interpretation is certainly within the semantic range of these words and is the most natural 
interpretation of those words, from a pragmatic perspective. It is not until the other, far less natural 
reading is revealed at the end of the play that it becomes clear that there was a flaw in her initial 
interpretation. Pragmatics suggest, however, that this alternate interpretation of the oracle (the one 
that proves to be correct) should not be an available meaning. Resolving this apparent 
contradiction will prove critical for an understanding of this play. 
 
164-174: Deianeira's second account 
 
165 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
 
χρόνον προτάξας ὡς τρίμηνον ἡνίκα  
χώρας ἀπείη κἀνιαύσιον βεβώς,  
τότ᾽ ἢ θανεῖν χρείη σφε τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ  
ἢ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπεκδραμόντα τοῦ χρόνου τέλος  
τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ζῆν ἀλυπήτῳ βίῳ.  
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔφραζε πρὸς θεῶν εἱμαρμένα  
τῶν Ἡρακλείων ἐκτελευτᾶσθαι πόνων,  
ὡς τὴν παλαιὰν φηγὸν αὐδῆσαί ποτε  
Δωδῶνι δισσῶν ἐκ Πελειάδων ἔφη.  
He established the length of time—that when he 
had been gone from this place for a year and three 
months, it would be necessary either for him to 
die at that time or, if he escaped the end of his 
time, he would live in the future without pain. 
He explained that these things had been decreed 
by the gods to bring the labors of Heracles to an 
end, and he said that the ancient oak at Dodona 
had spoken, through the two Peleiades.111  
                                                   
110 See the Introduction or Appendix B for a fuller treatment.  
111 The identity of the Peleiades here is unclear. Jebb’s Appendix (p. 203-7) details the history of the priests and 
priestesses of Dodona, using Strabo’s account of the site. According to Strabo, who himself draws on Pindar (7.7), 
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καὶ τῶνδε ναμέρτεια συμβαίνει χρόνου  
τοῦ νῦν παρόντος, ὡς τελεσθῆναι χρεών·  
164-74 
The unfailing truth of these things comes to 
fulfillment at this present moment in time, when it 
is necessary that they be fulfilled.   
 
Before going any further, it will be helpful to look at another passage. In the third—and 
thus far, most complete—reference to this prophecy, the division between Heracles’ own words 
and the prophetic words from Dodona is blurred. It seems safe to conclude that the partitioning of 
Heracles’ inheritance is not on the tablet,112 and in Deianeira’s account here, the fifteen-month 
timing is repeated from lines 44-45. The urgency of her anxiety makes more sense with this added 
bit of information. The time has effectively run out on Heracles’ fate and the decisive moment is at 
hand (χρόνου τοῦ νῦν παρόντος, 173-4). In fact, Deianeira’s whole speech reflects an obsessive 
awareness of time, in a variety of forms, as I explore below. As Deianeira is acutely aware, this is the 
moment when the oracle’s meaning will emerge—the ancient oak (τὴν παλαιὰν φηγὸν) was the 
source of this ancient tablet (παλαιὰν δέλτον) that is going to be realized at the present time 
(χρόνου τοῦ νῦν παρόντος). 
It is not until line 155ff. that we can begin to connect the prophecies with the tablet from 
the opening of the play. Here, Deianeira describes an ancient tablet (παλαιὰν δέλτον, 157), 
inscribed with ξυνθήματα (signs or signals). The use of ξυνθήματα is significant here. Jebb113 
notes that this is an archaizing word choice, since Sophocles “may have felt that it suited the heroic 
                                                   
when Dione’s temple was combined with Zeus’ (σύνναος τῶι Διὶ προσαπεδείχθη καὶ ἡ Διώνη), the Selloi (male 
priests) were replaced by priestesses, who were known as Peleiai or Peleiades. See also Pausanias (10.12.10) on this 
account. Priestesses at Delphi were known as μέλισσαι, so an animal epithet for priestesses is not unprecedented (see 
Sourvinou-Inwood 1979: 240). Strabo (7. Frag 1) also offers an account— φασὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν Μολοττῶν 
καὶ Θεσπρωτῶν γλῶτταν τὰς γραίας πελίας καλεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς γέροντας πελίους· καὶ ἴσως οὐκ ὄρνεα ἦσαν 
αἱ θρυλούμεναι πελειάδες, ἀλλὰ γυναῖκες γραῖαι τρεῖς περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν σχολάζουσαι—in which Πέλειαι is simply 
an alternate form of πολιαί, and the name relates to their age. Compare Eustathius (ad Od. 14.327) on this account. 
Parke, meanwhile, thinks that this refers to actual doves who, in an earlier period of Dodona’s history, lived in the 
sacred oak at Dodona and whose cooing and rustling of the leaves were seen as divine communication (Parke 1967: 
Chapter 3). For more on animals in religious contexts, see also Bodson 1978 and Lloyd 1975 (ad Herodotus 2.55). 
Herodotus’ own account at 2.55 derives the name of the priestesses from a prophetic dove, but does not suggest that 
there was ever any sort of dove-based divination taking place at Dodona. I tend to side with Easterling (ad loc.) in 
seeing these as actual (human) priestesses, but I also agree with Parke’s argument that Sophocles is deliberately vague 
here (Parke 1967:63), allowing the audience to imagine either priestesses or doves. 
112 Scholars have variously interpreted these markings as a will of some sort--Davies (ad 157-8) calls Pearson’s revival 
(1925) of Pretor’s idea of a will “unfortunate” and dismisses it, with T. von Wilamowitz--and the play thus far certainly 
does not preclude that interpretation. However, by the end of the play (1167 ff.), it becomes clear that Heracles 
himself has written some prophecies down—the far simpler interpretation of this passage understands the tablet to 
contain the prophecies about Heracles’ fate. 
113 Easterling (ad 157-8) tentatively follows Jebb on this on the archaizing effect: Jebb (ad 157 ff.) suggests that “[i]n 
later Greek συνθήματα meant a preconcerted cipher: . . . There is possibly a touch of designed archaism in the poet's 
phrase; he may have felt that it suited the heroic age to speak of writing as a mystery. This is more likely than that he 
thought of Heracles as using secret symbols.” 
 56 
age to speak of writing as a mystery,”114 but it particularly apt, beyond just the archaizing effect, 
since these inscriptions defy ready human interpretation. 
In this second iteration of the oracle,115 we are also given far more context about the oracle. 
It was delivered at Dodona, making it an oracle associated with Zeus instead of Apollo. More 
importantly, the phrasing of the oracle is modified: 
ὡς ἢ τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου μέλλει τελεῖν  
ἢ τοῦτον ἄρας ἆθλον εἰς τό γ᾽ ὕστερον  
τὸν λοιπὸν ἤδη βίοτον εὐαίων᾽ ἔχειν. (78-80) 
τότ᾽ ἢ θανεῖν χρείη σφε τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ  
ἢ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπεκδραμόντα τοῦ χρόνου τέλος  
τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ζῆν ἀλυπήτῳ βίῳ. (166-8) 
 
That either he will achieve the completion of his life, or, 
having accomplished this labor, in the future 
he will have a happy life, for the rest of it. 
it would be necessary either for him to die at that time 
or, if he escaped the end of his time, he would live in the 
future without pain. 
 
In its second full iteration, the apparent meaning of the oracle is not substantively different; 
both versions reflect the seemingly disjunctive fate and both use etymologically connected words 
(τελευτή, τελέω, τέλος) to describe the possibility of death, together with descriptions of a future 
(τὸν λοιπὸν ἤδη) with a pleasant and painless life (βίοτον εὐαίων᾽; ἀλυπήτῳ βίῳ). Rather than 
noting the similarities, however, it is more illuminating to look at the differences between the two 
passages. While we are repeatedly reminded that the oracles are inscribed (and, therefore, have a 
fixed form) on a tablet, the wording of this oracle has changed significantly in the span of less than 
100 lines.116 Given the grave import of oracular prophecies, this shift is striking. Overall, her 
                                                   
114 Cf. the description of writing in the story of Bellerophon (Il. 6.168-9): πόρεν δ᾽ ὅ γε σήματα λυγρὰ / γράψας ἐν 
πίνακι πτυκτῷ θυμοφθόρα πολλά. 
115 Dobree found lines 166-8 “frigid” and deleted them, arguing that “hic ubi omnia pessima ominatur, inepta sunt ista 
167-8, neque audivisse videtur Chorus 823-4” (ad loc.). Nauck and Wecklein follow him in removing the lines. 
However, as I will explore here, this repetition does add significantly to the presentation of the oracle, and there is not 
sufficient evidence to delete these lines. 
116 Deianeira’s own literacy is a difficult and unresolved question and the import of having a written account of the 
oracle is diminished significantly if she is not in fact able to read it, but instead is only accessing the oracle from her 
memory of what Heracles explained to her. I will be operating under the assumption that she is literate, though it only 
changes but does not invalidate my argument if she is not. If we imagine an illiterate Deianeira (as would be common in 
antiquity, and even more common among women in a much earlier time, as the heroic age was imagined to be), her 
shifting pronouncements are less striking, since she is drawing on a less fixed account that she must recall from 15 
months earlier, but her versions of the oracle are still accurate, in the end. As such, these need not be viewed as 
spurious or interpolated accounts—their legitimacy as oracles is corroborated by their eventual realization. Cole lays 
out the varying degrees of female literacy displayed in tragedy and argues (against Harvey 1966: 622) that Sophocles 
does not necessarily suggest an illiterate Deianeira. Deianeira, Cole argues, needs Heracles to explain the ξυνθήματα 
on the tablet because it is an oracle that is particularly difficult to understand—the ξυνθήματα are “the enigmatic 
expressions of the oracle . . . not the words of a text which she cannot read” (Cole 1981: 224-5). Dillon offers a broad 
look at the literary evidence for women’s literacy and concludes that both Sophocles and Euripides are interested in the 
question of elite female literacy, but that many of the depictions are inconclusive. Euripides’ Phaedra is certainly able to 
write in the Hippolytus, but Iphigenia needs someone else to write a letter for her (IT 582-7), and Clytemnestra’s 
literacy seems to vary. Dillon concludes, with Cole, that Deianeira seems to have read the tablet (Dillon 2014: 406ff). 
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second account of the prophecy has an increased vividness and pessimism. Instead of the vaguer, 
more euphemistic phrasing she used before (he is going to “achieve the completion of his life”), 
Deianeira here phrases the oracle in stronger terms—her earlier μέλλω has shifted to χρή, and it 
is necessary for him to die at that time (which, as we learn, is the current time). This shift in tone 
continues in the following line. If Heracles can run out from under (ὑπεκδραμόντα)117 the end of 
his time, then he can experience a painless life. Previously, all that Heracles needed to do was 
αἴρειν the ἆθλον. Since Heracles’ defining heroic characteristic is his ability to win contests and 
trials, this should not have been a difficult thing for him to accomplish.118 Yet the tone has shifted in 
a decidedly pessimistic direction between these two accounts of the oracle; the difficulty of avoiding 
death and the sureness of that death have both increased. This is significant because, if the 
underlying oracle has changed, and there is no reason to believe it has, any shift must then have 
been generated from Deianeira’s increasing concerns and pessimism about Heracles’ fate.  
Viewed within the larger context, however, the shift in the oracle makes more sense. Of 
course, her own sense of foreboding, established at the start of the play, explains to some degree 
the increasingly pessimistic tone. As discussed above, however, the passage as a whole places a 
great deal of emphasis on time. Time is, of course, a motif that permeates this play,119 but Deianeira 
herself focuses much more on time in this passage than she has before. The phrasing of the oracle 
exhibits this emphasis (τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, τοῦ χρόνου τέλος, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη), but the oracle’s 
wording and emphasis on time reflects Deianeira’s broader concerns. Beginning at line 155, 
Deianeira returns to time-related words over and over—ὁδὸν…τὴν τελευταίαν (155); παλαιὰν 
(157); πρόσθεν … ποτέ (158); νῦν δ’ (161); χρόνον ... ὡς τρίμηνον … κἀνιαύσιον (164-5); τὴν 
                                                   
117 ὑπεκτρέχωdoes not occur often in 5th and 6th century texts, but when it does, it generally has a connotation of 
escaping an unfortunate fate, as it must here. In a Euripidean fragment (ὅμως δ᾽ ἀγῶνα τόνδε δεῖ μ᾽ ὑπεκδραμεῖν·/ 
ψυχὴν γὰρ ἆθλα κειμένην ἐμὴν ὁρῶ., frag. 88 Kannicht), it refers to escaping a trial. It also occurs in Euripides’ 
Medea in the sense of escaping a storm at sea (δεῖ μ᾽, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴ κακὸν φῦναι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥστε ναὸς κεδνὸν 
οἰακοστρόφον ἄκροισι λαίφους κρασπέδοις ὑπεκδραμεῖν / σὴν στόμαργον, ὦ γύναι, γλωσσαλγίαν, 522-5), 
twice in his Andromache, both of escaping death (ἢν δ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν μὴ θανεῖν ὑπεκδράμω, / τὸν παῖδά μου 
κτενεῖτε; 338-9; and ἢν δ’ ὑπεκδράμηις μόρον, / μέμνησο μητρός, οἷα τλᾶσ’ ἀπωλόμην, 414-5), and one in his 
Phoenissae, of escaping or outrunning the gods (ὡς δὴ θεοὺς ὑπεκδραμούμενοι, 873). The verb only occurs one other 
place in Sophocles, at Antigone 1085-6 (ἀφῆκα θυμῷ καρδίας τοξεύματα / βέβαια, τῶν σὺ θάλπος οὐχ 
ὑπεκδραμῇ), and Herodotus uses it once as well (ἀρρωδέων δὲ μὴ καὶ ὕστερον κοτὲ οἱ Λυδοί, ἢν τὸ παρεὸν 
ὑπεκδράμωσι, ἀποστάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Περσέων ἀπόλωνται, 1.156). In both of these two instances, it is used to 
describe escape from weapons/military attack. All these instances do seem to share a common theme of escaping a 
pursuing fate (death, arrows, a storm, etc.). We might translate this as something like “evade the approaching or 
oncoming disaster.” 
118 See Lu 2013 for more on this point. 
119 For detailed explanations of the role of time, see Easterling 3-5 and Segal 1995: 30-2 and 2000: 153. 
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παλαιὰν φηγὸν (171); ποτε (171); τοῦ νῦν παρόντος (174); τελεσθῆναι (174). Deianeira is 
obsessively focused on the issue of time because the decisive moment in Heracles’ fate is at hand. 
Filtered through her own concern about time (and his time potentially running out), the change in 
the oracle’s phrasing is understandable. 
However, this second, different version presents a very real problem in the interpretation of 
the oracle. If its form can shift significantly in such a short span, how secure are any interpretations 
based on an oracle that is being paraphrased with questionable fidelity120? While this is an issue that 
potentially arises with any oracle, this particular oracle has not been transmitted by word of mouth. 
This oracle was inscribed on a tablet. Sophocles provides a set form for the oracle, though only the 
characters within the play have any access to the original. It is only through their perspective, then, 
that the audience can access the oracle, and this is important because it acknowledges and 
emphasizes the problems inherent in communication. The individual concerns, preoccupations, 
and perspective that each character naturally brings to the interpretation of this oracle shape the 
way that they understand it on a fundamental level. The process of interpretation—even of a 
common, fixed text—is fraught with unavoidable complications and I here adopt many of Heiden’s 
suggestions about the impossibility of reaching any sort of objective knowledge. From the 
perspective of the audience, any real understanding about the specifics of the oracle is impossible 
and the best we could do is try to wade through the varied accounts and come up with some 
approximation of what the underlying oracle must have said.121 Heiden’s deconstructionist reading 
                                                   
120 It is worth noting that all these versions could be seen as paraphrases, if we assume that any actual oracle would be 
in hexameters, and since none of our versions in the play are in hexameters, these are all paraphrases, and paraphrases 
are likely to change from iteration to iteration. The use of hexameters for oracular responses seems to be a purely 
literary convention, however—out of all the responses to inquiries at Dodona catalogued by Eidinow, none are in 
hexameter form (Eidinow 2007: 72-124). We should be cautious about assuming that the audience or Sophocles saw 
these non-hexameter forms as a clear paraphrase, since audience members might well be equally familiar with literary 
conventions as with actual oracular practices. Regardless, the characters in the play treat these versions of the oracle as 
true and accurate, and they perform close readings on the text, paraphrased or not. Sophocles chose not to have 
Deianeira (or anyone else in the play) cite a hexameter form. An analysis of this play should, I think, treat the multiple 
incarnations of the oracle at face value—particularly since all the different versions prove to be true in the end. 
Although this first shift in the form of the oracle is minor, we should still see the changes as significant, since Sophocles 
could easily have repeated the original form verbatim, but chose not to. As I have argued above, this choice points to 
the way that memory and emotional state relate to language transmission (since Deianeira’s emotional state is coloring 
the oracle, and it takes a slightly more pessimistic tone as she grows anxious) and it also adds an additional formulation 
to an oracle that will take on many forms in this play—this first shift is subtle, but starts to establish this pattern, which 
later iterations of this oracle will develop further.  
121 This process, I note, nearly resembles the process of a textual critic working back from extant manuscripts to 
recreate the original text of an ancient author. An ancient audience of this play (and this is only exacerbated by the 
additional remove of time and textual transmission, for a modern audience) would only have the versions of the oracle 
that had been transmitted and filtered through the different characters in the play. In the case of the Chorus, whose 
knowledge comes from an unidentified source, we cannot even posit how many intermediaries might have shaped the 
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understands this aporia as an end in itself, however, and does not look for any sort of positive 
conclusions in the midst of a sea of elusive language. I share his convictions that trying to excavate 
the content of the underlying oracle is an exercise in futility, but it is precisely this ambiguous and 
elusive nature of the oracle—and of the varied interpretations of it—that provides fertile ground 
for deeper analysis. The precise content of the oracle is not particularly important. It is only in the 
juxtaposition of all these different accounts that a coherent picture of how communication 
functions can (and does) emerge.  
 
821-830: The Chorus' account 
821 
 
 
 
825 
 
 
 
 
 
830 
ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμειξεν ἄφαρ  
τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν  
τᾶς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,  
ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, ὁπότε τελεόμηνος ἐκφέροι  
δωδέκατος ἄροτος, ἀναδοχὰν τελεῖν πόνων  
τῷ Διὸς αὐτόπαιδι· 
καὶ τάδ᾽ ὀρθῶς 
ἔμπεδα κατουρίζει.  
πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁ μὴ λεύσσων  
ἔτι ποτ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἐπίπονον πόνων  
ἔχοι θανὼν λατρείαν; 
821-30 
Look, girls, how suddenly  
the prophetic word with its ancient foresight has come 
upon us: 
When the twelfth plowing [i.e., year], with all its 
months, should come to a close, it would bring the 
series of toils to an end for the son of Zeus himself. 
And these things are truly coming  
to unfailing fulfillment.  
For how could one who no longer looks upon the light 
of day possibly still experience the painful servitude of 
toils, after he is dead? 
 
This passage provides the first version of the oracle that does not come from Deianeira. As 
such, this is our first external point of reference for this prophecy since, as noted above, Deianeira’s 
account is inconsistent and very likely distorted by her own mental state. It is striking, though, just 
how different a form the oracle takes here from what Deianeira has described previously. The 
Chorus recognizes that the oracle has now come to completion, at what seems to be the proper 
time for its fulfillment, but they date this moment by a very different standard. The version of the 
oracle that they know established a time period of twelve years (ὁπότε τελεόμηνος ἐκφέροι / 
δωδέκατος ἄροτος).122 Critically, the oracle (τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον) with which they are 
familiar did not lay out two different potential outcomes for Heracles. Rather, as recounted here, it 
                                                   
oracle’s words before it reached them. More significant, however, are the respective mental states and concerns and 
desired outcomes of each of the characters and the influence these have on their interpretive processes. This web of 
influences and interpretive bias present an ineluctable mess from which an underlying oracular utterance simply cannot 
be extracted. 
122 LSJ suggest that the phrase τελεόμηνος ἄροτος means “a full twelvemonth,” following a scholiast who glosses 
τελεόμηνος as ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ὁ τέλειον ἔχων τὸ δωδεκάμηνον· καὶ ἄροτος ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἅπαξ κατ’ 
ἐνιαυτὸν ἀροῦν. While twelve years presents some interpretive difficulty, one year is harder to reconcile with the rest 
of the play and—as Easterling notes (ad 825-5)—“there are no close parallels for such transference with numerals.” 
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foretold that Heracles would end his series of labors (ἀναδοχὰν τελεῖν πόνων) after twelve years. 
The Chorus correctly interprets that someone who has died cannot be a slave to labors any longer.  
Much ink has been spilled over the time discrepancy (fifteen months versus twelve years),123 
but there is no clear reason why these cannot make sense. These two different time periods are 
entirely compatible if—as both Kamerbeek and Easterling suggest—the original oracle was given 
twelve years ago.124 As Kamerbeek notes (ad 824, 5), “It is only logical that, if there was an oracle 
referring to the end of his labors, the term was reckoned from their beginning.” Reconciling the 
two accounts merely requires acknowledging that Heracles adjusted the time, providing only the 
amount of time left of the original twelve-year span—fifteen months—when recounting the oracle 
to Deianeira. 
The more relevant question to the present discussion is how the Chorus knows what they 
know.125 Their choice to date the oracle from when it was first given would seem to indicate that 
they are familiar with the oracle from before the moment when Deianeira describes it, if not from 
the time when it was given. There is no clear reason why this would be the case—as women from 
Trachis, it seems implausible that they would have some sort of special access to an oracle from 
Dodona. Although Easterling may be correct in suggesting that this oracle was common enough 
knowledge that the audience would already know its source, 126 within the context of the play itself 
                                                   
123 More troubling, to my mind, is the Chorus’ mention at 646-7 that Heracles has been gone for a year. T. von 
Wilamowitz (1917: 130) has pointed out, however, that a year of service followed by three months attacking Oechalia 
add up to the fifteen months mentioned here: Die Frist von fünfzehn Monaten ist natürlich erst von ihm ausgerechnet, 
indem er zu dem Jahre der Knechtschaft in Lydien drei Monate für den Feldzug gegen Oichalia zufügte, wie denn 
überhaupt die Hinterlassung des Orakels bei Deianeira und ihre Motivierung mit der Hinterlassung des Testamentes 
eine Erfindung des Sophokles sein wird. For additional information on this, see also Kranz 1921. Easterling suggests 
that the looseness is natural, because Heracles’ year in Lydia has been prominently mentioned at 69-70 and 253 (if 253 
is genuine, though I feel confident it is—Wunder’s arguments against them are not convincing, and both Easterling and 
Davies print 252-3). I am not bothered by Heiden’s objections (1989: 48-9) to this reckoning of time, on the grounds 
that Deianeira may well have miscalculated the time that has passed and—if an intercalary month is factored in, as it 
often was in ancient Greece—the elapsed time will in fact be 16 months. A potential (though not necessarily real) 
mathematical error of this sort does not seem like solid grounds on which to doubt that the prophecy’s moment of 
fulfillment is at hand.  
124 Apollodorus (2.4.12) provides an account of this myth in which the labors are fated to take twelve years. Both 
Kamerbeek and Easterling point to this passage as potential corroboration for the idea that twelve labors in twelve 
months was part of a familiar myth about Heracles. The account in Apollodorus is complicated, however, in that it 
recounts a Pythian oracle that only mentions ten labors in twelve years before eventually going on to describe 12 labors: 
κατοικεῖν δὲ αὐτὸν εἶπεν ἐν Τίρυνθι, Εὐρυσθεῖ λατρεύοντα ἔτη δώδεκα, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτασσομένους ἄθλους δέκα 
ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ οὕτως ἔφη, τῶν ἄθλων συντελεσθέντων, ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. 
125 Davis (ad 825) finds the Chorus’ “sudden and unexpected knowledge” about this oracle to be “logically 
indefensible” but “dramatically necessary.” 
126 Machin 1980: 153-4 takes up this oft-lamented issue in somewhat more detail, tracing the attempts to make sense of 
the Chorus’ unexpected knowledge about the oracle back through the line of interpretation begun by T. von 
Wilamowitz 1917. Machin takes particular aim at Jebb, who suggests that “[t]he answer is simply that this inconsistency 
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this explanation is dramatically unsatisfying. Deianeira was clearly not aware of the oracle until 
Heracles told her about it and its realization has caused her a great deal of anxiety. We cannot 
assume that the oracle is common knowledge within the play itself, particularly when there is so 
strong a focus on how and when Deianeira comes to learn about the oracle. The source of 
knowledge and the process of gaining understanding are major themes within this play and the 
Chorus’ sudden knowledge cannot easily be explained. I side with Machin 1980, however, in 
interpreting this as an intentional choice by Sophocles, and not an oversight, though I am 
nonetheless unable to provide a compelling or satisfying answer to how they came by their 
knowledge,127 beyond noting that the abrupt introduction of the Chorus’ version of the oracle only 
further highlights the issue of the sources and veracity of knowledge within this play.  
If we grant, however, that the Chorus does have some knowledge of the oracle, it is 
important to note that this version of the oracle has a significantly different formulation than the 
previous versions—a formulation that is importantly not influenced by Deianeira’s mental state. 
There are not two options in this account of the oracle. Instead, the oracle foretold an end to toils 
after twelve years. The Chorus solves the quasi-riddle by realizing that the “end of toils” is in fact 
death, because no one can experience a “servitude of toils” once they are dead. Suddenly, the 
oracles related by Deianeira also snap into focus, since the same interpretive move that the Chorus 
has just made will also resolve her disjunctive version of the oracle—peace and death are, we find, 
one and the same.128 
 
                                                   
of detail was simply overlooked by the poet” (1908: 123) and Kirkwood, who revisits Jebb’s arguments and modifies 
them: “it may be more accurate to say that the poet counted on his audience to overlook the inconsistency, while he 
went ahead and used whatever parts of the oracle suited his purpose at various points in the play” (1958: 79), but 
generally agrees with Jebb’s understanding of the oracle and how Sophocles uses it throughout the play. This is 
essentially the same approach that Easterling adopts, though Machin raises important objections to this explanation 
and (rightly, I think) concludes that Sophocles includes these elements in a much more intentional way and is not solely 
concerned with individual scenes at the expense of the overall continuity of the plot. As Segal aptly notes, “we need not 
accept his [T. von Wilamowitz’] view that Sophocles is willing to purchase an immediate dramatic effect in an 
individual scene at the price of inconsistencies and contradictions in the details of his plot” (2000: 155-6). 
127 Heiden 1989: 120 is unconcerned with the presumptive source of this knowledge, since it is “verified, or at least 
rendered credible, by its correspondence with Heracles’ account.” Presumably, they must have come to this knowledge 
by some means that bypassed Deianeira’s version, since their account bears no trace of her disjunctive understanding of 
the prophecy—though, her disjunctive incarnation might be a recent interpretive move, colored by her recent fear. In 
the end, how they learned of the prophecy is not crucial, since it too is fulfilled and is validated in that way, even if we 
cannot identify a clear source for the oracle.  
128 This solution should come as no surprise to a Greek audience, since it echoes traditional sentiments like “the best 
thing is never to have been born, and the next best thing is to die soon” (a sentiment common in pessimistic Greek 
though, but found in perhaps its most famous form at OT 1224-7: μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νι- / κᾷ λόγον· τὸ δ᾽, ἐπεὶ 
φανῇ, / βῆναι κεῖθεν ὅθεν περ ἥ- /κει πολὺ δεύτερον ὡς τάχιστα). 
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568-577: Nessus' dying words 
 
 
570 
 
 
 
 
575 
 
 
                ἐκθνῄσκων δ᾽ ὁ θὴρ  
τοσοῦτον εἶπε· παῖ γέροντος Οἰνέως,  
τοσόνδ’ ὀνήσῃ τῶν ἐμῶν, ἐὰν πίθῃ, 
πορθμῶν, ὁθούνεχ᾽ ὑστάτην σ᾽ ἔπεμψ᾽ ἐγώ·  
ἐὰν γὰρ ἀμφίθρεπτον αἷμα τῶν ἐμῶν  
σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, ᾗ μελαγχόλους  
ἔβαψεν ἰοὺς θρέμμα Λερναίας ὕδρας,  
ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον  
τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε μήτιν᾽ εἰσιδὼν  
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον. 
568-77 
The beast, as it was dying, told me this much: 
“Child of old Oeneus, you will profit to this extent 
from my ferrying, if you obey me, since you were my 
final passenger. If you collect in your hands the 
clotted blood from my wound, where the offspring 
of the Lernaian Hydra dyed the arrows with black 
bile, you will have a charm for the mind of 
Heracles, so that he will never look at another 
woman and love her more than you.” 
 
Before moving to the final iteration of Zeus’ oracle at Dodona, it is worth backtracking 
briefly to look at another statement about the future which occurs in this play—the dying words of 
Nessus, the centaur. Faced with Heracles’ affection for Iole, Deianeira recalls the ancient gift 
(παλαιὸν δῶρον, 555) that will be her means of remedying the situation (λυτήριον λύπημα, 
554). We should, as Heiden cautions,129 be very skeptical about this particular phrase—the text as 
transmitted in the manuscripts130 gives a reading that is both unusual and loaded. Nonetheless, an 
unusual reading is not reason enough to emend the text and λυτήριον λύπημα recalls language 
from elsewhere in the play. In lines 21 and 181, words with a λυ- root (forms of ἐκλύω and λύω, 
respectively) have both been used of questionable releases relating to Heracles. The nature of this 
λυτήριον λύπημα is extremely ambiguous and also belies an imprecise understanding of the 
philter itself on Deianeira’s part—an ambiguity echoed in the later use of φάρμακον (at line 685) 
to describe the same blood.  
                                                   
129 All of what follows here borrows heavily from Heiden 1989: 85-92 and his interpretations of λυτήριος (and words in 
the λυ- root) as well as φάρμακον. I do not endorse all Heiden’s arguments on this point—some of the layers of 
ambiguity that he teases out of this passage (lines 552-581) seem somewhat forced, but I am grateful for the nuanced 
analysis that I here borrow.  
130 This phrase is particularly difficult and there have been numerous attempts to emend away these difficulties in some 
fashion. Whereas Heiden titles an entire chapter from this passage (“A Pain that Cures,” 1989: 81ff.) and embraces the 
difficult ambiguity it presents, Campbell, Dawe 1979, and Easterling 1982 all dagger λύπημα. Davies defends the 
manuscript reading and remains unconvinced at the numerous attempts to emend the difficult reading: κήλημα 
(Hermann); τέχνημα (Blaydes, prob. T. von Wilamowitz); νόημα (Campbell); λώφημα (Jebb). Davies, following 
Lloyd-Jones (Sophoclea, p. 162), does not find the manuscript to be in need of emendation and cites parallels such as 
Aeschylus’ ἄκος τομαῖον (Cho. 539) to support the passage as referring to a remedy that is “naturally painful but can 
also be conceived as bringing relief” (Davies ad 554). For my purposes, the λυτήριον is the more important element—
whatever else this gift is, she views it as a means of deliverance. 
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In this scene, Nessus’ dying words to Deianeira function somewhat like an oracle, in that he 
describes future events, though his legitimacy as a source of prophecy is certainly dubious.131 
Although he does not have access to the sort of oracular authority bestowed by Dodona or Delphi, 
dying words are powerful and often prophetic.132 It will be useful to think of his words as a 
prophecy of sorts, if not on par with proper oracles, because they present another measure of 
Deianeira’s ability to interpret such language, as well as the way that language can mislead 
regardless of the form it takes. Like the oracle of Zeus, the critical element of Nessus’ prophecy will 
prove true, but not in the way that Deianeira assumes. Still, it is striking that a malicious centaur’s 
words prove true at all, given that he could easily lie (by which I mean say something that is 
completely false). By making Nessus’ words misleading but ultimately accurate, Sophocles 
effectively makes Nessus into a cipher for decoding Zeus’ oracles; the overt similarities between 
Zeus’ and Nessus’ words invite us to read these passages against one another and the differences 
between them illuminate some important linguistic features of Zeus’ oracles. 
It is worth noting, however, that much of this speech by Nessus can only be salvaged by 
somewhat tenuous interpretations of his words. For example, Nessus’ words begin with a 
dangerously imprecise instruction: “If you collect in your hands the clotted blood from my 
wound…” (ἐὰν γὰρ ἀμφίθρεπτον αἷμα τῶν ἐμῶν / σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, 572-3). Taken 
literally, these instructions would presumably kill Deianeira. Additionally, it is unusual to describe 
Deianeira receiving Nessus’ blood with the verb ὀνίνημι, or to call it a φρενός . . . κηλητήριον—it 
is strange indeed to call Heracles’ death a “profit” to Deianeira, though many commentators have 
raised no objections here, 133 and the poison’s effect might potentially be called a κηλητήριον, 
                                                   
131 See Bowman 1999 on prophecy and authority in the Trachiniae and the reasons why Nessus’ authority and 
legitimacy as a source of prophecy is very suspect. See also Bushnell 1988 on oracular authority more generally, 
especially 19, 22-5.  
132 Janko outlines the prophetic powers that people often obtain when they near death in his Iliad commentary (ad 
16.852-4), citing Xenophon (Cyr. 8.7.21), Plato (Apol. 39C and Phaedo 84E), Aristotle (frag. 10), Aeschylus (Ag. 
1444ff.), among others. There are also hints of this idea underlying Heracles’ words at the end of the play: ὡς 
τελευταίαν ἐμοῦ / φήμην πύθησθε θεσφάτων ὅσ᾽ οἶδ᾽ ἐγώ (1149-50). 
133 Jebb, Easterling, and Davies are all silent on these passages. Kamerbeek simply notes that “the ‘profit’ may turn out 
an injury” (ad 570, 1), which is clearly true in this situation, but in all Sophocles’ other uses of ὀνίνημι (OT 644) or 
ὄνησις (Ant. 616; OC 288, 452; Aj. 400; Elec. 1061), it refers unambiguously to an actual benefit. We might compare 
ἀπολαύω’s different uses here, since ἀπολαύω can mean to benefit or enjoy something but it can also be used in an 
ironic sense, as at Eur. Phoen. 1204-5 (Jocasta, talking about Creon losing his son: Κρέων δ᾽ ἔοικε τῶν ἐμῶν 
νυμφευμάτων / τῶν τ᾽ Οἰδίπου δύστηνος ἀπολαῦσαι κακῶν) and IT 526 (Orestes speaking about Helen: 
ἀπέλαυσα κἀγὼ δή τι τῶν κείνης γάμων). ὀνίνημι has a similar semantic range and though there are not many 
parallels for this sort of usage, ἀπολαύω provides a useful comparandum. See also Il.1.410, in which the “benefit” 
described with ἐπαυρέω is not a benefit at all, but rather the negative consequences of Agamemnon insulting Achilles 
(ἵνα πάντες ἐπαύρωνται βασιλῆος).  
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though its locus of attack is not limited to his φρήν.134 The oblique formulation of his final lines 
allows this part of his speech to be cryptically true (although Nessus does not seem to be similarly 
concerned with the validity of the rest of his speech, a point which I will revisit at the end of the 
chapter). At this point in the events of the play, however, none of the characters recognize the 
seemingly obvious cause for suspicion (i.e., Nessus is unlikely to want to help the people responsible 
for his death) and both Deianeira and the Chorus blindly believe in Nessus’ sincerity and the 
efficacy of this philter to re-inflame Heracles’ love for Deianeira.135  
Nessus’ words—unlike the prophecy from Dodona, which was literally inscribed onto a 
tablet (δέλτον ἐγγεγραμμένην, 157)—is fixed in her mind as though it were written on a bronze 
tablet (χαλκῆς ὅπως δύσνιπτον ἐκ δέλτου γραφήν, 863). The verbal echo is striking, since both 
descriptions imply a fixed permanence for the words, and yet at least the oracle from Dodona—the 
one that was literally written down and unchangeable—has appeared in three different forms thus 
far in the play.  
Similarly, in fact, this final utterance is also flexible and, despite being fixed in her mind, it 
appears in two different versions: 
                ἐκθνῄσκων δ᾽ ὁ θὴρ  
τοσοῦτον εἶπε· παῖ γέροντος Οἰνέως,  
τοσόνδ’ ὀνήσῃ τῶν ἐμῶν, ἐὰν πίθῃ, 
πορθμῶν, ὁθούνεχ᾽ ὑστάτην σ᾽ ἔπεμψ᾽ ἐγώ·  
ἐὰν γὰρ ἀμφίθρεπτον αἷμα τῶν ἐμῶν  
σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, ᾗ μελαγχόλους  
ἔβαψεν ἰοὺς θρέμμα Λερναίας ὕδρας,  
ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον  
τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε μήτιν᾽ εἰσιδὼν  
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ὁ θήρ με Κένταυρος, πονῶν  
πλευρὰν πικρᾷ γλωχῖνι, προὐδιδάξατο  
παρῆκα θεσμῶν οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσῳζόμην  
χαλκῆς ὅπως δύσνιπτον ἐκ δέλτου γραφήν.  
καί μοι τάδ᾽ ἦν πρόρρητα καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔδρων·  
τὸ φάρμακον τοῦτ᾽ ἄπυρον ἀκτῖνός τ᾽ ἀεὶ  
θερμῆς ἄθικτον ἐν μυχοῖς σῴζειν ἐμέ,  
ἕως νιν ἀρτίχριστον ἁρμόσαιμί που.  
κἄδρων τοιαῦτα.  
                                                   
134 Sullivan 1999 looks in detail at the use of psychological and related terminology in Sophocles. Chapters 2 and 3 
address the φρήν, both in Sophocles and in contemporary use. Sullivan notes that φρήν is the most common of the 
“psychic terms” that Sophocles uses (Sophocles follows Aeschylus in this). Aeschylus occasionally uses phrenes to refer 
to a physical part of the body (Ag. 997, Choe. 831, Eum. 158), though this is much rarer in Sophocles and only occurs 
once (Trach. 931) with a clearly physical meaning, rather than a psychological meaning (either intellectual or 
emotional) (Sullivan 1999: 13, 43-59). However, Heracles is suffering both in body and mind, and he describes physical 
pain (ἀλλήκτοις ὀδύναις, 985-6; πλευραῖσι γὰρ προσμαχθὲν ἐκ μὲν ἐσχάτας / βέβρωκε σάρκας, πλεύμονός τ᾽ 
ἀρτηρίας  / ῥοφεῖ ξυνοικοῦν, ἐκ δὲ χλωρὸν αἷμά μου / πέπωκεν ἤδη, καὶ διέφθαρμαι δέμας / τὸ πᾶν, 
ἀφράστῳ τῇδε χειρωθεὶς πέδῃ., 1053-7), but much of Heracles’ lament describes suffering (which could apply 
equally to body and mind, as δύσμορον and ἀπολεῖς μ᾽), illness (ἐπὶ τῷδε νοσοῦντι, 113) as well as regret (993-
1003) and betrayal (1010-1016).  
135 Heiden 1989:87-8 takes a detailed look at what effects Deianeira and the Chorus anticipate that the blood will 
have—Deianeira seems unsure whether it will diminish Heracles’ love for Iole or increase his love for Deianeira, as 
hinted by her use of πως at line 584, in describing her hoped-for success with the philter (φίλτροις δ᾽ ἐάν πως τήνδ᾽ 
ὑπερβαλώμεθα / τὴν παῖδα καὶ θέλκτροισι τοῖς ἐφ᾽ Ἡρακλεῖ, 584-5). If Mudge’s emendation is correct 
(πανίμερος for πανάμερος to describe Heracles at 660), the Chorus seems to anticipate that it will increase Heracles’ 
desire for Deianeira as well. When Hyllus recounts these events, he says that Deianeira intended to apply a στέργημα 
(1138) that Nessus had persuaded her would inflame his desire for her (Νέσσος πάλαι Κένταυρος ἐξέπεισέ νιν / 
τοιῷδε φίλτρῳ τὸν σὸν ἐκμῆναι πόθον, 1141-2).  
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στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον.  
568-77 
680-8 
The beast, as it was dying, told me this much: “Child of 
old Oeneus, you will profit to this extent, if you obey me, 
since you were my final passenger. If you collect in your 
hands the clotted blood from my wound, where the 
offspring of the Lernaian Hydra dyed the arrows with 
black bile, you will have a charm for the mind of Heracles, 
so that he will never look at another woman and love her 
more than you.” 
The beast, the centaur, instructed me as he was suffering 
from the harsh barb in his flank. And I neglected none of 
those things, but I kept them safe, as though they were 
written on a bronze tablet that cannot be wiped clean. 
These were his prorrheta136 to me, and I did these things: 
to protect that drug, away from the fire and always out of 
reach of the sun’s warm rays, in a hidden place, until such 
time as when I should prepare it, freshly-spread. And I did 
these things.  
 
Deianeira first quotes the centaur in oratio recta and gives the impression, at least, that she is 
recounting his dying words verbatim. Approximately 100 lines later, when she revisits this same 
moment, she includes a great deal more information than she had before. Davies (ad 686ff.) 
suggests that “these significant details were not mentioned in D’s initial account of Nessus’ remarks 
(569ff.). They are kept back until their significance is dramatically crucial.”  
The details were omitted from the initial account, but it does a disservice to Sophocles to 
suggest that his inclusion of these details at a later point in the play is merely a means to heighten 
the tension with a dramatic revelation. Rather, by delaying this information, Sophocles provides a 
nuanced characterization of Deianeira as she returns to the same story, but tells it through a 
different lens, since she has since seen the remnants of the wool she used to apply the philter, and 
she now suggests, in her second account, that her earlier actions may have been a mistake.137 We 
can see then that she has rethought her actions and is starting to struggle with this new piece of 
information, and the second account she provides has changed in psychologically plausible ways. 
Her characterization here not only demonstrates how language and meaning can shift and flow, 
based on context, but it also creates a situation that more nearly mirrors the interpretive issues with 
Zeus’ oracle. Immediately after Deianeira’s second account of Nessus’ instructions (680ff.), she 
offers a new, corrected interpretation of the entire interaction. After the fact (μεθύστερον, 710), 
she can see clearly what she had the tools to see all along: she has done a terrible deed (ἔργον 
δεινὸν, 706). Nessus had no reason to help her, since he was dying because of her (ἧς ἔθνῃσχ᾽ 
                                                   
136 I will revisit this word in greater detail and justify my preferred interpretation of it—not, as LSJ suggest, as 
“proclaimed, commanded,” but instead as “prophetic.” For the time being, I leave it untranslated, so as not to bias any 
interpretations of this passage.  
137 666-7, 669-70: I do not know, but I am afraid that I will soon be shown to have done a great evil, out of the hope of 
doing good…Absolutely, so that I would never advise anyone to zealously undertake a task which is unclear to them 
(οὐκ οἶδ᾿· ἀθυμῶ δ᾿ εἰ φανήσομαι τάχα /κακὸν μέγ᾿ ἐκπράξασ᾿ ἀπ᾿ ἐλπίδος καλῆς…μάλιστά γ᾽ ὥστε μήποτ᾽ 
ἂν προθυμίαν / ἄδηλον ἔργου τῳ παραινέσαι λαβεῖν). 
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ὕπερ, 708); his justification for why he would help her (since she was his last ferrying passenger, 
571) was always a flimsy pretext, but it is only after Deianeira has followed his instructions that she 
can see any of this.138 
From a purely psychological perspective, it is not surprising that her words have changed. 
Just as her account of the oracle of Zeus changes in a way that reflects her heightened alarm and 
anxiety about Heracles’ safety, intervening events have given her reason to be far more alarmed 
and skeptical about the efficacy of the potion. In fact, in her exchanges with the Chorus (before and 
after the passage from which her speech above is excerpted), Deianeira’s fear is repeated in many 
different forms:  
Δη: γυναῖκες, ὡς δέδοικα μὴ περαιτέρω  
πεπραγμέν᾽ ᾖ μοι πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀρτίως ἔδρων. 
Χο: τί δ᾽ ἔστι, Δῃάνειρα, τέκνον Οἰνέως; 
Δη: οὐκ οἶδ᾽· ἀθυμῶ δ᾽, εἰ φανήσομαι τάχα  
κακὸν μέγ᾽ ἐκπράξασ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐλπίδος καλῆς. 
Χο: οὐ δή τι τῶν σῶν Ἡρακλεῖ δωρημάτων; 
Δη: μάλιστά γ᾽, ὥστε μήποτ᾽ ἂν προθυμίαν  
ἄδηλον ἔργου τῳ παραινέσαι λαβεῖν. 
Χο: δίδαξον, εἰ διδακτόν, ἐξ ὅτου φοβεῖ.  
663-671 
Dei: Women, how I fear that I have gone too far in the 
things which I have just done.  
Cho: What is it, Deianeira, child of Oeneus?  
Dei: I do not know. I am despondent that I will soon be 
shown—from my noble intentions—to have brought 
about a terrible evil. 
Cho: You don’t mean your gift to Heracles?  
Dei: Yes . . . I would never advise anyone to take eager 
action when the situation is uncertain.  
Cho: Explain, if it can be explained, the source of your 
fear.  
 
Χο: ταρβεῖν μὲν ἔργα δείν᾽ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει,  
τὴν δ᾽ ἐλπίδ᾽ οὐ χρὴ τῆς τύχης κρίνειν πάρος. 
Δη: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ καλοῖς βουλεύμασιν  
οὐδ᾽ ἐλπίς, ἥτις καὶ θράσος τι προξενεῖ.  
723-6 
Cho: Fear, yes, is necessary about terrible deeds, but you 
must not condemn hope before you know the outcome.   
Dei: There is not—in the midst of bad decisions—any 
hope. Or at least not hope which provides any sort of 
confidence.  
So, psychologically, the shift here makes perfect sense. Now that Deianeira has a concrete reason 
to question the safety of the philter, her account of it changes as a result of her own apprehension. 
The emphasis has shifted from a narrative, verbatim account of Nessus’ words to a paraphrase (in 
oratio obliqua) that focuses on how faithfully Deianeira followed the instructions she was given 
(παρῆκα θεσμῶν οὐδέν, 682) and how permanently and accurately she recalled them (ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐσῳζόμην / χαλκῆς ὅπως δύσνιπτον ἐκ δέλτου γραφήν, 682-3)—the juxtaposition here is 
                                                   
138 As a result of a conversation with Ruth Scodel, I am more sympathetic to Deianeira’s mental processes here. While 
it is easy for an external audience to recognize that Nessus was not trustworthy, Deianeira’s account of his death does 
not suggest that she feels personal guilt about her role in his death, and it seems plausible that she does not think that 
she is responsible for his death. More importantly, Nessus dies while being sexually excited (about Deianeira) and 
Heracles kills him to protect Deianeira, motivated by his own sexual attraction. It would not be surprising for the result 
of a sexual conflict to have romantic or erotic powers, and Deianeira is not entirely naïve to think that this philter might 
have the powers Nessus suggests. Since the philter was the result of Heracles defeating a romantic rival, Deianeira 
might well suspect that (via sympathetic magic) it could help her defeat a romantic rival (Iole). This reading also adds 
an ironic note to Heracles’ death, since Nessus dies because he was unable to control his sexual appetite, and Heracles 
will ultimately die for the same reason, even if Deianeira does not intend for that to be the case.  
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particularly striking since she previously gave a verbatim account recently. As she begins to go back 
over the steps she has taken, now that she has seen the wool ominously disintegrate in the sunlight, 
her phrasing changes subtly to reflect how she is both retroactively seeking to justify her actions 
and also acutely aware of the mistakes she has made. If we are to accept line 684 (as I think we 
ought139), Deianeira prefaces her second account of Nessus’ instructions by reminding the Chorus 
that she had been given instructions and she was simply carrying them out (τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔδρων, 684). 
On the one hand, this phrasing deflects blame from Deianeira herself for the outcome—after all, 
she was only carrying out what Nessus had instructed her to do, long ago (προὐδιδάξατο, 681). 
However, as opposed to the previous account of Nessus’ death, this version includes mention of the 
pain that Nessus was in (πονῶν / πλευρὰν πικρᾷ γλωχῖνι, 680-1), hinting that perhaps 
Deianeira has now—in retrospect—finally recognized that Nessus, while dying from Heracles’ 
poisoned arrow, might not have the best intentions toward her or Heracles. As Heiden notes on 
this passage, “[t]he dissolution of the wool merely reminds her of what she already knows that 
could lead her to expect that the drug might be harmful” (1989: 105). As Deianeira goes on to call 
it a φάρμακον (685),140 rather than the φίλτρον (584) and θέλκτρον (585), even her terminology 
has shaded toward the ambiguous and dangerous. She, as she now sees, has been enchanted 
(ἔθελγέ μ᾽, 710), rather than enchanting Heracles, and though she did everything that she was told 
to do (καὶ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔδρων . . . κἄδρων τοιαῦτα, chiastically framing her account at 684 and 688), 
Deianeira is overwhelmed by fear about what she has done, as she reexamines the events that have 
just played out with far clearer hindsight—the late learning that is the hallmark of this play.  
Before turning to Heracles’ own account of the oracle, however, we should note how 
Nessus’ words echo elements of the oracle recounted by both the Chorus and (as we shall see 
shortly) the oracle recounted by Heracles. In the critical, quasi-oracular part of his speech, Nessus 
promises Deianeira that the blood from his wound, poisoned by the Hydra’s blood, will ensure that 
Heracles will never look at another woman and love her more than Deianeira (ὥστε μήτιν᾽ 
εἰσιδὼν / στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον, 576-7). What Nessus understands but 
                                                   
139 Line 684 is deleted by Wunder on the grounds that it is repetitive. Davies suggests that the interpolation—if it is an 
interpolation, which he cautiously determines it to be—is likely due to an attempt to provide a clear construction to 
govern the infinitive σῴζειν at 686 (which is properly governed by the more distant προυδιδάξατο at 681. Jebb and 
Lloyd-Jones have defended its inclusion on stylistic grounds, however, and noted that it denotes urgency and a 
repetitive emphasis on the detailed steps of a ritual (offering El. 288 as a parallel). I find it stylistically appropriate (for 
reasons I discuss below) and without a more compelling reason for deletion, I think that it is worth inclusion here.  
140 See Derrida 1981 and DuBois 1982: 100 for more on the ambiguity inherent in φάρμακον.  
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Deianeira does not is that the reason that Heracles will never love another woman more than 
Deianeira once she applies this philter is that Heracles will be dead (and, as a dead man, is 
incapable of loving anyone to any degree at all).  
Nessus’ words here have a great deal in common with the Chorus’ account of Zeus’ oracle, 
in terms of its formulation and potential for misinterpretation. Unlike the oracles that Deianeira 
describes, which seem to have two explicit alternatives, the Chorus’ account of the oracle (821-30) 
is more of a riddle. Here too, Nessus presents Deianeira with a prediction about the future that is 
almost a riddle, in that the language is cryptic and has a hidden “solution,” though Deianeira does 
not realize that she has been presented with anything that needs solving.141 Though she later 
realizes why she ought to have been more suspicious of Nessus’ intentions, she initially 
misunderstood the terms of their conversation and assumed that their conversation was 
cooperative, whereas Nessus is not interested in conveying any information accurately.  
In terms of Gricean Maxims, we can see how Deianeira’s actions stem from a 
misapplication of Grice’s Maxim of Quality and Manner, replicated here (relevant submaxims in 
bold): 
QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity.) 
4. Be orderly. 
Because Nessus does not actually want to convey the truth, he does not follow these maxims, and 
he tells what is in effect a lie (though his words are carefully crafted so that they are misleading, but 
they are also technically accurate, once properly understood) and intentionally introduces obscurity 
and ambiguity into his utterance. In effect, he is engaged in an uncooperative conversation and is 
                                                   
141 From the audience’s perspective, this riddle also foreshadows Heracles’ death, since the “answer” to Nessus’ 
riddling words is the death of Heracles, and at the moment of his death, Nessus’ words are fulfilled, just as the oracle at 
Dodona is also fulfilled by the death of Heracles.  
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not aiming at any sort of mutual understanding, but his words can have their intended effect 
precisely because Deianeira mistakes this for a cooperative conversation.  
Because she is tragically unaware of Nessus’ malicious intent, she approaches his words as 
though they accord with these underlying maxims. If he had been aiming at shared comprehension, 
Deianeira’s interpretation would be right. Nessus would not lie and would presumably have 
avoided such ambiguous language, and Deianeira would have been correct to infer the most 
natural meaning from his words. The critical misunderstanding that will lead to Heracles’ death is a 
clear feature of Deianeira misunderstanding the terms of their conversation and applying tools and 
approaches to Nessus’ words that are not appropriate. Because of his malicious intent, the rules of 
cooperative conversation do not apply and Deianeira ought to have adjusted the way she 
approached his words. This critical moment will be a useful lens through which to approach 
Heracles’ own misinterpretation of the oracle from Dodona.  
 
1159-1173: Heracles' prophecies and interpretations 
In this fifth and final iteration of the central prophecy of the play, the different prophecies 
collide with one another. Zeus, we learn, told Heracles that he would not die at the hands of 
anyone living: 
ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἦν πρόφαντον ἐκ πατρὸς πάλαι,  
πρὸς τῶν πνεόντων μηδενὸς θανεῖν ποτε,  
ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις Ἅιδου φθίμενος οἰκήτωρ πέλοι.  
For there was, of old, a prophecy for me, from my father 
That I would never die by the hand of anyone living 
But someone who was already dead, an inhabitant of Hades (1159-61). 
This prophecy has not been mentioned before, and as will become clear in a few lines, this is an 
older prophecy that seems to predate the prophecy given to Heracles at Dodona. Just as the 
Chorus did at 821ff., Heracles provides the “answer” to this riddle—the dead centaur killed 
Heracles, fulfilling what was divinely foretold (ὡς τὸ θεῖον ἦν / πρόφαντον, 1162-3). In the same 
moment, Nessus’ dying promise is also fulfilled. Heracles cannot love any woman more than 
Deianeira if he is dead. In this moment, the two seemingly-discrete prophecies merge into one 
event. Then, strikingly, Heracles connects these prophecies to the other major oracle about his 
death, which has appeared so frequently throughout the play. He promises to show Hyllus how the 
“new” prophecies (presumably the ones given at Dodona, though they have henceforth always 
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been identified as ancient) corroborate the old ones (φανῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ τούτοισι συμβαίνοντ᾽ ἴσα / 
μαντεῖα καινά, τοῖς πάλαι ξυνήγορα, 1164-5). 
We learn that Heracles wrote the oracle down personally, when he received it from the 
sacred oak at Dodona. At this point, then, we have four versions (not including Deianeira’s initial 
mention of the oracle, without any specific details, at 46ff.): 
Deianeira Deianeira 
ὡς ἢ τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου μέλλει τελεῖν  
ἢ τοῦτον ἄρας ἆθλον εἰς τό γ᾽ ὕστερον  
τὸν λοιπὸν ἤδη βίοτον εὐαίων᾽ ἔχειν. (79-81) 
τότ᾽ ἢ θανεῖν χρείη σφε τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ  
ἢ τοῦθ᾽ ὑπεκδραμόντα τοῦ χρόνου τέλος  
τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ζῆν ἀλυπήτῳ βίῳ. (166-8) 
 
That either he will achieve the completion of his life, 
or, having accomplished this labor, in the future 
he will have a happy life, for the rest of it. 
it would be necessary either for him to die at that time 
or, if he escaped the end of his time, he would live in the 
future without pain. 
 
Chorus Heracles 
ὁπότε τελεόμηνος ἐκφέροι  
δωδέκατος ἄροτος, ἀναδοχὰν τελεῖν πόνων  
τῷ Διὸς αὐτόπαιδι· (824-6) 
ἥ μοι χρόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ παρόντι νῦν  
ἔφασκε μόχθων τῶν ἐφεστώτων ἐμοὶ  
λύσιν τελεῖσθαι· (1169-71) 
 
When the twelfth year, with all its months, should 
come to a close,  
It would bring the series of toils to an end 
For the son of Zeus himself 
It [the oak] told me that now, in the living and present 
time, 
A liberation from the toils imposed on me 
Would be accomplished 
 
Since we know that Heracles received the oracle in person, his version has been passed 
through fewer intermediaries than the other accounts and should have the most direct access to the 
original oracle.142 By the same logic, however, Deianeira is in possession of the tablets that contain 
the oracle, and her version should therefore bear at least some resemblance to the actual oracle. 
Yet, Heracles and Deianeira recount very different versions of this oracle. Both accounts are 
ambiguous, but in fundamentally different ways. Deianeira’s account involves a disjunction and a 
misunderstanding about what sort of disjunction it is. Heracles’ (like the Chorus’ account) hinges 
instead on ambiguous wording and Heracles assumes that his “release from toils” will mean a good 
life (πράξειν καλῶς). As he and the Chorus realize, the only release from toils that he will achieve 
                                                   
142 It is worth noting that a few scholars have suggested that there may not be a contradiction between these two 
accounts. Linforth 1952: 257, Kane 1969: 82, and Dickerson 1972: 445 (fn. 45) have all suggested that Heracles may 
refer only to his interpretation and perceptions immediately after victory at Oechalia (that is to say, his version only 
differs from Deianeira’s because he has effectively eliminated the other alternative, once he is victorious and seems to 
no longer be at risk of death). The text leaves this option open, and it does present an intriguingly different picture of 
this oracle, but there is nothing in the text to suggest this interpretation (T. von Wilamowitz 131 n. 1 argues strongly 
against this suggestion). 
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is death—there is no toil for those who are dead (τοῖς γὰρ θανοῦσι μόχθος οὐ προσγίγνεται, 
1173).  
 
Pragmatic Analysis 
How Deianeira arrived at her accounts of the oracle tells a great deal about her own 
preoccupations and reliability, but it does not fundamentally change the accuracy of her two 
versions of the oracle. Her oracles are true in the end, even if they are not the same as what was 
written on the tablet.143 Heiden’s point that the existence of multiple versions represents an 
“interpolation in the text of the oracle, for Deianeira has not only interpreted the oracle, but also 
inserted her interpretation into the text” (1989: 34-5) is well taken and, as I have noted elsewhere, 
Deianeira’s own fears and concerns and preoccupations undoubtedly shade her language and her 
transmission of the oracle. It is, however, significant that these seemingly-adulterated versions of 
the oracle’s original text are all borne out in the end. This suggests that there is something very 
unusual about oracles in general, if all the different distortions and variations are nonetheless true. 
While this might point to a more skeptical reading of the whole conception of oracles as little more 
than open-ended wording that could apply to nearly any situation (in the same way that we might 
approach a modern psychic who creates a supernatural illusion by practicing cold-reading),144 the 
text itself does not suggest this reading. Rather, there seems to be some sort of divine guarantee 
behind these oracular iterations and, regardless of the interpretive bias or lens placed upon Zeus’ 
words, they all prove true.  
With this in mind, working from Deianeira’s accounts, the fundamental problem is not in 
her formulations of the oracle (which, of course, prove to be accurate). The problem is rather in 
her interpretations of those formulations. She approaches communication from the gods in the 
same way that she would approach communication with a mortal: she assumes that the gods are 
                                                   
143 We can perhaps infer from this that the actual oracle was at least ambiguous enough to accommodate her 
interpretations and that whatever underlying message Zeus gave to Heracles is compatible with all the variations we 
find in the play. I am not convinced that Sophocles had a particular underlying oracular message in mind, though, and 
it seems like an ill-advised exercise to try to excavate an “original” oracle through all these variants. 
144 To this point, Heiden suggests that perhaps the divine backdrop of this play is an illusion and “Sophoclean piety” 
(“belief in the absolute knowledge of the gods and the validity of their oracles”) is very much in doubt here 
(1989:14)—in fact, he argues, even Zeus’ paternity of Heracles is also called into question, as is the very existence of 
Zeus (1989: 38-9, 144-8, 160-1). The resulting “truth” of the oracles is in fact little more than Heracles’ own self-
realization of the oracles. Because he wants the oracles to be true, Heiden argues, Heracles manufactures an ending to 
the play that does fulfill the oracles (1989: 151). This reading, while perhaps available, is certainly not strongly 
suggested or demanded by the text. 
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trying to communicate effectively through their oracles, and so she applies contextual clues to the 
words she is hearing and she reasonably infers things based on the implications she perceives. She 
applies the basic assumptions that underlie human communication to divine communication 
without knowing that those rules do not apply to the gods, and that the gods communicate without 
the same concern for how context shapes meaning.145 What makes oracles so consistently 
misleading is the fact that divine language is semantically identical to mortal language, but from a 
pragmatic perspective, it is very different. The fact that these languages are semantically identical 
invites (one might say tricks) mortals into assuming that the two languages are entirely identical, 
and it is this assumption that leads Deianeira astray.  
Turning to Heracles,146 we see a different sort of confusion, though it stems from the same 
basic source. In the two different oracles he has received—that he will not die at the hand of any 
living creature and that he will have a release from his toils at the appointed, present time—the 
true meaning is not obvious. For the audience, the most obvious import of “no one living will kill 
you” would seem to point toward the well-known myth of Heracles’ apotheosis, since someone who 
is dead cannot generally commit murder, so “no one living” would mean, in effect, “no one.”147 
While the subsequent line—someone who is dead and in Hades—rules out this interpretation, it is 
still a fundamentally paradoxical idea that someone who is dead might kill the living. This contrast 
is emphasized a few lines later, with the semantically unnecessary ζῶντά (1163)148 to highlight how 
strange and unexpected the “solution” to this riddle is.  
In the case of the second oracle, Heracles even outlines his own source of confusion. 
“Release from toils” (μόχθων . . . λύσιν, 1170-1) certainly can apply to death, but there are far 
                                                   
145 “At first, it would seem that in tragedy, too, oracular language differs little from ordinary language; the gods speak in 
a human tongue, rather than through omens. But he divine oracle uses a privileged language that can deceive those 
who treat it as if it were ordinary speech” (Bushnell 1988: 14). 
146 The Chorus’ confusion is largely similar to that of Heracles, though we have less context for their assumptions and 
interpretations. As I understand their situation, however, they suffer from the same basic interpretive issue that 
Heracles does. Since their access to the oracle is probably mediated through Heracles, though we are not told how 
they hear the oracle, it is impossible to determine whether Heracles’ own misinterpretation was passed along to the 
Chorus, or if they reached a similar misunderstanding on their own. For these reasons, I will omit the Chorus in this 
discussion, with the assumption that any misunderstanding on their part has the same basic causes as Heracles’ own. 
147 For more modern comparanda, we might think of Shakespeare’s “Laugh to scorn / The power of man, for none of 
woman born / Shall harm Macbeth" (Macbeth 4.1.90-92), which causes Macbeth to think (incorrectly) that he cannot 
be killed. Similarly, Tolkien’s Witch-king of Angmar, about whom Glorfindel prophesies “not by the hand of man shall 
he fall,” thinks that he cannot be killed. All these prophetic formulations suggest that the subject of the words cannot 
be killed (though, in all three instances, that does not prove to be true).  
148 Interestingly, this echoes the description Deianeira gives of Nessus and his final instructions to her: τοῦτ᾽ 
ἐννοήσασ᾽, ὦ φίλαι, δόμοις γὰρ ἦν / κείνου θανόντος ἐγκεκλῃμένον καλῶς, / χιτῶνα τόνδ᾽ ἔβαψα, 
προσβαλοῦσ᾽ ὅσα / ζῶν κεῖνος εἶπε (578-81). 
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less ambiguous options. To return to the pragmatic analysis from before, Heracles assumes that the 
“speaker” of the oracle is playing by the standard rules of conversation. He assumes—per 
pragmatic theory—that a speaker would say something like “death” if that is what the speaker 
knows to be the outcome. Given a divine “speaker” for the oracle, the problem here cannot be a 
lack of knowledge. Instead, the problem must be that the speaker is either intending to mislead the 
listener, Heracles, or there is a different explanation for this transgression of pragmatic principles.  
Heracles, like the Chorus, understood this oracle in the most natural way. His mythological 
identity is closely associated with labors that he has been forced to endure. From the audience’s 
perspective, it seems ironically appropriate that his labors have consumed his life and his identity so 
thoroughly that the end of his labors is the end of his life. This awareness—like our awareness of 
the misleading nature of oracles—is something that seems only to operate outside the play. Within 
the play, Heracles’ interpretation seems like the natural interpretation. It is, of course, an 
interpretation that aligns with Heracles’ own self-interest, but his behavior is also plausible and 
realistic. These misunderstandings are the result of entirely human impulses.  
It is worth turning briefly to Nessus’ dying words for a moment. In general, for an 
examination of divine oracular communication, Nessus does not qualify. While he is not a human, 
he is also not a god and does not fit neatly into any particular category in an examination of the 
ways that gods communicate (or fail to do so) with humans.149 However, he is a useful foil when 
considering the broader psychological issues with oracular interpretation. 
Nessus’ final words are ambiguous yet true, like the oracles in the rest of the play. A great 
deal of weight is placed on the final words he speaks before his death: ὥστε μήτιν᾽ εἰσιδὼν / 
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον (576-7). These are undoubtedly true, in a perverse way. 
However, throughout the rest of his speech, there is a great deal that cannot readily be validated. 
For example, he describes Deianeira receiving his blood with the verb ὀνίνημι (570) and describes 
the blood as a φρενός . . . κηλητήριον (575). These are far more difficult to explain, but there is an 
obvious reason why these passages have not upset scholars—Nessus wants to cause harm and is 
willfully misleading Deianeira in order to cause suffering in the future.  
                                                   
149 See Heiden 1989: 86-7 on Nessus’ liminal identity. I am not fully persuaded by some of the specific claims that 
Heiden makes, drawing on Jebb (ad 557) on the association of centaurs with meaningless sound. Some of his examples 
of liminality push the evidence father than I would like. However, his overall analysis of the liminality of Nessus in this 
moment (drawing on the deep and rushing river he transverses and the general liminality of centaurs, at the border 
between human and animal) are certainly convincing. For more on this, see duBois 1982. 
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The ambiguity, then, is a weapon that Nessus wields in order to get his revenge. Deianeira 
only carries out the actions that she does because of her false impression that she knows what the 
effect of the Hydra’s blood will be.150 The riddle itself allows Nessus to have his revenge. On the 
one hand, he does create this false sense of confidence and security in Deianeira by phrasing the 
blood’s effect in a willfully deceptive way, so as to mislead her. Why, then, does he not completely 
lie about the blood? Why craft his final utterance as a riddle that proves to be true, but only on a 
certain, unintuitive reading? 
The ambiguous yet accurate nature of Nessus’ words accomplishes two things. On one 
level, his dying words have access to a sort of power. While most mythical comparanda for the 
power of dying words involve either a curse or a prophecy, Nessus’ words bridge the divide 
between these two. They are a prophecy in a sense, but this prophecy does not passively comment 
on an immutable future, as we might expect. Instead, the very utterance of this prophecy serves to 
bring about its completion—though, much like a curse, this prophecy will coincide with Nessus’ 
revenge on Heracles, his own killer. This alone is significant, and while there are not explicit rules 
for how dying words can possess this special efficacy, one imagines that there needs to be some 
measure of truth in them. So while Nessus might be more deceptive in other aspects of his speech 
to Deianeira, the power of his final words might offer one rationale for why he opts for a riddle of 
this sort.  
There is, however, another aspect to his word choice, which speaks to Sophocles’ reasons 
for shaping Nessus’ words this way rather than the motivations of the characters within the play. 
Although he is dead before the play begins, Nessus provides the mechanism through which the 
entire plot unfolds. Between his riddling prophecy and the blood that Deianeira takes from his fatal 
wound, Nessus offers both the physical and psychological tools which lead Deianeira to kill 
Heracles. Although his words are not an oracle, strictly speaking, they very much mirror the proper 
oracles from Zeus. His prophecy seems to offer two alternatives—another woman (μήτιν᾽ . . . 
γυναῖκα) or Deianeira (ἀντὶ σοῦ)—which are not two options in actuality, just as Deianeira’s 
seemingly disjunctive accounts of the oracle turn out not to be two different options at all. Further, 
her misunderstanding of both prophecies gives Deianeira a false confidence about the future that 
allows the events of the play to unfold the way they do. Deianeira falsely assumes that, by surviving 
                                                   
150 See Heiden 1989: 87-8 for a discussion of Deianeira’s language and the ways in which her own language (in 
particular, her use of πως at line 584: φίλτροις δ᾽ ἐάν πως τήνδ᾽ ὑπερβαλώμεθα) reveals Deianeira’s potential 
confusion about the specific effect of the charm.  
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his final competition in Oechalia, Heracles is out of harm’s way, since he won the competition and 
therefore will not fulfill the other option in the prophecy by dying. Similarly, she falsely assumes 
(through the design of Nessus) that the blood she has is a love potion. It is only at the intersection 
of these two misunderstandings that she acts to prevent a long, peaceful future in which Heracles 
loves another woman, Iole. Similarly, Nessus offers the sort of ambiguity that we see in the version 
of the oracle that Heracles recounts—an easy interpretation presents itself, but that natural reading 
will prove to be wrong, in both cases. In terms of the overall structure of the play, Nessus’ words 
help crystallize why and how the oracles are misunderstood. Placed between two sets of oracles, 
Nessus’s words can be seen as a sort of key which can unlock both sets of oracles which surround it, 
by pointing to the pragmatic principles which caused the oracles to be misunderstood and by 
providing the “answer” to the different oracles, which is Heracles’ death.  
Further, to return to Deianeira’s second account of Nessus’ dying words, we see another 
significant theme that mirrors the central oracle. Both Heracles and the Chorus reinterpret Zeus’ 
prophecy, once they see its fulfillment, and demonstrate the ways in which the oracle did turn out 
to be true, just not in the way that they anticipated.151 Deianeira too offers a reinterpretation of 
Nessus’ words and deeds once she can look back at them. In her first account of Nessus’ words, the 
only description of his speech that she provides is τοσοῦτον εἶπε (569), followed by what is 
presented as a direct quotation of his words. Once she has reason to think that Nessus perhaps 
misled her, the way in which she presents his words shifts. Now, he has taught her θεσμά and the 
content of his instruction is referred to as πρόρρητα. We find out that her previous verbatim 
account left out a great deal of information about the care and preservation of Nessus’ blood and—
as with the multiple, shifting accounts of Zeus’ oracle—we are left with a very unclear picture of 
what Nessus may have actually told her, since the two accounts do not mesh neatly together.  
This opens up another point of contact between Nessus’ words and the broader prophecy. 
Although Nessus’ authority to give prophecies is questionable,152 Deianeira recasts his words as 
                                                   
151 Heiden has argued that Heracles forces a fulfillment of the oracle here, out of a desire to impose unity and an 
illusion of justice and order onto an otherwise meaningless and terrible death. Heracles’ final commands to Hyllus, as 
well as the necessity of the pyre, are strange events indeed, as Heiden rightly points out, but their strangeness does not 
imply that the oracles are not fulfilled. I would suggest that even a forced-fulfillment (i.e. actions taken by Heracles to 
consciously ensure the accuracy of the oracle) would still constitute fulfillment of the oracle, in broad terms. However, 
there is nothing in the text to suggest that Heracles might recover from being engulfed in flames and continue his 
mortal life and—as Heiden too notes, though it contradicts his argument to some extent—choosing a death on the 
pyre actually threatens the validity of the oracle, since one could certainly argue that it changes his killer from the 
prophesied inhabitant of Hades to Hyllus (or whomever Hyllus finds to light the pyre) (1989: 150-156). 
152 See fn. 132. 
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πρόρρητα (684). This word is not used elsewhere until very late, but it is etymologically derived 
from προ + ἐρῶ153—an etymological kinship that does little to provide a conclusive meaning. LSJ 
offer “proclaimed, commanded” as a definition for πρόρρητος, and cites only this passage (the 
only use of this particular form, aside from scholiasts writing about this passage). Given its 
proximity to προυδιδάξατο (681), and the two glosses in the scholia, one of which equates 
πρόρρητα with προειρημένα,154 this definition is not unreasonable, but it perhaps loses some of 
the semantic range that προερέω and its derivatives can have. The other scholiast on this passage 
suggests ἀπόρρητα as a possible meaning for πρόρρητα—while the majority of the uses of 
ἀπόρρητα cluster around ideas of secrecy, which does not make much sense for its use in the 
Trachiniae, this gloss should perhaps incline us to think about the other major use of προερέω-
derived words, in the context of prophecy. Πρόρρημα and πρόρρησις both refer to predictions, 
prophecies, or prognosis (as does the derived adjective, προρρητικός). These often refer more to 
predictions (often in a medical sense), but the idea of “speaking before” is central to that of 
prophecy.155  
With this in mind, there is no compelling reason that πρόρρητα cannot have shades of a 
more prophetic meaning. In this light, Deianeira appropriately blurs the line between calling 
Nessus’ words instructions and predictions. In the end, they turn out to be a suitably ambiguous 
combination of those two ideas—they are a self-fulfilling prophecy that is only fulfilled precisely 
because of their ambiguity, since it is the confusion generated by this ambiguity that causes 
Deianeira to take the actions that she does. Nessus’ words and how they are transmitted and 
interpreted reflect the overarching prophecy about Heracles just as his words play a critical role in 
the realization of the prophecy. His deliberately misleading and ambiguous dying words mirror the 
prophecy from Dodona. By realizing these parallels, we can use Nessus’ words to illuminate 
something about Zeus’ words, as well as the inability of mortals to interpret them. 
                                                   
153 As a direct compound, this produces προερέω, though προεῖπον is often the more common form of this 
(προερέω or προερῶ serving as future of προεῖπον).  
154 The first scholiast on this passage writes πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὸ Νέσσου προειρημένα and the second writes 
προμεμελετημένα μοι ἢ ἀπόρρητα, Scholia vetera in Sophoclis Trachinias, 684a1 and a2. 
155 For πρόρρησις as a prediction or prognosis, see Hp. Prog. 15, D.S. 12.36, Plot.3.1.2. It can also be a proclamation, 
as at D. 9.13, or a sort of prefatory statement, as at <Arist.> Rh.Al. 1438b11. Diogenes Laertius uses πρόρρησις to 
mean the practice of predicting the future and pairs it with astronomy and prophecy: τοὺς δὲ Χαλδαίους περὶ 
ἀστρονομίαν καὶ πρόρρησιν ἀσχολεῖσθαι … ἀσκεῖν τε μαντικὴν καὶ πρόρρησιν, καὶ θεοὺς αὑτοῖς ἐμφανίζεσθαι 
λέγοντας (Vit.Phil. 1.6, 7). πρόρρημα is not a word that occurs often, but it is used of prognosis in a medical context: 
τὰ δὲ προῤῥήματα λαμπρὰ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὰ, ἀπὸ τοῦ διαγινώσκειν, Hp. Art. 58 (see also Hp. Prorrheticon 2.1-
2). We also find reference to the προρρητικός δύναμις (S.E. M.5.1) in addition to providing the title of one of 
Hippocrates’ works, Prorrheticon. 
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As noted above, the critical misunderstanding in all these instances hinges on the fact that 
Heracles and Deianeira approach the oracle as though it were a form of human communication.156 
Most importantly, they assume that the gods are participating in good faith in a cooperative 
conversation that is governed by all the underlying assumptions that govern human conversation. 
From our external vantage point, however, we know that oracles do not work that way. Either the 
gods are not capable of communicating more clearly with humans (though this seems unlikely if we 
are to imagine some sort of continuity with the Homeric world, in which gods certainly can appear 
to humans and speak clearly and intelligibly to them, when they want), or they do not want their 
meaning to be readily understood, or the gods and their motives are profoundly inaccessible to 
mortals. As the final lines of the play—delivered either by the Chorus or Hyllus—assert, there is 
nothing in the tragic outcome that is not Zeus (κοὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς, 1278). How are we 
to take this final sentiment? The interpretive difficulty of the oracle(s)—which are all oracles from 
Zeus—is certainly the vehicle through which Heracles meets his fatal end and regardless of who 
speaks the final lines, they stand as a final haunting indictment of Zeus’ role in the outcome. Viewed 
in juxtaposition with Nessus’ words, which bear a striking number of similarities to the different 
versions of the oracle, it would be tempting to understand a malicious and willfully deceptive Zeus. 
However, in closing this chapter, I would like to offer a very different interpretation.  
Conclusions 
The oracles in this play are shown to be true, but the characters in the play can only 
understand this in retrospect. Given the eventual outcome of the play, the ambiguous oracular 
language does seem to be malicious on Zeus’ part, as Sophocles plays with the literary convention 
of ambiguous oracles and manipulates them in a way that seems ultimately cruel. This cruelty is 
compounded by the constant reminders throughout the play that Heracles is the son of Zeus.157 
While his presumed apotheosis may temper this cruelty to some extent, Sophocles suppresses the 
idea of apotheosis and deliberately withholds any consolation for all the suffering.  
When considering the ending of the play, however, and the play as a whole, it is essential to 
recognize that Zeus’ motives are not the focus of this play, however central they may seem, both to 
characters within the play and to readers outside the play. Like the original text of the oracle, Zeus’ 
156 On the nature of effective human communication, see the Introduction. 
157 Easterling discusses this motif in her commentary on lines 19, 200, 8267-7, 983, and 1278. 
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motives cannot truly be discerned. When the play closes with the assertion at line 1278 that there is 
nothing there that is not Zeus, we have only one more potentially biased perspective on events, 
focalized through the characters.158 Like all the accounts of the oracle, this too is subject to 
distortion, even though it occurs in a particularly powerful place in the play, as the final line. This 
final line forces the audience to think about Zeus’ role in the horrors they have just seen—
Deianeira’s suicide, Heracles’ suffering and imminent death, and Heracles’ odd and semi-
incestuous request that Hyllus marry Iole. The play ends with the line κοὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ 
Ζεύς and the audience must determine what to make of what they have seen, and the only available 
responses are to agree or disagree. Either Zeus is complicit in these horrors, as the final line 
suggests, or Zeus and is fundamentally inscrutable and mortals simply cannot know what his role 
and intentions were. On the latter reading, all that we have access to are the linguistic 
pronouncements that come from Zeus, but language is an ineffective form of communication 
between mortals and humans, so we cannot know anything about Zeus, and the play cannot tell us 
anything about Zeus, but only about language. In response to these examples of divine language, 
we can see the basic assumptions that human characters are bringing to bear on these prophecies 
and we can also see that these fundamental assumptions—that the “speaker” is aiming at being 
understood and is entering into a cooperative conversation in good faith—are called into question. 
As the gods are mediated through language (Zeus here, but we will see this with other gods in 
subsequent chapters), it becomes clear that when language is the way that mortals attempt to 
                                                   
158 As an initial note, I am of the opinion that all the lines which come down to us in the manuscript tradition ought to 
be retained. Ritter 1861 deleted the final 4 lines completely (as he did with many other tailpieces), Hartung deleted 
1259-78, Bergk deleted 1264-78, and Dawe deleted 1257-78 (in his first edition of the text). I side with Lloyd-Jones and 
Wilson, however, in thinking that there is insufficient reason to delete any of the final lines. The more difficult question 
concerns who speaks the final four lines. The manuscripts provide an inconclusive answer, and a scholiast even reflects 
this confusion, which apparently dates back to antiquity (τοῦτο λέγει ὁ Χόρος ἣ ὁ Ὕλλος): ZgT give these lines to 
Hyllus, whereas P.Oxy. 3688 and KTa give the lines to the Chorus, and the remaining manuscripts are split. Hermann, 
Jebb, and Pearson give the lines to Hyllus, as do Davies and Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, whereas many other modern 
editors (e.g., Brunck, Campbell, Easterling) give these lines to the Chorus. Nauck, as something of an outlier removes 
Hyllus, gives 1259-1269 to Heracles and 1270-1278 to the Chorus. The question hinges on line 1275, and who is 
addressed with παρθέν᾽. Generally, we would expect the Chorus to deliver final lines, particularly lines of this nature. 
Because the Chorus does not elsewhere in extant Sophocles address another member of the Chorus with a singular 
form, many have thought that Hyllus must be speaking to a member of the Chorus (presumably the Chorus leader), 
since the only other living female, Iole, is presumably gone from the stage in lines 1219-20, based on the way that 
Heracles and Hyllus refer to her (Ἡρ.: τὴν Εὐρυτείαν οἶσθα δῆτα παρθένον; / Ὕλ.: Ἰόλην ἔλεξας, ὥς γ᾽ 
ἐπεικάζειν ἐμέ). However, as Kaimio 1970: 190-1 argues, Hyllus addressing the Chorus with παρθένε would also be 
unparalleled. I find both sides compelling and while I tend to prefer assigning these lines to Hyllus, the arguments on 
both sides of the question are compelling enough that I prefer not to rest my argument on a firm attribution. For more 
on this debate, see Easterling 1981: 70-1, Davies 1991: 265-7, Jebb’s Appendix (p. 208), and Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 
1990: 177-8. 
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interact with the gods, they are subject to the limitations of the linguistic medium. Despite the 
appearance that gods and mortals speak the same language, since both are nominally speaking 
Greek, we find instead that divine, oracular language is fundamentally different from human 
language. Language, then, is both the potential means of access to the divine and a marker of the 
boundary between gods and mortals. 
Oracles are strange and fantastical by nature—they are liminal and magical and give 
humans access to the knowledge of the gods. As such, the liminality and strangeness of oracular 
speech affords Sophocles the flexibility to play with language to create artificial exceptions to 
pragmatic principles. Oracular speech—precisely because it is not bound by the rules of “normal” 
speech—is a useful and effective tool to explore the ways in which pragmatic principles fail and 
what sorts of artificially-constructed miscommunications can “break” these rules. By exploring the 
limits of communication and miscommunication, Sophocles illustrates exactly what the guiding 
principles that undergird effective communication are. This play offers four different 
misinterpretations of what is ostensibly the same oracle. In so doing, it gives us four different 
examples of the ways humans naturally hear and interpret complex language. Pragmatic theory 
helps illuminate this play so well because the play is concerned with precisely the issues that are at 
the heart of pragmatics—how meaning emerges both from what is said and from what is unsaid and 
what sorts of rules or principles govern this process. And it is precisely by shifting our focus toward 
the mortal characters that we can see this more clearly.  
All of the different ways that mortal characters misinterpret Zeus’ oracle are shaped by 
fundamentally human approaches to language. As I detailed throughout, Deianeira, Heracles, and 
the Chorus all approach oracular communication as though it is normal communication, which is 
governed by a set of underlying principles and reasonable assumptions. They make the same kinds 
of inferences that usefully generate meaning, in the context of human communication, moving 
beyond the strict semantic meaning of the words they hear and bringing a rich array of pragmatic 
tools to bear on the words of Zeus. Because Heracles and the Chorus can correctly reinterpret the 
oracle once it is actually being fulfilled, it is tempting to look back through the play and think that 
the characters should have been able to understand the oracle all along. To do so suggests that we 
ought to attribute this failed communication to the hearers who made improper inferences and not 
to the speaker who—by standards of human communication —implicated things that were not 
true.  
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In conclusion, by looking at the ways in which oracular communication and interpretation 
fails spectacularly, Sophocles advances a conception of how human communication does work. 
Both the Chorus and Heracles explain how they misunderstood what a rest from toils meant159—
they took it as its most natural meaning and did not consider other meanings it might have. They 
recognize that they were operating under a set of assumptions (as described effectively by 
pragmatic theory) that were common to them both; these oracles are misunderstood precisely 
because of the mechanisms that are subconsciously a part of human communication. By creating a 
situation in which these mechanisms and assumptions fail, Sophocles also highlights their very 
existence. At a time when sophists and philosophers were beginning to discuss the nature of 
language, Sophocles’ conception of language and his underlying pragmatic theories represent a 
nuanced and generally overlooked contribution to this discussion. 
  
                                                   
159 Chorus at 828-30 and Heracles at 1171-3. 
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Chapter 2: Oedipus, Tiresias, and Apollo Loxias 
Introduction 
The Oedipus Tyrannus is perhaps the most well-known of Sophocles’ plays and the story 
recounted within it has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly work in many different fields. 
My argument here does not seek to examine many of the popular questions that scholars have 
asked about this text, and I will not offer an opinion as to the nature of the Sophoclean hero,160 or 
the psychoanalytic implications of this play,161 or issues of fate and free will,162 and I do not intend to 
examine the question of Oedipus’ guilt.163 Instead, my interests are quite narrow. The Oedipus 
Tyrannus is a play (the only other surviving Sophoclean play, besides the Trachiniae) whose plot is 
entirely concerned with oracles and their interpretations and fulfillment. The oracles within this 
play are woven much more thoroughly into the entirety of the work (as opposed to those in the 
Trachiniae, which can be neatly extracted) and the central prophecy—that Oedipus will kill his 
father and sleep with his mother—has in fact already been fulfilled before the play even begins. 
This, too, represents a departure from the sort of oracle that operates in the Trachiniae. Put 
                                                   
160 Most famously, Whitman 1951 (and later, Whitman 1982) and Knox 1964 (and, to a lesser extent, Knox 1957) 
address the tragic hero, though the theme has been taken up by many others since then, including Segal 1995 and, 
most recently, Van Nortwick 2015. See also Currie 2015 for a recent survey on Sophocles and hero cult.  
161 See Liapis 2012: 84 on the Freudian influence on interpretations of this play, with a bibliography for treatments and 
rebuttals of pro-and anti-Freudian arguments. See also Rudnytsky1987 for a more extended treatment, as well as Segal 
1994 and Nussbaum 2006.  
162 On this topic, see Dodds 1966, Mastronarde 1994, Cairns 2013, Gregory 2005. For the commonly-expressed view 
that this play is a “tragedy of fate,” there are myriad examples, but because of his deep influence on the modern 
reception of the play, I will here provide Freud’s description of this play as a Schicksalstragödie in his The 
Interpretation of Dreams. Before moving into his famous formulation of the Oedipal Complex, Freud concludes that 
“König Ödipus ist eine sogenannte Schicksalstragödie; ihre tragische Wirkung soll auf dem Gegensatz zwischen dem 
übermächtigen Willen der Götter und dem vergeblichen Sträuben der vom Unheil bedrohten Menschen beruhen; 
Ergebung in den Willen der Gottheit, Einsicht in die eigene Ohnmacht soll der tief ergriffene Zuschauer aus dem 
Trauerspiele lernen” (“V. Das Traummaterial und die Traumquellen”). Knox 1957 and Dodds 1966 both argue 
against this simplistic line of interpretation. To this end, Dodds invokes Knox’ analogy (Knox 1957: 39-40) to Peter in 
the Gospel of Matthew, in which Peter is prophesied to deny Jesus three times (Matthew 26:34-5, 60-75). The fact that 
he does so, both Dodds and Knox suggest, does not mean that Peter was bound by fate. Rather, free will and 
predestination can coexist and Peter can fulfill the prediction by an act of free choice (Dodds 1966: 42-3). 
163 I, as most all classicists do, accept that Sophocles is quite clear about Oedipus’ guilt and there can be no question 
that the oracles have been fulfilled and he has committed both incest and parricide. However, Goodhart 1978 and 
1996 argue that Sophocles does not in fact establish Oedipus’ innocence or guilt, but instead equivocates on this 
question. Ahl 1991 makes this same point, which has been picked up by scholars outside the field of classics. See also 
Girard 1986 and Chase 1986.  
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another way, the Oedipus Tyrannus is not a play that displays the inevitable and tragic fulfillment 
of an oracle, but one that performs a sort of autopsy on an already-fulfilled prophecy.  
In this chapter, I look at three different prophetic elements that run throughout this play: 
(1) Apollo’s oracle about how Thebes can remove the plague; (2) the different versions that Jocasta 
and Oedipus each received of the oracle that Oedipus would sleep with his mother and kill his 
father; and (3) Tiresias’ conversations with Oedipus, which explain elements of these oracles as well 
as foretelling the realizations that lie in Oedipus’ immediate future. Before looking at any of these 
elements, however, I start by examining the Riddle of the Sphinx and the associated pragmatic 
principles that govern the solving of riddles. The oracles in this play are not riddles, but the genre 
of the riddle introduces a far more complex pragmatic scheme than I outlined in the first chapter. 
Riddles, like other playful linguistic interactions (jokes, puns, etc.), are neither straightforward 
cooperative conversations nor are they lies. The genre of riddles provides a valuable perspective on 
how oracular language functions, and looking at the mechanics of riddles allows us to see exactly 
how some of the oracular misunderstandings in this play occur.  
The Riddle of the Sphinx 
The Sphinx looms as a shadow behind the Oedipus Tyrannus. She died long before the 
events of the play begin, but defeating the Sphinx is Oedipus’ defining heroic accomplishment and 
it is the grounds upon which he becomes the ruler of Thebes.164 It is repeatedly invoked, by 
Oedipus and others, as a crucial moment. In a sense, the Sphinx is the catalyst for the events of the 
play. The Sphinx’ presence is the (somewhat feeble) excuse that Creon gives for why no one 
                                                   
164 Barrett (2002: 205) notes the many ways that Oedipus’ identity is tied to the Sphinx, though his arguments are 
based in large part on the assumption that the riddle that Oedipus solves is the traditional formulation, in which case 
his name (which, as noted by the Corinthian at line 1036, is derived from his pierced—and thereby swollen—feet) and 
his great victory over the Sphinx are both connected. The Sphinx is deeply connected to Oedipus’ heroic identity. 
Edmunds 2000: 36 notes that there is no explicit discussion of how Oedipus comes to be ruler, but it must be some sort 
of a reward for defeating the Sphinx (Oedipus describes his rule as a gift from the city at 384). Oedipus’ status as ruler 
of Thebes is attained directly by marrying the queen (see Finkelberg 1991 on this type of succession, in which rule is 
passed from father to son-in-law, rather than father-to-son, and marriage is the means of acquiring kingship). By the 
end of the play, however, it has become clear that he has also inherited kingship from his father, though he did not do 
so because of his connection with Laius. As far as Thebes knows, kingship was transmitted in the same fashion that 
Finkelberg details and which occurs in so many other heroic, literary examples (Tyndareus to Menelaus, for example). 
Finkelberg cites Oedipus as providing a cautionary counter-example to all the instances in which kingship was passed to 
the king’s son-in-law, since kingship by marriage would generally rule out the king’s son as an option for the next king.  
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investigated who Laius’ murderers were (OT 130-
131) and it is the reason why Oedipus marries 
Jocasta: the Sphinx allows for the very situation that 
fulfills Oedipus’ terrible fate.  
Despite this, the Sphinx’ riddle is never 
described in the play. The traditional formulation of 
the Sphinx’ riddle was almost certainly known by 
the time of this play (see Fig. 1),165 but Sophocles 
does not even allude to that version or to the 
content of the riddle at all. At first glance, this 
seems like an odd choice, since there are striking 
parallels between the story of Oedipus and the 
traditional formulation of the riddle, which would 
have very likely been something of the following 
form:166 
ἔστι δίπουν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τετράπον, οὗ μία μορφή, 
καὶ τρίπον, ἀλλάσσει δὲ φυὴν μόνον ὅσσ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
ἑρπετὰ κινεῖται καὶ ἀν’ αἰθέρα καὶ κατὰ πόντον· 
ἀλλ’ ὁπόταν τρισσοῖσιν ἐπειγόμενον ποσὶ βαίνῃ, 
ἔνθα τάχος γυίοισιν ἀφαυρότατον πέλει αὑτοῦ. 
There is, on the earth, a thing that is two-footed and 
four-footed, and one form [or voice], and it is three-
footed as well, and it alone changes its form [or its 
nature], out of so many creatures that move across 
the land and through the air and in the sea. But 
                                                   
165 Lloyd-Jones 1978, building on Lesky 1928 and refining many of his own positions in Lloyd-Jones 1963, concludes 
that the riddle of the Sphinx likely does not date back to early epic. In the Oedipodeia, there is no evidence that the 
Sphinx poses riddles or is anything more than a murderous monster. It could originate with the Thebais, though 
Lloyd-Jones finds this unlikely, but there is strong evidence that it is well known by the time of Aeschylus. The famous 
cup in the Vatican with Oedipus and the Sphinx is dated to c. 470 BCE (Beazley ARV, 2nd ed. 451) and it includes the 
words (κ)αὶ τρί(πον). Lloyd-Jones suggests that the significantly different formulation found in P.Oxy. 2459 (a 
fragment of Euripides’ Oedipus) suggest that the nearly-identical forms that we find in our later sources are likely 
drawing on a more authoritative version than that of Euripides—in addition to the sources listed above, the riddle is 
also attested in hypotheses to Soph. OT (ed. Dain-Mazon ii.71) and Eur. Phoen. (ed. Schwartz i.243-4) as well as Σ 
Phoen. 50 (ed. Schwartz i.256), Σ Lycophr. 7 (ed. Kinkel, p. 65), and Tzetz. ad Lycophr. (ed. Scheer, ii 11). Lloyd-
Jones concludes that this more authoritative source is most likely Aeschylus’ Oedipus, which is a satisfying though 
unprovable suggestion. 
166 Lloyd-Jones 1978: 60-1 provides a thorough text and history of the text and variants. The version he compiles is 
essentially the version that Athenaeus provides (10.456B = FGrH 12 F 7a = AP 14.64), but Athenaeus has φωνή 
instead of μορφή at the end of the first line and gives φύσιν instead of φυὴν in line 2 (this line varies significantly 
between versions). Athenaeus also has γίνονται instead of κινεῖται in line 3 and πλείστοισιν ἐρειδόμενον instead of 
τρισσοῖσιν ἐπειγόμενον in line 4 (drawing heavily on Aesch. Ag .80-2, which he understands as an allusion to the 
riddle of the Sphinx). Lloyd-Jones’ text compiles the best available readings and his choice of readings seems preferable 
to Athenaeus’. On line 4, a reading of τρισσοῖσιν suggests that an elderly man with a cane is slower than a crawling 
child, whereas πλείστοισιν suggests that the old man is faster than the small child. I have printed Lloyd-Jones’ text as 
he prints it, though I am not sure about this particular reading, and both options seem plausible, depending what level 
of infirmity the Sphinx is imagining in the man aided by a cane.  
Figure 1, Red Figure Vase from the Vatican 
Museum (16541) 
ARV2 451.1 = LIMC VII, s.v. Oidipous, no. 19. Though 
not visible in this image, a retrograde ΑΙΤΡΙ is inscribed 
between the Sphinx and Oedipus, which has been 
conjectured to be κ]αὶ τρί[πον (or κ]αὶ τρί[πουν, 
depending on dialect) 
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whenever it goes about, moving itself forward with 
three feet, then the swiftness in its limbs is weakest.  
 
The answer to this riddle is “Man,” and the thematic resonances of this have been well noted and 
explored.167 A great deal less study has gone into the question of why this riddle is not mentioned in 
the play. While the riddle of the Sphinx is clearly not oracular speech, I nonetheless open my 
examination with an overview of how the riddle of the Sphinx functions within the play and what its 
significance is for the play as a whole, since an understanding of how riddles function linguistically 
offers us useful tools for approaching oracular speech in this play. 
Since we are not given any information about the content of the Sphinx’ riddle, it is worth 
starting with what we do learn about the riddle. We hear about the riddle three times within the 
play, and here we have a proper riddle (described with the word αἴνιγμα in two different places: 
393 and 1525) rather than the somewhat looser use of “riddle” I made in the previous chapter, in 
describing Nessus’ cryptic dying words.  
The riddle of the Sphinx is invoked by a priest at the start of the play to highlight Oedipus’ 
great service to the city, and we hear how he released (ἐξέλυσας, 35) the city from the Sphinx. The 
word used to describe this release, ἐκλύω, anticipates the actions Apollo demands to save the city 
(λύοντας, 101) and echoes the traditional language used to describe solving a riddle.168 
Linguistically, these are all closely related and Oedipus’ defining heroic act of solving the riddle is 
linked to his attempts to save Thebes. This seemingly obvious connection—defeating the Sphinx 
was what saved the city at the time—will become far more complicated by the end of the play, since 
Oedipus saves the city from one threat (the Sphinx) while exposing it to another (the plague).169  
35 ὅς γ᾽ ἐξέλυσας ἄστυ Καδμεῖον μολὼν  
σκληρᾶς ἀοιδοῦ δασμὸν ὃν παρείχομεν,  
καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐδὲν ἐξειδὼς πλέον  
οὐδ᾽ ἐκδιδαχθείς, ἀλλὰ προσθήκῃ θεοῦ  
λέγει νομίζει θ᾽ ἡμὶν ὀρθῶσαι βίον· 
OT 35-39 
And you, when you came to the city of the 
Cadmeans, you released us from the tribute we 
were paying to the harsh songstress. And further, 
having no special knowledge and not having been 
thoroughly instructed, but by the assistance of a 
                                                   
167 See Barrett 2002: 190-222. 
168 However, as LSJ note (ad αἴνιγμα), solving a riddle can be described with διειπεῖν and εἰδέναι, the passages it cites 
for both these verbs are from the Oedipus Tyrannus (OT 393,1525) and of little use when making an argument about 
language within this play. The other verb it provides for solving an αἴνιγμα is μαθεῖν (used at E.Ph.48, 50 to describe 
Oedipus’ actions). However, λύω is an extremely common word for solving riddles (found with both γρῖφος and 
αἴνιγμα) and occurs at Vit. Hom. 7 West (Vita Romana), D. Chr. Orat. 10.31, Arist. LI 969b.4-6, Jos. AJ 5.290, D.S. 
4.64.3, Str. Geog. 10.3.23, et al. We find also αἴνιγμα . . . δύσλυτον at Plu. Fr.25.3 and a wide range of compounds of 
λύω to also describe solving riddles: ἐπιλύω at Ath. Deip. 10.71, 10.73; and διαλύω at Ath. Deip. 10.73, 10.88 and 
Plut. Septem 154B. 
169 On the relationship between Oedipus and the Sphinx, and the way that Oedipus both vanquishes and (in a sense) 
becomes the Sphinx, see Moore 1980.  
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god, you are spoken of and credited as having 
restored our life.  
By invoking Oedipus’ victory over the Sphinx, the priest reminds the city and, more 
importantly, the audience that Oedipus earned his position—he is an embodiment of the positive 
elements of a tyrannus.170 He did not inherit rule, but he achieved it through his own actions. Yet, 
the priest is careful to remind us, Oedipus did not accomplish this entirely on his own. He had 
assistance (προσθήκη) from a god. Jebb notes that the use of προσθήκη here “is appropriate, 
since the achievement of Oed. is viewed as essentially a triumph of human wit: a divine agency 
prompted him, but remained in the background” (ad 38). I would elaborate and say that the divine 
agency is intentionally ambiguous. The priest can thus characterize Oedipus as a pious man 
without diminishing his accomplishments as the savior of the city; there is no specific god with 
whom Oedipus must share the credit. Instead, our introduction to Oedipus as a ruler casts him as a 
man who—in the eyes of his people—has a very pious understanding of his privileged relationship 
with the gods. The priest, speaking on behalf of the Theban suppliants, makes it clear that they 
have not come to Oedipus for help because they think that he is an equal to the gods (θεοῖσι μέν 
νυν οὐκ ἰσούμενόν σ᾽ ἐγὼ / οὐδ᾽ οἵδε παῖδες ἑζόμεσθ᾽ ἐφέστιοι, 31-2). Quite the opposite, in 
fact. They think that he is the best among men at dealing with the challenges of life and dealings 
with the divine (ἀνδρῶν δὲ πρῶτον ἔν τε συμφοραῖς βίου / κρίνοντες ἔν τε δαιμόνων 
συναλλαγαῖς, 33-4).171 This description complements what we find a few lines later, about the 
                                                   
170 See Knox 1957 for the most well-known look at the themes of tyranny and the rhetoric and imagery surrounding the 
figure of the tyrannus (and Athens as the polis tyrannos). As Knox 1957: 54 notes, “This sense of the word tyrannos is 
exactly appropriate for Oedipus…: he is an intruder, one whose warrant for power is individual achievement, not 
birth” (emphasis mine). Recent work on the topic, however, has found some fault with Knox: Edmunds 2002 revisits 
this question, looking at Oedipus in light of both the Athenian ideology of tyranny as well as the more ambivalent 
Panhellenic ideology of tyranny. Edmunds concludes that Oedipus’ intelligence is an anomalous or heterogeneous 
element of his tyranny (as opposed to the generic characteristics of tyranny). Seaford 2003 also finds some problems 
with Knox’ interpretation, since parallels between the figure of the tyrannus and the tyrannical city would have been 
easy for Sophocles to make explicit, and yet he does not chose to do so. Instead, Seaford highlights the ambivalent, 
tyrannical depiction of Oedipus, particularly when Oedipus is viewed across the OT and the OC. In short, Knox’ 
comments on the (at least partially) meritocratic characterization of Oedipus as a tyrannus are not undisputed, but they 
certainly serve to highlight the individual accomplishment of Oedipus, which is a defining aspect of his depiction. On 
the general topic of tyranny in Greece, and in Athens in particular, Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents 
in Ancient Greece (2003, ed. Morgan) is a useful, recent look at the topic.  
171 This passage is particularly difficult to translate and understand. The συμφοραῖς βίου seem straightforward 
enough, but the δαιμόνων συναλλαγαῖς are much less clear. Jebb argues strongly for δαιμόνων as a subjective 
genitive, meaning “’conjunctures’ caused by gods . . . Special visitations, as opposed to the ordinary chanced of life 
(συμφοραῖς βίου)” (ad 34). He lists the Sphinx and the plague (described as ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς at line 27) among these 
δαιμόνων συναλλαγαῖς and thinks that the use of συναλλαγή in the sense of “a conjuncture of events” at OC 410 
makes this a preferable reading, rather than understanding this as “dealings (of men) with gods.” I side with Dawe (ad 
34) in thinking that there is no compelling reason to choose any of the available meanings of συναλλαγή and that it is 
best to choose a translation (he suggests “dealings”) that is vague and open enough to accommodate the possibility that 
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assistance of a god. Oedipus seems to have a good working relationship with divinities, as far as the 
people can tell. He knows his place in relation to the gods, and the gods augment his own 
knowledge and abilities.172 By associating Oedipus and his heroic, interpretive victory with the gods, 
the priest makes an implicit connection between the gods and effective interpretation—a 
connection that will be challenged by Oedipus himself as well as by the outcome of the play.  
Later, when Oedipus accuses Tiresias of plotting with Creon to overthrow him, he invokes 
the Sphinx as well, but in a very different manner:  
390 
 
 
 
 
395 
 
 
 
 
400 
ἐπεί, φέρ᾽ εἰπέ, ποῦ σὺ μάντις εἶ σαφής;  
πῶς οὐκ, ὅθ᾽ ἡ ῥαψῳδὸς ἐνθάδ᾽ ἦν κύων,  
ηὔδας τι τοῖσδ᾽ ἀστοῖσιν ἐκλυτήριον;  
καίτοι τό γ᾽ αἴνιγμ᾽ οὐχὶ τοὐπιόντος ἦν  
ἀνδρὸς διειπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μαντείας ἔδει· 
ἣν οὔτ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οἰωνῶν σὺ προυφάνης ἔχων  
οὔτ᾽ ἐκ θεῶν του γνωτόν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ μολών, 
ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, ἔπαυσά νιν,  
γνώμῃ κυρήσας οὐδ᾽ ἀπ’οἰωνῶν μαθών·  
ὃν δὴ σὺ πειρᾷς ἐκβαλεῖν, δοκῶν θρόνοις  
παραστατήσειν τοῖς Κρεοντείοις πέλας.  
κλαίων δοκεῖς μοι καὶ σὺ χὠ συνθεὶς τάδε  
ἀγηλατήσειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ 'δόκεις γέρων  
εἶναι, παθὼν ἔγνως ἂν οἷά περ φρονεῖς. 
OT 390-403 
Come then, tell me, when have you shown 
yourself to be a true prophet? Why did you utter 
no saving word on behalf of the citizens, when the 
rhapsodic bitch173 was here? After all, the riddle 
was not for just any passerby to explain fully, and 
there was need of a prophet’s skill—a skill which, 
coming either from birds or any of the gods, you 
were conspicuously seen to be lacking. But I came, 
Oedipus who knew nothing, and I stopped her, 
accomplishing it with my intellect alone, having 
learned nothing from birds . . . And I whom you 
attempt to banish, thinking that you will stand 
near to the Creontic throne. I think that you and 
the one who plotted these things will regret your 
eagerness to drive the pollution out of the land. If 
you did not seem so old, you would have learned a 
painful lesson suited to your attitude.  
 
I will not dwell on the dramatic irony that pervades this tirade, though it is of course 
striking. I am more concerned with the effect of invoking the riddle of the Sphinx here. Before, the 
priest mentioned the Sphinx in order to emphasize the great service Oedipus had done to Thebes. 
In the process, he highlighted Oedipus’ piety and his meritocratic claim to rule. The riddle, 
however, was not mentioned at all. In this second version, the focus is entirely on the riddle 
(αἴνιγμ᾽, 393) and the difficulties it posed. This riddle could not be solved by just anyone (καίτοι 
τό γ᾽ αἴνιγμ᾽ οὐχὶ τοὐπιόντος ἦν / ἀνδρὸς διειπεῖν, 393-4). Its difficulty demanded some sort of 
                                                   
this means “’dealings’ with the gods, or a crisis caused by them, or even a reconciliation with them,” since all these 
possibilities are attested uses of συναλλαγή. 
172 Dawe notes (ad 31) that “it is most important that we should know at an early stage whether Oedipus is the kind of 
tyrant who might wish to be regarded as divine, or whether he keeps himself free from such impiety . . . Oedipus is the 
sort of man who might reject extreme adulation with words like οὐ τίς τοι θεός εἰμι· τί μ’ἀθανάτοισιν ἐΐσκεις; like 
Odysseus, Hom. Od. 16.187; or λέγω κατ᾽ ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ, like Agamemnon, Aesch. Agam. 925. The 
suppliants know this, and respect his wishes. They feel that he has some special relationship with the gods (38) but they 
carefully draw the vital distinction between gods (31) and men (33).” 
173 Her description as both an ἀοιδός (36) and a ῥαψῳδὸς (391) reinforces what we might have already expected 
about the riddle’s meter, which is that it was in hexameter. See Lloyd-Jones 1978: 60 on this point. 
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extraordinary skill—Oedipus suggests that mantic skill should have allowed Tiresias to solve the 
riddle, but since it did not, Oedipus had to use intellectual skill instead. It is not clear, however, that 
a riddle might require prophetic abilities.174 In less tragic contexts, riddles were popular party 
games; they allowed party guests to match wits with one another, not to showcase their prophetic 
abilities.175 Even if the reference to prophetic skill is not entirely appropriate, it is rhetorically 
useful, since it allows Oedipus to compare his service to the city to that of Tiresias. The citizens 
needed a seer to save them, but Tiresias, the seer par excellence, did not utter any saving word 
(ἐκλυτήριον, 392). Oedipus, who goes to great lengths to point out that he is not a seer and has no 
special knowledge, accomplished with his intellect alone (γνώμῃ) what Tiresias could not do. 
Oedipus’ own language echoes that used by the priest (ἐξέλυσας, at line 35) to describe the service 
Oedipus rendered to the city, and Oedipus here casts himself, as he has been cast by others, as the 
bringer of release and the solver of riddles—and the sole savior of the city.   
As opposed to the previous mention of the Sphinx, which painted a picture of a pious and 
heroic Oedipus who freed the city from a monster, we now see a different version of Oedipus who 
makes no mention of divine assistance (προσθήκῃ θεοῦ, 38) but instead takes full credit for himself 
and his intellect and offers his own abilities as an alternative to Tiresias’ divinely inspired ones. His 
speech here certainly serves to characterize him as hubristic, antagonistic, and defensive, but it also 
does something else that is subtle yet significant—Oedipus detaches the gods from his moment of 
interpretive clarity. Unlike the priest, he asserts that there was no divine assistance here and it was 
his own interpretive capabilities at work. He may be hubristic, but we cannot be sure that he is 
wrong. In no other moment in the play do we see Oedipus effectively understanding any sort of 
divine communication or receiving any discernible divine help.176 In a play that focuses relentlessly 
                                                   
174 This is not to suggest, however, that prophets were not associated with riddles. For instance, the Melampodia (frag. 
278 MW = Strabo 14.1.27) recounts Calchas’ death, which occurs after he loses a contest against Mopsus. It is 
somewhat nebulous whether this should be seen as a riddle competition or a divinatory competition, and I tend to think 
that this is a competition in divining, but the distinction between the two categories is not an entirely clear one (this is, 
incidentally, the same sort of non-riddle riddle that Bilbo poses to Gollum in The Hobbit, which I detail at greater 
length below). We have a similar example, but with poets instead of prophets, in the Contest of Homer and Hesiod. 
Poets are not prophets, per se, but the connection between prophecy and poetry has a long tradition in Greek 
literature. Oedipus’ words, taken together with these examples, suggest that a while a prophet’s divine knowledge isn’t 
necessary to solve a riddle, it should nonetheless help him solve a riddle better than a mere mortal.  
175 On this, see Collins 2005, The Muse at Play (2013, eds. Kwapisz, Petrain, and Szymański), and Beta 2009. 
Plutarch’s Septem sapientum convivium and Quaestiones conviviales, as well as Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae, all 
display this practice (and, in a less explicitly riddle-game format, Xenophon’s Symposium).  
176 Perhaps we should take his claim more seriously, since the mere linguistic hint of Apollo seems to obscure 
understanding, as I will explore later. If the events of the play are any indication, Apollo at least was no part of Oedipus 
solving the Sphinx’ riddle. 
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on misunderstood communication from the gods, it is significant that the one moment in which 
Oedipus is most conspicuously successful at interpretation occurs outside the confines of the play 
and—if we take him at his word—occurs without any interference from the gods.  
This transition is interesting and serves both to characterize Oedipus and to illuminate his 
own ideas about interpretation and the role of the gods. Although the riddle of the Sphinx has no 
clear connection to the oracles from Apollo, it is precisely this apparent divide between the two that 
makes it so useful. The riddle’s relevance, for my purposes, lies in its potential to elucidate the 
oracles that we see elsewhere in this play. In much the same way that Nessus’ dying words in the 
Trachiniae are not a proper oracle, but are an effective foil for looking at issues of interpretation in 
the play, the riddle of the Sphinx is also a useful lens through which to view the actual oracles in 
the Oedipus Tyrannus.177  
Before drawing out the broader implications of this, I would like to address the only other 
mention of the Sphinx within this play,178 which is a very brief mention in passing: 
 
128 
 
 
130 
Οἰδίπους 
κακὸν δὲ ποῖον ἐμποδών, τυραννίδος  
οὕτω πεσούσης, εἶργε τοῦτ᾽ ἐξειδέναι; 
Κρέων 
ἡ ποικιλῳδὸς Σφὶγξ τὸ πρὸς ποσὶν σκοπεῖν  
μεθέντας ἡμᾶς τἀφανῆ προσήγετο. 
Οἰδίπους 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς αὖθις αὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ φανῶ·  
OT 128-132 
Oedipus 
With the ruler (tyrant) dead in this fashion, what 
sort of trouble kept you from finding out what 
happened? 
Creon 
The Sphinx, enigmatic singer, forced us to let go 
of these obscure things and focus on more 
immediate things.  
Oedipus 
I will start back up again and I will reveal these 
things.  
                                                   
177 Interestingly, both these examples involve monsters who are liminal and partially human (the Sphinx and the 
centaur). There is a great deal to say about this, but it is sadly outside the scope of this project. Cf. duBois 1982: 95-
109, which focuses on the divide between humans and animals. Thought duBois does not explicitly discuss the Sphinx, 
her statements about monsters (Geryon, for example, and Acheloos) also apply to the Sphinx, in that the Sphinx is s 
non-human who threatens an organized, civilized polis. The human subject, duBois notes, concerns himself with 
“keeping his enemies, animals as well as barbarians, the alien and the monstrous, at bay” (duBois 1982: 95). The 
Sphinx is, in many ways, both animalistic and barbarian (as well as female) and an encapsulation of all that is “enemy” 
to the civilizes polis, as duBois lays out these polarities. However, in its ability to engage in logical games and human 
speech, the Sphinx also demonstrates fundamentally human characteristics, making her an ambivalent and liminal 
figure who is well suited to a play concerned with the most liminal sort of communication (oracles).  
178 I am excluding lines 1524-5 here, since many scholars agree that these are later additions that are spurious. I do not 
agree that these lines should be omitted from texts of this play, but I also do not want to rest too much of my argument 
on lines whose authenticity are debated. Though I see the arguments of those who have argued against the authenticity 
of different lines at the end of the play (see, for instance Dawe 2001, who feels strongly that everything from 1424-1530 
is spurious), I cannot concur with them. Dawe argues that the play’s plot demands the exile that Oedipus requests at 
1410-2. He suggests that a “series of surprises” (3) makes up the end of the play, and this should indicate clearly that it 
is all spurious. Others, such as Ritter 1861, simply omit from line 1524 onward. Dawe and Ritter are both more 
enthusiastic emenders of texts than I am, however, and I do not find the arguments against these lines to be compelling 
enough to merit their removal. For a defense of these lines, see Serra 2003.  
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Though we do not hear about the riddle in this passage, the Sphinx and her effect are described in 
ways that echo traditional characteristics of riddles: riddles are obscure and hard to make out 
(τἀφανῆ, 131) as well as artful or otherwise complex and intricate (ποικίλος can be inferred from 
ποικιλῳδός, 130). A riddle’s efficacy hinges on obscure language, doubled meanings, and the 
potential for the listener to mis-identify how the language maps onto underlying realities.  
Since, as I noted earlier, the specific contents of the Sphinx’ riddle are conspicuously 
missing179 from the Oedipus Tyrannus—though the traditional version of the riddle (whose answer 
is “Man”) was almost certainly known at the time of this play—I will start with a general 
examination that can apply to riddles more broadly, and not just the traditional version of the 
riddle.  
Mechanics of Greek Riddles 
In an examination of the collection of ancient riddles found in Book 14 of the Greek 
Anthology, Luz finds that there are several categories of riddles (or, more precisely, several types of 
mechanisms that operate in riddles).180 I will exclude for now the mythological riddles, in which the 
solution hinges on a depth of mythological knowledge (usually of mythological murders),181 as well 
                                                   
179 By “conspicuously absent,” I mean that the text gestures toward the riddle of the Sphinx, but does not ever 
explicitly discuss the form of the riddle. Sophocles could easily have made the connection that so many other readers of 
this play have made over the years, that Oedipus can solve a riddle about Man, but cannot solve the riddle of just one 
man (himself), and that he can answer a riddle about feet, but cannot use his own pierced feet as a clue to understand 
his own past. Sophocles could well have used the traditional riddle formulation to draw out these parallels for the 
audience, but he chooses not to. I see this as a conscious choice, since this version of the Sphinx’ riddle was known by 
the time he is writing, meant to highlight these connections in a very subtle way—by omitting any mention of the details 
of the riddle, but by hinting at it at times, as with τὸ πρὸς ποσὶν at line 130, Sophocles invites the audience to make 
those connections on their own, but does not foreground these parallels. The same occurs at line 397, ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς 
Οἰδίπους, where the popular folk etymology which derives his name from οἶδα + πούς, is called to mind, but whereas 
a proper folk etymology would identify Oedipus as the man who knows about feet, only “knowing” is mentioned here, 
and the πούς part is missing—as, one could argue, is the case with Oedipus’ own search for his identity, in that he’s 
missing what a clue his own feet are. 
180 Luz 2013. See also Ar. Poet . 22 for a useful look at an ancient conception of riddles and the right syntactic balance 
and register that is necessary for an effective riddle: ἀλλ’ ἄν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἔσται ἢ 
βαρβαρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα 
αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι· κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν <ἄλλων> ὀνομάτων σύνθεσιν 
οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται, οἷον “ἄνδρ’ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ’ ἀνέρι 
κολλήσαντα”, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν γλωττῶν βαρβαρισμός. It should be noted that <ἄλλων> is 
omitted in Ξ, and the reading here is Twining’s, ex Piccolominii versione (Ar.).  
181 For example, one of these that is particularly appropriate for this chapter is Anth. Pal. 14.38: Κτεῖνα κάσιν, κτάνε 
δ᾿ αὖ με κάσις, θάνομεν δ᾿ ὑπὸ πατρός· / μητέρα δ᾿ ἀμφότεροι τεθναότες κτάνομεν (I killed my sibling, and my 
sibling killed me in return. We died because of our father, but by both dying, we killed our mother). The solution is 
either Polynices or Eteocles, and while the description obscures the story somewhat, the main skill required to solve this 
is a knowledge of the story of Oedipus’ family and not any sort of particular mental gymnastics.,  
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as spelling-based riddles182 since, as Luz notes, “the largest group [of riddles in the Greek 
Anthology] are riddles whose solution consists in an everyday object such as wine, a mirror, a fish, 
smoke,”183 and we might here compare Aristotle’s definition of a riddle as something that uses 
metaphors to join together impossible things with things that exist (αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη 
ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι).184 We can see, then, that riddles are primarily 
metaphorical descriptions of relatively common things, and it is the combination of common items 
with uncommon language choices that unites this genre.185 Further, the mechanisms of these most-
common types of riddles have a great deal in common. The different categories overlap quite a 
bit,186 but Luz distinguishes three major categories that are relevant here: 
(1) Metonymy/analogy: objects are described with vocabulary and images from another sphere 
of life 
Εἷς ἄνεμος· δύο νῆες· ἐρέττουσιν δέκα ναῦται· 
εἷς δὲ κυβερνήτης ἀμφοτέρας ἐλάει. 
Anth. Pal. 14.14 
One wind, two ships; ten sailors row 
One pilot directs both 
                                                   
182 A particularly clever example of this is Anth. Pal. 14.105: εἰμὶ χαμαίζηλον ζώων μέλος· ἢν δ᾿ ἀφέλῃς μου / 
γράμμα μόνον, κεφαλῆς γίνομαι ἄλλο μέρος·/ ἢν δ᾿ ἕτερον, ζῶον πάλιν ἔσσομαι·/ ἢν δὲ καὶ ἄλλο, οὐ μόνον 
εὑρήσεις, ἀλλὰ διηκόσια (I am the part of animals which reaches for the ground. If you take from me a single letter, I 
am another part of the head, and if you take another, I am back to an animal / and if you take another, I will not find 
me to be one, but two hundred!). The answer is πούς (foot), from which you can take remove the π to leave you with 
οὖς (ear), and which then shrinks to ὗς (pig), and finally ς (the sign for 200). 
183 Luz 2013: 93 
184 For more on this, see Ar. Poet. 1458a. He explains that the poet should aim for clarity (σαφήνεια), but not for so 
much clarity that the writing becomes ταπεινός (banal or insipid). Instead, poets should use unfamiliar or unusual 
words (ξενικοί), which makes their poetry σεμνὴ (erudite or elevated) and ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν 
(distinguished from commonplace writing). He elaborates that ξενικοί words can be γλῶτται (obsolete or foreign 
words), μεταφοραί (metaphors), ἐπεκτάσεις (lengthenings), and anything else out of the ordinary (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ 
κύριον). If a poet uses exclusively ξενικοί words, however, they will be writing a riddle or something unintelligible (ἢ 
αἴνιγμα…ἢ βαρβαρισμός). Riddles, he says, are composed of metaphors, whereas too many archaic or foreign words 
produce something unintelligible. A riddle is defined, at its core, as something that combines descriptions of real and 
impossible things (αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι·). This is only 
possible by combining metaphors, and not by using other names of things (κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὀνομάτων 
σύνθεσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεταφορῶν ἐνδέχεται).   
185 There is a rich linguistic bibliography on the pragmatics of jokes and other sorts of enigmatic communication. For 
more on this topic (with a particular focus on folk-riddle phenomena), see Georges and Dundes 1963; Cray and 
Herzog 1967; Johnson 1975; Attardo 1993; Manetti 1993; Clark 1994; Rokem and Shulman (eds.) 1996 (Cohen 1996 
and Kaivola-Bregenhøj 1996 are of note); Dienhart 1998; and Mooney 2004.   
186 For example, Anth. Pal. 14.21 (20 is essentially the same riddle, but in a slightly different form) combines the 
mythological and spelling types of riddles, as well as the metonym/analogy type, since Hephaestus is used to mean fire: 
Ἐς μέσον Ἡφαίστοιο βαλὼν ἑκατοντάδα μούνην, / παρθένου εὑρήσεις υἱέα καὶ φονέα (Throwing just 100 into 
the middle of Hephaestus, you will find the son and murderer of a maiden). Here, Hephaestus must be converted into 
a more common word for fire, πῦρ, though it retains its genitive case and becomes πυρός. If ρ, the sign for 100, is 
inserted into πυρός, it becomes Πύρρος, the son of Achilles and the young princess, Deidamia, and the murderer of 
another maiden, Polyxena.  
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The answer here is a double flute. The wind is the flautist’s breath, the two ships are the two pipes, 
and the ten sailors are the ten fingers. Here, the language is clearly nautical, which misdirects the 
hearer. It is only by recontextualizing these words that the listener can solve the riddle (potentially 
by starting with the easiest word to reimagine in another context—ἄνεμος, wind—and then 
working out from there to imagine another context in which some other sort of wind could drive 
two objects, and then out still further to figure out who or what the sailors might be). Often, these 
types of riddles also employ some sort of metonymy with the use of divine names to stand in for 
things with which those gods are associated.187 
(2) Pun/double meaning: a particularly common example of this involves κόρη used in a way 
that seems to indicate young girl, for example, but the solution requires it to be understood 
as pupil or eyeball 
Ἐν πυρὶ κοιμηθεῖσα κόρη θάνεν· ὁ προδότης δὲ 
οἶνος· ὑφ᾿ οὗ δὲ θάνεν, Παλλάδος ἦν στέλεχος· 
ὁ κτείνας ναυηγός· ἐνὶ ζώοντι δὲ τύμβῳ 
κεῖται μεμφομένη τὰς Βρομίου χάριτας. 
Παλλὰς καὶ Βρόμιός τε καὶ ὁ κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις, 
οἱ τρεῖς τὴν μούνην παρθένον ἠφάνισαν. 
Anth. Pal. 14.109 
A sleeping girl (κόρη) died in a fire. The traitor was 
wine. The thing by which she died was a log of Athena’s, 
the one who killed her was shipwrecked; in a living tomb 
she lies, blaming the blessings of Bromius. 
Pallas and Bromius and the famed lame one, the three 
did away with a single girl. 
Here, the story of Odysseus blinding Polyphemus is told in an oblique fashion. The “girl” 
mentioned at the start is in fact the Cyclops’ eye and she (the eye) is “killed” by a heated (by means 
of fire, or Hephaestus, the “famed lame one”) stake of olive wood (Pallas) wielded by the 
shipwrecked Odysseus. The eye/girl now lies in the “living tomb” that is the eye socket of the still-
living Polyphemus. Bromius, of course, is the wine that incapacitated Polyphemus.  
 
(3) Paradox: a seemingly impossible situation is described which signals to the hearer that it is a 
riddle 
 
Μὴ λέγε, καὶ λέξεις ἐμὸν οὔνομα. δεῖ δέ σε λέξαι; 
ὧδε πάλιν, μέγα θαῦμα, λέγων ἐμὸν οὔνομα λέξεις. 
Anth. Pal. 14.22 
Do not speak and you will say my name. But do you 
need to speak? Well—what a marvelous thing!—by 
speaking you will also say my name!  
 
                                                   
187 As an example of this, see Anth. Pal. 14.53: Ἡφαίστῳ ποτὲ Παλλὰς ὑπ᾿ ἀγκοίνῃσι δαμεῖσα / εἰς εὐνὴν ἐμίγη 
Πηλέος ἐν θαλάμοις· / τοὶ δ᾿ ὡς οὖν λιπαρῇσι καλυφθήτην ὀθόνῃσιν, / αὐτίκ᾿ ἐγεννήθη νυκτιπόλος Φαέθων 
(Once, Pallas was mastered by the embraces of Hephaestus and she mixed with him in sleep in the bedchambers of 
Peleus. And when the two of them were covered by fine, shining linen, suddenly night-roaming Phaethon was born). 
Here, Pallas metonymically represents (olive) oil and Hephaestus represents fire. The “bedchambers of Peleus,” 
playing on the popular derivation of Peleus from πηλός (clay) here represent a lamp, and Phaethon is the light that 
comes out of the lamp, once oil and fire are combined.  
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Οὐδεὶς βλέπων βλέπει με, μὴ βλέπων δ᾿ ὁρᾷ· 
ὁ μὴ λαλῶν λαλεῖ, ὁ μὴ τρέχων τρέχει· 
ψευδὴς δ᾿ ὑπάρχω, πάντα τἀληθῆ λέγων. 
Anth. Pal. 14.110 
No one who looks sees me, but one who isn’t looking 
sees. The one who is not speaking, speaks; the one 
who is not running, runs. 
I am false, while speaking all truth.  
 
In the first instance, the answer is silence,188 since by not speaking at all, someone could be 
understood to be “speaking silence,” as well as by actually saying the word “silence.” Here, the 
riddle hinges on the fact that “silence” is both an absence of sound and a word. For the second 
riddle, the answer is a dream, since only someone whose eyes are closed in sleep (i.e. not “looking”) 
can see a dream. Similarly, a sleeping person cannot speak or run, but they can seem to do so in a 
dream, and dreams are simultaneously both false and true, since the events seen in a dream are not 
actually occurring, but the message conveyed by the dream is understood to be true.189 This type of 
riddle sets up things that seem to be incompatible but turn out to be true, from an unexpected 
perspective. By framing the solution in this apparently unrealizable way, it clearly identifies itself as 
a riddle—if the statement is true, then something about it must need to be reinterpreted to make 
sense of the contradictions.190  
Finally, as noted above, the majority of riddles have very commonplace solutions, at least in 
the sample that survives. The requisite skill set to solve a riddle is not, in general, a breadth of 
knowledge. Instead, it is a mental agility. Luz notes that: 
The dense and highly sophisticated way the riddles describe their objects forms a certain 
contrast with the nature of these objects themselves. They are commonplace things or 
famous episodes or characters drawn from a common stock of knowledge such as everyday 
life or Greek myth and literature. No extraordinary knowledge of the world is required as 
far as the solution of the riddles is concerned. The point of the riddles is not to present an 
object as rare or recherché as possible but to disguise something mundane in the most 
sophisticated and hard-to-guess way. Hence it is not the objects of the riddles which require 
wide-ranging knowledge as well as the ability to see through allusions and to deal with their 
                                                   
188 This solution is not universally acknowledged. Buffière 1970 ad loc. provides a range of other conjectured answers to 
this riddle, though the lemma (Paris. 1409) provides σιγή as the solution. Other conjectures include μὴ πάλιν 
(Lange), οὐδέ (Prévost), οὐδέν (Welcker), the negation (Rossignol), and Μὴ...δεῖ...α/Μήδεια (Buttmann). Buffière 
emends λέξεις to λήξεις in the second line, which he feels makes the riddle more of a jeu de mots. I see no need to 
emend, however, and the riddle seems to work just as well (in fact, better) with λέξεις as the final word.  
189 My initial reading of this riddle assumed that it referred to perception that dreams can be both true or (at times) 
notoriously false. I was here thinking in particular of Agamemnon’s famously false dream from Zeus in Iliad 2. Through 
conversation with Scodel (per litt.) I have come to realize that the far stronger reading understands this as a reference 
to the ways in which any dream is simultaneously false and true, as described above. It is true that dreams can, at least 
in certain literary contexts, be false, but I am convinced that this riddle must be disregarding such situations and instead 
assuming that the prophetic message of a dream is always true.  
190 As will be explored in greater detail later, this is a fundamental semiotic issue, in that riddles involve finding a 
secondary (or even tertiary) relationship between the signifier and the signified. For an application of Saussurean 
semiotics to classical texts, see Manetti 1993. 
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intricate and roundabout expressions; rather it is the process of decoding the riddles’ 
disguise which demands all this and challenges the recipient’s intellectual capacity.191 
 
Let us return then to the riddle of the Sphinx. As noted earlier, the well-known riddle of the 
Sphinx is absent from the play. Nonetheless, at least a portion of the audience would likely supply 
some form of this riddle and it is as good an exemplum as any to explore the genre of riddles.192 
Looking at this riddle, we can see the same mechanisms at work as in our broader sample of riddles 
from the Greek Anthology: 
ἔστι δίπουν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τετράπον, οὗ μία μορφή, 
καὶ τρίπον, ἀλλάσσει δὲ φυὴν μόνον ὅσσ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
ἑρπετὰ κινεῖται καὶ ἀν’ αἰθέρα καὶ κατὰ πόντον· 
ἀλλ’ ὁπόταν τρισσοῖσιν ἐπειγόμενον ποσὶ βαίνῃ, 
ἔνθα τάχος γυίοισιν ἀφαυρότατον πέλει αὑτοῦ. 
There is, on the earth, a thing that is two-footed and 
four-footed, and one form [or one voice], and it is 
three-footed as well, and it alone changes its form [or 
its nature], out of so many creatures that move across 
the land and through the air and in the sea, but 
whenever it goes about, moving itself forward with 
three feet, then the swiftness in its limbs is weakest.  
 
The adjectives are all neuter (a two-footed and four-footed thing) and the words here are far more 
commonly used for animals (ἑρπετά and ἕρπω are not commonly used of humans, though they 
can be),193 and the descriptions of land and sea and air incline the listener to think of a non-human 
animal. Here, we see the metonymic type of riddle operating and only by thinking more broadly 
about what might be included in the category of “creatures that move across the land and through 
the air and in the sea” can we see that the solution is Man. Whether or not we are justified in 
thinking that this particular riddle was the riddle that Sophocles’ Oedipus solved before the play 
begins, solving any riddle would presumably require the same sort of interpretive skill—an ability to 
                                                   
191 Luz 2013: 96 
192 Either Sophocles has no particular riddle in mind, and only the generic idea of the riddle, or he intends to call this 
version of the riddle to mind in his audience while leaving it conspicuously unmentioned. Either way, there are clear 
references to an αἴνιγμα and we are, I think, justified in supplying this particular riddle as a placeholder in order to 
examine the broader linguistic principles that govern riddles.  
193 ἕρπω is, admittedly, much semantically broader and is used of Odysseus (Hom. Od. 17.158), Aphrodite (h.Ven. 
156), and the Pythia (Aesch. Eum. 39). It is also used in a general sense, to describe abstract subjects, as a rough 
equivalent to “come (slowly/gradually)” without the animalistic connotations of “crawl,” as at Pind. N. 7.67-8 (ὁ δὲ 
λοιπὸς εὔφρων / ποτὶ χρόνος ἕρποι) and Aesch. Ag. 450-1 (φθονερὸν δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλγος ἕρπει προδίκοις Ἀτρείδαις). 
ἕρπω does, however, often refer to animals, as at Pind. O. 7.52 (ζωοῖσιν ἑρπόντεσσί) and it is often used to describe 
the range of living things that move about the earth, as at Il. 17.446-7 (οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς 
/ πάντων, ὅσσά τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἕρπει.) and h.Cer. 365 (ὁπόσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει). ἑρπετόν, however, 
does not have this semantic range and occurs to describe monsters (as of the varied forms that Proteus will take at 
Hom. Od. 4.418, Typhon at Pind.P.1.25, and Python at Anth.Graec. 3.6) and non-human animals (a dog at Pind. Frag. 
106.3, creeping animals that attack gardens at Arist. Av. 1069-70, and non-flying creatures, at Her. Hist. 1.140). As 
noted by the range of definitions provided in LSJ, it is used primarily (and broadly) of a “beast or animal which goes on 
all fours” and “creeping thing, reptile, esp. snake.” 
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think abstractly about language and make unexpected connections and associations to bring a 
secret, hidden meaning out of the words. The claims, by both the priest and Oedipus, that Oedipus 
knew nothing when he solved the riddle of the Sphinx (οὐδὲν ἐξειδὼς πλέον, 37; ὁ μηδὲν εἰδὼς 
Οἰδίπους, 397)194—an odd word choice for a man who is famous for knowing the riddle that no 
one else could solve— now make somewhat more sense. The skill of the riddle-solver is specifically 
not one of specialized or rare knowledge. His heroic victory over the Sphinx was a victory of 
decoding artificially intricate language to reveal the simple underlying reality,195 not a victory of 
superior information.  
As we will see, the oracles in this play are not particularly cryptic or riddling, in the 
traditional sense. There is no question about the semantic meaning of the prophecy that Oedipus 
will kill his father and marry his mother, but there is a very real question of what those words 
correspond to. This play hinges on Oedipus’ eventual understanding of the oracular “riddle” that 
he was unable to solve before; the way he described Tiresias’ inability to solve the riddle of the 
Sphinx will be precisely Oedipus’ own failing. Oedipus accuses Tiresias of not being able to explain 
fully (διειπεῖν, 394) what the riddle meant (and, by extension, of not being able to save the city).196 
He cannot mean that Tiresias did not understand the semantic meanings of the words the Sphinx 
used, but he is instead reproaching Tiresias for his inability to find the unexpected solution that met 
the description provided in the riddle.197  
                                                   
194 The clever pun in this line should be noted. Oedipus’ name has several different folk etymologies, but one of them 
derives his name from οἶδα + πούς (Oedipus is the man know knows about feet) and collocating his name with a form 
of οἶδα nods to this folk etymology. This is also a prime example of the allusions within the play to the content of the 
Sphinx’ riddle without explicitly mentioning the riddle, as discussed at fn. 19. 
195 It is worth noting that this is precisely what constitutes linguistic communication as well, on a basic semiotic and 
semantic level. If we adopt a basic definition of semantics as being “concerned with the relations of signs to denotata” 
(Matthews 2007, paraphrasing C.W. Morris), then Oedipus’ great victory as a riddle-solver is both pragmatic (since a 
riddle requires a recontextualization of language) as well as semantic in nature. He is the one who is able to identify, in 
the signs of the riddle, the proper denotatum (man). Riddles draw on unintuitive signifier-signified relationships, but 
they are entirely concerned with the relationship between signifier and signified.  
196 διειπεῖν is, as Dawe 1982 and others have noted, a somewhat odd word choice. It also occurs at Trachiniae 22, 
where its use is not so odd: καὶ τρόπον μὲν ἂν πόνων / οὐκ ἂν διείποιμ᾽· οὐ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ (Trach. 21-2). In this play, 
however, it occurs twice, both in complicated passages. Here, we have it used to describe Oedipus’ interactions with 
the Sphinx, as well as at line 854, to describe Apollo’s oracular warning about the child that Laius and Jocasta would 
bear (εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τι κἀκτρέποιτο τοῦ πρόσθεν λόγου, / οὔτοι ποτ᾽, ὦναξ, σόν γε Λαΐου φόνον / φανεῖ δικαίως 
ὀρθόν, ὅν γε Λοξίας / διεῖπε χρῆναι παιδὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ θανεῖν, OT 851-4).  
197 On this point, and the peculiarity of διειπεῖν, Bollack 1990 is useful. Bollack’s understanding of the use of διειπεῖν 
offers a particularly clever and illuminating reading that merges the disparate meanings that the context suggests, as 
both a sort of speaking (since ηὔδας at 392 is contrasted with διειπεῖν—whereas Tiresias could not speak anything that 
would save the citizens, Oedipus was able to διειπεῖν) as well as a sort of solving (since the direct object of διειπεῖν is 
τό…αἴνιγμ᾽ at 393). Bollack suggests that the great triumph of Oedipus is not only that he knows the answer to the 
riddle, but that he is capable of translating the riddle and speaking what needs to be spoken in response to it. The 
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Ironically, Oedipus’ inability to replicate this feat will be the central interpretive failure of 
the play, as he fails to see that he is the unexpected solution that meets all of Apollo’s descriptions. 
The language is almost deceptively clear in the oracles that Oedipus receives, but there is a critical 
piece of information left out (the identity of Laius’ killer, in the case of the plague; the identity of 
Oedipus’ father and mother, in the oracle about his fate). Without this information, a clever riddle-
solver could still broaden their interpretation and understandings of the oracles and find the 
correct meaning, assuming they recognized the necessity of doing so.   
In fact, to return to one of the sample riddles I provided above, about silence, the critical 
missing piece of information would be that we are shifting between a word and the external reality 
to which it corresponds—or, to use the Saussurean terminology, between the signifier and the 
signified. In the context of an actual riddle, this ruins all the fun, but meaning emerges much more 
effectively: 
Do not speak and you will say my name. 
But do you need to speak? Well—what a 
marvelous thing!—by speaking you will 
also say my name! 
 
Be silent and you will enact my meaning. 
Alternatively, you can also say the word 
that represents me and you will be 
representing me that way too! 
 
Meaning emerges, but the riddle is no longer a riddle. Our “marvelous thing”—the ability of an 
unexpected solution to solve an apparent paradox—is gone, but in its place we have clarity and 
ready comprehension.  
The riddle of the Sphinx, whatever its form, is such a useful starting point because it helps 
us to see what sort of interpretive moves Oedipus needed to have made in order to understand the 
oracles about himself. It also helps us to think in a more nuanced way about why he does not 
“solve” the riddle of himself. There are specific rules in play when solving a riddle which mostly 
                                                   
nature of Oedipus’ victory is, in this view, a distinctly linguistic accomplishment, one that is tied up with the spoken 
word and Oedipus’ ability to render something that is unintelligible to others into a clear, intelligible form. In Bollack’s 
words, Oedipus can turn la parole chantée into something spoken, whereas it remains inassimilable and indicible to 
Tiresias and the others : “L’idée de solution peut être retrouvée dans le verbe, sans qu’on en modifie l’acception obvie, 
si la ‘parole,’ et les distinctions qu’elle établit, sont opposées à la récitation ‘rhapsodique’ de la Sphinge, qui s’exprime 
par symboles. Son chant reste confus tant que la chose absente n’est pas cernée par l’introduction d’un sujet dans une 
proposition prédicative qui explicite les références. ‘Dire l’énigme,’ c’est donc en posséder la représentation qui permet 
de se l’approprier par le langage. Le fait qu’Œdipe puisse ‘parler’ . . . montre que la parole chantée a pu être assimilée 
par Œdipe, alors que pour les autres, dont le devin, elle était restée inassimilable, et donc indicible. De même, dans les 
derniers vers, τὰ κλείν᾽ αἰνίγματ᾽ ᾔδει [1525] eut ne pas signifier seulement qu’Œdipe connaissait la solution, mais 
qu’il sut dire ce qu’il fallait. Le ‘texte’ n’est pas alors, comme dans les vers qui nous ont transmis l’énigme, le ‘chant’ du 
monstre, mais sa transposition articulée dans le langage qui en fait une réponse efficace, composée pour le maîtriser” 
(Bollack 1990 ad 393f.) 
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consist of disregarding several of the rules of normal speech. To solve a riddle, a listener must 
consciously discard the obvious, natural, intended meanings of words and the most logical 
correspondence between the signifier and the signified. Instead, they must find a less natural or less 
obvious correspondence which may involve a secondary meaning of a word or a more metaphorical 
or abstract interpretation of the question. In normal conversations, however, this flies directly in the 
face of the understood and accepted ways of communicating. I have replicated Grice’s Maxims 
here, as a reference point for what I have argued, in the previous chapter, that standard 
communication should entail: 
Maxims of Conversations:  
QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false [i.e. do not lie]. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
QUANTITY: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
RELATION: Be relevant. 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity.) 
4. Be orderly. 
 
For a riddle, all of these maxims are at risk of being broken in some capacity. Riddles abound with 
willfully misleading language (though, critically, the content must still be true, and can only seem to 
break the maxim of Quality), red herrings (breaking the maxim of Quantity and/or Relation), and 
ambiguous or obscure expressions (breaking the maxim of Manner). In fact, their efficacy as riddles 
depends on how they skillfully and judiciously198 disregard these maxims. We can see, then, that the 
rules of normal speech and the rules of riddles stand in sharp contrast to one another. When 
Oedipus does not realize that he ought to approach these oracles as a riddle, he applies the wrong 
                                                   
198 Judiciously, in that a complete and total disregard of these maxims would result in absurdity or nonsense. A well-
constructed riddle needs to balance conformity with and divergence from these maxims. An appropriate balance 
ensures that there is enough readily-intelligible information to solve the riddle but not so much that there is no 
challenge to the hearer. A failure to strike the right balance is the problem with the final “riddle” that Bilbo Baggins 
tells Gollum in The Hobbit. “What is in my pocket?” is not constructed in a way that gives Gollum enough information 
to solve it, and he would need to have specific outside knowledge in order to answer correctly, whereas all of the other 
riddles contain sufficient information to be solved based solely on the language of the riddle. As Luz notes, of this same 
passage in The Hobbit, we can see from this that not all questions are riddles (Luz 2013: 83), as Bilbo himself 
recognizes, since “that last question had not been a genuine riddle according to the ancient laws.” 
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set of rules to this oracular language and cannot see the true meaning of the words until it is too 
late.  
 
Oracles and Prophecy in the Oedipus Tyrannus 
The plot of the Oedipus Tyrannus centers on prophecies in much the same way that the 
Trachiniae does, though the actual mechanisms of the prophecies turn out to be very different. 
Rather than a central oracle whose form shifts and changes throughout the play, as we see in the 
Trachiniae, the Oedipus Tyrannus prominently features a fairly stable oracle and all the outcomes 
of these prophecies have already taken place before this play begins. The critical oracular 
misunderstanding here does not stem from a fatal inability to understand the language that the 
oracle employs. Instead, Oedipus and Jocasta are both unable to correctly associate the words in 
the prophecy with the objects they reference. There is nothing inherently cryptic about the words 
of the oracle, though it will be illuminating to look more closely at what Apollo’s oracle specifically 
does not say; the misunderstandings occur because the hearers think that they can correctly fill in 
the gaps left by what Apollo does not say when, in fact, they cannot. As I trace the multiple 
incarnations of these different prophecies, it will become clear that there are multiple sets of 
“rules” in play. The rules of cooperative conversation, as detailed in Chapter 1, remain relevant, 
but here we can see the rules of riddles in play, too, as well as a complex process of blending and 
bending of these different sets of rules and linguistic principles.  
Although the most famous oracle—that Oedipus will kill his father and sleep with his 
mother—tends to overshadow any examination of this play, there are two major groups of 
prophecies that run throughout it. In addition to the more well-known prophecy, which has 
already been fulfilled by the time the play begins, there is also the “prophecy” with which the play 
opens, which reveals instructions from Apollo about how Thebes can remove the plague. It is 
perhaps more accurate to call this second message from Delphi something like “oracular 
instructions,” since this does not describe an unavoidable fate (as is the case with the true prophecy 
about Oedipus killing his father and sleeping with his mother). However, since it does offer a 
guaranteed outcome about the future, I feel comfortable classifying this as a second type of 
prophecy. There is also a third type of prophecy that does not fit neatly into either category, but 
which shares a great deal with both types. These are the utterances of Tiresias, which predict the 
exact nature of the fulfillment of the two oracles—that Oedipus will realize that he is guilty of 
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killing his father (which brought on the plague in the first place) and sleeping with his mother, and 
that he will blind himself when he realizes all of this.  
As I noted above, these oracles cannot be neatly compartmentalized. Oracles are alluded to 
and hinted at and used in a variety of rhetorical contexts that obscure the details and either 
minimize or highlight certain elements, as the situation demands. However, I will nonetheless 
attempt to separate out and examine the three different types and contexts of prophetic utterances 
that occur in this play before looking at them all more holistically. From this examination, we will 
see the role that Apollo’s speech plays. Though one might easily believe that Apollo is malicious, I 
argue that we are not compelled to see malice or deception in his words. Rather, I suggest, Apollo 
is in much the same position as Zeus in the Trachiniae—his motives are entirely inaccessible to the 
mortals in the play and the mortals in the audience. We can only access Apollo through language 
and, as evidenced by the confusion surrounding the meaning of these oracles, Apollo’s language 
conforms only with the semantic rules of human communication, but not the pragmatic 
conventions. Not to take too pithy an approach to this complex linguistic issue, but I argue here 
that Apollo is not necessarily bad, but simply misunderstood.  
 
1. Oracular Instructions and the Plague 
I will begin, as the play itself does, with the oracular instructions that Creon receives from 
Delphi about how Thebes can be freed from the plague it is facing. These instructions do not 
involve the pragmatics of riddles to the degree that other oracles in this play do, but they do allow 
us to see how Apollo obscures meaning and hinders effective communication. This opening scene 
juxtaposes plague and healing as well as oracular communication and obfuscation. As such, it 
includes multiple spheres in which Apollo operates and it displays his potential role as both 
benefactor and adversary to mortals.199 Though the details will become clear throughout this 
                                                   
199 This is not a particularly strange or unexpected attribute of a god and Apollo regularly uses his divine attributes to 
both help and hinder mortals (as in Iliad 1, when he sends a plague, even though he is the god of healing). Knox 1957 
9-10 claims that Sophocles “repeatedly and emphatically” insists that the plague is not to be considered as coming 
from Apollo. He instead suggests that the Chorus associates the plague with Ares, and whether or not they are correct 
to do so, Sophocles is “clearly insisting” that the plague is not to be understood as the work of Apollo. While I agree 
that the Chorus does not attribute the plague to Apollo, I do not see anything to suggest that Sophocles is clearly 
insisting that Apollo is uninvolved in the plague. The divine is inscrutable throughout this play, and while Knox 
conclusively proves that the Chorus does not associate the plague with Apollo, we cannot, I think, assume that the 
Chorus is correct. Issues of sickness and health are Apollo’s traditional domain and Apollo is deeply involved in the 
events of this play. I see no reason to think that the plague is not Apollo’s work, though it is not explicitly attributed to 
Apollo in the play. As I discuss in this chapter, a great deal about Apollo is unclear and ambiguous, but the text allows 
for a reading in which the plague is his doing. 
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section, my central argument here is that the mere presence of Apollo serves to hinder 
understanding.200 By “presence,” I mean something very broad—either his physical proximity (as 
when Oedipus goes to Delphi) or his linguistic or ideological presence, which is a much more 
nebulous concept. In my first example, we will see that when Creon recounts the words of the god 
(a god of light and clarity—themes that are emphasized ironically throughout the play201) 
communication breaks down. In this instance, Apollo is “present” when his words are being 
recounted by Creon (this is what I mean by his “linguistic presence”). In other instances, he is 
“present” when Jocasta is talking about Apollo. The idea of Apollo seems capable of causing 
misunderstanding, as well as the words he actually says. While I recognize that this is a loosely 
defined phenomenon, it does nonetheless hold true in a way that complements the more obvious 
issues with understanding and misunderstanding that occur throughout the play.  
Let us turn, then, to the oracular instructions Creon receives concerning the plague in 
Thebes. The terrible plague (λοιμὸς ἔχθιστος, 28), we are told by the priest, is the result of an 
unnamed god, who is identified only as ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς (27), and the city is described quite 
vividly as drowning in waves of death which involve a blight on crops and herds as well as stillbirths 
and miscarriages among the women of Thebes.202 Oedipus tells the citizens that he has given the 
plague a great deal of thought (πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις, 67), and since he 
could not come up with a solution on his own, he sent Creon to Delphi to consult Apollo.203 When 
Creon returns, Oedipus immediately asks to know what the oracle is (ἔστιν δὲ ποῖον τοὔπος; 
                                                   
200 On this note, his epithet Λοξίας is relevant. Though its origins are unclear, the epithet is plausibly connected with 
λοξός (slantwise) and several texts connect this with the indirect and ambiguous nature of Apollo’s prophecies. Others 
(e.g., Cleanth. Stoic. 1.123) connect this epithet to the elliptical orbit of the sun. However, the belief that Apollo was so 
named because of his confusing oracles is pervasive and it corroborates my overall argument that Apollo is a force of 
confusion and misinterpretation.  
201 The plot of the entire play is concerned with vision (in a literal and metaphorical sense) and clarity and bringing 
secret, hidden truths out into the light, it is not surprising that these ideas are reflected in the language of the play. 
Though this is certainly not an exhaustive list, it does show the pervasiveness of words relating to clarity and visibility: 
ἐμφανής (96, 908); σαφής (286, 390, 604, 702, 846, 958, 978, 1065, 1132, 1182, 1325. Of Apollo specifically: 106, 
1011); φαίνω and compounds of it (146, 164, 453. 457, 474, 725, 754, 832. 853, 1059, 1229, 1383). φῶς (375, 1183, 
1229, 1428). See Buxton 1996 for more on this.  
202 πόλις γάρ, ὥσπερ καὐτὸς εἰσορᾷς, ἄγαν / ἤδη σαλεύει κἀνακουφίσαι κάρα / βυθῶν ἔτ᾽ οὐχ οἵα τε φοινίου 
σάλου, / φθίνουσα μὲν κάλυξιν ἐγκάρποις χθονός, / φθίνουσα δ᾽ ἀγέλαις βουνόμοις τόκοισί τε / ἀγόνοις 
γυναικῶν, 22-7. 
203 παῖδα γὰρ Μενοικέως / Κρέοντ᾽, ἐμαυτοῦ γαμβρόν, ἐς τὰ Πυθικὰ / ἔπεμψα Φοίβου δώμαθ᾽, ὡς πύθοιθ᾽ ὅ 
τι / δρῶν ἢ τί φωνῶν τήνδε ῥυσαίμην πόλιν, 69-72. 
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89).204 Though we have had hints and allusions to prophecies before now,205 this is the first overt 
instance of an oracular pronouncement within the play: 
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Κρέων 
λέγοιμ᾽ ἂν οἷ᾽ ἤκουσα τοῦ θεοῦ πάρα.  
ἄνωγεν ἡμᾶς Φοῖβος ἐμφανῶς ἄναξ  
μίασμα χώρας, ὡς τεθραμμένον χθονὶ  
ἐν τῇδ᾽, ἐλαύνειν μηδ᾽ ἀνήκεστον τρέφειν. 
Οἰδίπους 
ποίῳ καθαρμῷ; τίς ὁ τρόπος206 τῆς ξυμφορᾶς; 
Κρέων 
ἀνδρηλατοῦντας ἢ φόνῳ φόνον πάλιν  
λύοντας, ὡς τόδ᾽ αἷμα χειμάζον πόλιν. 
Οἰδίπους 
ποίου γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τήνδε μηνύει τύχην; 
Κρέων 
ἦν ἡμίν, ὦναξ, Λάϊός ποθ᾽ ἡγεμὼν  
γῆς τῆσδε, πρὶν σὲ τήνδ᾽ ἀπευθύνειν πόλιν. 
Οἰδίπους 
ἔξοιδ᾽ ἀκούων· οὐ γὰρ εἰσεῖδόν γέ πω. 
Κρέων 
τούτου θανόντος νῦν ἐπιστέλλει σαφῶς  
Creon 
I will tell you the things I heard from the god.  
Lord Phoebus clearly bid us to drive pollution out of 
the land—pollution that he says has been nourished 
in this land—and not to nourish it, incurable.208  
Oedipus 
With what sort of purification?209 What is the manner 
of the misfortune? 
Creon 
Banishment, or paying back murder with murder,  
since this blood is storm-tossing the city.  
Oedipus 
Yes, of what sort of man is this fate that he reveals? 
Creon 
Lord, Laius was our leader in this land,  
before you restored this city.  
Oedipus 
I am well acquainted with him, by reputation, for I 
never looked upon him at all.  
Creon 
That man died and now Apollo clearly orders us  
to punish the murderers, whoever they are, by force.  
Oedipus 
Where on earth are they? Where will this trace,  
hard to make out, of an ancient guilt be found? 
Creon 
He said in this land. The thing that’s being sought 
                                                   
204 As Jebb notes on this passage, the τοὔπος here refers to the oracle itself, drawing a contrast with Creon’s own words 
(λέγω, 87; λόγῳ, 90). Jebb here draws a parallel with τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον, at Trach. 822, which is a particularly 
salient comparison in the context of this project. 
205 E.g., μαντείᾳ σποδῷ (21), which Dawe suggests may refer to the temple of Apollo σπόδιος or divination by burnt 
offerings. At line 52, though it must refer to a good omen in a more generic sense, and not the actual practice of 
divination through bird signs, ὄρνιθι αἰσίῳ nonetheless calls to mind other practices of divination as well. Creon’s 
report, then, is introduced in a context in which other prophetic alternatives have at least been called to mind. This 
serves to highlight subtly the differences between these methods of receiving information from the divine. What sets 
oracular communication apart is its peculiarly linguistic nature (see pages 29-31 in the Introduction for a more 
thorough discussion of the shift from methods of divination that rely on natural signs to methods that communicate 
linguistically). 
206 F.W. Schmidt’s emendation of πόρος here is tempting, but I read τρόπος with Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, which is in 
the manuscripts. Dawe’s argument is compelling that τρόπος “can be dismissed, for Oedipus can hardly be asking for 
the characteristics of the misfortune, since everyone present knows them already” (ad 99), but a difficult reading is not 
reason enough to emend the text.  
208 I have tried to leave the ambiguity in this line, since there is debate as to the proper interpretation of ἀνήκεστον. 
Jebb suggests that the adjective is a proleptic predicate and that “the μίασμα is ἀνήκεστον in the sense that it cannot 
be healed by anything else than the death or banishment of the blood-guilty. But it can still be healed if that expiation 
is made” (ad 98). Dawe suggests that this can mean either “without curing it” or can be taken predicatively, to mean 
“to that it becomes incurable” (ad 98). While the translation I have chosen is not the most elegant, I hope that it 
preserves the ambiguity of the line and leaves the different interpretive paths open to the reader. 
209 ποίῳ καθαρμῷ; could also be understood as “purification for what?” here, since ποῖος can be used to ask a 
speaker to elaborate further on a point, when the interlocutor thinks that they have missed some critical piece of 
information.  
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τοὺς αὐτοέντας χειρὶ τιμωρεῖν τινας.207 
Οἰδίπους 
οἳ δ᾽ εἰσὶ ποῦ γῆς; ποῦ τόδ᾽ εὑρεθήσεται  
ἴχνος παλαιᾶς δυστέκμαρτον αἰτίας; 
Κρέων 
ἐν τῇδ᾽ ἔφασκε γῇ· τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον  
ἁλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει δὲ τἀμελούμενον. 
OT 95-111 
can be caught, but the thing that’s neglected can 
escape.  
 
 
Apollo is described as having bid them clearly (ἐμφανῶς), which is true, at least to a point. There 
will be no sudden “trick” meaning that emerges from this prophecy, as we saw in the Trachiniae. 
The meaning is clear: the pollution (μίασμα) must be driven out of the land. The issue here is that 
it is unclear what (or who) the pollution actually is, which is precisely what Oedipus tries to 
uncover next. Here, things begin to be somewhat less clear. Creon’s account blends his own words 
with those of Apollo and the words of the god become lost within Creon’s own words.210 This 
would not be such a critical issue, if the meaning were clearly transmitted, but we see in the ensuing 
conversation that Creon and Oedipus are not communicating very effectively. Approaching this 
exchange with Gricean maxims in mind, we can readily identify the problem: given the context 
here, this ought certainly to be a cooperative conversation—that is, both parties have an interest in 
effectively communicating—and yet it does not seem to operate that way. The ways that this 
conversation both challenges and breaks many pragmatic principles shed a great deal of light onto 
the problems of communication in this play, especially in the context of transmitting and 
understanding the language of the divine.  
Were Creon, in a normal context, to relate that Apollo “clearly bade us drive pollution out 
of the land—pollution that he says is being nourished in this land—and not to nourish it, 
incurable,” in a normal context, he would implicate211 that this “pollution” was something that 
would (or should) be known to everyone. His words also suggest that this was all that Apollo said, 
                                                   
207 Jebb finds no problem with the text as printed here and suggests that the “τοὺς implies that the death had human 
authors; τινας, that they are unknown” and points to OC 288-9 as a parallel (ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ κύριος / παρῇ τις), which he 
translates as “the master—whoever he be.” Dawe, however, thinks that the indefinite pronoun cannot be used in this 
way and argues that the usage is unknown. Instead, he thinks that τινας must be corrupt and suggests that it is a 
corruption from an adjective meant to modify χειρὶ. He has suggested τίται, for a reading of “to punish them with an 
avenging hand,” but acknowledges that it is a rare enough word that we cannot feel confident about the conjecture. 
Kassel also cites K.-G. i. 662 ff. to support the manuscript reading, and I am convinced that this line does not need 
emendation.  
210 This is, of course, an inescapable problem with prophecies and is something that we saw in the Trachiniae, most 
strikingly in the case of Deianeira’s accounts. The gods are mediated through oracular prophecies and then these 
prophecies are mediated again through the people who heard the oracle and recount it to other characters on stage. 
211 See the Introduction or Appendix B for a brief overview of these terms. 
 102 
or at least that this is the extent of the relevant information that Oedipus might need (drawing, 
respectively, on the maxims of relation and quantity). Further, the miscommunications which run 
throughout this scene begin here, since Creon does not specify the type of pollution, so Oedipus 
does not know that this is pollution that resulted from a murder. The issue which causes Schmidt to 
emend the next line from τρόπος (as the manuscripts read) to πόρος is, as Dawe notes, “Oedipus 
can hardly be asking for the characteristics of the misfortune, since everyone present knows them 
already” (ad 99). This question makes a great deal more sense, and the manuscript reading can be 
preserved, in light of the fact that Creon has not specified the nature of the pollution in any detail. 
Everyone in Thebes knows about the plague, but no one else besides Creon knows the origin of the 
miasma which is causing the plague.  
With that in mind, when Oedipus asks what sort of purification is necessary (ποίῳ 
καθαρμῷ; 99) and what the nature of the misfortune is (τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς; 99), he is 
requesting more information, even though Creon has just implicated that Apollo did not say any 
more than what Oedipus has already heard. This would make sense if he were asking Creon to help 
him determine what Apollo means by μίασμα, but Creon seems to have more information from 
Delphi. Creon tells him that the two available options are banishment (ἀνδρηλατοῦντας) or 
retributive murder (φόνῳ φόνον πάλιν λύοντας). The distinction here is subtle, but Creon does 
not exactly answer the questions that Oedipus has asked (he focuses almost entirely on the question 
ποίῳ καθαρμῷ; and generally ignores the question about the nature of their misfortune 212), 
responding as though Oedipus had simply asked what action they should take (τί ποιοῦντας;).213 
While his response is not entirely tailored to the questions he is asked, Creon’s response suggests 
                                                   
212 Jebb understands ξυμφορᾶς as a euphemism for guilt, citing parallels at Pl. Lg. 934B (τοῦ δ’ εἰς τὸν αὖθις ἕνεκα 
χρόνον ἢ τὸ παράπαν μισῆσαι τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἰδόντας αὐτὸν δικαιούμενον, ἢ λωφῆσαι μέρη 
πολλὰ τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς) and 854D (Ὃς δ’ ἂν ἱεροσυλῶν ληφθῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ δοῦλος ἢ ξένος, ἐν τῷ 
προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶ γραφεὶς τὴν συμφοράν), though I am not persuaded by this interpretation. In both of the 
passages he cites, the συμφορά is closely connected with a crime and the guilt for that crime, but the meaning is still 
“misfortune” and the idea of guilt is implied, but it is not part of the semantic meaning and I do not feel that these 
examples necessarily suggest guilt here. Nonetheless, I do not feel that this merits emendation (as Dawe does), since the 
text here (printed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson) is perfectly legible, if challenging to interpret.  
213 Jebb comments upon this (ad 100 ff.), drawing upon the fact that he keeps τρόπος at 99, which increases the 
disconnect between Oedipus’ question and Creon’s answer. On Jebb’s reading, Oedipus has asked about what sort of 
purification is necessary and what the nature of the misfortune is, and Creon has answered neither of those questions. 
His point is still relevant, however, on either reading of the line. However, though Jebb notes the odd form that the 
conversation takes, and the way that the two men seem to be “talking past” one another, he seems to suggest that the 
disconnect in this conversation begins with Creon (of Creon, at line 100, he says that it is “[a]s if, instead of ποίῳ 
καθαρμῷ, the question had been τί ποιοῦντας;”). I would suggest instead that it begins with Oedipus, one line 
earlier, and that Creon is simply continuing the conversation as though Oedipus had not asked a somewhat off-topic 
question.  
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that he has anticipated Oedipus’ question and has assumed that he will want to take action above 
all else, something very much in keeping with the overall characterization of Oedipus as a man of 
relentless action.214 To push this point farther, however, I would suggest that what Creon answers is 
the question that we might have expected Oedipus to ask after being told that Apollo demands that 
they drive out the pollution from the land: “What is the pollution and how can we drive it out?” 
Banishment and execution are the only options for how to drive it out, because the pollution is this 
blood (τόδ᾽ αἷμα). Blood has not yet been mentioned in the conversation though, despite Creon’s 
use of a deictic, suggesting that this blood is known to his interlocutor, though there is no reason 
why it would be.  
At this point, following the abrupt introduction of τόδ᾽ αἷμα, the natural question for 
Oedipus to ask is “What blood?” Creon has used the demonstrative pronoun, τόδε, which could 
refer obliquely to the φόνος mentioned in the previous line (this blood being the blood of the 
unavenged murder), but Oedipus still does not know whose murder needs avenging. Instead of 
asking about the blood (and, by extension, the source of the pollution), he instead asks whose fate 
Apollo disclosed—a question which could well be interpreted to mean “Whose blood?” (i.e. “Who 
was the victim of a murder?”) or “Who needs to be banished or killed?” I incline toward the latter, 
in part on etymological grounds215  and in part on pragmatic grounds, since Creon has been talking 
about the process of purifying the city, via banishment or execution, and both of those necessitate 
an object. It seems more likely to me that τύχη is intended to be forward-looking here, and 
                                                   
214 This characterization has been well noted in the scholarship. As a few illustrative examples, Winnington-Ingram 
comments on “the keen energies and the thrusting intelligence which made him great” (Winnington-Ingram 1980: 
204). Knox is far more extensive in his descriptions, describing his “independence of action” and “vigorous action” and 
calling him “a self-made ruler . . . a man of action.” He goes on to say that “[t]here is nothing passive in his make-up; 
his natural tendency is always to act, and he scorns inactivity,” “[h]is action is lightning swift: once conceived it is not 
hampered by fear or hesitation; it anticipates advice, approval, or dissent. The characteristic Oedipean action is the fait 
accompli,” and “‘[s]wift,’ tachys, is his word” (Knox 1957: 11, 14, 15). Though other scholars have taken a somewhat 
less elaborate approach to this theme, the characterization of Oedipus as a man of action is pervasive. Knox 1964 has 
also been quite influential in this line of thinking, and his influence can be felt in many of the studies of Sophoclean 
heroes, as he draws out a conception of the hero that hinges on intransigence, resolve, and strength and unity of will, 
and who is an active agent, rather than a tragic victim as in Euripides.  
215 It seems as though he has picked up on the discreet etymological elements of ἀνδρηλατοῦντας. ἀνδρηλατέω is 
derived from the combination of ἀνήρ and ἐλαύνω (cf. βοηλατέω/βοηλάτης from βοῦς and ἐλαύνω). The 
lengthened η is to be expected, per Sihler: “When neither vowel is high (sc. when the first element of a compound ends 
in a vowel and the second starts with one) the first vowel is without effect and the second is replaced by its long 
counterpart.” (cf. ὠμηστής, from ὠμός and ἔδω). The true etymology (as coming from ἐλαύνω rather than, for 
example, something like ἀλητεύω) seems to have been felt in antiquity. Scholiasts on this passage gloss 
ἀνδρηλατοῦντας as ἄνδρας ἀπελαύνοντας and τὸν πράξαντα τοῦτο ἄνδρα ἐλαύνοντας and discuss πρὸς τὸ 
ἐλαύνειν τὴν δύναμιν. Later grammarians and lexicographers certainly knew the correct derivation, and Phrynichus, 
Photius, Timaeus, and the Suda all define it as ἄνδρας ἐλαύνειν. 
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referring to a fate that is as yet unrealized. However, as in so many places throughout this 
conversation, Creon answers a different question, and describes whose blood is causing pollution.  
Thus far, Creon’s account can be understood as a reenactment of his own experience with 
the oracle at Delphi. This is quite illuminating, in fact, when attempting to make sense of the 
strange question-answer pattern that we see here. Creon’s account, as noted above, ought to 
include all the relevant information that he knows, per Grice’s maxims of conversation. This 
assumes that he is primarily concerned with informativity, but it is clear that stringing out these 
oracular instructions is not going to convey his meaning in the most efficient fashion. Often, this 
sort of prolonged conversation is attributed to “dramatic suspense” or other generic conventions, 
as a sort of catch-all, but we need not resort to that interpretation for this scene when there is a 
more illuminating option available, and one which subtly highlights the different linguistic and 
narrative mechanisms at play here.216 Creon’s actions make sense if we understand him to be giving 
a faithful account of what he heard at Delphi, as it occurred—that is, if he is actually reenacting the 
words that Apollo spoke to him.217 Creon, then, is recounting Apollo’s words with his concern being 
primarily for the fidelity of the reenactment (not what was communicated, but how it was 
communicated). We can then understand the beginning of this scene as Creon recounting what he 
was told in the order and fashion that he was told. We might think of the translation in the 
following way: 
                                                   
216 This is, of course, not to suggest that dramatic suspense or other conventions of the genre are not responsible for 
many choices by playwrights. These causes very often are the determining factor in the way a scene is constructed and a 
great deal of this entire play is concerned with postponing understanding to an extreme and perhaps implausible extent. 
Dawe 2006 suggests that this play does cannot actually hold up under close scrutiny. Many of the elements simply are 
not plausible when examined too closely and skeptically, he argues, and it does a great injustice to the play as a whole 
to take such an approach. I am generally sympathetic to his views, but I also think that we must be cautious about 
attributing too much to “dramatic convention” and using that as a reason to avoid looking for other factors that may be 
at work as well. Sophocles does need to work within the generic conventions of tragedy, but he is a skilled enough 
author that we should be cautious about attributing his word choices to the demands of meter, or the constraints of 
stichomythia.  
217 Presumably, we are to understand this as a conversation with the priestess of Apollo, as was the actual practice at 
Delphi, but the text presents Delphi as the voice of Apollo and it will be useful to elide the priestess out of the 
transmission process for the moment, for simplicity’s sake, while keeping in mind that there is yet another layer to all of 
this which only further complicates this process. 
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Apollo 
Drive the pollution out of the land—
pollution that is being nourished in 
your land—and do not nourish it, 
incurable.  
Creon 
What pollution? How can we drive it 
out? 
Apollo 
Banishment or paying back murder 
with murder, since this blood is storm-
tossing the city.  
Creon 
What blood? 
Apollo 
Laius’ 
 Creon 
I will tell you the things I heard from the god. 
Lord Phoebus clearly bid us to drive the 
pollution out of the land—pollution that he 
says is being nourished in this land—and not to 
nourish it, incurable.  
Oedipus 
With what sort of purification? What is the 
manner of misfortune? 
Creon 
Banishment or paying back murder with 
murder, since this blood is storm-tossing the 
city.  
Oedipus 
And whose is this fate that he reveals? 
Creon 
Lord, Laius was our leader in this land, before 
you restored this city. 
 
I should note here that Delphic oracles are not generally conveyed in a conversational form. We 
have both historical and literary examples to suggest that someone could ask a follow-up question 
at Delphi, at least in some situations (see the Introduction for these), but there are no parallels for 
an actual conversation of this sort. We can nonetheless remove the conversational element and 
Apollo’s words are perfectly intelligible without Creon’s words inserted: 
Drive the pollution out of the land—pollution that is being nourished in your land—and do 
not nourish it, incurable. [Drive it out by means of] banishment or paying back murder with 
murder, since this [understood as a forward-looking deictic] blood is storm-tossing the city: 
Laius’ blood.  
We have no way of knowing how closely Creon’s words parallel those delivered by Apollo, 
but Apollo is clearly identified (at line 96) as the source of at least some of Creon’s words. At lines 
100-1, the “author” of these ideas is unclear, but we are certainly inclined to think that these also 
come from Apollo. Oedipus certainly has, since we must supply Apollo as the subject of μηνύει at 
line 102—whose fate does Apollo reveal? Oedipus at least understands the sentence of banishment 
or death to come from Apollo, in an unadulterated fashion. By lines 103-4, however, Creon 
undoubtedly speaks with his own voice, and not that of Apollo. At this point, Oedipus has asked 
who needs to be banished or killed, and Creon instead speaks about Laius and his fate. Looking 
again at the proposed conversation above, we can make sense of Creon’s mention of Laius here—
he is the answer to the natural question that ought to have been asked at this point, though 
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Oedipus instead focuses on who ought to be punished. We might imagine Creon’s account of 
Apollo’s words—like Deianeira’s account of Zeus’ oracle—to be filtered through his own 
perceptions and agenda, but everything up to this point can be plausibly attributed to Apollo. At 
lines 103-4, this changes significantly.  
Once Creon hears that Laius’ (unavenged) blood is causing the plague on the city, he has 
all of the information from the god that he needs. Creon is, after all, aware of the relevant history—
that Laius was killed many years ago, and his killer or killers were never found and punished. At this 
point, Creon’s primary purpose shifts away from recounting the oracular instructions as he received 
them and he instead focuses on providing the relevant information to Oedipus. In more pragmatic 
terms, now that informativity and advancing shared understanding are his primary concerns, his 
speech should again be governed by Grice’s maxims. His speech shifts from reenactment to 
explanation and interpretation and the conversation becomes a great deal smoother and more 
effective. 
The objections I raised earlier—that Creon is not as informative as he could and should 
be—are now resolved. Once he speaks in his own voice, and not that of the god, he conveys as 
much information as he has in the most lucid way possible. He tells Oedipus that Laius was 
murdered218 and Apollo demands some sort of forcible punishment of the murderers. Oedipus now 
asks (perfectly reasonably) “Where are they?” and Creon responds that Apollo said they are in 
Thebes. This is essentially the same content that Creon conveyed earlier, but in a far more effective 
form this time. However, as this part of their conversation ends, the god is again invoked:  Apollo 
said that the guilt is in the land. Here again, the voices blur. How much of this final sentiment is 
Apollo’s and how much is Creon’s own? Jebb here notes that “[t]he γνώμη, though uttered in an 
oracular tone, is not part of the god’s message,” but perhaps we should question his assertion. The 
lines between the god’s words and those of Creon have been blurred persistently and this final 
rhyming couplet is stylistically unusual. As the god is reinserted into this conversation, the language 
itself becomes less clear and less informative, as it was at the start of this passage.219 The language 
and the meaning are cryptic and Oedipus essentially ignores the entire couplet and follows this 
                                                   
218 Strictly speaking, he says that Laius died and that they need to kill his murderers. In strict pragmatics terms, he does 
not say that Laius was murdered, but he does implicate it. 
219 The “oracular tone” is pronounced and while his meaning is intelligible, the style of the couplet is markedly different 
from Creon’s surrounding lines. With ἔφασκε at line 110 appealing to Apollo’s authority to support this claim, we 
should understand these lines as coming directly from Apollo. 
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passage by asking Creon where the murder occurred (πότερα δ᾽ ἐν οἴκοις ἢ 'ν ἀγροῖς ὁ Λάϊος / 
ἢ γῆς ἐπ᾽ ἄλλης τῷδε συμπίπτει φόνῳ; 112-13).  
In the course of this short scene, we can draw out two different “voices” at work in the 
transmission of this oracle. One is the voice of the god and the other is Creon’s own voice; the god’s 
words are not readily intelligible, though their meaning does emerge eventually, with the help of 
Creon’s own interpretive voice. This oracle does not present a riddle, and it does not cover some 
secret, hidden meaning that will only emerge later, as we saw in the Trachiniae. In fact, this oracle 
is shockingly straightforward, by oracular standards, and there will not be any misunderstanding 
about what it means, in a strict sense.  
However, before leaving this passage, I would like to highlight two important elements that 
illustrate the difficulties of understanding prophecy in the play. One is the ways in which Apollo’s 
presence (in the form of his words, relayed to Oedipus through Creon) serves to derail effective 
communication. Oedipus and Creon speak at cross-purposes and it is only when Creon discards the 
voice of Apollo and speaks with his own, mortal voice that he is able to convey his meaning to 
Oedipus effectively. This will be a recurrent motif surrounding Apollo in this play. His presence (or 
even simply the mention of him, in some instances) obfuscates meaning. However, this need not be 
the result of malice on Apollo’s part, and Apollo need not be trying to mislead Oedipus, as many 
have claimed.220 Instead, these failures to interpret Apollo’s words point to a fundamental 
incompatibility between divine communication and mortal communication. Just by his very nature, 
as a god, Apollo cannot help but confuse and mislead. Because, as we will see, Apollo does not 
communicate in accordance with human pragmatic conventions, he will inevitably be 
misunderstood by the humans who try to interpret his speech.  
                                                   
220 This is a common and almost unavoidable approach to this play, and listing all the scholars who have taken it would 
be a long and pointless exercise. Kovacs 2009 is worth mentioning though, since he suggests that we ought to look at 
the play as a sort of chess game, in which Oedipus plays against a grand master, in Apollo. This approach offers an 
easily-intelligible way to preserve Oedipus’ free will, since Apollo can easily outmaneuver Oedipus and is confident that 
he will prevail in this competition, even though he does not know Oedipus’ individual moves in advance. This is a 
particularly clever analogy and this approach maintains Oedipus’ responsibility and agency in the face of divine 
prophecy in a way that avoids the messy and unproductive question of fate versus free will. That said, the chess game 
analogy also hinges on the idea of an antagonistic (or, at the very least, simply competitive) relationship between 
Oedipus and Apollo, since Apollo wants Oedipus to lose the game and his superior skill ensures that this will be the 
outcome. Kovacs (among many other scholars) rests his interpretation on the premise that Apollo is interested in 
bringing about Oedipus’ fall. This then raises the question of why Apollo is so intent on punishing Oedipus (on the 
difficulty of this question and the nature of Apollo’s active involvement or interest in destroying Oedipus, see 
Winnington-Ingram 1980: 319 and Lawrence 2008), and it is hard to find a truly satisfactory answer. The 
interpretation that I suggest in this chapter does not require (though, it also does not preclude) a malicious Apollo, 
which has the added benefit of obviating any need to understand why Apollo should be so invested in Oedipus’ fall.  
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The second important element is that we can already see issues of interpretation and 
transmission emerge in this short scene. Apollo told Creon that they needed to drive the pollution, 
which stems from the blood, out of the land—either by banishment or by paying back murder with 
murder. This imprecise instruction becomes “Apollo clearly orders us to punish the murderers” in 
Creon’s own words. In this plural form, murderers, we see that Creon, though he is certainly acting 
in good faith here, has added information that Apollo did not give him. In an attempt to make 
Apollo’s words conform to the Maxim of Manner (which requires speakers to avoid obscurity of 
expression and ambiguity), Creon has had to supply something more concrete—an object for their 
punishment. Since, as we later learn at lines 122-3, the sole witness of Laius’ murder described 
multiple robbers (λῃστάς), τοὺς αὐτοέντας would seem to be accurate. However, it will turn out 
to be the case that there was only one killer and that only one man, Oedipus, needs to be 
punished.221  
 
2. Prophecies about Laius and Jocasta 
While the play begins with a desire to rid Thebes of the plague, the central oracle and the 
one that dominates the story of Oedipus is the prophecy about his killing his father and sleeping 
with his mother. It is difficult to speak about the precise prophecy, though, since this oracle was 
delivered at least two distinct times and it is only ever related in paraphrases or incomplete accounts 
that are woven throughout the play and invoked before, during, and after Oedipus’ tragic 
realization about his own identity and fate. Nonetheless, it is useful to at least attempt to isolate 
these oracular utterances in order to study them more closely. 
To start, I will examine this prophecy as it is presented by both Oedipus and Jocasta, 
leaving aside any references made by Tiresias. Tiresias, as a seer, occupies a liminal space between 
gods and mortals, and he is the only one who has any accurate knowledge about the meaning of the 
oracles. For these reasons, I will examine Tiresias and his interactions with these oracles separately, 
at the end of this section, even though his presence is woven throughout the play.  
As I noted earlier, there are several different types of conversation and conversational 
principles invoked in this play; we can think of these almost as different genres of speech. These 
                                                   
221 Oedipus does not actually adopt this false information, however. When he pledges to the people his commitment to 
ridding the city of plague, he promises that he will ally himself with Creon to take vengeance on behalf of Thebes and 
Apollo (ὥστ᾽ ἐνδίκως ὄψεσθε κἀμὲ σύμμαχον / γῇ τῇδε τιμωροῦντα τῷ θεῷ θ᾽ ἅμα, 135-6) and that he will 
dispel the defilement (ὑπὲρ γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἀπωτέρω φίλων, / ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποσκεδῶ μύσος, 137-8). 
The errant plurals do not creep into Oedipus’ own pronouncement and he returns to the vagueness that Apollo used. 
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different codes of conversation require entirely different approaches toward extracting meaning in 
their different respective contexts. In standard conversational contexts, where both members of the 
conversation are aiming at a mutual understanding, certain maxims shape those conversations. 
When speakers depart from those maxims, they have an identifiable motive for doing so; when 
mortal characters lie, they have something to gain from those lies.222 Playfully ambiguous or 
misleading language does have an appropriate context, but that context is riddling games and 
competitions—the exact situation that forms the backdrop of this play, in the Sphinx’ riddle. 
Cooperative conversations, lies, and riddles all have their own underlying principles that shape the 
way language works in these contexts; violations of these principles should, according to pragmatic 
linguistic theory, have a motivation of some sort. Critically, we see these different violations of 
conversational rules in the language of the oracles in this play, but without a clear reason. As I 
concluded in Chapter 1, divine language does not recognize the role that context plays in human 
communication.  Instead, by conspicuously misapplying linguistic rules in situations to which they 
do not apply, or by failing to effectively signal which genre of speech and which communicative 
rules ought to be employed, oracles are constantly misunderstood while never lying outright.  
 
707-725: Jocasta’s “Unrealized” Oracle about her Son’s Killing Laius 
The first direct account of this oracle (about Oedipus and his parents) in the play223 occurs 
when Jocasta reassures Oedipus that he need not worry about Tiresias’ accusations (which he 
suspects come from Creon) that Oedipus is the cause of the plague. She offers him a concise 
demonstration (σημεῖα σύντομα) of her claim that “there is no mortal thing that has a part of the 
prophetic craft” (βρότειον οὐδὲν μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης, 709): 
 
 
 
 
710 
Ἰοκάστη 
σύ νυν ἀφεὶς σεαυτὸν ὧν λέγεις πέρι  
ἐμοῦ 'πάκουσον, καὶ μάθ᾽ οὕνεκ᾽ ἐστί σοι  
βρότειον οὐδὲν μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης.  
φανῶ δέ σοι σημεῖα τῶνδε σύντομα.  
Jocasta 
Release yourself from the things you are 
speaking of. Listen to me and learn that there is 
no mortal thing that has a part of the prophetic 
craft. I will show you concise evidence of these 
                                                   
222 Scodel 2005:246-7 looks at the ways in which lying is central to Sophoclean drama—the plots of both Philoctetes 
and Electra hinge on deception, and some sort of lying plays a major role in all the extant plays except Antigone and 
Oedipus at Colonus, though there are still accusations of lying (e.g., OC 229-33). However, particularly in Oedipus 
Tyrannus, characters’ motives for lying are discernable. In general, characters lie because they are afraid to tell the 
truth (as the herdsman in the Oedipus Tyrannus) or to advance a ruse (as in the Electra, or the Philoctetes). Human 
characters do not lie needlessly or without some explanation, however.  
223 366-7 alludes to this, when Tiresias says “I say that you have not recognized that you are, and you do not see how 
bad things are for you” (λεληθέναι σε φημὶ σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις / αἴσχισθ᾽ ὁμιλοῦντ᾽, οὐδ᾽ ὁρᾶν ἵν᾽ εἶ κακοῦ), but I 
will be looking at Tiresias’ speech separately and this reference is vague enough that it does not cause Oedipus to 
comment upon it. 
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715 
 
 
 
 
720 
 
 
 
 
725 
χρησμὸς γὰρ ἦλθε Λαΐῳ ποτ᾽, οὐκ ἐρῶ  
Φοίβου γ᾽ ἄπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπηρετῶν ἄπο, 
ὡς αὐτὸν ἥξοι μοῖρα πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν,  
ὅστις γένοιτ᾽ ἐμοῦ τε κἀκείνου πάρα.  
καὶ τὸν μέν, ὥσπερ γ᾽ ἡ φάτις, ξένοι ποτὲ  
λῃσταὶ φονεύουσ᾽ ἐν τριπλαῖς ἁμαξιτοῖς·  
παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι  
τρεῖς, καί νιν ἄρθρα κεῖνος ἐνζεύξας ποδοῖν  
ἔρριψεν ἄλλων χερσὶν ἄβατον εἰς ὄρος.  
κἀνταῦθ᾽ Ἀπόλλων οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἤνυσεν  
φονέα γενέσθαι πατρὸς οὔτε Λάϊον  
τὸ δεινὸν οὑφοβεῖτο πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν.  
τοιαῦτα φῆμαι μαντικαὶ διώρισαν,  
ὧν ἐντρέπου σὺ μηδέν· ἣν224 γὰρ ἂν θεὸς  
χρείαν ἐρευνᾷ, ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸς φανεῖ. 
707-725 
things. For a prophecy came to Laius once—I 
will not say it was from Phoebus himself, but 
from his attendants—that the fate of dying at the 
hands of his child would come upon him, 
whatever child should come forth from him and 
me. And he, well, foreign bandits killed him at 
the place where three roads meet, as the story 
goes. And not three days passed from the birth 
of the child, and Laius yoked the joints of his 
feet together and threw him—though by the 
hands of others—onto a desolate mountain. And 
so then Apollo did not bring it about that he 
become the murderer of his father, nor that 
terrible thing which Laius feared, that he die at 
the hands of his child. The mantic reports 
delineated these things—do not pay them any 
mind! The things that the god pursues with 
need, he himself easily reveals.  
 
There are three significant things that can be teased out of this passage. The first two are 
closely connected—Jocasta’s description of the oracle as well as her interpretation of the events 
surrounding it. The third, to which I will turn in a moment, is her overall characterization in this 
scene. The content of the oracle here seems to be contained in only a few lines: that the fate of 
dying at the hands of his child would come upon him, whatever child should come forth from him 
and Jocasta (ὡς αὐτὸν ἥξοι μοῖρα πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν, / ὅστις γένοιτ᾽ ἐμοῦ τε κἀκείνου 
πάρα, 713-4). The oracle occurs again in a similar form, though it is presented as an impossible 
and unfulfilled prophecy: “And so, Apollo did not accomplish that thing, that [the child] should 
become the murderer of his father nor that Laius should die at the hands of his child—the thing he 
was dreading terribly” (κἀνταῦθ᾽ Ἀπόλλων οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἤνυσεν / φονέα γενέσθαι πατρὸς 
οὔτε Λάϊον / τὸ δεινὸν οὑφοβεῖτο πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν, 720-2). 
Layered almost seamlessly into her transmission of the oracle is her interpretation of it. In 
lines 720-2, we can already see some of this interpretation, since she has determined that the oracle 
was not fulfilled, but she also maps events from the past onto the words of the prophecy, in the 
process of showing how it was not fulfilled. On the most basic level, this involves her describing the 
actual cause of Laius’ death—foreign bandits, ξένοι λῃσταὶ—as well as the child’s fate, which she 
                                                   
224 The manuscripts all read ὧν instead of ἣν, though I have adopted the emendation of Brunck and Musgrave here. 
Lloyd-Jones prints ὧν, and Jebb commends this line (as it reads in the manuscripts, with ὧν) as a “bold line,” but 
Dawe et al. prefer ἣν and suspect that the ὧν at the start of the line caused the ἣν to get copied as ὧν in the 
transmission process. The reading of ὧν is sound, but the arguments for corruption by duplication are compelling and 
I have tentatively printed ἣν here. 
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insinuates was death. From these two facts, which certainly seem to contradict the prophecy she 
and Laius received, she infers that the prophecy was not fulfilled.  
This inference leads us to the final element that I would like to highlight in this speech: 
Jocasta’s carefully calibrated relationship with Apollo. This scene is often viewed as an example of 
hubris or impiety,225 but Jocasta is very careful not to claim that Apollo failed to foretell the future. 
In fact, her justification for her skepticism hinges on the very fact that Apollo is infallible, and her 
argument is not unreasonable. Simplified, her argument seems quite logical: 
1. Apollo’s priests speak for Apollo 
2. Apollo’s priests said that Laius’ child would kill him 
• Ergo, Apollo said that Laius’ child would kill him 
3. Laius’ child was exposed with pierced feet  
4. Exposed children die, especially when their feet are pierced 
5. Laius was killed by a band of robbers 
• Ergo, Apollo’s priests were wrong 
6. Apollo cannot not be wrong 
 
At this point, the only way to reconcile this apparent paradox is to figure out which premise 
cannot be right, since Jocasta has reasoned herself into a corner, so to speak. All her initial premises 
(1-6) seem to be solid, and none of them are impious or hubristic. In fact, Jocasta is firmly 
committed to premise 6, that Apollo is infallible, and her only failing is that instead of realizing that 
premises 4 and 5 were incorrect, she assumes that 1 is incorrect. From an external perspective, we 
know that tragic prophecies are never wrong, but we only know this because of the literary 
convention—characters within this literary work cannot access that.226 Similarly, it is a trope in this 
type of scene that the seer will be accused of conspiring and acting out of a desire for money or 
                                                   
225 For various approaches to this question, usually centered on the second stasimon, and whether the Chorus is 
responding to Oedipus’ behavior, Jocasta’s behavior, some combination of the two, or something entirely different. For 
two more nuanced approaches to this question, see Winnington-Ingram1971 and Scodel 1982 (which include 
bibliography of those who see the Chorus as “simply” responding to Jocasta’s rejection of oracles). 
226 This is not categorically true, and there are certainly instances of metatheatricality in both ancient and modern 
theater in which a character acknowledges and plays with theatrical conventions. However, the only hint of this sort of 
clear and overt metatheatricality is, to my mind, when the Chorus asks why they should dance, if at lines 895-6 (εἰ γὰρ 
αἱ τοιαίδε πράξεις τίμιαι, / τί δεῖ με χορεύειν;). I see no evidence that we should impute a recognition of their own 
generic conventions to the characters within this play (or, in fact, in the extant corpus of Sophocles). For a different 
stance on the question of metatheatricality in Sophocles, see Ringer 2000. 
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influence when they are in fact giving an accurate prophecy.227 Again, this is a trope that only the 
audience can access, and the fulfillment of prophecy is not guaranteed by anything other than 
genre here.  
Returning to Jocasta, then, we can see that she does not act irrationally.228 When faced with 
a paradox, she reevaluates all the ways in which she could have reached this apparent paradox in 
error, and then she adjusts the only one that seems adjustable. Her evaluation of which premises 
could be wrong is flawed, but the process by which she concludes this is neither impious nor 
irrational. Her fault, from a certain perspective, is in taking the simplest approach to solving this 
paradox.229 
Here, it is useful to recall the types of riddles I outlined earlier. In a normal situation, it is 
entirely reasonable to try to “solve” a paradox or a contradiction by the simplest and most likely 
explanation (i.e. Occam's razor). However, as we saw, this is exactly the wrong approach to take 
when trying to solve a riddle. Jocasta does not recognize that this oracle has far more in common 
with a riddle than with a straightforward statement of facts, and, as a result, she approaches it with 
a flawed methodology.  
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                                         ἠγόμην δ᾽ ἀνὴρ  
ἀστῶν μέγιστος τῶν ἐκεῖ, πρίν μοι τύχη  
τοιάδ᾽ ἐπέστη, θαυμάσαι μὲν ἀξία,  
σπουδῆς γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς οὐκ ἀξία.  
ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἐν δείπνοις μ᾽ ὑπερπλησθεὶς μέθῃ  
καλεῖ παρ᾽ οἴνῳ, πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί.  
κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν  
μόλις κατέσχον, θἀτέρᾳ δ᾽ ἰὼν πέλας  
μητρὸς πατρός τ᾽ ἤλεγχον· οἱ δὲ δυσφόρως  
τοὔνειδος ἦγον τῷ μεθέντι τὸν λόγον.  
κἀγὼ τὰ μὲν κείνοιν ἐτερπόμην, ὅμως δ᾽  
ἔκνιζέ μ᾽ ἀεὶ τοῦθ᾽· ὑφεῖρπε γὰρ πολύ.  
I was considered to be the greatest among the 
citizens there, until this chance event came 
suddenly upon me, worthy to be marveled at, but 
not worthy of the eager haste I applied to it. For a 
man at a banquet, intoxicated by drinking, said—
over his wine—that I was not the true son of my 
father. I was greatly distressed that whole day and I 
scarcely restrained myself, but on the following day, 
going up to my mother and father I questioned 
them closely. They were very upset with the person 
who had hurled this disgraceful charge. I was 
gladdened in relation to the two of them, but all the 
                                                   
227 E.g., both Calchas and Tiresias are elsewhere accused of acting out of a desire for personal gain (Ant. 1033-55; 
Bacch. 255-60; IA 520). This is a motif common in the historians as well (see Hdt 7.141-3, in connection with Plut. Vit. 
Them. 10.1-2).  
228 Winnington-Ingram offers a similar, sympathetic reading of both Jocasta’s and Oedipus’ skepticism about Apollo’s 
oracles. He suggests that Jocasta argues from σημεία, rather than feelings (as the Chorus does) and that Jocasta may be 
impious, but that she is a victim of circumstance who behaves rationally, in light of the available evidence (Winnington-
Ingram 1980: 183-4). He concludes that they “are hardly to be blamed, though they were dreadfully wrong” (184). 
229 As elsewhere in this play, we should not discount the effect of Jocasta’s desire for the oracles to be wrong. Her 
emotional and psychological state certainly influence her interpretive choices, though they are far from the only forces 
shaping interpretation and comprehension in this play.  
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same I remained upset about these things, for it ate 
deeply at me.230 
 
Immediately after Jocasta’s account, we hear Oedipus’ account of a startlingly similar 
prophecy that he received from Apollo. Here, the way that he frames his account is particularly 
striking. As he describes why he went to Delphi in the first place, he describes a drunken man who 
claimed that Oedipus was not the true son of his father (πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί, 780).231 The way 
that Oedipus describes this account is significant, though: “a chance event . . . worthy to be 
marveled at, but not worthy of the eager haste I applied to it” (πρίν μοι τύχη / τοιάδ᾽ ἐπέστη, 
θαυμάσαι μὲν ἀξία, / σπουδῆς γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς οὐκ ἀξία. 776-8). Kamerbeek is quite right to 
suggest that Oedipus has no questions about his parentage at this point and that it would be 
perverse to read any ambiguity into his words here (ad 777)—as much as our knowledge of the 
outcome of this play might incline us to read some latent awareness into his earlier words, there is 
no evidence to suggest this. In fact, his entire presentation of this story is entirely dismissive. It was 
not worthy of his urgency (σπουδή), Oedipus mentions, and then he goes on to describe the story, 
with a heavy emphasis on how the man had been drinking (ὑπερπλησθεὶς μέθῃ, παρ᾽ οἴνῳ), 
presumably meant to undermine his legitimacy as a source.232  
                                                   
230 I draw on a translation here, which Campbell suggests but then ultimately rejects, of “for it rankled deeply” (for 
ὑφεῖρπε γὰρ πολύ). Jebb and Campbell both understand this as a reference to a rumor spreading about Oedipus (“it 
still crept abroad with strong rumour”). Jebb notes that this corresponds nicely with 775’s implication that this event 
altered Oedipus’ popular repute and says that we “might render: ‘it was ever recurring to my mind with force’: but this 
(a) is a repetition: is less suited to πολύ, which implies diffusion” (ad 786). I tend to think that “it rankled deeply” is a 
better translation here. We might look to parallels for insight, and as Kamerbeek notes, Aesch. Ag. 450 is an extremely 
striking parallel to this line: φθονερὸν δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλγος ἕρπει προδίκοις Ἀτρείδαις. He also offers Ag. 270 and Cho. 463 
(quoted by Fraenkel ad Ag. 450) as evidence for this reading and notes that “[t]he uneasiness of [Oedipus’] soul is like 
the soreness of spreading pain” (ad 786). I find the repetition to be acceptable, given the significance that this moment 
had on Oedipus’ life. Emphatic repetition is an entirely appropriate choice at this moment and I find no issue with 
πολύ here. Jebb’s and Kamerbeek’s observations are entirely compatible if we understand the “diffusion” implies by 
πολύ to be a diffusion into Oedipus’ own mind or psyche. At the same time, the parallels in Ag. 270 and Cho. 463 both 
invite an interpretation of a slow, spreading pain (the two passages refer to joy, χαρά, and a shudder, τρόμος, 
respectively), but Ag. 450 juxtaposes spreading rumors with spreading resentment and pain. I am inclined to see both 
of these aspects in OT 786, though I do not have an adequate English translation which can effectively capture both 
aspects.  
231 Not that he does not, as Oedipus tells this story, call his entire parentage into question. Instead, he claims that 
Oedipus is πλαστὸς. Jebb renders πλαστὸς ὡς εἴην πατρί this as “falsely called a son to my father (i.e. to deceive 
him)” and Dawe points to Eur. Phoen. 28-31, which gives a fuller account of Polybus being tricked by his wife into 
thinking that Oedipus was his true son (ad loc.). Oedipus only recounts the challenge to his paternity, however, and the 
thrust of this accusation is directed at his father, Polybus. The way that he recounts this story suggests that he was not 
worried that he was supposititious, but rather that he was a bastard—the story Oedipus tells is that of a drunk man 
calling his mother adulterous. 
232 From the audience’s perspective, however, we may be inclined to give extra credence to the man’s drunken claim, on 
the assumption that he was more inclined to speak the truth while his inhibitions (and fears of repercussion) were 
lowered due to alcohol (cf. in vino veritas). 
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Here, the particles are particularly illuminating in terms of Oedipus’ own train of thought. 
The explanatory γὰρ at 779 draws a strong causal connection between the two sentences. This 
chance event was not worthy of Oedipus’ σπουδή because the man was at a banquet and quite 
drunk—if this γὰρ is meant to truly explain Oedipus’ lack of concern, then his underlying 
assumption must be that the man’s drunkenness caused him to speak foolishly or nonsensically or 
maliciously, all of which provide grounds for Oedipus to discount his words. As he finishes this 
opening part of his speech, Oedipus justifies why he went to Delphi and what he asked Apollo, and 
it is worth pausing here to carefully dissect these last few lines: κἀγὼ τὰ μὲν κείνοιν ἐτερπόμην, 
ὅμως δ᾽ / ἔκνιζέ μ᾽ ἀεὶ τοῦθ᾽· ὑφεῖρπε γὰρ πολύ (I was gladdened at the reaction of the two of 
them, but all the same I remained upset about these things, for it ate deeply at me). On the surface, 
these final lines are difficult to interpret—if Oedipus was truly reassured at the reaction of his 
parents in response to his questions, why would he still be upset about these claims? Why would he 
need to go to Delphi to follow up on this issue?  
In this passage, there are two discrete elements in tension. We have the events that 
occurred in the past, whose major elements are set: Oedipus did go to Delphi and receive an 
oracle. However, Oedipus does not, at the present moment, believe any of the things that drove his 
actions in the past. In this scene, Oedipus tries to rewrite the past with his convictions from the 
present. The only plausible way to explain his dismissal of the accusation about his paternity and his 
decision to visit Delphi anyway is to recognize that at the time, he must have given these claims far 
more credence than he does now.233 If the accusations continued to eat at him in the past, they 
must have held more sway over him, and the incongruities in this account stem from his current 
disregard (hence, the dismissive attitude toward the drunken man) layered on top of underlying 
events that were dictated by an actual concern that he might not be the son of Polybus.  
On this reading, Oedipus must have believed the man at the banquet, which is certainly 
supported by his subsequent actions and it even permeates his description of the events. He may no 
longer think that man was credible, but he acknowledges that, at the time, he was upset and barely 
able to control himself (βαρυνθεὶς, μόλις κατέσχον) at these accusations. Knowing as we do that 
                                                   
233 This could be because he is worried, on some level, about his parentage. This could also—if we understand ὑφεῖρπε 
(786) as alluding to rumors which are creeping throughout Corinth—be a political concern about his status and his 
claim to be the heir to Polybus. On this reading (suggested to me by Ruth Scodel), he is hoping to receive Delphic 
confirmation of his parentage which would then solidify his claim to the Corinthian throne. On either reading, Oedipus 
is concerned enough about the rumor(s) that he departs for Delphi to resolve the question definitively.  
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this man at the banquet was correct about Oedipus’ father, we can discern an initial moment when 
Oedipus does in fact suspect something of the truth about his parentage. It is only once Oedipus 
arrives at Delphi that his concern about the identity of his father is diverted onto something much 
more pressing—and, simultaneously, much less intelligible to him. Put another way, Oedipus takes 
all the necessary steps to effectively learn about his identity when he interacts with mortals; it is only 
once Oedipus comes into contact with Apollo that his ability to judge and interpret and understand 
his circumstances is hopelessly compromised.  
As we move into Oedipus’ actual account of the prophecy he received, we have a scene that 
is very similar to Jocasta’s account, in that we can see both the content of the prophecy—which 
differs somewhat from the one Jocasta recounts—as well as Oedipus’ approach to that prophecy. 
We can also see an overall shift away from the questions which brought Oedipus to Delphi. At this 
point, Oedipus’ attention is now focused on averting this new prophecy he has received, and in the 
process, as he comes into linguistic contact with Apollo, he moves farther away from an accurate 
understanding of himself and his situation.  
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λάθρᾳ δὲ μητρὸς καὶ πατρὸς πορεύομαι 
Πυθώδε, καί μ᾽ ὁ Φοῖβος ὧν μὲν ἱκόμην  
ἄτιμον ἐξέπεμψεν, ἄλλα δ᾽ ἀθλίῳ 
καὶ δεινὰ καὶ δύστηνα234 προυφάνη λέγων,  
ὡς μητρὶ μὲν χρείη με μιχθῆναι, γένος δ᾽  
ἄτλητον ἀνθρώποισι δηλώσοιμ᾽ ὁρᾶν,  
φονεὺς δ᾽ ἐσοίμην τοῦ φυτεύσαντος πατρός.  
κἀγὼ 'πακούσας ταῦτα τὴν Κορινθίαν,  
ἄστροις τὸ λοιπὸν τεκμαρούμενος,235 χθόνα  
ἔφευγον, ἔνθα μήποτ᾽ ὀψοίμην κακῶν  
Without the knowledge of my mother and father, I 
made my way to Pytho, and Phoebus sent me forth, 
deemed unworthy of the things about which I’d come, 
but he did blaze forth suddenly, telling terrible and 
disastrous things to wretched me, that I was fated to 
sleep with my mother, and I would bring forth a race, 
unendurable for men to look upon, and that I would 
be the murder of my father who begat me. And I, 
when I heard these things, I fled the Corinthian land—
which I henceforth measure only from afar, by the 
                                                   
234 The manuscripts read ἀθλία here, but the text has been emended in different ways; I print what I think is the 
strongest reading in light of the various manuscripts and attempts to improve the Greek. With Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, 
I read ἀθλίῳ here. Though its manuscript support is tenuous at best (one manuscript, Lac, may have had this reading) 
Kamerbeek’s point (ad 789) that a reading of ἀθλίῳ means that we are left with an emphatic καὶ . . . καὶ construction 
in 790 that “makes one pause” is well taken, but it does not make me pause so much that I feel we must reject that 
reading. An emphatic construction seems entirely appropriate in this context.  With most editors of this text, I find that 
ἀθλίῳ is the lectio difficilior and worth printing. I reject Heimsoeth’s conjecture of δύσφημα for δύστηνα as clever 
and elegant but also unnecessary. The manuscripts all read προυφάνη, though Jebb finds this reading indefensible and 
strongly favors Hermann’s conjecture of προύφηνεν, writing that “the difficulty of conceiving Sophocles to have 
written thus is to me so great that the special appropriateness of προὔφηνεν turns the sale” (ad 790). The strength of 
the manuscripts as well as Campbell’s justification for προυφάνη (“He came forth with; προυφάνη expresses the 
suddenness of the revelation,” ad loc.) inclines me to prefer προυφάνη. 
235 I am not convinced that the reading ἐκμετρούμενος, found in all the manuscripts, is not viable, contra Lloyd-Jones 
and Wilson who describe it as “nonsense” (1990: ad loc.). However, Nauck’s emendation of τεκμαρούμενος is very 
clever and works nicely with the ἄστροις. Kamerbeek and Nauck offer many parallels to support a reading of 
τεκμαρούμενος, and Housman 1972 offers the strongest parallel, in Libanius v. 540 Foerster (τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸ 
βῆμα καὶ τοὺς ἐνταυθοῖ θορύβους ἄστροις, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοῦ λόγου, τὸ λοιπὸν τεκμαιρόμενος) and I am 
convinced that this is the stronger reading here.  
 116 
 χρησμῶν ὀνείδη τῶν ἐμῶν τελούμενα.  
OT 787-97 
stars—to where I would never see the shameful things 
in my vile prophecy come to fulfillment.  
 
The actual content of the oracle, as Oedipus recounts it at least, seems to have three 
discrete elements. The first is that he would sleep with his mother (μητρὶ μὲν χρείη με μιχθῆναι, 
791), then that he would bring forth a race “unendurable for men to look upon” (γένος δ᾽ / 
ἄτλητον ἀνθρώποισι δηλώσοιμ᾽ ὁρᾶν, 791-2), and finally that he would be the murderer of his 
biological father (φονεὺς δ᾽ ἐσοίμην τοῦ φυτεύσαντος πατρός, 793). The way that he structures 
his own retelling of this prophecy certainly suggests an ordered list. Knowing as we do that this is 
not the actual order in which these events will occur, we are left with two explanations—either 
Oedipus has faithfully transmitted the basic content and form of the oracle, which was delivered in 
a misleading but not incorrect fashion, or he has simply misremembered the oracle. Because, as I 
will examine in a moment, his actions are consistent with the first of these options, I will focus 
primarily on that explanation.236 We know that Oedipus is not transmitting the oracle verbatim, 
since it is not in hexameters and at least some of the words have been changed (your to my, for 
example, to accommodate the shift in speaker from Apollo to Oedipus). However, he does present 
it as though these are the words of Apollo, and this oracle formulation recalls the oracle(s) of Zeus 
from the Trachiniae, in that both exploit linguistic loopholes to misdirect the listener without 
actually saying anything that is untrue. Here, the μέν…δέ…δέ… construction suggests but does 
not necessitate a chronologically ordered list.237 As such, the same basic pragmatic principles are in 
                                                   
236 As a further note, this explanation is simply more interesting, though I would like to justify this choice further, so as 
to not seem to be flippantly discarding a viable explanation. While it seems natural that memories might be somewhat 
garbled after so many years, the play is not concerned with strict verisimilitude, as Dawe has noted at length in the 
introduction to his commentary. While it is indeed a possibility the Oedipus misremembered the oracle, that yields a 
very different reading of Oedipus, depending how much intent we ascribe to this misremembering. In the most 
mundane version, Oedipus is simply as a man who is the victim of a truly random coincidence, since he has managed to 
recount an incorrect version of the oracle which happens also to be fulfilled. In another reading, we might see Oedipus 
as a man whose subconscious has understood his fate well before his conscious mind has and who is now rewriting his 
own memories, so to speak, in order to retroactively remove any guilt he might bear. On this more psychological 
reading, Oedipus grasps on some level what he has done, but is now scrambling to craft a version of the past in which 
the oracle bears the majority of the blame, due to its misleading phrasing.  
237 The μέν…δέ…δέ… structure can be used to “connect a series of clauses containing different matter, though with 
no opposition” (LSJ μέν II.3). However, I would suggest that in a narrative context, a string of events related in list 
form is assumed to be chronological. As an example, someone might tell a story in the form of “I made coffee and ate 
breakfast and went for a run”—the events seem to be things that occurred in that order, but it would only be a 
misleading statement, not an inaccurate one, if it turns out that the run came first, then coffee, then breakfast. In Greek, 
μέν…δέ…δέ… can join things in a similar fashion. Though there is not, to my knowledge, an extensive study of the 
way that this operates, I offer the following by way of example:  
Πηλεΐδης μὲν ἐπὶ κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἐΐσας 
ἤϊε σύν τε Μενοιτιάδῃ καὶ οἷς ἑτάροισιν: 
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play here as they were in the previous chapter—Apollo has not lied to Oedipus,238 but he has 
spoken in a way that implicates something that is not true. As in Chapter 1, I will leave the broader 
implications of this as an open question to revisit later in this chapter.  
There are several important questions to consider at this point. The first of these is why 
Oedipus does not suspect that Jocasta’s prophecy might be referring to him, given that both 
prophecies describe the same event (Oedipus killing Laius). However, on a close reading, the 
oracle he received does seem markedly different from the one that Jocasta received. Jocasta’s 
account, if we can assume that she recounted it in its entirety, only mentioned that her child would 
kill Laius, with no mention of incest. If we can also assume that she has not mentioned this oracle to 
Oedipus before, there is not a compelling reason that he should see himself in the oracle she 
received, since it only corresponds with one small aspect of his three-part fate. If, as it seems, this is 
the first time that the two have compared stories of their respective oracles, they both have 
established narratives of their own histories that do not invite the sort of drastic rewriting that will 
be required to grasp the truth.239 In short, we might pause at the unnoticed coincidence between 
the two oracles, but we ought not to expect such a coincidence to cause two adults to recast their 
entire histories in light of a partial correspondence between oracles that are presumed to be 
unfulfilled.  
This leads to a broader question, however, about what Oedipus thinks Apollo has told him 
and why he leaves Delphi at all. Oedipus acknowledges that he left without Apollo deigning to 
answer the question he had actually asked (καί μ᾽ ὁ Φοῖβος ὧν μὲν ἱκόμην / ἄτιμον ἐξέπεμψεν, 
                                                   
Ἀτρεΐδης δ᾽ ἄρα νῆα θοὴν ἅλα δὲ προέρυσσεν, 
ἐν δ᾽ ἐρέτας ἔκρινεν ἐείκοσιν, ἐς δ᾽ ἑκατόμβην 
βῆσε θεῷ, ἀνὰ δὲ Χρυσηΐδα καλλιπάρῃον 
εἷσεν ἄγων: ἐν δ᾽ ἀρχὸς ἔβη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς (Il. 1.306-11) 
Here, there is not a clear sense of opposition between the elements, but rather a sense of order. First, Achilles retreats 
to his ships and his men, then (or perhaps while, here) Agamemnon prepares a ship for launch, selects rowers, and 
prepares a hecatomb, puts Chryseis on the ship, and finally Odysseus takes command of the ship. The time 
relationships here are not particularly clear, but it seems safe to suggest that these are not out of chronological order—
each item seems to be contemporaneous with or subsequent to the earlier item in the list.  
238 It is important that Apollo does not lie. If oracles are lies, then communication from the gods is essentially hopeless. 
As much as he may mislead, Apollo, as the god of light and prophecy, does not lie. Cf. Pindar P. 9.42 καὶ γὰρ σέ, τὸν 
οὐ θεμιτὸν ψεύδει θιγεῖν (and you [Apollo], for whom is it not permitted to so much as touch a lie). See also 
Naerebout and Beerden 2012 (aptly titled “Gods Cannot Tell Lies: Riddling and Ancient Greek Divination”).  
239 In a different context, we might imagine a transition between Jocasta’s and Oedipus’ speeches that alludes to the 
shared theme of parricide in these two oracles (i.e. “funny you should mention your son killing his father . . . that was 
actually something I was told that I would do, though thankfully that has not happened yet!”), but even in a play so 
steeped in dramatic irony (on such irony, see Liapis 2012: 91ff, who finds the dramatic irony to be heavy-handed at 
times), such a transition would not be well suited to the dramatic and generic demands here. 
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788-9). He is certainly aware that he did not receive any information about his parentage. The only 
reassurance he has received on that front is that his parents were very upset with the man who 
questioned his parentage (οἱ δὲ δυσφόρως / τοὔνειδος ἦγον τῷ μεθέντι τὸν λόγον, 783-4). 
Oedipus says he was comforted even though, as we saw, his parents do not refute the claim and the 
accusations were nonetheless still gnawing at him (κἀγὼ τὰ μὲν κείνοιν ἐτερπόμην, ὅμως δ᾽ / 
ἔκνιζέ μ᾽ ἀεὶ τοῦθ᾽· ὑφεῖρπε γὰρ πολύ, 785-6). The critical question remains: if he was upset 
enough to go to Delphi to find out if there was any truth behind the drunken man’s claims, why 
does Oedipus leave Delphi without the answers he was seeking, when the identity of his parents is 
more critical now than ever before? Or why is he not more alert to the possibility that Polybus and 
Merope are not his true parents?  
There is, of course, no easy answer to this question. A variety of theories have been offered 
to explain this, attacking the critical issue from different angles and dissecting what we can see 
about Oedipus’ character from his actions after receiving this fateful oracle. For my purposes, it is 
most useful to focus on what we can glean about his own understanding of his motivations. Put 
more simply, I will focus on what Oedipus seems to think his own motivations were and leave any 
external factors aside for the moment. Perhaps Oedipus is a man whose character is defined by his 
unceasing need to act vigorously and immediately,240 and he never could have acted any differently. 
but that is not the story he tells about this moment. Rather, the elements that he highlights in the 
story of his own past—whether or not he is giving an accurate account of these events—subtly 
point to his own motivations. The problem with this approach is that his words do not tell a 
coherent and psychologically plausible story. They do, however, tell two discrete stories—in the 
past, up until Oedipus goes to Delphi, this account makes perfect sense: 
In the past  In the present 
1. A man questions Oedipus’ 
paternity 
2. Oedipus asks his parents and they 
do not answer him directly 
3. Oedipus goes to Delphi for 
answers (which he does not 
directly get) 
 1. A drunk man (not to be given 
credence) questions Oedipus’ 
parentage 
2. Oedipus asks his parents and is 
reassured 
3. Oedipus goes to Delphi anyway 
and leaves with an entirely 
different set of concerns 
We are left, then, with the question of what happened between these two accounts. The shifts are 
subtle, but they serve to undermine the psychological plausibility of this story. If the man at the 
                                                   
240 See fn. 210 on this characterization.  
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banquet is drunk, why does Oedipus let the man’s drunken insults bother him so deeply? If he is 
reassured by his parents, why go to Delphi? The string of events no longer has a clear causal 
relationship, as related in the present. However, the past version I suggest above makes clear sense 
of how Oedipus behaves. If we understand the present account as this past account retold in light 
of his current convictions (that the man in the banquet was wrong and his parents are Polybus and 
Merope), then we can understand the strange version Oedipus tells. He is constrained by the 
events as they happened in the past, but he can rewrite the motivations and his own impressions to 
give “past Oedipus” the mindset of “present Oedipus,” as much as possible. These two accounts 
do not blend seamlessly,241 but blend well enough that no one questions this story’s plausibility.  
What, then, caused this conviction that reshaped Oedipus’ version of this story? This shift 
occurs when Oedipus arrives at Delphi and comes into contact with Apollo, but the prophecy itself 
is worth examining in some detail. As I discussed above, the way that Oedipus recounts the 
prophecy, in the μὲν . . . δὲ . . . δὲ . . . format, suggests an ordered series of events in which 
Oedipus will first sleep with his mother, then father incestuous children, then kill his father. The 
order cannot have been specified in this way, since that is not the order in which it is fulfilled, but 
the way that Oedipus presents it suggests that he assumed this was the order. Combined with a 
heavy emphasis on Oedipus’ father’s identity in his retelling, but no mention of Merope not being 
his real mother, we can see at the very least that his own focus is on his paternity. Whether we 
should imagine this as an objective truth (i.e. the man at the banquet only questioned his father’s 
identity) or think that this is a result of Oedipus filtering the story though his own perceptions and 
memories, they come to much the same thing: in the version of his past that Oedipus tells, the 
central question that drove him toward Delphi had to do with his paternity.242  
With all this in mind, let us return to this difficult question: why does Oedipus leave Delphi 
and head toward Thebes? We have evidence to suggest that Oedipus is not sure about his 
paternity, but he does feel certain that the first of these wretched and terrible and disastrous events 
to take place will be that he sleeps with his mother. If his own assumptions and inferences are 
correct—though, clearly, from our perspective we know that they are not—the best way to avoid 
                                                   
241 This is not unlike the way that Creon blends two different “voices” when he recounts what he heard from Apollo, as 
I discussed earlier. We can, to some extent, pull these different stories apart and explain some of the seeming 
inconsistencies or implausibilities in these accounts when we understand Oedipus and Creon to be blending two 
discrete (and not entirely compatible) accounts into one.  
242 See page 110ff. on this. 
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setting this oracle in motion is to put as much distance between himself and his mother as possible. 
My interpretation also sheds some light onto the oft-raised question of why Oedipus recklessly kills 
a man he does not know at the crossroads if he has just been told that he will kill his father (and 
some doubt has been cast onto his father’s identity). On this interpretation, even if he is not 
convinced that Polybus is his true father (though his initial doubt certainly seems to fade over time, 
judging from his reaction to news of Polybus’ death), Oedipus does not need to be hyper-aware of 
potential parricide until he sleeps with his mother, whom he thinks he can securely identify as 
Merope.  
As is the case with all the oracles we have seen, Oedipus will be wrong about his 
assumptions here. However, as was the case with Jocasta, his logical process is sound—it is only 
because his starting premises are wrong that he comes to the wrong conclusion.243 If we look back 
to the riddle framework from earlier in this chapter, we can see that the fundamental problem here 
can map onto the pun/double meaning category of riddles in a way that is illuminating, even 
though it is not a perfect correspondence. If my interpretation is correct, Oedipus makes two 
critical mistakes in his interpretation of the oracle—one is to assume that the three parts of his fate 
were ordered chronologically and the other is that he knows what “mother” means. The first 
mistake does not explicitly correspond to any of the types of riddles I examined earlier, so I will 
begin with the second assumption. This oracle seems straightforward, but there are in fact two 
different easy opportunities for misinterpretation which present themselves here. First, though 
Oedipus dos not fall into this trap, there is the possibility that “mother” is meant metaphorically 
and does not refer to his biological mother. Though this might seem implausible at first glance, this 
is precisely the form that Hippias’ prophetic dream takes. Herodotus tells us that he had a dream 
                                                   
243 The philosophical terminology of valid/invalid and sound/unsound is useful here. An argument is valid “when its 
conclusion follows from its premises (other descriptions are ‘is deducible from’ or ‘is entailed by’),” whereas sound 
arguments “are valid arguments with true premises.” (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, “argument”). The standard 
example of this is the syllogism:  
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
This argument is sound, since it is valid and the premises are true. If we were to change this to: 
All men are purple. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is purple. 
Here, the argument is valid, in that the conclusion follows from the premises, but it is not sound, since the premise All 
men are purple is not true. In Oedipus’ case, his deductive process is valid but not sound, in that his premises are not 
true and he arrives as an inaccurate conclusion.  
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that he slept with his mother (τῆς παροιχομένης νυκτὸς ὄψιν ἰδὼν τοιήνδε· ἐδόκεε ὁ Ἱππίης τῇ 
μητρὶ τῇ ἑωυτοῦ συνευνηθῆναι, 6.107.1), which he interprets to mean that he will regain his 
homeland of Athens and die there. In this situation, μήτηρ refers to motherland (though his 
interpretation is not entirely correct), and his dream was not about actual incest, though it 
appeared to be.244 Apollo’s words could well have meant that Oedipus would return to his 
motherland, and not to his mother (though both prove to be true).245 Alternatively, we can see this 
as a version of the sort of riddle in which κόρη is used to make the hearer assume that it means 
young girl when the solution requires it to be understood as eyeball. Here, however, the “riddle” is 
more subtle: μήτηρ is used to make Oedipus assume it means Merope when the solution requires it 
to be understood as Jocasta. As with all riddles of this sort, this is a fundamentally semiotic failure to 
recognize the proper signified that corresponds with the signifier.  
The first assumption is of a slightly different type. Like riddles which hinge on puns and 
double meanings, this too exploits Oedipus’ natural assumptions to misdirect his interpretation. 
This is not as directly anchored to one word, but it is an underlying feature common to many types 
of riddles as well as ambiguous communication in general. As such, it is worth recalling the 
pragmatic principles that were discussed in the Introduction. Standard conversational conventions 
dictate that a speaker will present information as clearly and unambiguously as possible, if they are 
striving for comprehension. In general, a list of three items structured in the way that this oracle is 
structured will suggest that they are an ordered list—more often than not, μὲν . . . δὲ . . . δὲ . . . will 
be structured in some way, and not a random list. As with the mis-identification of mother 
described above, these are intuitive assumptions that a listener will make when engaged in a 
cooperative conversation. However, understanding this oracle requires a very different interpretive 
move that specifically does not take the most obvious or immediate available meaning, but instead 
finds a linguistic loophole that is semantically available, though not pragmatically available, as we 
saw with Zeus’ oracular language in the Trachiniae. This is the same move required to solve a 
                                                   
244 Jocasta’s claim that that many men have slept with their mothers in dreams (πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κἀν ὀνείρασιν 
βροτῶν / μητρὶ ξυνηυνάσθησαν, 981-2) may well be a reference to this sort of story, if not to Herodotus’ specific 
account.  
245 A lesser ambiguity here also centers on the meaning of “kill,” since Greek tragedy is full of characters making claims 
like ὄλωλα when they are not in fact dead, but simply in distress of some sort. Similarly, at Aj. 1126, Menelaus (still 
very much alive) says, of Ajax, δίκαια γὰρ τόνδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖν κτείναντά με. We can see, then, that there are several 
different levels on which “you will kill your mother” is an ambiguous prediction.  
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riddle and—as was the case with the oracles structured with ἢ . . . ἤ, in Chapter 1—it requires a 
specific disregard for pragmatic rules of conversation.  
In the end, Oedipus’ fatal misinterpretation stems from a failure to recognize that standard 
rules of conversation did not apply to the oracle from Apollo and, more specifically, that the 
pragmatic rules that he should have applied to the oracle were the very rules that he used to 
become ruler of Thebes—the rules of riddles. To return to an earlier point, with the prophecy 
about the plague, these miscommunications only emerge once Apollo is involved in the 
communication. Creon’s speech, we saw, cannot be understood when he is acting as the voice of 
Apollo, and it is only once he speaks in his own voice that Oedipus can understand the content of 
the prophecy. Here, we can observe the same phenomenon, but it takes a different form. Oedipus 
properly understands and investigates the challenges to his paternity until he reaches Delphi. Once 
he comes into contact with Apollo, he still approaches his circumstances with a fundamentally 
logical, reasoned approach, but he is misdirected by Apollo’s speech, which is not “playing by the 
same rules,” so to speak, as Oedipus expects. Apollo’s oracle implies—but, critically, does not 
explicitly state—things that are not true and Oedipus works from these invalid premises to come to 
unsound conclusions.  
As a final note on this point, there is another aspect of Apollo’s prophecy which disregards 
the pragmatic conventions which govern cooperative human communication. To revisit the basic 
Gricean maxims, the Maxim of Relation dictates that speakers should be relevant. When Oedipus 
asks who his parents are, Apollo’s response disregards this maxim entirely. The revelation that he 
Oedipus will kill his father and sleep with his mother is not relevant to the question of who his 
parents are.246 Conventions of conversation would suggest that at this point, Oedipus would ask a 
clarifying question and try to find an interpretation in which Apollo’s words are relevant to his 
question (since he would assume that his interlocutor is participating in a cooperative conversation 
whose goal is effective communication). However, Apollo’s words are traumatic and shocking 
enough that Oedipus leaves immediately and there is no possibility for Oedipus to attempt to 
clarify what Apollo meant. Further, nothing we see elsewhere in this play suggests that Apollo is 
                                                   
246 There is, I suppose, a very forced and unintuitive interpretation in which the “answer” to Oedipus’ question is 
actually “your mother is the person you will sleep with and your father is the man you will kill.” This would turn out to 
be accurate, but in addition to being a forced reading, this seems like an imprecise definition of his parents, since he 
may well have killed other people in addition to Laius (the Sphinx, say, and possibly others). 
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abiding by the rules of cooperative conversations,247 so there is no reason to believe that Oedipus 
would eventually reach an accurate understanding, no matter how many questions he asked of 
Apollo. In the end, this serves as yet another example of how Apollo’s communication is not 
governed by the same rules which govern human speech.  
 
Tracing the Echoes of the Prophecy 
As we attempt to trace this prophecy throughout the rest of the play, these two accounts of 
the oracle, from Oedipus and Jocasta, will provide a useful point of reference, since all the other 
accounts stem from these two instances. Though references to their respective oracles are always 
paraphrased, all the subsequent versions are consistent with these initial versions. Though they do 
not provide new information as to the content of the oracle, later accounts are dramatically 
effective, as both a reminder of the constant presence and effect of this oracle in the lives of the 
central characters as well as an ominous and foreboding reminder to the audience of the terrible 
secret that will soon come to light. Beyond these effects, however, the later mentions of the oracle 
also serve to characterize Oedipus and Jocasta, since the oracle is not always recounted in its 
entirety or in a neutral way. The details characters choose to include and exclude are significant, as 
are the contexts in which they mention the oracle and the rhetorical effects they hope to achieve by 
its mention.  
The next clear mention of these oracles about Oedipus’ killing his father come when 
Oedipus is starting to suspect that he might actually be the killer of Laius and that he has brought 
the plague upon Thebes. At this point, it becomes nearly impossible to keep the two oracles 
distinct, and although this first mention (813-33) is strictly about the plague, it is worth examining 
these two passages in tandem, since they are so inextricably linked.  
Only slightly later in the speech in which Oedipus describes receiving the oracle from 
Apollo, he returns to the prophecy from Apollo about the plague. In the interim, he has described 
coming across Laius at the crossroads and killing him, so he has never truly stopped talking about 
oracles and their fulfillment, but it will be more useful to look at prophecy from the perspectives of 
the characters in the play and not from our own position outside the play. As far as Oedipus 
                                                   
247 As I have acknowledged earlier, the obvious reason that this is the case is that oracular consultations are not, strictly 
speaking, conversations. That does not mean that we cannot apply many of the principles of Gricean conversational 
maxims to help illuminate how communication goes awry, but it bears repeating that oracular consultations are not 
conversations. As an analytic framework or a diagnostic tool, however, using these so-called conversation maxims can 
help us understand precisely what about Apollo’s phrasing is so difficult to understand.  
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understands his own speech, lines 787-97 describe Apollo’s prophecy to him and 798-813 are 
unrelated, until he revisits the plague prophecy again at line 813: 
 
 
815 
 
 
 
 
820 
 
 
 
 
825 
 
 
 
 
830 
                                          εἰ δὲ τῷ ξένῳ  
τούτῳ προσήκει Λαΐῳ τι συγγενές,  
τίς τοῦδέ γ᾽ ἀνδρός νῦν ἂν ἀθλιώτερος;  
τίς ἐχθροδαίμων μᾶλλον ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἀνήρ;  
ὃν μὴ ξένων ἔξεστι μηδ᾽ ἀστῶν τινι  
δόμοις δέχεσθαι μηδὲ προσφωνεῖν τινα,  
ὠθεῖν δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οἴκων. καὶ τάδ᾽ οὔτις ἄλλος ἦν  
ἢ 'γὼ 'π᾽ ἐμαυτῷ τάσδ᾽ ἀρὰς ὁ προστιθείς.  
λέχη δὲ τοῦ θανόντος ἐκ χεροῖν ἐμαῖν  
χραίνω, δι᾽ ὧνπερ ὤλετ᾽· ἆρ᾽ ἔφυν κακός;  
ἆρ᾽ οὐχὶ πᾶς ἄναγνος; εἴ με χρὴ φυγεῖν,  
καί μοι φυγόντι μἤστι τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἰδεῖν  
μηδ᾽ ἐμβατεύειν πατρίδος, ἢ γάμοις με δεῖ  
μητρὸς ζυγῆναι καὶ πατέρα κατακτανεῖν  
Πόλυβον, ὃς ἐξέφυσε κἀξέθρεψέ με.  
ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ὠμοῦ ταῦτα δαίμονός τις ἂν  
κρίνων ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τῷδ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοίη λόγον;  
μὴ δῆτα, μὴ δῆτ᾽, ὦ θεῶν ἁγνὸν σέβας,  
ἴδοιμι ταύτην ἡμέραν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ βροτῶν  
βαίην ἄφαντος πρόσθεν ἢ τοιάνδ᾽ ἰδεῖν  
κηλῖδ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ συμφορᾶς ἀφιγμένην. 
OT 813-33 
But if anything akin to Laius pertains to this man, who 
is a more wretched man than I myself am? What man 
would be possessed of a more hostile fate? For, this 
man—it is not permitted for any foreign man or any 
citizen to welcome him into their homes or to speak to 
him, but they must push him from their homes. And 
these things—no other person but my very self laid 
these curses on me. And I pollute the bed of the dead 
man with my two hands—the hands by which he 
perished.  Am I not wretched? Am I not entirely 
unclean? If I must flee, and it is no longer possible for 
me to see my loved ones or set foot in my fatherland—
or I must join with my mother in matrimony and kill my 
father Polybus who sired and raised me.  Then, would 
not someone who judged that these things came from a 
savage god, would they not be right about me? Pure 
reverence of the gods, may I never look on that day! 
But may I pass out from among the ranks of mortals 
before I see such a stain of misfortune come upon me! 
 
The critical piece of evidence that seems to exonerate Oedipus, to Jocasta’s way of thinking, is the 
fact that Oedipus killed several men at a crossroads by himself, whereas Laius was killed by a band 
of robbers. She reassures Oedipus with the following argument: 
 
 
 
 
850 
 
 
 
 
855 
 
 
 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φανέν γε τοὔπος ὧδ᾽ ἐπίστασο,  
κοὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐκβαλεῖν πάλιν·  
πόλις γὰρ ἤκουσ᾽, οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνη, τάδε.  
εἰ δ᾽ οὖν τι κἀκτρέποιτο τοῦ πρόσθεν λόγου,  
οὔτοι ποτ᾽, ὦναξ, σόν γε Λαΐου φόνον  
φανεῖ δικαίως ὀρθόν, ὅν γε Λοξίας  
διεῖπε χρῆναι παιδὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ θανεῖν.  
καίτοι νιν οὐ κεῖνός γ᾽ ὁ δύστηνός ποτε  
κατέκταν᾽, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς πάροιθεν ὤλετο.  
ὥστ᾽ οὐχὶ μαντείας γ᾽ ἂν οὔτε τῇδ᾽ ἐγὼ  
βλέψαιμ᾽ ἂν εἵνεκ᾽ οὔτε τῇδ᾽ ἂν ὕστερον. 
OT 848-58 
But know that the story was at least told this way, and 
he is not able to take this back, for the city heard 
these things, and not I alone. But even if he should 
change something from his earlier account, he will at 
no time, lord, show that this murder of Laius that 
you suggest has been truly fulfilled—Loxias declared 
that it would be necessary for him to die at the hand 
of my child. And indeed, that wretched thing never 
killed him, but he himself died earlier. Because of 
this, I would not—as far as divination is concerned—
look to this side or that in the future.  
 
Viewed in tandem, we can see how these two scenes display the continued misinterpretive moves 
that both Oedipus and Jocasta make, continuing the misunderstandings they have held from the 
start.  
Oedipus approaches the new oracle from Apollo with the assumption that it is true, just as 
 125 
he approached the oracle about his own fate. Therefore, he has already at least entertained his 
hypothetical guilt as Laius’ murderer and laments how terrible his banishment will be, if he does 
prove to be the murderer. The two oracles begin to close in on Oedipus at this point. However, he 
places the two oracles into dialogue with one another. If he is guilty, he must be banished, but in 
banishment from Thebes, he would be doubly cursed, since he could not remain in Thebes (due to 
the plague oracle) and he could not return to Corinth (due to his familial oracle). As such, he is 
effectively hemmed in by two oracles of Apollo.  
Here, his use of the term ἐχθροδαίμων is interesting, in that it gives us insight into his own 
perception of his fate at this point. In terms of dramatic irony, this term is highly loaded, and all of 
its potential meanings absolutely apply to Oedipus. It is a hapax and the scholiasts on this passage 
gloss it alternately as θεοῖς ἐχθρός (“enemy to the gods”), μισητὸς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν (literally, 
“hateful, from the gods”), ἐχθρὸς τοῖς δαίμοσιν (“enemy to the daimones,” which is essentially 
equated to θεοῖς ἐχθρός here, with ἤγουν τοῖς θεοῖς following after), and δυστυχής 
(“unfortunate”). Given the bivalent nature of ἐχθρός, though, none of these glosses are 
particularly helpful and they all leave the possibility open that ἐχθροδαίμων could mean hated by 
the gods or hateful to the gods. Either way, Oedipus is an ἐχθρός in relation to the gods, but in one 
scenario, all this misfortune has befallen him because the gods, who do not like him, want to punish 
him. In the other scenario, he has committed such a terrible crime that the gods hate him because 
of his crimes.  
LSJ opt for the equally ambiguous “hated of the gods” for this word and the consensus 
seems to be in favor of the “hated by the gods” interpretation, leaving Kamerbeek’s suggestion (ad 
816) that this word ought to be compared to κακοδαίμων largely overlooked. When viewed in the 
context of δυσδαίμων, εὐδαίμων, and κακοδαίμων, the natural meaning for ἐχθροδαίμων is not 
“hated by the gods” but rather something akin to “having a fortune that is inimical (sc. to me).” 
On this reading, Oedipus sees himself as ill-fated, but not in a way that implies that he is being 
punished by the gods or that he has necessarily incurred their wrath. Instead, he is here lamenting 
his misfortune in a way more akin to someone complaining about their terrible luck.248 This echoes 
                                                   
248 See Winnington-Ingram 1980: 151ff. (esp. 173-8) for a thorough look at the meaning of daimon here, as opposed to 
moira, in terms of an impersonal fate. While I am not interested in an examination of how fate and free will interact in 
this play, I do think Winnington-Ingram’s observation about the distinction between destiny (the realm of daimones 
and moira) and gods (theoi): “destiny is inexorable, whereas gods, it is hoped, can be moved by prayer and sacrifice” 
(152). A daimon is not the personal, anthropomorphic entity that a theos is. As Winnington-Ingram also notes “gods 
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lines 776-7, in which Oedipus describes the events which drove him from his homeland as τύχη 
τοιάδ᾽. His inimical fortune has led to him cursing himself, without knowing it, since his unknowing 
act is the source of the plague.  
Here, we see the moment when the reality of what has happened is first truly expressed, 
though it is still very much a potential horror, from Oedipus’ perspective: ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ὠμοῦ 
ταῦτα δαίμονός τις ἂν / κρίνων ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ τῷδ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοίη λόγον; (“Then, would not 
someone who judged that these things came from a savage god, would they not be right about 
me?” 828-9). In these lines as well as 816 (τίς ἐχθροδαίμων μᾶλλον ἂν γένοιτ᾽ ἀνήρ;), Oedipus 
speaks in potential optatives: If this were to possibly prove true, I would be a wretched victim of a 
cruel δαίμων (ἐχθροδαίμων, ἀπ᾽ ὠμοῦ … δαίμονός). He will not name the δαίμων, nor will he 
specify here that he is being tormented by a θεός, though we are aware that he certainly is and this 
is not the nebulous δαίμων of one’s general lot or fortune in life.  The bitter irony of this scene 
rests on the utter accuracy of this statement—Apollo’s own prophecy set this in motion (driving 
Oedipus out of Corinth toward Thebes, where he could kill Laius)—but, more to the point, he 
presumably sent the plague to Thebes,249 which is the only reason why Oedipus ever embarks on 
this quest for self-knowledge. If it were not for the plague from Apollo, Oedipus’ fated woes would 
still have happened, but he would never know. This moment is, in the end, an embodiment of the 
complex range of Apollo’s divine attributes—he is operating though plague and the possibility of 
healing as well as through oracular obscurity and the possibility of clear comprehension. 
Paradoxically, he will bring about a forced realization and terrible clarity while simultaneously 
obscuring any sort of linguistic clarity or comprehension by his mere presence.  
Once we get into the actual restatement of the oracle here, we have little new information, 
but this is nonetheless a useful passage. Not only does Oedipus draw these two oracles together into 
one passage—though he certainly does not make any thematic or causal connection between the 
two—but he pointedly refers to Polybus as his father (πατέρα, 826) who sired and raised him (ὃς 
ἐξέφυσε κἀξέθρεψέ με, 827). Whether Polybus is Oedipus’ father is not in question, as the 
characters in the play understand this moment. This identification alone blocks the oracles from 
                                                   
are likely to have intelligible motives” (152). Oedipus is not complaining about gods in this moment—instead, he is 
plagued by an inimical daimon.  
249 It bears repeating that we have no evidence to suggest that Apollo actually did send the plague to Thebes, aside 
from his general interest in Oedipus’ fate and his association with plague. This evidence is circumstantial, but we (and 
perhaps Oedipus) may well presume that the plague is Apollo’s doing.  
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blending into one another from an external perspective. If not for that, there would be no 
significant reason why the two oracles cannot refer to the same murder. After all, if Polybus is not 
Oedipus’ father, any man that he killed could conceivably be his father, and if the only man he has 
killed since going to Delphi is Laius, events could quickly unravel to the point that the two oracles 
could be understood as overlapping at the moment when Oedipus kills Laius. This scene functions 
as a place where the two oracles are so close to merging into each other, in the midst of the gods 
and daimones, but the firm identification of Polybus as Oedipus’ birth father in the middle blocks 
that possibility.  
To return to Jocasta’s speech, we see a parallel moment, but from the perspective of 
characters themselves. As I noted above, all that keeps Oedipus from realizing that he was the 
murderer of Laius is the lone survivor’s story that a band of robbers, and not a single man, killed 
the king. Yet when she returns to the prophecy, we see a strange approach to reassuring Oedipus 
by discrediting the oracle. Presumably, given Oedipus’ concern that he may be the murderer of 
Laius and is the cause of the plague, she is attempting to assuage those fears. As before (707-25), 
Jocasta offers the allegedly unfulfilled oracle that she received from Apollo as an argument against 
prophecy in general. In this case, though, she has strengthened her stance. Instead of questioning 
the priests rather than Apollo, as she carefully did before, she now directly criticizes Apollo 
(invoking Λοξίας directly at 853) and divination (μαντεία, 857). To simplify her argument, it 
follows this causal chain: 
1. Oedipus, do not be worried that you are the cause of the plague because  
2. The survivor said there was a band of murderers. 
3. Even if you did kill Laius, you do not need to exile yourself or worry about returning to 
Corinth, as you thought, because  
4. Laius’ killer in the city is not the cause of the plague even though the oracle said that, 
because  
5. Oracles are wrong—case in point, Laius was not killed by his son, since his son died as a 
baby 
 
Jocasta’s premises are not sound here, but her rhetorical approach does make sense. Really, the 
“band of murderers” is the only thing that is necessary to prove Oedipus’ innocence and save him 
from exile. Invoking the oracle here is logically unnecessary, but dramatically effective in that we 
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can see this same process that occurs over and over throughout the play. Jocasta starts off in a 
logical, rational mode, but once she brings the words of Apollo into play, her argument loses its 
soundness and we see that—yet again—Apollo has obscured the possibility of effective 
interpretation. 100 lines before this, Jocasta was drawing a distinction between the priests of Apollo 
and Apollo himself. A failure on the part of the priests of Apollo is even less evidence for Apollo’s 
fallibility and the worthlessness of divination as a whole.  
However, by this point, both Oedipus and Jocasta have become more committed to their 
original misunderstandings and more entrenched in those views. Oedipus is firmly convinced that 
he can accurately identify not only his mother, but also his father. Jocasta, meanwhile, has shifted 
the fallibility from the priests to Apollo himself and has assumed (incorrectly) that this proves that 
all prophecy is flawed. Again, we see that the words of Apollo persistently confuse and obscure 
attempts to effectively pull meaning from them and rather than revisit any of the other assumptions 
she has made about this prophecy, she reaffirms her commitment to the idea that an exposed child 
must have died at the expense of her belief that Apollo cannot be wrong.  
The next reference to these prophecies comes in the last moments before the full truth is 
revealed about Oedipus’ parentage in the messenger’s speech. These last few moments are minor, 
but they nonetheless reinforce the persistent characterization of Jocasta and her approach to these 
prophecies.250 When the messenger reports that Polybus has died, Jocasta sends for Oedipus while 
explicitly challenging the oracles (μαντεύματα) again: 
 
945 ὦ πρόσπολ᾽, οὐχὶ δεσπότῃ τάδ᾽ ὡς τάχος  
μολοῦσα λέξεις; ὦ θεῶν μαντεύματα,  
ἵν᾽ ἐστέ. τοῦτον Οἰδίπους πάλαι τρέμων  
τὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἔφευγε μὴ κτάνοι· καὶ νῦν ὅδε  
πρὸς τῆς τύχης ὄλωλεν οὐδὲ τοῦδ᾽ ὕπο. 
945-9 
Maid, will you go as quickly as possible and tell 
these things to your master? Oracles of the gods, 
you have come to this! This is the man that 
Oedipus fled, long fearing that he would kill him, 
and now this man has died by chance and not by 
Oedipus’ hand.  
 
When Oedipus arrives, she makes a similar claim:  
952 ἄκουε τἀνδρὸς τοῦδε, καὶ σκόπει κλύων  
τὰ σέμν᾽ ἵν᾽ ἥκει τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεύματα. 
952-3 
Hear this man and see, as you listen, what the 
revered oracles of the god have come to.  
                                                   
250 As I noted earlier, I am not suggesting this reading to the exclusion of all others. There is certainly a psychological 
element here, as Jocasta is very likely bringing her own desires and preconceptions to bear on these prophecies. 
Though I am not offering a psychological or psychoanalytical reading here, I do think that Jocasta’s own mental state 
contributes to her misunderstandings here, if we imagine that her subconscious is trying to protect her conscious mind 
from the realization that this horrific prophecy has in fact come true. However, the careful choices that Sophocles 
makes suggest other explanations as well, as I have explored in this chapter.  
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No new information is provided here, but there has not in fact been any new oracular 
information since the first time that Oedipus and Jocasta recount their respective oracles. Instead, 
we have seen the references to this oracle deployed in ways that are to the benefit of the speaker. 
Allusions to the oracles, once the content was conveyed, become mechanisms to explore the 
psychological motivations of the people making those allusions. Here, Jocasta displays her 
increasing commitment to the worthlessness of oracles. At each juncture when she discusses 
divination, she commits herself more deeply to the idea that oracles are not useful or true. When 
she first introduced the oracle that she and Laius received, she questions the priests’ ability to 
foretell the future. After that, she goes further and says that Loxias and all divination have no 
bearing on outcomes. Finally, in the last version, which we see here, she goes so far as to directly 
address the oracles with scorn: ὦ θεῶν μαντεύματα, / ἵν᾽ ἐστέ (“Oracles of the gods, you have 
come to this!” 946-7).251 Her skepticism reaches its peak here, making the impending recognition 
scene all the more dramatic and ironic.  
However, for my purposes, it is important to note that this skepticism does not simply reach 
a crescendo here for dramatic effect. Instead, as I noted earlier, we can trace how and where 
Jocasta’s misinterpretation originates. At each subsequent consideration of the oracle, she becomes 
more deeply committed to this inaccurate interpretation. This is not a coincidence. At each 
mention of Apollo or each attempt to convey his words from Delphi, Jocasta slides further into this 
misunderstanding. This is very much in keeping with the overall pattern of the play: whenever 
Apollo appears in a conversation, comprehension and rational inquiry are interrupted.  
For the moment, I will leave the recognition scenes aside, since they are not a moment 
where understanding is obscured, but rather a moment where understanding and meaning emerges 
out of the conversations. Instead, I will move to the final reference to this prophecy, after Oedipus 
                                                   
251 Jebb here draws attention to the use of μαντεύματα as the subject and suggests that her scorn is directed “not at 
the gods themselves, but at the μάντεις who profess to speak in their name” and concludes that “the gods are wise, but 
they grant no πρόνοια to men,” drawing on lines 978 and 712 as comparanda (ad 946). I agree that there is a focus on 
the μαντεύματα, but she has already directly attacked Apollo before (848-58) and the inclusion of θεῶν (946) and 
τοῦ θεοῦ (953) suggest a close connection with the gods. Such language could have been left out without 
fundamentally changing the content of the sentences and this does seem to be a direct attack on the gods—it is an open 
question whether we should understand that she is saying that the gods do not know the future, or simply that they 
cannot effectively communicate it. Either way, I do not think the repeated use of μαντεύματα is meant to spare the 
gods themselves from any blame or to avoid an appearance of impiety. 
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knows everything.252 Since he is looking back in retrospect, it is unsurprising that he now 
understands the meaning of the oracle. After all, the riddle has been solved: 
 
 
 
 
1360 
 
1365 
οὔκουν πατρός γ᾽ ἂν φονεὺς  
ἦλθον οὐδὲ νυμφίος  
βροτοῖς ἐκλήθην ὧν ἔφυν ἄπο.  
νῦν δ᾽ ἄθεος μέν εἰμ᾽, ἀνοσίων δὲ παῖς,  
ὁμολεχὴς δ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἔφυν τάλας.  
εἰ δέ τι πρεσβύτερον ἔτι κακοῦ κακόν,  
τοῦτ᾽ ἔλαχ᾽ Οἰδίπους. 
OT 1357-66 
I would not, then, have become the murderer of my 
father, nor would I have been known to men as the 
husband of the woman from whom I came. But now, 
I am godless, child of the profane, sharing a brood 
with those from whom I—wretch that I am—sprang. 
If there is some evil that is yet graver than evil, 
Oedipus has received it as his part.  
 
I would like to point out one particular word that Oedipus uses to describe himself: 
ἄθεος.253 The primary meaning here is clearly his wretchedness and the magnitude of his crimes. 
However, it is also a particularly apt word for this moment, since he can now see everything 
clearly.254 For the first time in his life, he is fully aware of his identity and has solved all the riddles 
(even the ones he did not know were riddles that needed solving). The god who has hounded his 
family, obscuring understanding and offering misleading oracles, is no longer interfering, now that 
Oedipus has been effectively destroyed. His understanding coincides with his status as ἄθεος 
because it was that very θεός whose involvement precluded effective interpretation of the words of 
the oracles.  
 
3. Tiresias: Most like the Lord Apollo 
Tiresias plays a very liminal role in this play, as both a mortal and a mouthpiece for Apollo, 
a role that is explicitly ascribed to him by the Chorus: 
 
                                                   
252 These lines may be spurious. Dawe (ad 1458-60) thinks that interpolation begins at 1422 and that everything from 
line 1458 to the end of the play is spurious “and the voice of Sophocles is heard no more.” Kamerbeek, contra Dawe, 
thinks that the bulk of the text through line 1530 is authentic and he even argues against Pearson et al. who consider 
1524-30 to be spurious. I tend to side with Pohlenz’ interpretation and think that lines 1524-30 fit better if they are 
spoken by Oedipus than by the Chorus (contra Kamerbeek’s preference for the Chorus). Regardless, I feel 
comfortable considering lines 1356ff. to be authentic, as noted before (fn. 18). 
253 For a thorough examination of the loaded term ἄθεος, see Whitmarsh 2015, which provides a useful overview of the 
historical uses of the term and in a changing cultural context. In particular, on this passage, he notes that Oedipus feels 
"deliciously free from divine determination," though his quasi-atheistic stance is reversed in the course of the play. 
When Oedipus exclaims that he is ἄθεος, Whitmarsh argues that “it will have taken the ancient spectators a few 
seconds to work out that he means it in the older sense, 'abandoned by the gods,' rather than the current 'atheist'” 
(106), and that the meaning that would be most readily available to the audience would have been “atheist.” See also 
116ff.  
254 Not literally, of course, since he has blinded himself, an irony lost on no one.  
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285 
ἄνακτ᾽ ἄνακτι ταὔθ᾽ ὁρῶντ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι  
μάλιστα Φοίβῳ Τειρεσίαν, παρ᾽ οὗ τις ἂν  
σκοπῶν τάδ᾽, ὦναξ, ἐκμάθοι σαφέστατα. 
284-6 
I know that lord Tiresias sees things most like the 
lord Apollo. From him, lord, someone who is 
seeking would learn these things most clearly.  
 
“Lord Tiresias” (ἄνακτ᾽ … Τειρεσίαν) is ἄνακτι μάλιστα Φοίβῳ—the lord most like the lord 
Apollo. This makes the next lines laden with importance: “From him, lord, someone who is seeking 
would learn these things most clearly.” Knowing what we know about Apollo’s inability to 
communicate effectively, this first claim about Tiresias (that he is most like the lord Apollo) is true, 
but in a complex fashion. Apollo does, after all, see things clearly and his perceptions and 
knowledge are not in doubt. Similarly, Tiresias is fully aware of the outcome of the events of this 
play, but the second claim, with its future less vivid condition, is far more dubious—Oedipus is 
undoubtedly seeking, but he does not learn things clearly from Tiresias. This ominous line harks 
back to Oedipus’ unsuccessful attempts to learn about his parents, at Delphi. Here, it is worth 
considering how far his characterization as μάλιστα Φοίβῳ is meant to extend and how much 
weight we ought to place on the Chorus’ claims. Tiresias is in fact a great deal like Apollo, from all 
the evidence available to Oedipus and the Chorus, but most like Apollo simply does not imply any 
sort of clear revelations in this play, and lines 285-6 are best understood as being heavy with 
dramatic irony.  
Similarly, the Chorus describes Tiresias as “the divine seer” (τὸν θεῖον μάντιν, 298) and 
the one person with truth inherently in him (ᾧ / τἀληθὲς ἐμπέφυκεν ἀνθρώπων μόνῳ, 298-9). 
Oedipus too says that he is the one who “observes everything, things that can be taught and things 
that cannot be spoken, heavenly things and things that walk the earth” (ὦ πάντα νωμῶν 
Τειρεσία, διδακτά τε / ἄρρητά τ᾽, οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοστιβῆ, 300-1). Tiresias, we see, is 
located somewhere between divine and mortal. Access to divine knowledge is attributed to him 
alone, and he is the only mortal who is assimilated so closely to Apollo. Thus far, I have been 
drawing a divide between how mortals communicate and how divine communication interrupts 
these processes of communication. Where, then, does the liminal Tiresias fit within this system? 
Tiresias, I will argue here, represents something of a third category within this divine-
mortal system. Tiresias does not confound understanding in the same way that Apollo does; 
however, he also does not live up to the Chorus’ claims of revealing things clearly, as we will see 
below. Critically, regardless of how we may infer his motives throughout this play, we can say 
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conclusively that he is not engaged in a cooperative conversation. Tiresias—like Apollo—is not 
observing the Gricean maxims and, as a result, effective transmission of meaning cannot occur.  
The nature of Tiresias’ communications reflects the fact that Tiresias, as a mortal agent of 
Apollo, inhabits both the divine and mortal realms—his words are intelligible, and yet he refuses to 
reveal the things that he knows. His stated reasons are hard to discern through the complicated and 
thoroughly debated text, but he seems to say that he does not want to give voice to the truth, since 
the evils that he knows are currently only his, but if he speaks them, they will become Oedipus’ 
woes as well: πάντες γὰρ οὐ φρονεῖτ᾽· ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ μή ποτε / τἄμ᾽, ὡς ἂν εἴπω μὴ τὰ σ᾽, 
ἐκφήνω κακά (328-29). If we do not emend the passage, there are two main interpretations of this 
passage, and I side with those who follow Jebb’s translation of “I will never reveal my (not to call 
them thy) griefs” and understand Tiresias’ reluctance to stem from a desire not to give Oedipus 
bad news that will inflict κακά on him—not, as the other interpretive approach would suggest, as a 
reluctance born out of fear at the negative consequences he will suffer as the bearer of bad news.255 
The distinction may seem minor, but his motivations and Oedipus’ perception of his motivations 
drive their whole exchange from lines 300-462. Looking closely at the ways in which Tiresias 
interacts with Oedipus will prove critical to a full understanding of this scene.  
300 
 
 
 
 
305 
 
 
 
 
310 
 
 
 
 
315 
ὦ πάντα νωμῶν Τειρεσία, διδακτά τε  
ἄρρητά τ᾽, οὐράνιά τε καὶ χθονοστιβῆ,  
πόλιν μέν, εἰ καὶ μὴ βλέπεις, φρονεῖς δ᾽ ὅμως  
οἵᾳ νόσῳ σύνεστιν· ἧς σὲ προστάτην  
σωτῆρά τ᾽, ὦναξ, μοῦνον ἐξευρίσκομεν.  
Φοῖβος γάρ, εἴ τι μὴ κλύεις τῶν ἀγγέλων,  
πέμψασιν ἡμῖν ἀντέπεμψεν, ἔκλυσιν  
μόνην ἂν ἐλθεῖν τοῦδε τοῦ νοσήματος,  
εἰ τοὺς κτανόντας Λάϊον μαθόντες εὖ  
κτείναιμεν ἢ γῆς φυγάδας ἐκπεμψαίμεθα.  
σύ νυν φθονήσας μήτ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οἰωνῶν φάτιν  
μήτ᾽ εἴ τιν᾽ ἄλλην μαντικῆς ἔχεις ὁδόν,  
ῥῦσαι σεαυτὸν καὶ πόλιν, ῥῦσαι δ᾽ ἐμέ,  
ῥῦσαι δὲ πᾶν μίασμα τοῦ τεθνηκότος.  
ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν· ἄνδρα δ᾽ ὠφελεῖν ἀφ᾽ ὧν  
ἔχοι τε καὶ δύναιτο, κάλλιστος πόνων. 
300-15 
Tiresias, you who observe everything, both things 
that can be taught and things unspeakable, things in 
heaven and things upon the earth—even though 
you do not actually see, you nonetheless perceive 
what sort of sickness is besetting the city. We find 
that you alone, lord, are the guardian and the savior 
of the city. Phoebus—if you have not heard 
anything from the messengers—sent back to us who 
sent to him that release from this disease would only 
come if we discover the killers of Laius and kill them 
or send them out of the land as exiles. Now, do not 
begrudge us either the voice of the birds or some 
other path of prophecy you may have—save 
yourself and the city, save me, and save us from all 
the pollution of the dead man. For we are in your 
hands it is the finest labor for a man to provide aid, 
as his resources and his faculties allow. 
                                                   
255 Jebb and Campbell and Mazon all take essentially this same approach, with τὰ ἐμὰ κακά referring to the weight 
that the secrets about Oedipus have for Tiresias and τὰ σὰ κακά referring to the same secrets as they apply to Oedipus 
(Jebb ad loc.)—these are the same κακά, but Tiresias seems to be suggesting here that they are only Oedipus’ κακά if 
he knows about them, and if Tiresias keeps them to himself, they will afflict only him. I side with Kamerbeek in finding 
this to be a far preferable reading to that suggested by Elmsley, Platt, Pearson, et al., which understands ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ μή 
ποτε τἄμ᾽, ὡς ἂν εἴπω μὴ τὰ σ᾽, ἐκφήνω κακά to be essentially equivalent to οὐ μή ποτε τὰ σὰ ἐκφήνω κακὰ ἵνα 
εἴπω τὰ ἐμὰ (ἔπη or κακά). On this reading, Tiresias refuses to share his knowledge on the grounds that he will suffer 
some direct (negative) consequences for sharing. Dawe, however, simply emends the second line to τὰ λῷστα γ’ 
εἴπω μὴ τὰ σ᾽, ἐκφήνω κακά and avoids the complicated passage. 
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When approaching these lines, I will do so from the assumption that Tiresias does in fact 
know everything, as Oedipus and the Chorus have claimed. In this sense, he is very much like 
Apollo, and his actions come from a place of complete knowledge. Tiresias is the only person who 
truly knows the meaning of the oracles, a fact which is inextricably linked to his status as the only 
person who truly knows Oedipus’ identity. I would suggest that this knowledge extends beyond 
simply knowing Oedipus’ parentage; Tiresias knows Oedipus’ psychology as well. When he 
provokes Oedipus before telling him (in a limited fashion) the truth, he ensures that Oedipus will 
not be receptive to that truth. Tiresias is not misunderstood here, as Apollo is. Instead, he 
orchestrates a situation where he will be understood but not believed.  
Tiresias, then, engages in communication in a way that is not fully divine or fully human, 
which will be an important motif throughout his conversations with Oedipus. He is effectively 
divine, in terms of knowledge, but his words can be understood, unlike Apollo’s. There is nothing 
about his actual syntax that obscures his meaning, and Oedipus understands his words without any 
difficulty, once Tiresias actually reveals what he knows. So many of the failures of divine-human 
communication arise from the interaction between words and the context in which they are 
delivered—when gods talk, they consistently display a disregard of human pragmatic conventions, 
and they speak in a language whose meaning can only be understood by stripping away the normal 
contextual elements that would normally contribute to meaning. This may involve applying a 
seemingly-inappropriate set of linguistic rules to an oracle (as the riddle-like elements of Apollo’s 
words to Oedipus highlight) or disregarding the normal assumptions that humans apply to 
language and instead finding something of a linguistic loophole, as we saw in the Trachiniae.  
With Tiresias, something different happens. Tiresias, as we will see, does not speak in 
cryptic, riddling phrases, as oracles tend to do. Instead, he functions as something of a mortal 
inversion of Apollo; instead of communicating in a way that disregards context, he communicates in 
a way that exploits context’s role in generating meaning. Because of this manipulation of contextual 
elements, Tiresias’ speech will not be believed even though it will be understood—that is to say, 
Tiresias uses language in the way that mortals do, and his meaning is readily understood, but he 
simultaneously frustrates any chance of comprehension by manipulating the context and Oedipus’ 
own personality. 
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As I noted above, when Oedipus first speaks to Tiresias, he addresses him as the man “who 
observe[s] everything, both things that can be taught and things unspeakable, things in heaven and 
things upon the earth.” He goes on to characterize him as the lone protector and savior of the city 
(ἧς σὲ προστάτην / σωτῆρά τ᾽, ὦναξ, μοῦνον ἐξευρίσκομεν, 303-4), a theme that recurs later 
in this address as well, as Oedipus asks Tiresias to save (ῥῦσαι) himself, the city, and Oedipus, and 
to remove the pollution from the city. Significantly, he invokes both divination via birds (ἀπ᾽ 
οἰωνῶν φάτιν) as well as “some other path of prophecy” (τιν᾽ ἄλλην μαντικῆς ὁδόν)—even 
though Oedipus paraphrases the oracle in a way that implies a syntactic comprehension (aside from 
a small but critical confusion about whether there were one or many murderers), he is still aware 
that he does not fully understand the oracle. There is a critical piece of information missing—the 
identity of the person or people who killed Laius—and without knowing that, he cannot act upon 
the oracle. Here, the different modes of prophecy are juxtaposed: anyone can go to Delphi and 
receive an oracle, and the oracular form is (seemingly) accessible to anyone who speaks the Greek 
language. However, there is still need of a very particular set of skills that only Tiresias or other 
seers have access to, when it comes to questions of facts and information. This brings us back to the 
fundamental skill set involved in solving a riddle—Oedipus is the riddle solver par excellence, and 
yet he and others focus on how he knows nothing more than anyone else. Oedipus’ skills focus on 
his ability to interpret language flexibly and to find the well-known thing hiding beneath 
obfuscating language.256 His particular types of knowledge and understanding do not extend to any 
sort of preternatural access to information. For this, we must depart from the basic premise 
underlying oracles—that they can be effectively interpreted by anyone—and return to divination 
and seers to access things that cannot otherwise be discovered by humans.  
Before moving on, it is important to note the last argument that Oedipus uses to motivate 
Tiresias to help him: it is the finest labor (κάλλιστος πόνων) for a man to provide aid, as he is 
able (from both his resources and his faculties, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔχοι τε καὶ δύναιτο). Directly after asking 
Tiresias to save himself and the city and Oedipus himself, Oedipus then allies himself with the 
suppliants and the city as a whole (we are in your hands, ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν, 314), something he will 
continue to do throughout this exchange. Oedipus sets up a clear structure, in which Oedipus is 
                                                   
256 The dramatic irony, as so many others have noted, is thick here, precisely because this oracle is truly at the pinnacle 
of well-known things hiding under obscuring language. What could (or should) be more well-known to Oedipus than 
himself? 
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aligned with the city and the people, and Tiresias is positioned as the sole savior of them all.257 
Though it is implicit here, Oedipus begins to set up the grounds for his belief that Tiresias ought to 
help decipher the oracular instructions—patriotism and obligation to Thebes, layered with a sort of 
human compassion.  
Tiresias’ first words are something of a soliloquy—they do not directly address any of what 
Oedipus said and could be seen as more of an aside, except that Oedipus clearly overhears him and 
responds.  
316 φεῦ φεῦ, φρονεῖν ὡς δεινὸν ἔνθα μὴ τέλη  
λύῃ φρονοῦντι· ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς ἐγὼ  
εἰδὼς διώλεσ᾽· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δεῦρ᾽ ἱκόμην. 
316-18 
Ah, how terrible it is to have knowledge when it 
offers no benefit to the one who has it! And I knew 
this full well, but I forgot—for otherwise, I would 
not have come here.  
 
This is not an unusual way for a character to enter a scene and could easily be understood as a 
standard entrance lament.258 However, it is worth examining this closely, since it is the opening 
salvo in a conversation that effectively manipulates Oedipus’ psychology. In response to a direct 
request from the ruler of the city, asking him to nobly help the city and all the people, Tiresias 
responds with a lament about how terrible it is to know things that are not of profit to the one who 
knows them. We might, as many have, understand this as the moment when Tiresias (who has 
shown reluctance in coming and needed to be summoned twice) understands the full horror of 
what his knowledge entails.259 However, Sophocles has Tiresias specifically delay sharing his 
knowledge until revealing it will cause the most damage, and we should at least consider his actions 
in a less generous (and less humane) light. After all, his long delay in arriving gives Oedipus time to 
discuss the oracle with Creon and—more importantly—to curse the murderer and thereby curse 
himself (236-54). This has also given Oedipus time to discuss the actions he will take to uncover the 
murderer and banish him, and to announce these plans to the city. Perhaps, given how the rest of 
this scene unfolds, we should not think of Tiresias’ delayed arrival as something born out of 
                                                   
257 This is a stark inversion of the characterization of Oedipus as the savior of Thebes, a claim that was made less 
explicitly by the priest at the open of the play and one that will be made far more aggressively by Oedipus at the end of 
this exchange with Tiresias. 
258 For examples of characters entering with an emotional exclamation, see Polymestor at Hec. 1056; Cassandra at Ag. 
1072; Hermione at And. 825. For other examples of characters who enter with an outburst of some sort, see Cassandra 
at Tro. 308 ff.; Pentheus at Bacc. 642ff.; Hippolytus at Hipp. 601-2. See Mastronarde 1979 for more on this.  
259 For example, Jebb suggests this and paraphrases the sentiment here as “(I have to bewail this now), for, though I 
once knew it, I have forgotten it” and suggests that “Tiresias, twice summoned (288), had come reluctantly. Only now, 
in the presence of Oedipus, does he realise the full horror of the secret which he holds” (ad 317). 
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reluctance and horror, but rather as the first in a long string of intentional delays that will allow the 
terrible revelations of the play to unfold in the most horrific fashion.  
Returning to Tiresias’ words with this in mind, we can see how his opening lines subtly work 
to begin this process. To return to the pragmatic terminology of implicatures and inferences,260 
Tiresias opens with a series of statements that implicate that he does in fact have some sort of 
wisdom. Oedipus can reasonably infer from this lament that Tiresias has some sort of relevant 
knowledge that applies to this oracle. Again, there is no reason why Tiresias needs to open with this 
sort of a gnomic statement, and I would argue that it is a mistake to assume that we cannot read 
intentionality into these opening lines, even though they are not particularly marked or unusual.  
As the conversation unfolds, we can see Tiresias subtly hinting at his knowledge and 
bringing this idea to the forefront. His next lines, after Oedipus comments on how ἄθυμος Tiresias 
is (τί δ᾽ ἔστιν; ὡς ἄθυμος εἰσελήλυθας), refer obliquely to his privileged status as someone 
possessed of special wisdom or knowledge: 
320 ἄφες μ᾽ ἐς οἴκους· ῥᾷστα γὰρ τὸ σόν τε σὺ  
κἀγὼ διοίσω τοὐμόν, ἢν ἐμοὶ πίθῃ. 
320-1 
Let me go home! For you will carry on most easily, 
as will I, if you do what I ask.261  
Oedipus is still very much unaware what sort of thing of Tiresias’ needs to be “carried on.” All he 
has heard is that it is δεινὸν, because Tiresias’ knowledge brings, in Tiresias’ own words, “no 
benefit to the one who has it” (μὴ τέλη / λύῃ φρονοῦντι, 316-7). Yet, rather than share this 
information, as Oedipus has requested, Tiresias asks to be allowed to go home—and, by extension, 
to take his knowledge with him. Rather than the sort of response that might be expected here—
“What is your thing you need to carry, Tiresias?” or, for that matter, “What is my thing to carry, 
Tiresias?”—Oedipus picks up on the fact that Tiresias is withholding what he knows: 
322 οὔτ᾽ ἔννομ᾽ εἶπας οὔτε προσφιλῆ πόλει  
τῇδ᾽, ἥ σ᾽ ἔθρεψε, τήνδ᾽ ἀποστερῶν φάτιν  
322-3 
You are saying words which are neither appropriate 
nor friendly to this city, the one which raised you, 
since you are withholding this report. 
This is the element he responds to, painting Tiresias’ words as neither appropriate (ἔννομα)262 nor 
friendly (προσφιλῆ) to Thebes, since he withholds his report (τήνδ᾽ ἀποστερῶν φάτιν, 323). 
                                                   
260 These are discussed thoroughly in the Introduction and also in Appendix B.  
261 I have opted for the more colloquial option of “carry on” here, rather than a more literal translation of “bear 
your/my thing through,” which is a better rendering of the Greek and one which actually expresses the direct objects 
(τὸ σόν, τοὐμόν), though it is inelegant English. I am hesitant to use any translation (endure, suffer, bear one’s 
cross/burden etc.) that suggests something necessarily negative, since ῥᾷστα has contrasting implications and it seems 
best to leave the language as neutral as possible as this point in the exchange.  
262 In the most literal sense, the meaning of ἔννομος reflects its constituent parts: ἐν + νόμος (LSJ: “ordained by law, 
lawful, legal”). Lloyd-Jones translates this passage as “What you say is neither lawful nor friendly to this city,” but the 
context here demands that we understand νόμος more as custom or usage, and less as a law, per se. There is (to the 
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Here, we ought certainly to understand φάτιν as referring to a divine report, as it often does.263 
More than just withholding a report, Tiresias is withholding divine knowledge. Oedipus does not 
understand this as a choice aimed at him personally, but rather an attack on the city as a whole. 
These are not very strong accusations, however, and Jebb is right to say that “the king’s first 
remonstrances are gentle” (ad 322). Oedipus is still asking nicely, and he is not yet inclined to 
disregard what Tiresias says completely.  
It is at this point that Tiresias begins to turn his responses toward Oedipus directly: 
324 ὁρῶ γὰρ οὐδὲ σοὶ τὸ σὸν φώνημ᾽ ἰὸν  
πρὸς καιρόν· ὡς οὖν μηδ᾽ ἐγὼ ταὐτὸν πάθω— 
OT 324-5 
Yes, I see that, for your part, your speech is not 
beneficial [or perhaps “does not hit the mark”]. So 
then, in order that I do not suffer the same fate— 
The Greek here is quite condensed, and there is not a firm consensus about the meaning. I have 
provided as literal a version as possible above, but in order to understand the sentiment here, 
additional content must be provided. While there are a variety of ways to make sense of this,264 I 
would suggest that the best way to do so is to understand that he was in the process of saying 
something to the effect of “I see that what you are saying is not helping (οὐδὲ … πρὸς καιρόν)—
since what you say is accomplishing nothing, why should I speak, since words are not helping?” I 
have, of course, had to supply my own speculative conjectures here, in order to increase the clarity 
of this ambiguous statement, and even still, the meaning is not particularly clear.265 This still leaves 
open the very salient question of helping (or not helping) at what. Helping persuade Tiresias to 
reveal what he knows? Helping save the city? Helping improve the general situation at hand? The 
                                                   
best of my knowledge) no reason to think that Tiresias’ actions would be illegal, but it is, as Jebb writes “not in not in 
conformity with usage, which entitled the State to benefit by the wisdom of its μάντις” (ad 322). I have used 
“appropriate” here as a shorthand for “in accordance with what is customary and expected by the State,” though it is 
an admittedly imprecise translation.  
263 See, e.g., Eur. Supp. 834; Aesch. Ag. 1132; A. Pers. 227 and 521. 
264 Jebb here suggests “(I do not speak), for I see that neither dost thou speak opportunely: (I am silent) therefore, lest I 
too should speak unseasonably” and understands πρὸς καιρόν to be synonymous with καιρίως. Contra Jebb, 
Kamerbeek suggests that πρὸς καιρόν should be understood with more a sense of “advantage” or “profit” rather than 
“opportunity” or “proper moment.” Dawe, however, suggests “I do so because I see that in your case too (like any 
remarks that I might make) what you are saying will lead us into an unfortunate situation.” There is likewise a great 
deal of debate about the context of the ending (ὡς οὖν μηδ᾽ ἐγὼ ταὐτὸν πάθω) and Jebb and Campbell both 
suggest that something to the effect of “I am silent” must be understood before this passage. Jebb suggests “(I do not 
speak), then, in order that neither (μηδέ) may I share your mishap (of speaking amiss)” and expands on that with “If he 
speaks not, neither will he speak wrongly.” I tend to agree with the majority of editors and commentators, however, 
who understand Tiresias to be interrupted mid-sentence by Oedipus’ impassioned outburst of μὴ πρὸς θεῶν… 
265 Dawe comments (ad 324) that “Tiresias’ language is at the moment veiled and restrained, as befits a prophet.” I find 
it to be more malicious than this, since he is taking the first steps here in the process which I will argue ends with 
Oedipus infuriated to the point that he will no longer heed the words of Tiresias. Dawe is not wrong, however, to note 
that Tiresias is restrained in his speech here. In fact, Tiresias will remain restrained and elusive throughout the entire 
conversation (a calculated choice), which is precisely what will enrage Oedipus, who is looking for actions he can take 
to rectify the situation in Thebes.  
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latter seems most likely, but even that is unclear—what about his φώνημα is not helping? Is the 
tactic Oedipus employs (of appealing to Tiresias’ patriotism) not an effective one? Or is there no 
φώνημα that could remedy the situation? 
There is, of course, no clear answer to this, but my interest lies more in this formulation. 
The intention of this ambiguously worded response is not to mislead the hearer (as oracular 
ambiguity often does). Instead, it is to further play with Oedipus’ emotional and psychological 
state. The outcome of this conversation does not critically depend on Oedipus’ proper or improper 
understanding of this ambiguous line, as is the case with oracles. Instead, Oedipus is so enraged by 
Tiresias’ suggestion that he will not speak—regardless of the justification that he gives—that he 
interrupts Tiresias.266 Whatever meaning Tiresias may have intended from his cryptic wording is 
irrelevant to the subsequent course of the conversation, since Oedipus does not ask Tiresias to 
clarify why his φώνημα is not πρὸς καιρόν. Instead, the effect of Tiresias’ ambiguous words are all 
that matter.  
The immediate effect of Tiresias’ words—Oedipus cutting Tiresias off mid-sentence and 
both exclaiming and beseeching—allows us a great deal of insight into Oedipus’ perceptions here: 
326 μὴ πρὸς θεῶν φρονῶν γ᾽ ἀποστραφῇς, ἐπεὶ  
πάντες σε προσκυνοῦμεν οἵδ᾽ ἱκτήριοι. 
326-27 
No, by the gods! Having knowledge as you do, do 
not turn away, since we all desperately beseech you 
as suppliants.  
Whatever meaning Tiresias may have intended, Oedipus makes it clear how he has interpreted the 
prophet’s words: as a threat to leave and take his privileged knowledge with him.267 The terms in 
which he objects echo the constant element in Oedipus’ lines here—his identification of himself 
with the city. While Tiresias insists on framing himself and Oedipus as individuals, Oedipus uses 
first person plural forms: we are in your hands (ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ἐσμέν, 314), we suppliants here beseech 
you (πάντες σε προσκυνοῦμεν οἵδ᾽ ἱκτήριοι, 327). Tiresias’ intransigence is not a personal affront 
                                                   
266 I feel confident that these lines are properly attributed to Oedipus, though some editors choose to follow ΣL and A, 
which give these lines to the Chorus. See Kamerbeek ad 326, 7 on this question; I am persuaded that these lines do 
belong to Oedipus and that these were likely misattributed to the Chorus because of the plural forms used here. 
However, the plural forms are very much in keeping with Oedipus’ rhetoric, though they may well have misled scribes 
and led to this misattribution.  
267 I suspect that Tiresias delivers these lines while turning away as if to leave, given Oedipus’ response (ἀποστραφῇς), 
though there is no clear evidence to prove that this language is literal, rather than metaphorical. It does seem likely, 
however, given Oedipus’ response. If Tiresias does begin to turn away here, then we have yet another example of a way 
that Tiresias exploits the full range of contextual aspects of communication (including body language) in his 
manipulation of Oedipus, whereas oracular communication must necessarily be devoid of any sort of body language. 
Oedipus, meanwhile, also invokes a very physical sort of language, whether he is actually prostrating himself or simply 
using that language.  
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to Oedipus, as he presents it, but rather an affront to the community as a whole—Oedipus is 
merely a representative of the city, investigating on the city’s behalf.  
Finally, Tiresias briefly allows this identification, by using second person plural forms to 
refer to Oedipus and the city as a collective group. However, he only does so in order to disparage 
the group as a whole, and then to return to his rhetoric of two individuals:  
238 πάντες γὰρ οὐ φρονεῖτ᾽· ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ μή ποτε  
τἄμ᾽, ὡς ἂν εἴπω μὴ τὰ σ᾽, ἐκφήνω κακά. 
328-9 
For you all have no knowledge—but I will not ever 
reveal my woes, so as not to call them yours. 
These woes and burdens are Tiresias’ and could potentially be Oedipus’, but he pointedly avoids 
the issue of the state, no matter how frequently and insistently Oedipus returns to it, as he does 
immediately after this: 
330 τί φής; ξυνειδὼς οὐ φράσεις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐννοεῖς  
ἡμᾶς προδοῦναι καὶ καταφθεῖραι πόλιν; 
330-1 
What are you saying? You know the truth full well 
and you will not speak it, but instead you intend to 
betray us and destroy the city? 
Rather than before, when Tiresias was merely guilty of behaving in a way that was not ἔννομα or 
προσφιλῆ (322), here his refusal to speak is equated to treason. He is betraying and destroying the 
city by not sharing what he knows; rather than the city’s collectively approaching Tiresias as the 
lone savior figure, Oedipus has now shifted his language to focus on how Tiresias is the sole 
treacherous figure who is attacking and destroying the city by refusing to speak. Although, of 
course, Oedipus is the sole figure who is destroying the city, the rhetoric he employs here conflates 
the idea of bringing destruction and that of choosing not to ward off destruction when one is 
capable of doing so. Tiresias did not infect the city, but he is withholding the cure.  
In light of all this, Tiresias’ actions look less like reluctance and more like willful antagonism. 
Tiresias’ responses are not lies, but they are deft deflections away from the content of what he 
knows. Instead of addressing the ways in which he might be hurting the city, Tiresias maneuvers the 
argument back toward Oedipus and does not address the fact that he has this knowledge, but 
instead places the blame for his silence on Oedipus himself: 
332 ἐγὼ οὔτ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν οὔτε σ᾽ ἀλγυνῶ. τί ταῦτ᾽  
ἄλλως ἐλέγχεις; οὐ γὰρ ἂν πύθοιό μου. 
332-3 
I will neither pain myself, nor you. Why do you ask 
these things in vain? You could not learn from me.  
Tiresias has already made it clear that his knowledge pains him, but his repeated inclusion of 
Oedipus in his refusals (at 320, 324, and 329 before this instance at 332) is calculated. After 
Oedipus’ next impatient outburst, Tiresias returns to this same argument: 
337 ὀργὴν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμήν, τὴν σὴν δ᾽ ὁμοῦ  
ναίουσαν οὐ κατεῖδες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὲ ψέγεις. 
OT 337-8 
You’ve criticized my temper, but you have not 
recognized the temper inherent in you, but instead 
you blame me.  
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Tiresias refuses to include any details while simultaneously connecting Oedipus to Tiresias’ own 
silence and blaming Oedipus—who is insistently asking Tiresias to speak and save the city—for why 
he cannot do what Oedipus is asking. Knowing what we know, Tiresias’ arguments make sense, but 
from Oedipus’ perspective, this is both nonsensical and infuriating, for obvious reasons.  
Over the next rounds of this exchange, we can see exactly what we have seen throughout 
Oedipus’ engagement with oracles and prophecy. He approaches things logically and rationally 
and makes valid inferences and interpretive moves, given what he knows. He is firmly committed to 
his allegiance to the city of Thebes, and even as he grows noticeably frustrated, even acknowledging 
his own (justified) anger, he returns to the crux of his argument: 
339 τίς γὰρ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ἂν ὀργίζοιτ᾽ ἔπη  
κλύων, ἃ νῦν σὺ τήνδ᾽ ἀτιμάζεις πόλιν; 
339-40 
Who would not be angry to hear words such as 
these, with which you are now dishonoring this city? 
 
Oedipus is upset because Tiresias is doing a grave injustice to the city. We might here question how 
legitimate Oedipus’ account is, knowing that his anger led him to kill Laius at the crossroads, but 
his argument is no less valid—Tiresias’ silence is threatening the city, and any reasonable ruler of a 
city would be angry in that position. The trajectory of the plot will vindicate Tiresias’ words by the 
end, but that does not change the fact that Oedipus is making consistently valid and reasonable 
arguments, in the face of an intractable and unhelpful interlocutor. This pattern culminates when 
Tiresias tells him that the future will happen, whether or not Tiresias shares his knowledge of it, at 
which point Oedipus objects that there is no reason Tiresias should not tell him.  
 
341 
Τειρεσίας 
ἥξει γὰρ αὐτά, κἂν ἐγὼ σιγῇ στέγω.  
Οἰδίπους 
οὔκουν268 ἅ γ᾽ ἥξει καὶ σὲ χρὴ λέγειν ἐμοί; 269 
Tiresias 
For these things will happen of their own accord, 
even if I conceal them with silence.  
Oedipus 
                                                   
268 The manuscripts read οὐκοῦν here, but Herwerden’s emendation of οὔκουν is a better reading and I (with Dawe, 
Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, and others) print Herwerden’s conjecture.  
269 On line 341, Jebb notes: “‘(the things of which I wot) will come of themselves.' The seer is communing with his own 
thought, which dwells darkly on the κάκα of v. 329.” The following lines are quite vexed, and I offer here several 
interpretations. Kamerbeek: “ἥξει γὰρ αὐτά: vaguely referring to the matter he is unwilling to disclose. γὰρ 
presupposes the suppressed idea: ‘I need not reveal what I know’ or ‘my silence makes no difference’ (Campbell).” 
Kamerbeek also comments: “καὶ: In my opinion the stress is equally divided between σὲ and λέγειν; so καὶ has to be 
taken with the entire phrase σὲ χρὴ λέγειν ἐμοί contrasting it with ἅ γ᾽ ἥξει.” Jebb differs only slightly: “‘Then, seeing 
that they will come, thou on thy part (καὶ σὲ) shouldest tell them to me.' The stress of καὶ falls primarily on σὲ, but 
serves at the same time to contrast λέγειν with ἥξει. In ἅ γ᾽ ἥξει the causal force of the relative is brought out' by γε: 
quippe quae ventura sint.” Dawe offers: “In that case (οὔκουν), if they are going to come anyway (ἅ γ᾽ either like 
ἅπερ, the very things we have been talking about, or, more likely, semi-causal, since they are going to come), why don’t 
you take the complementary step (καὶ) of telling me about them?” 
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341-2 Since these things will in fact happen, shouldn’t you 
tell me about them? 
This is, in fact, something of a non sequitur on Tiresias’ part, as Oedipus notes, and Oedipus makes 
a valid request for information. However, instead of sharing what he knows, Tiresias exploits the 
frustration and anger he has provoked in Oedipus. As noted above, Oedipus is not being 
unreasonable—any ruler would presumably be angry in this situation. But Oedipus is not any ruler, 
and he has demonstrated both great anger (in killing Laius, though the play has not revealed that 
yet) and great zeal on behalf of his people. Tiresias specifically manipulates these elements to goad 
Oedipus to rage by deftly manipulating the argument to frustrate his attempts to learn how to save 
his city while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge Oedipus as a representative of the city.  
Oedipus constantly tries to depict himself and Thebes as one side of this conversation, in opposition 
to Tiresias as a lone figure who can save the city or condemn it through his silence. Tiresias 
insistently recasts this as Oedipus versus Tiresias and places onto Oedipus the blame for his own 
refusal to help. In a way, this realigns the city with Tiresias, since Oedipus is the element which, for 
reasons Tiresias will not share, keeps Tiresias from saving the city. This approach is subtle and 
carefully designed to anger Oedipus, playing on his particular character.  
His final blow, so to speak, is to point out how angry Oedipus has become while refusing yet 
again to tell him what he wants to know: 
343 οὐκ ἂν πέρα φράσαιμι. πρὸς τάδ᾽, εἰ θέλεις,  
θυμοῦ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἥτις ἀγριωτάτη. 
343-4 
I would not speak any further. At this, if you wish, 
rage on with anger—whatever fiercest anger you 
please.  
His tone is excessively polite270—infuriatingly so, particularly for someone who is as frustrated as 
Oedipus is, as we will see in his response. This is Tiresias’ last provocation before Oedipus erupts 
into accusations, and it is a calculated one. Oedipus has not been unreasonable in his responses 
thus far, but Tiresias carefully redirects the conversation at every opportunity in order to avoid 
addressing the substance of anything that Oedipus asks him. Rather than respond to Oedipus’ 
objection that it could not hurt for Tiresias to tell him what will happen, even if it cannot be 
changed, Tiresias instead focuses on Oedipus’ emotional state.271 As he has effectively done so often 
                                                   
270 Jebb (ad 343f.) notes this “courteous formula” but concludes that “just because it is such, here expresses fixed 
resolve” and draws parallels to similar constructions (of ἂν plus an optative) at lines 95 and 282. In both the parallels he 
cites, however, this is in fact an overly courteous phrasing used to express polite deference toward Oedipus. As I will 
argue here, I think that Jebb is not far off, but that there is something far more complex going on in these lines that 
needs to be examined and unpacked more. 
271 In a modern context, we might describe what Tiresias does here as “tone policing,” a term used to describe when 
someone shifts an argument away from the content or substance of the debate and instead focuses on their 
interlocutor’s emotional state. Tone policing is generally used to refer to the practice of dismissing the content of an 
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throughout this argument, Tiresias is again able to shift the focus of the argument to frustrate 
Oedipus’ attempts to figure out how to rid Thebes of the plague. As the culmination of all this, 
rather than address Oedipus’ reasonable point, Tiresias uses excessively (perhaps condescendingly) 
polite language to tell Oedipus that his anger will not accomplish anything. This statement proves 
to be self-fulfilling, as it is exactly what will push Oedipus into a very fierce rage.  
When Oedipus reacts—predictably—with anger and an accusation that perhaps Tiresias 
was involved in the murder, since he refuses to help in any way, even though he can, Tiresias is 
perfectly primed to tell Oedipus the truth and simultaneously guarantee that Oedipus will not be 
receptive to this message.  
 
345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350 
Οἰδίπους 
καὶ μὴν παρήσω γ᾽ οὐδέν, ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω,  
ἅπερ ξυνίημ᾽· ἴσθι γὰρ δοκῶν ἐμοὶ  
καὶ ξυμφυτεῦσαι τοὔργον εἰργάσθαι θ᾽, ὅσον  
μὴ χερσὶ καίνων· εἰ δ᾽ ἐτύγχανες βλέπων,  
καὶ τοὔργον ἂν σοῦ τοῦτ᾽ ἔφην εἶναι μόνου. 
 
Τειρεσίας 
ἄληθες; ἐννέπω σὲ τῷ κηρύγματι  
ᾧπερ προεῖπας ἐμμένειν, κἀφ᾽ ἡμέρας  
τῆς νῦν προσαυδᾶν μήτε τούσδε μήτ᾽ ἐμέ,  
ὡς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ᾽ ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι. 
345-53 
Oedipus 
Angry as I am, I will not pass over any of my 
thoughts. Know that you seem to me to actually 
have helped cultivate this deed, and to have done it, 
except for actually killing with your own hands. If 
you happened to be able to see, I would say this 
deed was yours alone! 
 
Tiresias 
Seriously? I bid you to abide by the proclamation 
you decreed, and from this day onward, do not 
speak to these men or to me, since you are the 
impure polluter of this land.  
 
Just as we know that Tiresias is never acting out of a desire for profit, we also know that he is never 
wrong and never makes idle pronouncements or accusations. But Oedipus shares none of this 
extra-dramatic knowledge. He has just angrily accused Tiresias of being complicit in Laius’ murder, 
and when he is then accused in turn of the same thing, he is particularly unreceptive to this 
information. If his interlocutor were anyone else, this would be a natural, defensive reaction to 
being accused of murder.  
Though this is a gross simplification, I have provided the basic outline of this exchange 
below, to highlight some of Tiresias’ subtle manipulations of the conversation. While Oedipus 
                                                   
argument based on the manner in which it is presented (we might also describe this as valuing “style over substance”). 
In more modern contexts, tone policing is often used to delegitimize a person’s objections to a perceived slight or 
injustice by pointing out that that person is being “hysterical” or “hotheaded,” Rhetorically, this allows the person who 
is doing the tone policing to avoid addressing a legitimate point and to shift the conversation to be about whether their 
interlocutor’s demeanor is appropriate. For a more thorough discussion that situates this practice within the context of 
internet debates and intersectional feminism, see Geek Feminism Wiki’s entry on “tone argument” 
(http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Tone_argument). Tiresias here focuses on Oedipus’ anger (which is, 
incidentally, quite reasonable and even justified, given the context) to derail Oedipus’ questions. In modern internet 
parlance, we might describe Tiresias as trolling Oedipus.   
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repeatedly phrases his requests for information in terms of the city and its well-being, Tiresias insists 
on withholding that information while simultaneously expressing his rationale in terms of Oedipus’ 
and Tiresias’ own well-being (the italicized lines, inset with =>, indicate things that the speaker is 
implicating at that point in the conversation, and recurrent ideas have been put in bold or 
underlined for emphasis):  
Oedipus (300-15): Tiresias, you have total knowledge, and the city’s well-being depends on 
a critical piece of information—please share that information! It’s the humane and 
patriotic thing to do. 
Tiresias (316-8): This knowledge I have is terrible to have. 
=> I do in fact have knowledge 
(320-1): Let me withhold that information for your sake and mine. 
Oedipus (322-3): Withholding what you know is tantamount to an attack on our city. 
Tiresias (324-5): Nothing you say is helping, so why should I speak? 
Oedipus (326-7): Don’t hold back what you know!  
=> Perhaps my speech isn’t helping because I don’t have access to any knowledge. 
You should speak because you know something. 
Tiresias (328-9): You’re right. None of you know anything. But for your sake and mine, I 
won’t say anything.  
Oedipus (330-1): So you do know, but won’t say? By not helping when you can, you are 
attacking the city. 
Tiresias (332-3): I will not say anything, for your sake and mine. 
(337-8): You’re calling me angry, but you’re the one who’s angry 
Oedipus (339-40): Who wouldn’t be angry on behalf of the city you’re attacking? 
Tiresias (341): The future will be the same whether or not I tell you what it involves. 
Oedipus (342): So how does it hurt to tell me? 
Tiresias (343-4): I won’t tell you—get as mad as you want.  
Oedipus (345-9): I will get mad! You seem like you killed him. 
=> You have shown you don’t care about helping the city, which is akin to hurting 
the city. Maybe you’ve hurt the city in other ways. Maybe you killed Laius. 
Tiresias (350-3): Me? You killed him! 
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By frustrating Oedipus’ attempts to equate himself rhetorically with Thebes, Tiresias manipulates 
and provokes Oedipus to the point where he is no longer in a psychological or emotional state to 
consider Tiresias’ words at face value.  
In the end, Tiresias has orchestrated a situation in which he will be able to tell Oedipus not 
once, but twice, that he is the source of pollution in the city272 and ensure that he will not be 
believed. If we understand the conclusion of this conversation not simply as a dramatically ironic 
scene to be enjoyed by Sophocles and the audience, but also as a situation that Tiresias has 
carefully crafted in order to be able to speak truths that Oedipus will angrily disregard, then the 
ironic foreshadowing is even more striking at the end. First, Tiresias asks Oedipus if he wants to 
hear more (though perhaps taunts is a better description of this), so that he can get still angrier 
(εἴπω τι δῆτα κἄλλ᾽, ἵν᾽ ὀργίζῃ πλέον; 364), presumably offering to reveal Oedipus’ parentage. 
Then, Tiresias finishes with this exchange: 
 
 
 
 
370 
Τειρεσίας 
εἴπερ τί γ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας σθένος. 
 
Οἰδίπους 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι, πλὴν σοί· σοὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἐπεὶ  
τυφλὸς τά τ᾽ ὦτα τόν τε νοῦν τά τ᾽ ὄμματ᾽ εἶ. 
 
Τειρεσίας 
σὺ δ᾽ ἄθλιός γε ταῦτ᾽ ὀνειδίζων, ἃ σοὶ  
οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχὶ τῶνδ᾽ ὀνειδιεῖ τάχα. 
369-73 
Tiresias 
Yes, since there is a certain strength in truth. 
 
Oedipus 
There is, but not for you. There is none for you, 
since you are utterly blind—in your ears and your 
mind and your eyes.  
 
Tiresias 
You are a wretch indeed to hurl these taunts, which 
everyone here will soon hurl at you! 
Given how skillfully Tiresias has manipulated this conversation and Oedipus himself, I suggest that 
we should at least consider the possibility that this irony is generated by Tiresias. Knowing the 
future as he does, and knowing how these events will unfold, we can think of Tiresias as having a 
hand in crafting this ironic foreshadowing. Rather than craft ambiguous or misleading language in 
the way that Apollo’s oracle does, Tiresias instead manipulates the entire contextual situation to 
generate this moment in which Oedipus launches all the accusations at Tiresias that will soon be 
directed back at Oedipus himself. Apollo’s words and Tiresias’ words operate in different ways, but 
they work in tandem to misdirect Oedipus toward the same terrible outcome. Tiresias even makes 
this explicit a few lines later: 
376 οὐ γάρ σε μοῖρα πρός γ᾽ ἐμοῦ πεσεῖν, ἐπεὶ  
ἱκανὸς Ἀπόλλων, ᾧ τάδ᾽ ἐκπρᾶξαι μέλει. 
376-7 
For it is not fated for you to fall at my hands, since 
Apollo is sufficient—Apollo, whose concern it is to 
accomplish these things.  
                                                   
272 First at line 354 (ὡς ὄντι γῆς τῆσδ᾽ ἀνοσίῳ μιάστορι) and again at line 362 (φονέα σε φημὶ τἀνδρὸς οὗ ζητεῖς 
κυρεῖν). 
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As Tiresias understand things, Apollo will accomplish Oedipus’ destruction. In one sense, he 
already has, since Oedipus has already carried out all the terrible acts that Apollo foretold. 
However, the verb Tiresias uses here is πίπτω, which suggests an actual fall,273 and Oedipus is still 
in a position of power and honor in Thebes at this point. Here, we might understand Tiresias to be 
saying that Apollo is concerned with making sure that Oedipus recognizes what he (Oedipus) has 
already done, and that Apollo will make sure that this realization occurs. We are left, however, with 
the question of how accurate a claim this is. Does Apollo play an active role in the tragic outcome 
of this play?274 
Whether or not we think that this is the intended effect of Tiresias’ words, we can see that 
his part of their conversation angers Oedipus and sets him on a course of terrible self-discovery. At 
the time when this play takes place, the underlying horrific events of Oedipus’ life have already 
occurred, and Apollo’s original oracle to Oedipus has been fulfilled for many years. Rather, the 
focus of the play is about the recognition of the truth of Apollo’s oracle, which coincides with 
Oedipus’ recognition of his own ruin. Tiresias’ role (primarily his words, but also his delayed 
arrival) is critical in bringing about the tragic conclusion of the play. By disclosing the identity of 
Laius’ murderer in the way that he does way, he pushes Oedipus toward the full discovery of his 
guilt. By antagonizing Oedipus so thoroughly and then revealing the truth, Tiresias in fact takes a 
central role in the destruction of Oedipus by goading him into discovering the entire truth about 
his past. He may attribute this destruction to Apollo, as suggested by his claim at 376-7,275 but there 
is no denying that Tiresias and his uncooperative participation in this conversation play an integral 
role in Oedipus’ fall.  
 
                                                   
273 A word choice surely not lost on Aristotle, as this certainly calls to mind his formulation of the most tragic sort of 
plot, which contains a περιπέτεια (as at Poet. 1452a22). 
274 This question is far from settled, and there are many compelling arguments arguing for and against Apollo’s direct 
involvement in the events of this play. Cairns 2013 offers a helpful overview of the scholarship on either side of this 
question, dating back to Dodd’s influential “On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex” (1966).  
275 On these lines, Cairns 2013 argues that "an audience cannot be expected to regard [Tiresias] as mistaken in this 
assertion about his patron's motivation...there are the strongest possible reasons for accepting what he says" (128), 
regarding Tiresias description of Apollo and Apollo's role in Oedipus' demise. I am not entirely convinced of this point, 
and I think that we can plausibly draw some distinction between Apollo and Tiresias, rather than treating Tiresias as 
Apollo’s agent in human form. However, as I have noted earlier, the dominant reading of this play does completely 
assimilate Tiresias with Apollo, and Cairns offers one of the best discussions of the reasons for such a reading.  
 146 
Conclusions 
In Chapter 1, I concluded that the main focus of a study of oracles in the Trachiniae should 
not be whether Zeus and his oracles are malicious. Instead, the ways oracles are misunderstood 
point us toward an examination of how language works and how context combines with language to 
produce meaning. Oracular language in the Trachiniae, I suggest, provides a non-human language 
that functions without many of the pragmatic, context-driven elements that are present in human 
speech. Thus, oracles in the play serve to highlight the pragmatic principles that shape human 
communication and the ways that inferences and assumptions and things that are left unsaid all 
work together with the syntactic meanings of the words that are said in order to generate meaning.  
This simple dichotomy—humans communicate with pragmatic principles in mind, whereas 
the gods do not—is complicated by the Oedipus Tyrannus. In this play, a third type of speaker is 
introduced in the form of Tiresias. As a liminal figure, he bridges this neat human-god division, and 
he has access to complete, divine knowledge. More importantly, however, we have a new 
“language” introduced in this play. In the Trachiniae, I looked at communication as something that 
was either a cooperative conversation, governed by basic Gricean maxims, or not. Put another way, 
cooperative communication either aims at clarity and shared understanding (the “human” type of 
communication), or it does not (the “divine” type).276 In the Oedipus Tyrannus, the genres of 
communication are more complex, as playfully and purposefully ambiguous language is added to 
the simpler picture of language that we see in the Trachiniae, and communication is not limited to 
just cooperative conversations, self-interested lies, or divine communication that is artificially 
stripped of some of the pragmatic aspects of human speech.277 Though I hesitate to call it a theory, 
since it is not formally defined, Sophocles does present a conception of language that accounts for 
more of the ways in which communication takes place. Because the riddle of the Sphinx looms over 
all the events of the play, riddles are the most natural lens through which to approach this sort of 
language, but the pragmatic principles of riddles are broadly similar to those at work in jokes and 
                                                   
276 There are, of course, noncooperative types of communication. As I have detailed in this chapter, riddles and other “playful” 
language (jokes, etc.) fall into this category, since they do not aim at transmitting information clearly from speaker to listener. 
Any sort of speech which intentionally disregards the maxims of cooperative conversation falls into the category of 
noncooperative communication. The other major type of speech that is noncooperative are lies, which flagrantly disregard the 
Maxim of Quality (“Try to make your contribution one that is true”) and, in particular, the first submaxim (Do not say what you 
believe to be false).  
277 I make no claims about the relative dating of these plays and I do not necessarily think that this is a linear 
progression in Sophocles’ thought. The increase in complexity that I examine here is merely a feature of the order in 
which I have arranged this study. A sort of evolution in Sophocles’ thought would certainly be intriguing, but I would 
not attempt to date any of these plays, as it is well outside the scope of this project. 
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puns and other playful modes of conversation. The similarities between proper riddles and the 
oracles in this play are striking, and the same basic skills are needed to solve a riddle and to 
properly understand Apollo’s oracles about Oedipus and his family. However, the major difference 
between the two is more significant: a riddle is signaled as a riddle. Once the listener knows that 
they are hearing a riddle, they know to switch their interpretive approach and to use the principles 
of riddles rather than the principles of cooperative conversations. In the case of Apollo’s oracle, 
however, the language is not particularly complex or cryptic, and nothing about the oracle itself 
signals that there is something special about this language. Oedipus and Jocasta have no reason to 
think that they should approach these oracular pronouncements as anything other than normal 
speech. 
The issue here is not a complete disregard for context, since the interpretive moves that 
would allow Oedipus and Jocasta to understand these oracles correctly come from a specific 
context. Instead, oracular speech in this play is governed by the rules of a different context. The 
speaker and the listener are not applying the same principles to their communication, which gives 
rise to their tragic misunderstandings.  
However, Tiresias adds yet another aspect to all this. As I mentioned earlier, he bridges the 
mortal-divine dichotomy. He is not a passive seer, however, offering unerring insight into the 
outcome but without any real influence over the events of the play (as is the case with Cassandra, in 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, for example). Though he claims that the future will turn out the same 
way, regardless of what he says, the uncooperative nature of his conversation with Oedipus plays a 
major role in bringing about the tragic ending of the play. In this way, Tiresias communicates in a 
way that is both human and divine, appropriate for a man who bridges those two realms. He speaks 
from a place of complete knowledge, like a god, but he also communicates in a way that deftly 
manipulates context. Whereas direct communication from gods to mortals consistently operates 
without concern for context or with concern for the wrong context, Tiresias is almost hyper-aware 
of the role that context and other extra-syntactical elements play in communication. Here, we can 
see the ironic appropriateness of the Chorus’ description of Tiresias as the man who is most like 
Apollo, as his words combine with Apollo’s to manipulate Oedipus without either of them ever 
speaking falsely. Whereas Apollo’s oracle manages to avoid lying (it misleads Oedipus, but the 
words are not wrong, just unlikely to be understood correctly), Tiresias instead manipulates 
Oedipus and his mental and emotional state in order to speak the truth directly to him without 
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Oedipus believing what he says. Tiresias is understood but not believed; the oracle is believed but 
not understood. Together, Tiresias’ words and the words of the oracle work in tandem to destroy 
Oedipus. 
I have been very careful to talk about Apollo’s oracle here, and not Apollo himself, with 
good reason. This play invites the conclusion that Apollo is malicious, since his oracle seems to be a 
clear extension of him, and it is only once Oedipus receives the oracle that he begins to bring about 
its fulfillment. It would seem that Apollo has some unexplained (or, rather, specifically omitted) 
grudge against Oedipus or his family and that he orchestrates their elaborate downfall. Perhaps, 
looking at Apollo alone, we might debate whether he is truly malicious or (like Zeus in the 
Trachiniae) his motivations are inaccessible. However, when we consider the ways in which Tiresias 
acts, it is tempting to infer a malicious intent. Tiresias’ words seem to goad Oedipus to anger, and, 
since Tiresias is at least a quasi-mortal character, we might reasonably ask why he speaks in this 
way. On one reading, Tiresias is an extension of Apollo (his is, after all, the lord most like the lord 
Apollo) and his language is marked by a similar uncooperative element that is indicative of little 
more than a fundamental divide between mortals and the supernatural. Tiresias is long-lived and 
possessed of special powers, and he might well be classed as a non-human entity, for the purposes 
of a human/other dichotomy.  
I would like to offer another reading, however, which is made available by the text, though 
it is far from the only interpretation. On this reading, we might conclude that there is something 
distinctly willful and sinister about Tiresias’ manipulation of language and context. While Apollo 
may be speaking in a way that simply overlooks the rules by which humans communicate, Tiresias is 
not a god, and he knows how mortals arrive at meaning. As we hear from Tiresias, Apollo himself 
will destroy Oedipus and Oedipus’ destruction is not in fact Tiresias’ doing, because Oedipus’ 
downfall is important to Apollo (Ἀπόλλων, ᾧ τάδ᾽ ἐκπρᾶξαι μέλει, 377). Apollo, we are told, is 
the mastermind of this entire plot.  
It is here where I would like to depart somewhat starkly from much of the previous 
scholarship and explain all the elaborate hedging I have been doing thus far, when discussing the 
relationship between Tiresias and Apollo. This play leaves open the option that we cannot know 
anything about Apollo,278 since he is always mediated in this play. At Delphi, he is mediated 
                                                   
278 I am not the first to make this argument. Dodds 1966, for instance, argues that this play presents a world in which 
the gods are inscrutable and cannot be judged by human moral codes.  
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through language which does not abide by the same pragmatic, contextual principles that govern 
human speech, and his oracle need not be malicious, but simply unintelligible. Our only other 
means of accessing anything about Apollo is through Tiresias, and there is no reason to assume that 
he has infallible access to Apollo’s motivations.279 If, as I have argued, there is an unbridgeable 
linguistic divide between mortals and gods, then Tiresias might be just as mistaken as other mortals 
when he thinks he can fully interpret the divine.  
On this reading, Tiresias falls into a similar trap as Oedipus. Neither man understands 
Apollo, though both men think that they do. Just as Oedipus acts to avert what he thinks is his fate, 
Tiresias acts to further what he thinks is Apollo’s will. In the end, though, even Tiresias cannot 
know the divine, and his willful manipulation of context in his conversation with Oedipus could 
very well be nothing more than a misguided attempt. Tiresias too may have his own (less 
disastrous) tragic arc which loosely parallels those of Oedipus and Jocasta. While there is no way to 
know definitively whether Apollo is malicious or Tiresias’ speech simply gives that impression, this 
reading presents intriguing possibilities and it neatly avoids the question of how a play with a 
spiteful and cruel god came from a man whose biography tells of his great piety.280 If my suggestion 
here is correct, then this play centers on a god whose motivations are not vicious, but 
fundamentally unknowable. 
Why, then, is Apollo’s deceptive communication so elaborately constructed, if his specific 
motivations are not discernible and (since they cannot be known) essentially relevant? As in the 
Trachiniae, oracular language serves as a locus for exploring language more broadly, and the 
picture that Sophocles presents of language and communication is significantly more nuanced in 
                                                   
279 I am here arguing against the standard approach to this play, which assumes that Tiresias is a proxy for Apollo. For 
a recent example of this approach, see Beer 2012. Beer suggests that Tiresias speaks directly for Apollo and that Apollo 
himself speaks, as it were, from behind the mask of Tiresias: “Tiresias’ words conceal the actual voice of Apollo” (Beer 
2012: 100). 
280 Freud, in his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (transl. J. Riviere, ed. 2 (1929) 278) expresses shock “that 
Sophocles’ tragedy does not call forth indignant remonstrance in its audience . . . For at bottom it is an immoral play.” 
He then elaborates that: “It would be easy to believe that an accusation against destiny and the gods was intended in 
the story of the myth; in the hands of the critical Euripides, at variance with the gods, it would probably have become 
such an accusation. But with the reverent Sophocles there is no question of such an intention; the pious subtlety which 
declares it the highest morality to bow to the will of the gods, even when they ordain a crime, helps him out of the 
difficulty.” This question of the pious and reverent Sophocles has been a contentious one, however. Despite a great 
many ancient testimonia praising his famous piety (see Scodel 2012 for more on this), scholars have rightly noted that 
this play does not provide an entirely positive view of the gods. Dawe notes that, while “[o]utright condemnation of fate 
or the gods is not something to be expected of a playwright competing in a religious festival,” nonetheless the 
characters “are notably silent when it comes to any actual defense, or even explanation . . .of the workings of fate or 
heaven” and that the “horror and sympathy they express for the human victim must imply a compensatory, if 
unspoken, verdict against those forces that permit, or cause, such things to happen” (Dawe 2006: 4). 
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this play. Further developing the linguistic framework detailed in the Trachiniae (in Chapter 1),281 
the Oedipus Tyrannus provides a broader conception of language that does not reduce 
communication to merely cooperative and non-cooperative modes. Instead, this play acknowledges 
other types of communication which have their own pragmatic, linguistic rules. The riddle of the 
Sphinx, which lurks behind the play as a whole, introduces a modified sort of cooperative 
conversation in which basic Gricean maxims are selectively subverted, with the full knowledge of 
the speaker and listener. The conversation, then, becomes a game which is governed by different 
rules; the challenge is to uncover which cooperative principles are being broken and in which ways. 
By acknowledging this distinct mode of communication, Sophocles broadens his linguistic theories 
so that they recognize a much fuller range of communication, since riddles, jokes, puns, and other 
linguistic play all fall into this para-cooperative sort of speech. The normal principles are still 
operational, in that they provide the baseline against which linguistic play can occur. The critical 
element in all of these modes of speech is that both the speaker and the listener are aware of the 
altered “rules” of communication, because the speech is clearly identified as a riddle or some other 
sort of non-straightforward communication. 
In sharp contrast to the riddle of the Sphinx, however, the plot of the Oedipus Tyrannus 
centers on oracular speech which could be effectively understood if the rules of riddles were 
applied, but the shift in communicative modes is not signaled. As such, the principles of 
communication are not modified, and the two parties find themselves playing by very different 
rules. This oracle formulation creates an artificial variation on the riddle form and allows us to see 
how riddles and straightforward communication both ought to function, by displaying a situation in 
which both codes fail.  
To return to some of the earlier arguments in this chapter, the effect of Apollo is broader 
than simply the source of linguistically misleading oracles. As we saw with Creon’s account of what 
he learned at Delphi, the mere presence of Apollo, in a linguistic sense, serves to hinder 
understanding. When Apollo is invoked, Creon and Oedipus are unable to communicate 
effectively. There is nothing inherently wrong with the way either man is speaking (no ambiguous 
                                                   
281 The order in which I am examining these plays is carefully chosen to present an increasingly complex linguistic 
theory. I recognize that this implies a sort of progression in Sophocles’ thought, which suggests an order to the dates of 
composition for these plays. I do not, however, mean to suggest that these plays were written in any particular order. 
Rather, it is a useful order for my examination, since it allows me to slowly introduce more complex pragmatic theories 
and scholarship. It would certainly complement my argument nicely if the Trachiniae did in fact pre-date the Oedipus 
Tyrannus, but I would not suggest an order based on my arguments here.  
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language, for example), and yet the two cannot effectively communicate information when Apollo’s 
influence is felt, linguistically.  
We are left, in the end, with an impression that Apollo is a force of confusion and 
obfuscation. As the god of (among other things) light and clarity, this is somewhat strange, but not 
particularly surprising, as we often find gods operating in diametrically opposed spheres.282 This 
double nature of Apollo is particularly relevant to the issue of language in 5th century Athens. At a 
time when works like the Dissoi Logoi and Gorgias’ rhetorical works were becoming far more 
prevalent in Athens, the potentially deceptive nature of language was a salient topic.283 Rather than 
accept a deconstructionist stance and conclude that language is inherently meaningless and 
conventional, Sophocles uses the opportunities provided by oracles in his plays to suggest that 
there is some intrinsic meaning in language and communication; language’s slippery nature does 
not prove that there is no stable meaning to language, but simply that the rules that govern 
meaning are more complex than people often realize. Sophocles constructs these situations at the 
edge of meaning and understanding (after all, it is the liminal nature of oracular speech that 
provides him such fertile ground for his investigations) and allows us to see artificially constructed 
failures of communication in order to see how pervasive and extensive the properly functioning 
versions of these systems are.  
  
                                                   
282 For example, in the Iliad, Apollo sends a plague, though he is the god of healing. Gods are often able to function 
almost as a double-edged sword in their areas of influence, wielding (in this instance) both sickness and health, as the 
situation demands. Similarly, Apollo can act in the sphere of understanding, being either a force of revelation and 
knowledge or a force of confusion. As a further example, Artemis is associated with young girls and their protection, yet 
she demands the sacrifice of Iphigenia. See also fn. 36 on this question.  
283 Knox 1957:116-38 likens Oedipus’ quest to the “intellectual scientific quest of the age” (116), and draws parallels 
between the language used by sophists and other intellectuals of the time, including Gorgias talking about riddles (D-K 
B8), Aristophanes’ description of Socrates (Clouds 171-2 and 188), and Hippocratic treatises (VM 3). Segal 1981 
discusses how this play highlights the “shifting, uncertain, ‘enigmatic’ quality of language” (151) in tandem with a 
shifting, uncertain world. He takes an almost structuralist approach to communication in this play, placing the Sphinx 
and Apollo on opposite sides of a binary that collapses as the oracle and the Sphinx’ words converge.  
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Chapter 3: The Other Plays and What Is Found There 
Introduction 
This chapter will further develop the ideas of the previous two, using the remaining five 
plays of Sophocles to develop a more nuanced understanding of his conception of language. 
Though it is not a formal theory per se, Sophocles includes and highlights instances in which 
language seems to fail. His purpose in doing this is not to undermine language and meaning (that is 
to say, Sophocles is not a proto-deconstructionist) but rather to highlight places where language is 
governed by a complex yet intuitive set of rules. Native speakers can make sense of language which, 
at times, should not give rise to a clear meaning. As detailed in Chapters 1 and 2, by highlighting 
these sorts of scenarios, Sophocles forces the audience to consider how they drew meaning out of 
syntactic ambiguity. By examining the varied instances of prophetic communication in the other 
five extant plays of Sophocles, we will see more details of Sophocles’ theory of language which 
address a wider variety of speech than we have seen in the Trachiniae or the Oedipus Tyrannus. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the complicated way in which prophetic messages are 
transmitted by humans. Though the analogy is somewhat imprecise, I would nonetheless liken this 
phenomenon to Plato’s Theory of Forms—oracles are perfectly true when they are uttered, but 
with each reproduction of the oracle’s message, the imitation is further removed from the true 
original. We will see that these shifts happen in a variety of ways, but they all demonstrate how 
messages can be shaped and molded by both speakers and listeners, whether consciously or 
unconsciously. When Calchas’ prophecy is related by the messenger in the Ajax, his words pass 
through men who have a desire for Ajax to remain alive. Therefore, this prophecy is taken to mean 
that there is a possibility that Ajax might survive the day, and thereby escape Athena’s anger, even 
though there is no real possibility that this will occur. In the Electra, Orestes’ own intentions color 
his interpretation of Apollo’s words, and he presents Apollo’s oracle as a divine sanction of his 
matricide. As we will see, however, Apollo’s words do not necessarily provide this sanction, leaving 
the audience to suspect possible manipulation of the message by Orestes himself. In the Antigone, 
we see Tiresias once again act as a wielder of prophecy. Though Tiresias starts out simply 
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recounting what he has learned through ornithomancy, and offering advice based on what the bird 
signs have shown him, Creon is unreceptive. It is at this point that Tiresias shifts into inspired 
prophecy (i.e., he prophesies things that he has learned directly from the gods, rather than things 
he has gleaned from reading natural signs), and his words function more as a curse than as a simple 
prophecy. As was the case in the Oedipus Tyrannus, Tiresias deploys prophecy at a time and place 
when it will inflict harm on the recipient (instead of, say, telling Creon earlier that he will bury his 
son if he condemns Antigone to death, thereby allowing Creon a chance to avert disaster). Finally, 
in the Philoctetes, we see the most complex instance of how context can shape how prophecy is 
used. Here, Odysseus carefully withholds elements of Helenus’ prophecy from Neoptolemus in 
order to manipulate him. Knowing full well that Neoptolemus will find his plan distasteful, 
Odysseus slowly reveals more of the details of Helenus’ prophecy, but only as necessary. While the 
other three plays provide examples of divine messages that may be altered by those who convey 
them, the Philoctetes is the only instance where this process is clearly conscious and calculated.  
I omitted the Oedipus at Colonus from this outline because it involves a very different 
situation. Here, we see a man who is approaching the liminal space between life and death and who 
has, as a result, acquired a special status. In many ways, he operates as a prophet throughout this 
play, and the play explicitly describes him as such at several points. The Oedipus at Colonus offers 
a striking contrast with the Oedipus Tyrannus, precisely because Oedipus can understand oracles 
effectively and can augment them with his own supernatural knowledge. This play fits nicely at the 
end of this chapter, not only because it is the last play that Sophocles wrote, but because it provides 
an example of effective communication between gods and mortals. After six plays in which 
communication fails or is ambiguous or obscured, this play offers a corrective of sorts, in which 
communication succeeds.  
Finally, this chapter includes a much wider range of prophecy than I have examined in 
previous chapters. Only the Electra and the Oedipus at Colonus feature actual oracles; the rest of 
the plays involve prophecies given by prophets (Calchas, Tiresias, and Helenus), and the Oedipus 
at Colonus features both types of prophecy. I consider these two categories of prophetic speech to 
be closely connected, though not identical. Both are ways in which communication from the gods 
can be given to humans, and both involve a linguistic mediation of divine knowledge. The critical 
difference is where and how that mediation occurs. When someone consults an oracle, as we saw in 
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the previous two chapters, the god’s message is transmitted in language that comes directly from 
the god. This is why, I have argued, oracles are so often misunderstood, because the Sophoclean 
gods communicate in a way that is does not share all the pragmatic considerations which shape 
human speech. When the words come directly from the gods, they tend to mislead humans 
precisely for these context-based reasons. Humans mistake the language of the divine for their own 
language (not surprising, since oracles are conveyed in Greek) and interpret it as they would 
interpret any other sort of speech, not realizing that different rules govern divine speech.  
When a prophet conveys a message, there is not this same pragmatically driven 
misunderstanding, since prophets understand how pragmatic rules shape language. Instead, 
prophets introduce a very different sort of obstacle to effective communication. Their words are 
influenced by their own predispositions, and when a prophet is hostile (as Tiresias seems to be in 
the Antigone), he can control the time and place when he reveals his supernatural knowledge in 
order to make sure that it has the desired effect. When a prophet or those who transmit his message 
has a vested interest in the outcome of events, as in the Ajax, words may be shifted to accommodate 
a desired outcome. Overall, prophets do not lie, but their access to the divine is colored by all the 
same elements that affect regular human communication, so prophecies pass through one 
additional stage of human transmission and introduce one additional stage at which the message 
can be corrupted or compromised.  
The Transmission of Fate: Calchas’ Words in the Ajax 
As mentioned above, there is no actual oracle in the Ajax; the only prophetic utterance that 
occurs in the play is the reported prophecy of the seer Calchas, which details how the anger of 
Athena will pursue Ajax for one day. There is a degree of ambiguity here, and it is unclear exactly 
what we should make of this prophecy. Does this mean that Athena’s anger will cease after one day, 
and Ajax need only survive until the end of the day, at which point Athena will no longer angrily 
pursue him? We have no other examples of a Greek divinity whose anger simply expires at the end 
of a period of time; anger of this sort (described as μῆνις at line 757, so this is no small anger284) 
would be unprecedented. Nonetheless, this is clearly what the characters in the play understand it 
to mean. A more fatalistic reading, however, might understand this to mean that Athena’s anger 
                                                   
284 For more on the force of μῆνις, see Slatkin 1992 as well as Kim 2000, Cairns 2001, and Muellner 2004. In addition 
to several other relevant chapters in Braun and Most 2004, Cairns 2004 critiques Muellner, to which Muellner 
responded in turn (Muellner 2011). 
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will last only a day because she will succeed in destroying Ajax in that time. Her wrath does not 
have a time limit on it, on this reading, but her anger at Ajax will not last beyond his death, since 
her anger will be deprived of its object at that point. 
This ambiguity is something that I will return to later in this section. Before looking at the 
actual content of the prophecy, however, I would like to examine its delivery and the complexities 
introduced in the Messenger’s speech. To begin with, the Messenger stakes the authority of his 
account on his status as an eyewitness to the events he describes. I know this, he says, because I was 
there (τοσοῦτον οἶδα καὶ παρὼν ἐτύγχανον, 748). This is a common rhetorical move in 
messenger speeches,285 but the content of his speech gives us reason to wonder how much of this he 
witnessed directly, as opposed to hearing second-hand.286  
As he begins his speech, we have a fairly standard account of events. Calchas goes to speak 
to Teucer: 
 
751 
 
 
 
755 
Ἄγγελος 
εἰς χεῖρα Τεύκρου δεξιὰν φιλοφρόνως  
θεὶς εἶπε κἀπέσκηψε, παντοίᾳ τέχνῃ  
εἶρξαι κατ᾽ ἦμαρ τοὐμφανὲς τὸ νῦν τόδε  
Αἴανθ᾽ ὑπὸ σκηναῖσι μηδ᾽ ἀφέντ᾽ ἐᾶν,  
εἰ ζῶντ᾽ ἐκεῖνον εἰσιδεῖν θέλοι ποτέ.  
751-5 
Messenger 
[Calchas] placed his right hand into Teucer’s 
hand in a good-natured way, and then spoke and 
commanded him to use every possible means to 
keep Ajax inside his camp throughout this present 
day that is upon us, and not to let him go out, if 
he wished to ever see him alive. 
I pause on this passage only to establish the contrast with what follows. Here, the Messenger is 
simply relating facts. He narrates the events leading up to the prophecy, and then conveys the 
prophecy itself: 
756 ἐλᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ μόνῃ  
δίας Ἀθάνας μῆνις, ὡς ἔφη λέγων.  
756-7 
The μῆνις of the goddess Athena will pursue him 
for this day alone, as Calchas said.  
This is often thought to be the crux of the “prophecy” in this play, and it is directly attributed to 
Calchas (ὡς ἔφη λέγων). We might question how verbatim this account is, but the Messenger 
would have his audience believe that this is precisely what Calchas said. For the moment, at least, 
let us accept at face value that Calchas says “The μῆνις of Athena will pursue him for this day 
alone” (τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ μόνῃ).  
                                                   
285 Barrett 2002 examines messengers’ claims to be eyewitnesses, in addition to exploring the tension inherent in their 
presentation as both an eyewitness and a detached and omniscient observer, drawing on Cahen’s formulation of “un 
spectateur idéal” (Cahen 1924: 305). For more on the objective, omniscient messenger, see Bremer 1976, Rosenmeyer 
1982, and Michelini 1982. For a counter argument, see Heath 1987, Goldhill 1986, and de Jong 1991. 
286 I will elaborate on this point later, but the Messenger recounts conversations that he is unlikely to have been a part 
of. Though Sophocles is not bound by strict verisimilitude, Sophocles is interested elsewhere in how knowledge and the 
truth can be found. We should not be too quick to overlook the question of where the Messenger got his information 
and how precisely he transmits what he heard.  
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From this point onward, however, things get less clear. Although the attribution is 
somewhat delayed (ἔφασχ᾽ ὁ μάντις, 760), Calchas is marked as the speaker of this gnomic 
statement that follows:  
 
 
760 
τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα287 σώματα  
πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις  
ἔφασχ᾽ ὁ μάντις, ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν  
βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ.  
758-761 
For, when people reach such a point of 
excess that they are not useful, they fall 
under the grievous misfortunes sent by the 
gods, the prophet said, whoever has a human 
nature but does not think in a way that is 
appropriate for a human.  
Are we to understand this as prophetic speech? Is something a prophecy solely because it has been 
spoken by a prophet? This is an open question, and we certainly see prophets elsewhere in tragedy 
who speak conversationally,288 but there are not, to the best of my knowledge, examples of prophets 
ever speaking falsely. What, then, is the distinction between a prophet’s speech in general and a 
prophet’s speech qua prophet? Are there multiple modes of speech available to prophets 
(unmarked speech as opposed to prophetic speech), or do they always speak as a prophet? I have 
no satisfying answer to this question, but it is a relevant question to keep in mind as we approach 
the rest of the Messenger’s speech, because the speaker of the next lines is somewhat ambiguous on 
a close reading. Picking up on the final lines of this gnomic utterance, μὴ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ, 
the speech goes on to explain how Ajax fits into that paradigm, and why cruel misfortunes will 
destroy him: 
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775 
 
 
κεῖνος δ’ ἀπ’ οἴκων εὐθὺς ἐξορμώμενος 
ἄνους καλῶς λέγοντος ηὑρέθη πατρός. 
ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐννέπει, “τέκνον, δορὶ 
βούλου κρατεῖν μέν, σὺν θεῷ δ’ ἀεὶ κρατεῖν.” 
ὁ δ’ ὑψικόμπως κἀφρόνως ἠμείψατο, 
“πάτερ, θεοῖς μὲν κἂν ὁ μηδὲν ὢν ὁμοῦ 
κράτος κατακτήσαιτ’· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα 
κείνων πέποιθα τοῦτ’ ἐπισπάσειν κλέος.” 
τοσόνδ’ ἐκόμπει μῦθον. εἶτα δεύτερον 
δίας Ἀθάνας, ἡνίκ’ ὀτρύνουσά νιν 
ηὐδᾶτ’ ἐπ’ ἐχθροῖς χεῖρα φοινίαν τρέπειν, 
τότ’ ἀντιφωνεῖ δεινὸν ἄρρητόν τ’ ἔπος· 
“ἄνασσα, τοῖς ἄλλοισιν Ἀργείων πέλας 
ἵστω, καθ’ ἡμᾶς δ’ οὔποτ’ ἐνρήξει μάχη.” 
τοιοῖσδέ τοι λόγοισιν ἀστεργῆ θεᾶς 
ἐκτήσατ’ ὀργήν, οὐ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν. 
762-777 
But he, right from when he set out from home, 
he was shown to be foolish, when his father was 
speaking well. For his father spoke to him:  
“Child, wish to conquer in battle, but wish 
always to conquer with a god’s assistance.” 
But he replied, arrogantly and senselessly: 
“Father, even the man who is nothing could 
achieve victory together with the gods. But I 
believe that I can lay hold of glory even without 
them.”  
This was the boast that he made. And then a 
second time, when goddess Athena was urging 
him on, she told him to turn his gory hand 
against his enemies, he then spoke back to her, a 
terrible and unspeakable speech: 
“Queen, stand near to others of the Argives, for 
the battle will never break through where I am.” 
                                                   
287 Though κἀνόητα has often been printed (since Ajax is elsewhere characterized as foolish, as ἄνους at 763), the 
manuscript tradition almost entirely supports the lectio difficilior of κἀνόνητα, with the exception of the rarely cited 
Vat.gr.1333 manuscript, ante correctionem. 
288 For example, Tiresias in the Bacchae. 
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With such words, he won for himself the 
implacable anger of the goddess, having 
thoughts that are not appropriate for a mortal. 
 
The story itself provides the relevant mythological background for Athena’s anger,289 so this 
passage is certainly helpful in advancing the plot. The only explanation that she gives during the 
prologue, at lines 51ff., is an implicit suggestion that she drove Ajax mad to protect Odysseus and 
the other Greek leaders, but her actions are far more vicious than necessary to simply prevent Ajax 
from murdering them (“But I goaded the man on, as he roamed in his diseased madness, and I 
hurled him into evil snares,” ἐγὼ δὲ φοιτῶντ’ ἄνδρα μανιάσιν νόσοις / ὤτρυνον, εἰσέβαλλον 
εἰς ἕρκη κακά, 59-60). The fact that Ajax has caused prior offense to Athena makes her anger 
justified, rather than an instance of irrational and unintelligible divine punishment.290 However, this 
passage also blurs the lines between speakers. Are we to understand this entire passage as part of 
the prophecy, as Calchas delivered it? Prophets do not usually provide so much narrative backstory 
when they are offering actual prophecies. Instead, if we take the full passage from 762-777 as a sort 
of interpolation which seeks to explain why Calchas’ words apply to Ajax, we are left with a far 
more typical prophetic utterance: 
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755 
 
 
 
Ἄγγελος 
          εἶπε κἀπέσκηψε, παντοίᾳ τέχνῃ  
εἶρξαι κατ᾽ ἦμαρ τοὐμφανὲς τὸ νῦν τόδε  
Αἴανθ᾽ ὑπὸ σκηναῖσι μηδ᾽ ἀφέντ᾽ ἐᾶν,  
εἰ ζῶντ᾽ ἐκεῖνον εἰσιδεῖν θέλοι ποτέ.  
ἐλᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ μόνῃ  
δίας Ἀθάνας μῆνις, ὡς ἔφη λέγων.  
τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα  
Messenger 
[Calchas] spoke and commanded him to use every 
possible means to keep Ajax inside his camp 
throughout this present day that is upon us, and not 
to let him go out, if he wished to ever see him alive.  
For the μῆνις of the goddess Athena will pursue him 
for this day alone, as Calchas said. 
                                                   
289 The madness and suicide of Ajax is not a Sophoclean innovation, but there is no extant version which details 
Athena’s anger and attributes Ajax’ madness to Athena’s desire for revenge. Ajax’ madness appears in the Little Iliad; 
its presence there is alluded to in Porphyry (Paralip. fr. 4 Schrader, ap. Eust. 285.34) and detailed more fully in Proclus 
(Chrestomathia, suppleta ex Apollod. epit. 5.6–16). Homer (Odyssey 11) and Pindar (Nemean 7 and 8) also allude to 
the judgment of Achilles’ arms as the source of Ajax’ anger, which in turn accounts for his madness (some accounts 
elide the distinction and suggest that the judgment of the arms led directly to Ajax’ madness. The mythological account 
seems to say that Athena’s involvement was purely to help Odysseus, and she harmed Ajax only because he was 
opposed to Odysseus. There are not, to my knowledge, any earlier accounts in which Athena has any particular animus 
toward Ajax. I am struck by the possibility (raised to me by Newman, per litt.) that there is a sort of latent animus that 
we can see even in the Iliad, even though she seems simply to ignore Ajax. Athena is largely concerned with Achilles 
throughout the Iliad, but Ajax presents the most significant threat to Achilles’ kleos, both because he is the next 
greatest warrior after Achilles and because Ajax wounds Hector before Achilles kills him, thereby lessening the glory 
involved in killing Hector (since it is more impressive to kill a man whom no one else has been able to challenge). 
290 Athena’s behavior here contrasts with the picture of the divine in the Oedipus Tyrannus and the Trachiniae, in that 
Athena appears onstage and expresses her own intentions. We need not guess at the nature and will of the gods, as we 
must in other plays (as, for instance, in the Antigone, where the extent of the gods’ involvement is unclear). By placing a 
god on stage as a character, the Ajax is unique among Sophocles’ extant plays, as it offers the only unmediated access 
to a god (with the partial exception of Heracles in the Philoctetes). 
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778 
 
780 
 
πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις  
ἔφασχ᾽ ὁ μάντις, ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν  
βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ.  
[intervening lines omitted] 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ, τάχ᾽ ἂν  
γενοίμεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ σὺν θεῷ σωτήριοι.  
τοσαῦθ᾽ ὁ μάντις εἶφ᾽· 
752-61, 778-80 
For, when people reach such a point of excess that 
they are not useful, they fall under the grievous 
misfortunes sent by the gods, the prophet said, 
whoever has a human nature but does not think in a 
way that is appropriate for a human. 
[intervening lines omitted] 
But if he still lives on this day, perhaps we could—
with the help of a god—be his salvation.  
The seer said so much.  
The intervening lines would come, on this reading as an interpolation provided either by 
Calchas or the Messenger to explain the import of this prophecy. This, then, explains the echo of 
μὴ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῇ (761) with οὐ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν (777). μὴ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον 
φρονῇ, as Calchas utters it, may not convince anyone that Ajax is at risk, since this observation does 
not immediately seem to apply to him. Then, to emphasize the urgency of the situation, we have an 
explanation that maps this prophecy onto Ajax’ behavior. It makes sense that this mythological 
aside ends with οὐ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν at 777, because this story has now come full circle 
and fulfilled its purpose. We now see precisely how Ajax’ situation corresponds to Calchas’ words. 
Now, with this understanding, we are prepared for the rest of what Calchas has to say, and Calchas 
is again conspicuously marked as the speaker.  
I do not mean to suggest that this is precisely how Sophocles intended this scene to be read, 
but rather that the text allows it and that the structure of this messenger speech leaves a great deal 
of ambiguity about who has spoken which words. This ambiguity is present in any sort of messenger 
speech, but Calchas’ involvement raises the stakes here. What Calchas said, and how he said it (as 
prophecy or as normal speech), are very important, since dramatic convention dictates that 
prophets are always correct, as the Messenger reminds us at the end of this speech (εἰ Κάλχας 
σοφός, 783). Though he phrases this as a conditional, the audience understands this as a surety. 
Calchas is σοφός, so Ajax’ fate is determined.  
Looking at the context of this prophecy in comparison with the prophecies examined in my 
previous two chapters is useful for two reasons. First, the Ajax presents a prophecy which is 
unquestioned as to its accuracy. However, as I argued at the start of this section, we do have some 
ambiguity. Unlike in the Trachiniae or the Oedipus Tyrannus, however, that ambiguity is never 
noted. The characters think that they can save Ajax if they keep him in his tent, and the fact that he 
leaves the tent means that we will never know how accurate their understanding of the prophecy is. 
They have no reason to think that he would not have escaped Athena’s wrath if they could have 
kept him in the tent until the end of the day.  
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However, this brings us to the far more difficult question about this prophecy: what should 
we understand “Athena’s wrath” to be? Athena certainly seems to have already done all that she 
intends to do by the start of the play. Ajax’ suicide is not, in any discernible way, the result of 
Athena’s still-pursuing wrath. Her actions certainly drive Ajax to kill himself, but she is not 
constantly harassing him.291 She set these events in motion and then simply allowed them to unfold 
toward their inevitable conclusion. What about nightfall would change this? Ajax’ character would 
be unchanged, and his shame would remain. It seems patently unlikely that any of the situations 
that culminate in Ajax’ suicide would end after this one day. We are left, then, with a different, 
better interpretation of Calchas’ words. Athena’s wrath will pursue him for one day because he will 
be dead by the end of the day.292 We might here recall the prophecies in the Trachiniae, in which 
Heracles’ “end of toils” was his own death. There was never a chance of averting this outcome, 
because the wheels were in unstoppable motion from the opening scene of the play.  
If that is the case, however, we must revisit lines 752-755 and 778-9 of the Messenger’s 
speech. If we assume that Calchas is infallible, these lines present a problem, since I have just 
suggested that there never was a chance of saving Ajax, but these lines both suggest that Calchas is 
charging Teucer with the impossible task of saving someone who cannot be saved: 
             εἶπε κἀπέσκηψε, παντοίᾳ τέχνῃ  
εἶρξαι κατ᾽ ἦμαρ τοὐμφανὲς τὸ νῦν τόδε  
Αἴανθ᾽ ὑπὸ σκηναῖσι μηδ᾽ ἀφέντ᾽ ἐᾶν,  
εἰ ζῶντ᾽ ἐκεῖνον εἰσιδεῖν θέλοι ποτέ.  
752-5 
[Calchas] spoke and commanded him to use every 
possible means to keep Ajax inside his camp throughout 
this present day that is upon us, and not to let him go 
out, if he wished to ever see him alive. 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ, τάχ᾽ ἂν  
γενοίμεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ σὺν θεῷ σωτήριοι.  
778-9 
But if he still lives on this day, perhaps we could—with 
the help of a god—be his salvation.  
Both εἰ θέλοι (for ἐάν θέλῃ, since it is in secondary sequence) and τάχ᾽ ἂν γενοίμεθ᾽ suggest a sort 
of uncertainty that would be unusual from a prophet. This means that either my interpretation of 
Calchas’ prophecy is wrong, Calchas himself is wrong, or that Calchas is not the speaker of these 
lines. For the moment, I would like to explore the third option. As with the description of Ajax’ 
                                                   
291 Though we might think of this as being a simple example of “double motivation” (see Lesky 1966 for more on this, 
building on Schadewaldt’s 1958 work on the Odyssey), double motivation in tragedy is often not a simple, unified 
phenomenon in the way it is in Homer (see esp. Lesky 1966: 261, 392 on how double motivation often causes tragic 
conflict). Even though we may identify this as an instance of double motivation, that does not remove the very real 
question about the nature of Athena’s wrath.  
292 As was the case with the Trachiniae, the Ajax only hints at a better fate awaiting the hero after his death, without 
ever making this explicit. We might understand the honor that Ajax’ memory will receive as another meaning of 
Calchas’ words, since Athena’s anger will cease with his death, and her people (the Athenians) will offer cult worship to 
Ajax. On the allusions to Ajax’ hero cult and the extent to which Sophocles is here invoking that cult, see Scodel 2006 
and Henrichs 1993.  
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history, these lines are not particularly characteristic of a prophet. This is a degree of uncertainty 
that we do not see elsewhere in prophetic speech. This makes perfect sense, though, if we are 
seeing the words of Calchas (and in particular, his use of τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ μόνῃ) filtered through the 
interpretive processes of the Messenger. This would look something like the following: 
• Calchas says: Athena’s anger will pursue Ajax for this one day [sc. because then he will be 
dead and cannot be a viable object of anger] 
• Messenger interprets: “This one day” means that Ajax will be safe once this day ends and 
he only needs to survive the day 
• Messenger conveys: Either Ajax dies today or he survives—both are equally viable options. 
So, if he is still alive now, then we still have a chance at keeping him alive for the rest of the 
day.  
Alternatively (though, I think, less likely), if Calchas has misunderstood the prophecy that he is 
transmitting, then he may well be conveying the sort of oracular language we have seen elsewhere, 
and his pragmatic inferences are incorrect, even though his words are semantically true. On this 
interpretation: 
• Calchas says: Athena’s anger will pursue Ajax for this one day 
• Calchas thinks he means: Athena’s anger will end—regardless of anything else—at the end 
of this day 
• Calchas’ words actually mean: Athena’s anger will end because there will be no object for 
her anger once Ajax has died 
This recasts Calchas with less agency than he has in other interpretations, since this relegates him 
to a role of a mere mouthpiece or conduit for the words of a god (presumably Apollo). This 
contrasts sharply with the relationship Tiresias has with Apollo in the Oedipus Tyrannus. Even 
though I argued that Tiresias may be incorrect in his assumptions about Apollo’s motivations, 
Tiresias nonetheless has full knowledge of past, present, and future events. He is not confused 
about what his words mean in any way. On the interpretation that I have just suggested though, 
Calchas speaks words that he does not understand fully.  
Regardless of which explanation we prefer for how and why Athena’s anger will not last 
beyond the day, we are still left with the troublesome question of why Ajax cannot be let out of the 
house. I am not aware of any interpretations which adequately explain this in a way that fits neatly 
into the plot of the play, but there is a potential reading of the second part of Calchas’ words which 
provides an interpretation, though not an entirely satisfying one. We know that Calchas “spoke and 
commanded him to use every possible means to keep Ajax inside his camp throughout this present 
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day that is upon us, and not to let him go out, if he wished to ever see him alive” (752-5). In oratio 
recta, this would produce something along these lines: 
Keep Ajax inside all day. Do not let him go out, if you want to ever see him alive again. 
If we phrase this in logical terms, we could say that keeping Ajax inside is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for his survival.293 Put another way, If you want Ajax to live, then you will keep 
him inside. However, the inverse of this (If you keep Ajax inside, then he will live) does not 
necessarily hold. Returning to Gricean maxims again, it is not intuitive to interpret a conditional 
statement as describing something that is necessary but not sufficient. If something additional was 
required, a cooperative speaker would say “If you want Ajax to live, you will keep him inside and 
offer a sacrifice to appease Athena,” for example. What Calchas says implicates that this is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for Ajax’ survival, when that may in fact not be the case.  
Of course, all these questions are obviated by Ajax’ departure from his tent and the reality 
that, while his loved ones may want him to live, Ajax does not wish to live any more. If my proposed 
interpretations are correct (and while I recognize that my necessary but not sufficient argument is 
unconventional at best), this play introduces a complex linguistic construction which is mediated by 
the Messenger, whose own inferences may shape elements of the prophecy as he recounts it. As 
with all the other instances of prophecies and oracles, Calchas’ prophecy here is a place where 
communication is at its most complex. The layers of speech and interpretation I have laid out here 
do account for the way that the characters within the play approach Calchas’ words while 
preserving Calchas’ prophetic authority as well as Athena’s characterization (from the opening 
scene). This allows us to identify all of the different layers of mediation between Calchas’ prophecy 
and the audience. We cannot examine how Calchas’ syntactic choices function in this play, since we 
cannot truly peel back all of the intervening steps that have reshaped his words. We are left, in the 
                                                   
293 The following are all equivalent, in logical terms/notation: 
• P is necessary and sufficient for Q  
• P if and only if Q  
• P⇔Q 
• P is necessary for Q and Q is necessary for P 
• P⇒Q ∧ Q⇒P 
If something is necessary but not sufficient, it means that P implies Q but that Q does not imply P. A common example 
is that being a mammal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being a dog. Being a dog implies being a mammal 
(all dogs are mammals) but being a mammal does not imply being a dog (something could be a mammal and be a cat 
instead, for instance).  
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end, with an unexpectedly ambiguous prophecy—not because Calchas cannot or will not 
communicate more clearly, but because his words have been altered in the transmission from one 
man to another.  
What I hope to have shown here is not that there is any correct reading of the Messenger’s 
speech in this play, but instead that the Messenger’s speech leaves a great deal unexplained. We 
cannot tell where he inserts his own interpretive voice into the account that he received, and we do 
not know how much his own intermediate inferences color the account he conveys. Stepping back a 
bit from a close textual reading, it is also worth reflecting on why and how these misinterpretations 
could occur. Calchas’ words undergo very subtle shifts, once they are relayed by the Messenger, 
but these are shifts that potentially add the potential for hope to what may have been a 
straightforward prediction of Ajax’ death. In one of the possible interpretations I outlined, Calchas’ 
words are shifted to introduce an element of control or agency to an incontrovertible outcome. 
Rather than hearing that Ajax will die and there is nothing that can be done to save him, these men 
choose instead to hear a version in which that fate might be averted, even though they must make 
some significant interpretive and linguistic compromises in order to do so. I do not think that this is 
the result of an irrational attachment to free will. In fact, very little in Greek literature reveals an 
irrational attachment to free will, in our modern sense of the term. Instead, I think this stems from 
the emotional investment of the Messenger. These problems in transmission are a result their 
desperate hope that there may yet be a way to keep Ajax alive, and their willingness to push 
Calchas’ words to (or perhaps beyond) their linguistic limits. The transmission of Calchas’ 
prophecy is flawed in this play, but for the most human of reasons.  
 
The Use and Misuse of Oracles in the Electra 
Turning now to the Electra, we see an oracle from Apollo again. In this instance, however, 
there is no contrast between an apparent and actual meaning of the oracle (as in the Trachiniae and 
Oedipus Tyrannus). Instead, we find an oracle whose form and meaning is obscured by the process 
of transmission, but whose actual form and meaning is entirely irrelevant to the play’s outcome. 
There does seem to be some ambiguity, but it is impossible for the audience to determine whether 
the oracle itself is vague and ambiguous or if Orestes has obfuscated the oracle’s words, either 
intentionally or unintentionally. The answers to these questions should all matter a great deal, since 
they determine whether Apollo sanctions matricide or not. However, the play never highlights this 
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oracular ambiguity, nor does it address Apollo’s stance on the events of the play. Although this 
oracle does not feature prominently in the plot of the Electra, this unresolved ambiguity threatens 
to shift the entire moral import of the actions of the play.  
To begin, let us examine the first time we hear about the oracle, when Orestes details what 
he learned when he went to Delphi: 
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ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡνίχ’ ἱκόμην τὸ Πυθικὸν 
μαντεῖον, ὡς μάθοιμ’ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ πατρὶ 
δίκας ἀροίμην τῶν φονευσάντων πάρα, 
χρῇ μοι τοιαῦθ’ ὁ Φοῖβος ὧν πεύσῃ τάχα· 
ἄσκευον αὐτὸν ἀσπίδων τε καὶ στρατοῦ 
δόλοισι κλέψαι χειρὸς ἐνδίκους294 σφαγάς. 
ὅτ’ οὖν τοιόνδε χρησμὸν εἰσηκούσαμεν, 
σὺ μὲν μολών, ὅταν σε καιρὸς εἰσάγῃ, 
δόμων ἔσω τῶνδ’, ἴσθι πᾶν τὸ δρώμενον, 
ὅπως ἂν εἰδὼς ἡμὶν ἀγγείλῃς σαφῆ. 
οὐ γάρ σε μὴ γήρᾳ τε καὶ χρόνῳ μακρῷ 
γνῶσ’, οὐδ’ ὑποπτεύσουσιν, ὧδ’ ἠνθισμένον. 
λόγῳ δὲ χρῶ τοιῷδ’, ὅτι ξένος μὲν εἶ 
Φωκέως παρ’ ἀνδρὸς Φανοτέως ἥκων· ὁ γὰρ 
μέγιστος αὐτοῖς τυγχάνει δορυξένων. 
ἄγγελλε δ’ ὅρκον προστιθείς, ὁθούνεκα 
τέθνηκ’ Ὀρέστης ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τύχης, 
ἄθλοισι Πυθικοῖσιν ἐκ τροχηλάτων 
δίφρων κυλισθείς· ὧδ’ ὁ μῦθος ἑστάτω. 
 32-50 
For when I went to the Pythian oracle, in order 
to learn in what way I might take vengeance for 
my father, on his murderers, Phoebus gave me 
an oracle, the gist of which you will shortly 
learn:  
In person,295 not furnished with shield-bearing 
men or an army, I should stealthily bring about, 
through deception, righteous slaughters done by 
my own hand. 
Since, then, this is the sort of oracle I heard, 
you—when the opportune time should lead you 
in—go inside this house and learn everything 
that is being done, so that you can announce it 
to us, knowing everything clearly. They will 
know you at all, adorned as you are by old age 
and the length of time, and they will not suspect 
you. Use this story, that you are a stranger and 
you have come here from Phanoteus the 
Phocian man, for he is the greatest of their allies. 
Having sworn an oath, announce that Orestes is 
dead, as a result of an accident that could not be 
avoided at the Pythian games, having been spun 
out of his wheel-drawn chariot.  
Let the story be established thus.  
 
Before delving into the oracle itself, I would like to pause on the surrounding text, since we 
see here what the stakes of this oracle actually are. Orestes follows his account of the oracle with 
ὅτ᾽ οὖν τοιόνδε χρησμὸν εἰσηκούσαμεν (38). His use of ὅτε here is telling296—the Paedagogus’ 
subsequent actions should be informed by this χρησμός. Does this plan actually follow from what 
                                                   
294 I depart from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson here and print ἐνδίκους (found in all the manuscripts) rather than the 
ἐνδίκου suggested by L. Lange. I do not find Lloyd-Jones and Wilson’s justification (“we are able to take χειρὸς 
ἐνδίκου with σφαγάς”) to be sufficient justification for emending the text, though one can easily imagine how ἐνδίκου 
σφαγάς could be erroneous transcribed as ἐνδίκους σφαγάς, through diplography. ἔνδικος readily modifies either 
noun, but in the absence of a more compelling reason to emend, I prefer the reading of the manuscript here.  
295 I translate αὐτὸν as “in person,” at the suggestion of Ruth Scodel, rather than “alone,” as Jebb and Kells both 
suggest, citing OT 221 and OC 1650. As Scodel rightly noted (per litt.), Orestes is saying these words in the presence of 
his co-conspirators who will be present for his revenge, and it would make little sense for him to talk about how Apollo 
told him to act alone while so clearly not being alone (and strange too for neither of them to comment on this, if we 
should in fact understand “alone” here).  
296 As Kells notes (ad loc.), likening this ὅτε to Latin quandoquidem, this use is “not simply temporal…and gives a 
subjective reason.”  
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Apollo said, however? The actual oracle seems to consist of these lines only: 
ἄσκευον αὐτὸν ἀσπίδων τε καὶ στρατοῦ  
δόλοισι κλέψαι χειρὸς ἐνδίκους σφαγάς.  
 
In person, not furnished with shield-bearing men or an 
army, I should stealthily bring about, through 
deception, righteous slaughters done by my own hand. 
The actual words of Apollo, as transmitted by Orestes, are in fact both vague and minimalist. The 
course of action that Orestes pursues generally accords with these oracular instructions, but there 
are many other courses of action that would also do so.  
Unlike the oracular prophecies received by Heracles (in the Trachiniae) and Jocasta and 
Laius (in the OT), this oracle is not presented as a prophecy given in a vacuum.297 Rather, this is a 
response to a question that Orestes asks: how he might take vengeance on his father’s killers. In 
other contexts,298 we might expect such a short, vague oracle to be misunderstood in light of some 
misfortune in the phrasing of the question or some circumstance that the listener failed to take into 
account. In other literary contexts, a man may not fully understand the import of the question he is 
asking, and through some unrealized imprecision of his language, he might not be able to 
understand the god’s message. Here, however, we have none of that. We hear simply that Orestes 
went there to learn how to take vengeance, rather than anything precise about what he asked the 
oracle. We then have a very uncharacteristic oracle in which neither the question nor the answer 
seems to matter very much. The question, as noted, is not deemed worthy of recounting in any 
detail and is never revisited. The answer too does not seem to matter much, since Orestes will not 
have any sort of revelatory moment when he realizes the true meaning of the oracle and suffers the 
consequences of his misunderstanding (as in other plays I have examined). What, then, is the point 
of this oracle at all? 
The most obvious issue surrounding this oracle is whether Apollo validates the matricide, 
an issue that has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Unlike the version presented in 
Aeschylus, we do not have any clear answer to this question, since Apollo never appears on the 
stage to explain his role. We are not even on very firm ground if we assume that Apollo tacitly 
approves what transpires, since he does not interfere to stop Orestes, since divine retribution is a 
                                                   
297 This is, of course, another feature of literary oracles that seems to bear little or no resemblance to actual divinatory 
practice. The sort of oracular consultation that Orestes describes is a much more realistic depiction of how an actual 
Greek would ask for divine instructions. However, at least in Sophocles, the spontaneous pronouncement of oracles 
(rather that in response to some question) seems to be a perfectly acceptable element of tragic prophecy. 
298 As in the Trachiniae. See also Herodotus 1.53, 55, 91 (the oracles given to Croesus) and 5.92B-C (oracles given to 
Eetion and the Bacchiadae). 
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dish often served both cold and late, especially in Sophocles.299 The stakes of this question are in 
fact quite high, and yet Sophocles does not provide a definitive answer, which only serves to 
emphasize the risks of flawed communication, since it leaves the audience with questions that will 
never receive an answer. Another closely related aspect of this oracle is the way that its presentation 
sidesteps any question of the role of the questioner in an oracular pronouncement. As noted above, 
this oracle is given in response to a question, which had been formulated by Orestes. While we do 
not get the precise wording, we do hear the general form of the question and, as Sheppard has 
noted,300 Orestes did not ask whether he should take vengeance, but how he should (ὅτῳ τρόπῳ). 
The importance of Orestes’ question forms the basis of a great deal of debate about whether 
Apollo sanctions this matricide, and the question is far from settled.301  
For my purposes here, the central issue is not whether Apollo endorses Orestes’ actions, 
but the fact that this oracle raises these questions (even though there is no clear answer, as 
evidenced by the scholarly ink still being spilled over this question). Sophocles formulates the 
oracle and the surrounding plot in a way that allows for this question and does not provide an 
answer. Instead, we see familial violence coated in a veneer of divine decree with no way of knowing 
the legitimacy of that decree. What we undoubtedly see is a prophecy used for personal gain and, 
given the status of this family and the implications for rule in Argos, the political is very much 
personal for Orestes. Here, then, Sophocles introduces the motif, common from the historians and 
comedians, of a politician coopting or exploiting oracles to advance his own agenda. While Orestes 
might act, as so many politicians have, with full awareness of how he is manipulating Apollo’s 
language, there is also the possibility that he reshapes these words subconsciously, as I suggested 
might occur with the Messenger in the previous section. Orestes, motivated by a desire to avenge 
his father, might well recount a slightly different version of Apollo’s words, but one which aligns 
more closely with what he wanted Apollo to have said. On either reading, Orestes demonstrates a 
                                                   
299 Leaving aside the general motif of late learning, which permeates Greek tragedy as a whole, the Antigone provides 
an example of divine silence indicating the gods’ disapproval of Creon’s actions, rather than their approval. It would be 
illogical to think that Apollo’s silence can be taken as his approval or disapproval. As so often in Sophocles, the gods 
remain inscrutable here.  
300 Sheppard 1927a: 2-9 and 1927b: 163-165. 
301 For a selection of scholars who follow Sheppard (1918, 1927a and b) in thinking that Apollo is responding 
to a leading question and that we cannot see him as validating Orestes’ actions, see Perrotta 1963: 299-301; Friis 
Johansen 1964: 8-32; Kells 1973: 1-12; Markantonatos 1976: 147-150. For those who disagree and think that 
Apollo’s oracle should be taken at face value, as an endorsement of matricide, see Steinweg 1924: 23-24; Turolla 
1934: 143-160; Bowra 1944: 215-218; Letters 1953: 246-247; Maddalena 1959: 156-161; Linforth 1963: 91, 
120-121; Woodard 1964: 163-205; Torrance 1965: 307-314; Woodard 1966: 215-227; Ronnet 1969: 233; Gellie 
1972: 107; Stevens 1978: 111-120; Erbse 1978: 284-300; Hester 1981: 15-25. 
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very plausible sort of behavior that combines a pious intention (evidenced by his visit to Delphi) 
with a very human desire for vengeance and political power.  
Taken as a whole, the play offers us an easier reading, which is the dominant reading, in 
which Apollo does tell Orestes to kill Clytemnestra (as he does in the Aeschylean precedent) and in 
which Orestes is correct to label himself a prophet (ἐγώ σοι μάντις εἰμὶ τῶνδ᾽ ἄκρος, 1499), 
because he has accurately understood the words of the god. He is certainly casting himself as a 
prophet, since he purports to speak (and act) on behalf of the god, but the ambiguity of Apollo’s 
actual meaning undermines Orestes’ credibility as a prophet. We know that Orestes wants this to be 
Apollo’s will, but how certain can we be that Orestes is correct? There remains, however, this 
second, more unsettling interpretation, in which Apollo does not approve of Orestes’ actions, and 
Orestes has instead reshaped and deployed Apollo’s words for his own personal gain, whether or 
not he realizes he has done so.  
Before I move onto the next play, however, I would like to note that the overall plot of this 
play is mostly unconcerned with the question of how faithfully Orestes transmits Apollo’s words. 
There is no moment of revelation when we learn that Orestes misused Apollo’s oracle to lend 
credence to his own plot, and no one within the play raises any sort of objection about how Orestes 
presents the oracle (a less generous reading might say “co-opts”) and uses it to support his own 
plan. Within the world of the play itself, oracles simply are true, and, with no overt reprimand for 
his impiety, we have no reason to suspect that Orestes has done anything wrong. Any awareness of 
Apollo’s ambiguity (or suspicion that his words might be ambiguous) is limited to the audience 
members, as is any sort of anxiety or cynicism about how powerful figures tend to manipulate 
religion for their own personal agendas—these tropes, common elsewhere in literature, are absent 
from this play in any explicit sense.  
It is interesting to note that Sophocles cannot have included this oracle because the plot 
demands it. After all, the plot is entirely unconcerned with the precise wording of the oracle. As we 
have seen in the Trachiniae and the Oedipus Tyrannus, however, Sophocles is concerned with the 
details of language when he forms these oracles, and we ought to see this as another opportunity 
for Sophocles to play with the elusive nature of language and the ways that humans are often 
unable to interpret language without also shaping or manipulating it in some way. In the Electra, as 
in all five of the plays I examine in this chapter, Sophocles fills in more gaps in the theories of 
language that he has been developing. Though they are outside the scope of this analysis, in 
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addition to this ambiguous oracle, we also see lies and a prophetic dream (described by 
Clytemnestra as δισσῶν ὀνείρων, 645). All of these are types of communication which require a 
complex set of linguistic and pragmatic rules in order to analyze the speech. I will return to this 
point in greater detail, but for now, my main concern is to show that Sophocles is highlighting 
instances of speech that are difficult to analyze properly. Things like lies and ambiguity and subtle 
misrepresentations resist simple classification. They are not precisely true or false, and they exist at 
the heart of sophistic rhetorical techniques.  
 
A Prophecy or a Curse? Tiresias’ Words in the Antigone  
Moving to the Antigone, we are again faced with a prophecy transmitted not through an 
oracle, but through a prophet—here, Tiresias. In this play, he starts out practicing inductive 
divination, in the form of ornithomancy, before moving to inspired divination, when he predicts 
that Creon will bury his child. As he bursts out in angry prophecy, however, his words are hard to 
classify and they border on a curse rather than a prophecy. As was the case in the Oedipus 
Tyrannus, Tiresias is a very human vessel whose knowledge is infallible, but whose communication 
is colored by his own disposition and his emotional relationships with other mortals. When he 
communicates, his motivations and his agenda are constantly relevant, since they shape how his 
words are delivered and how they are received. Though we might be tempted to equate him with 
Apollo, we should be careful to remember that Tiresias is not a mere conduit for Apollo, but in fact 
exercises a great deal of discretion of his own. 
In the Antigone, we have a very different situation.  Rather than a prophecy that is only 
recounted secondhand (or perhaps third-hand), the main instance of prophecy in this play is 
delivered on stage by Tiresias himself. As with Calchas’ words in the Ajax, however, this prophecy 
deserves closer scrutiny. Tiresias’ first words to Creon actually describe a failed attempt at augury, 
rather than the sort of prophecy that Tiresias practices elsewhere, in which he simply “sees” or 
knows the future.302 Creon, however, does not draw a distinction between modes of prophecy and 
refers to Tiresias with such terms as μαντικῆς (1034), τὸν μάντιν (1053), τὸ μαντικὸν [γένος] 
1055, and μάντις (1059). It is interesting to note the terms in which Tiresias describes this process: 
τέχνης σημεῖα τῆς ἐμῆς… εἰς γὰρ παλαιὸν θᾶκον ὀρνιθοσκόπον / ἵζων (998-1000). His focus 
                                                   
302 For example, in the Oedipus Tyrannus, Delphi is consulted when Thebes is in need of a diagnosis. Tiresias instead 
possesses a knowledge of the past and future in the OT, and Sophocles does not depict him as requiring any natural 
σημεῖα, as he does here (Ant. 998).  
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is on signs and on watching birds (themselves a type of σημεῖον).303 This scene establishes a subtle 
distinction between modes of telling the future.304 Though Greek prophetic terminology is not 
always precise, a problem that plagues much of the study of ancient religion,305 Sophocles does at 
least seem to be drawing a distinction here between portent-interpretation, which Tiresias practices 
at the start of this scene, and a different sort of prophecy, which he will practice only once Creon 
goads him into an angry outburst: 
 
1065 
 
 
 
 
1070 
 
ἀλλ᾽ εὖ γέ τοι κάτισθι μὴ πολλοὺς ἔτι  
τρόχους ἁμιλλητῆρας ἡλίου τελῶν,306  
ἐν οἷσι τῶν σῶν αὐτὸς ἐκ σπλάγχνων ἕνα  
νέκυν νεκρῶν ἀμοιβὸν ἀντιδοὺς ἔσει,  
ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἔχεις μὲν τῶν ἄνω βαλὼν κάτω  
ψυχήν τ᾽ ἀτίμως ἐν τάφῳ κατῴκισας,  
ἔχεις δὲ τῶν κάτωθεν ἐνθάδ᾽ αὖ θεῶν  
ἄμοιρον, ἀκτέριστον, ἀνόσιον νέκυν.  
1064-1071 
But know full well that you will not complete 
many more race-circuits of the sun before you 
yourself will have given one from your own 
entrails, a corpse in exchange for corpses, in 
exchange for the fact that you have thrown down 
below one of those from above, having 
disenfranchised and displaced a living soul into a 
tomb, while you simultaneously keep something 
that belongs to the gods below, a corpse that has 
not received its due, without funeral rites and 
without consecration. 
This is generally understood307 to be Tiresias’ prophecy, and on an initial reading, it certainly seems 
prophetic. By the end of the play, Tiresias’ words will be fulfilled. However, if we understand 
prophecy to be the process by which a mortal looks into a future that it at least somewhat 
                                                   
303 Tiresias does refer to himself with θεσπίζειν at line 1054, though to be more precise, he uses θεσπίζειν ψευδῆ to 
describe how Creon has been characterizing Tiresias. Line 1054 provides a clever etymological play on Tiresias’ part, 
in fact. In response to Creon saying that he does not wish to “speak badly about the seer” (οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν 
ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς), Tiresias responds with “you are in fact speaking badly (sc. about me) by saying that I am 
prophesying false things” (καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίζειν λέγων). Θεσπίζειν, a denominative formed from 
θέσπις, is thought to come from *θέσ-σπ-ις, a combination of *θεσ- 'god' and -σπ- from the verb *σπεῖν (ἕπω) 
(Beekes, Frisk, Chantraine s.v. θεσπέσιος). Θεσπίζειν, etymologically, means something akin to “speak divinely uttered 
things.” If we understand the ἀντ- of ἀντειπεῖν more literally, ἀντειπεῖν means something more like “to speak 
contradictorily.” Tiresias’ response can then be better understood as “you do in fact speak contradictorily when you 
say that I’m saying false things when I say divinely-uttered things,” since (to Tiresias, at least) false things simply cannot 
be the same as divinely-uttered things. 
304 I do not in any way mean to suggest that this is the only (or even the primary) purpose of this initial description of 
Tiresias’ attempts at augury. This scene carries a great deal of weight in the play as a whole, since it establishes that the 
gods condemn Creon’s actions (a fact that the audience would have likely already gleaned from other facets of the play 
thus far) and it reveals Creon to be the sort of person who would argue with a prophet and accuse him of corruption. I 
am reading this scene, and this play as a whole, in a very selective way that only focuses on specific aspects of prophecy 
and the gods.  
305 For an overview of these problems, though in a Roman context, see Schultz 2016. 
306 I agree with Griffith (ad loc.) that Winckelmann’s emendation ἥλιον τελεῖν is unnecessary, though it is a clever 
conjecture that provides a more straightforward reading and removes some superficial difficulties with the meaning of 
the next few lines. As I have printed them here, lines 1064-5 suggest that Creon himself will not survive much longer. 
However, the parallel Griffith provides (OC 618-20, ad 1066-7) is convincing and I am forced to conclude that this 
passage does not require emendation. Either reading forces us to understand ἐν οἷσι as “before” rather than a simple 
“during.” 
307 See, for instance, Bushnell 1988 (esp. 56ff.) for a reading that considers this passage a prophecy. See also Kirkwood 
1994, Knox 1983, and Whitman 1951 for seminal readings which equate Tiresias’ words here with the will of the gods. 
This is far and away the dominant interpretation of Tiresias’ words here.  
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predetermined and describes it to other mortals, this prophecy is more problematic than it seems at 
first, as we will see. Tiresias ends his speech with these words: 
 
1085 
τοιαῦτά σοι, λυπεῖς γάρ, ὥστε τοξότης 
ἀφῆκα θυμῷ καρδίας τοξεύματα 
βέβαια, τῶν σὺ θάλπος οὐχ ὑπεκδραμῇ. 
1084-6 
Such arrows at your heart—for you grieve me—
I have loosed, like an archer, in anger. Sure 
arrows, whose heat you will not outrun. 
The critical passage I would like to focus on is the one beginning with λυπεῖς γάρ (1084). The rest 
of Tiresias’ words are equally true, regardless of anything Creon has said to him. Creon has already 
cast a living person under the earth and kept a corpse above ground. If the Erinyes are upset about 
Creon’s actions, as it seems that they should be,308 Tiresias’ words should have no bearing on them. 
Creon’s actions alone are an affront to the natural order of things. Until his final lines, Tiresias 
seems to have delivered an entirely standard sort of prophecy in which he simply alerts Creon to 
what will happen in the future.  
When Tiresias adds λυπεῖς γάρ, at line 1084, he complicates a more simplistic view of his 
prophecy. The easier interpretation here is that Tiresias has only told Creon about the future 
because Creon has offended Tiresias. The outcome will be the same regardless, but Creon must 
now deal with the knowledge of this fate. Given how quickly this prophecy will be fulfilled, 
however, one might wonder how much revenge Tiresias is getting by simply adding a very brief 
period of anticipation and dread to Creon’s terrible fate.309 This requires us to assume that Tiresias 
                                                   
308 The authority and concerns of the Erinyes are not well-defined (what follows uses Rose, Dietrich, and Peatfield 2012 
as a starting point). Throughout Greek literature (Il. 9. 571; cf. Il. 9. 454, 11. 280, 21. 412; Od. 2. 135; Hes. Theog. 
472; Aesch. Sept. 70; Eum. 417), they concern themselves with crimes against family members (primarily against a 
parent), though the details vary. They are occasionally seen as the personification of a parent’s curse, though at other 
times they seem to pursue blood-guilt with or without an explicit curse from the wronged family member. Elsewhere 
(Il. 15. 204), they are concerned with familial rights and order, and on occasion they seem to protect people who are 
entitled to protection, even if they are not family members (Odysseus in beggar form, at Od. 15. 204), and they punish 
oath-breakers (Il. 19. 259; cf. 3. 279). Strangest of all, they remove the voice from the horse Xanthus at Il. 19. 409, 
after Hera has granted him the power to speak. Heraclitus’ claim that the Erinyes make sure that the sun stays in its 
proper course (Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν, DK 22 B 
94) may provide the best clue toward an overarching sense of what the Erinyes concern themselves with, since (if we 
assume that Heraclitus is only modifying the traditional role of the Erinyes rather than departing entirely from any 
previous idea of what the Erinyes do) the proper course of the sun suggests a much broader purview than simply 
intrafamilial violence. We might then think of the Erinyes as protecting the way that things ought to be—a sort of 
cosmic order. From this perspective, the Erinyes ought certainly to be upset with Creon’s behavior, since he has 
committed an abomination by inverting the natural way of things and keeping the dead above ground while burying a 
living being. This seems to be precisely the sort of behavior that Erinyes punish.  
309 One might here remember Tiresias’ words to Oedipus (“I will not ever reveal my woes, so as not to call them 
yours,” OT 328-9). The sentiment seems similar on the surface (woes are only properly said to belong to someone 
when that person is aware of them), but there is a very different set of circumstances behind these two scenarios. In the 
OT, ignorance could have been bliss for Oedipus, in theory, if he never found out that the man he killed was his father 
and the woman he married was his mother. In this play, however, this is not a similarly available option. I find it hard to 
imagine a version of events in which Haemon dies but Creon simply does not hear about it ever, and thereby avoids 
realizing his misfortune. In fact, if we read this scene, in the Antigone, against the scene in the Oedipus Tyrannus, we 
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was withholding information that he had from the start—he presumably knows that Haemon will 
die in the course of events set in motion by Creon’s impiety, but he simply chooses not to share this 
knowledge until he is provoked. A darker alternative is that Creon might well have averted 
Haemon’s death, but Tiresias waits to tell him about this until it is too late. Tiresias’ delay in telling 
Creon anything about his son’s death is then twofold—Tiresias waits until Haemon cannot be 
saved, but then rather than stay silent, he ensures that Creon recognizes that this outcome could 
have been avoided if not for his impiety. The implicit message here is “I knew all along that if you 
were impious, you would lose your son, and I could have warned you in advance, but I chose not 
to.” If correct, this reading produces a chillingly cold Tiresias. 
There is, however, another reading that can account for Tiresias’ words here, and for the 
difference between his first and second speeches, though it is a more unexpected reading. Rather 
than a prophecy, what if Tiresias is instead uttering a curse? On this reading, Tiresias reacts angrily 
when his integrity and accuracy as a prophet are challenged, and he pronounces something far 
worse than what he initially shared—not because this was always going to happen, but instead 
because Creon has grieved Tiresias (λυπεῖς γάρ). 
At this point, I should acknowledge the evidence against this reading. Leaving aside that 
this is a very strange way for a prophet to act, and an unprecedented one, Tiresias’ own words 
argue against this interpretation, at least in part. Before this outburst, he warns Creon “You will 
provoke me to reveal things unmoved from [lit. through] my mind” (ὄρσεις με τἀκίνητα διὰ 
φρενῶν310 φράσαι, 1060). I am here diverting from the suggestion in LSJ for this particular line, 
which renders τἀκίνητα as “not to be stirred, inviolate… hence, that must be kept secret,”311 a 
meaning that has been adopted to some degree by many prominent translators, since I do not think 
that this sense of necessity is present in other uses of the word, and we unduly bias our reading if we 
assume there is some sort of obligation expressed here (should or must be kept secret) rather than a 
                                                   
see two subtle variations on a similar exchange. Though we do not know which play was written and performed first, 
that does not mean that we cannot read these two scenes in tandem. Both scenes are conversations with Tiresias and an 
interlocutor and both scenes become increasingly emotionally charged over the course of the scene. Whereas Oedipus 
is the one whose emotional reaction drives the scene in the OT, and it is only through his increasing anger and agitation 
that any prophetic revelation emerges, here it is Tiresias who reacts in anger (θυμῷ, 1085). 
310 Lloyd-Jones and Wilson consider διὰ φρενῶν to be suspect, though they do not offer anything else in its stead. 
Without a plausible and preferable reading, we are obligated to make sense of this line, despite the difficulties it 
presents.  
311 ἀκίνητος A.II.2. LSJ base this meaning on this passage and OC 624, and while I think that this meaning it 
appropriate in the OC, it would be a mistake to rely on that parallel alone to judge the meaning in this context when 
“unmoved” is perfectly sufficient and does not close off interpretive possibilities the way that “that must be kept secret” 
does. 
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more neutral reading of “not (yet) revealed.”312 This does suggest that lines 1064-1090 are some 
sort of secret knowledge that Tiresias has been holding within his mind—in other words, Tiresias 
fairly explicitly suggests that he is providing a prophecy and not a curse.  
At the same time, Tiresias does not frame his words as a prophecy. Griffith (ad 1064-90) 
writes that “[a]lthough [Tiresias] is angry, his voice is that of the representative of divine order and 
retribution (1068-76) rather than of personal retaliation (contrast the shriller tone of OT 408-62),” 
but I am not so convinced. Griffith is right to note the rhetorical and metrical precision of this 
passage, but the content of Tiresias’ words does in fact suggest a personal element (even if this 
passage does not match OT 408-62 in shrillness). In addition to his use of λυπεῖς γάρ at 1084, 
there are other moments where a personal, vengeful anger shows through in Tiresias’ words. For 
instance, at lines 1077-8, Tiresias inserts a reference back to the accusations of corruption Creon 
made previously: 
1077 καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἄθρησον εἰ κατηργυρωμένος  
λέγω 
1077-8 
Examine whether I say things because I have been 
bribed 
He continues this bribery motif in the next line, with language that evokes rubbing a coin to reveal 
if it is real (φανεῖ, τριβὴ). It is hard to read these lines without understanding some personal 
animus beneath the words. After all, Tiresias explicitly invokes the words of Creon that provoked 
him to this outburst in the first place, and his arrow imagery in lines 1084-6 recalls Creon’s words 
at 1033-4 (ὦ πρέσβυ, πάντες ὥστε τοξόται σκοποῦ / τοξεύετ᾽ ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε).  
More significantly, as Tiresias turns to walk back into the house, he addresses his guide with 
these words: 
1087 
 
 
1090 
ὦ παῖ, σὺ δ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἄπαγε πρὸς δόμους, ἵνα  
τὸν θυμὸν οὗτος ἐς νεωτέρους ἀφῇ,  
καὶ γνῷ τρέφειν τὴν γλῶσσαν ἡσυχαιτέραν  
τὸν νοῦν τ᾽ ἀμείνω τῶν φρενῶν ὧν313 νῦν φέρει.  
1087-90 
Boy, lead me away, to the house, so 
that this man may exercise his anger 
against younger men, and learn to 
develop a gentler tongue and a better 
intellect than the mind he currently 
has.  
While this is ostensibly directed at Tiresias’ guide, the real target here is Creon, who can 
                                                   
312 For other translations of this, see Jebb’s “You will stir me to utter the dire secret in my soul”; Lloyd-Jones’ “You will 
provoke me into telling you things that should not be dug up!” 
313 I use Brunck’s emendation here, though I do not find the ἢ found in the manuscripts (and printed by Jebb) to be 
unlikely or “syntactically impossible” (see Griffith on this passage for a reading that accommodates ἢ, though he is 
quite right to prefer the emended text). ὧν (for ἅς, by attraction) does avoid the awkward τὸν νοῦν τῶν φρενῶν 
however, and gives a better sense than the manuscript. 
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presumably overhear these words.314 Tiresias’ choice to address his servant rather than Creon, 
while knowing full well that Creon can hear him, must be a choice calculated to insult. Following 
directly on the heels of comments made to Creon (σὺ …οὐχ ὑπεκδραμεῖ), this shift into referring 
to Creon in the third person (οὗτος…ἀφῇ) is both abrupt and pointed. This allows Tiresias to 
avoid more direct aggression toward Creon, which makes it harder for Creon to respond directly. 
In a more modern context, we might say that Tiresias is being passive-aggressive. Because he has 
not been slighted or even really addressed, Creon risks looking petty in a very public setting if he 
responds to this comment, which was made to the παῖς. The issue here is not what Tiresias says as 
he leaves the stage but instead how he says it.  
I raise the question of personal animus here, not because it solves anything about this scene, 
but because it further complicates any reading of this “prophecy” and exactly what power and 
weight this speech has. There simply is not an entirely satisfying reading that takes all of Tiresias’ 
words and the context in which he says them into account. Though I cannot entirely reconcile 
these readings, I also do not think that they need reconciling. I would like to end this section with 
the preliminary conclusion that part of Sophocles’ aim here is to complicate the idea of prophecy. 
The gods are famously silent for much of this play (though they are not entirely uninvolved—the 
concealing dust storm certainly seems to be their doing, though Creon expresses skepticism), and 
mortals are left to try to understand their will without much guidance. By the time the gods 
unambiguously communicate, through Tiresias, the wheels are already in motion and tragedy and 
death are unavoidable. The two avenues of divine communication in this play (birds and Tiresias) 
are imperfect, and the results of failed communication are devastating.  
As in the Ajax, I do not mean to suggest that an alternative reading of Tiresias is necessarily 
                                                   
314 Dynel 2011 attempts to synthesize several disparate works by Goffman (Goffman 1959, 1963, 1964, 1967, 1974, 
1981) into one coherent theory, since his works on participation span a number of topics and at times seem to suggest 
slightly different classifications, and I rely here on her work as well as several of Goffman’s own. Goffman approaches 
interactions with an eye to “footing,” which he considers “participant’s alignment, or set, or stance, or projected self” 
(Goffman 1979: 5). Among the participants in a conversation, Goffman usefully separates them into ratified hearers 
and unratified hearers. The latter category includes overhearers and eavesdroppers, who are numbered among the 
bystanders, though bystanders in general are expected (by the demands of etiquette) not to overhear conversations in 
which they are not a ratified hearer, and “maximally encourage the fiction that they aren’t present” (Goffman 1979: 9). 
It is against this conception of participation that Goffman describes the situation in which a speaker may intend to be 
overheard, thereby potentially turning an unratified hearer into a ratified hearer (see Dynel 2010 on this point, though 
this change of status is not agreed upon by everyone) As an example, Dynel describes a situation in which a woman in 
line at a store complains loudly to her partner about the incompetence of the woman working at the checkout (Dynel 
2011). Dynel’s example maps neatly onto what I suggest is happening in this exchange between Tiresias and his guide, 
but which is really intended for Creon’s ears. 
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right, or better, than the standard interpretation. My interest is instead in how this play allows for 
alternate possibilities and presents unanswered questions. Tiresias seems to be drawing distinctions 
between modes of prophecy, as he avoids all the prophetic words that Creon uses (μάντ- 
language) and instead highlights his role as a reader of signs and a practitioner of an older mode of 
divination. It is only later, once provoked, that he engages in what seems to be a more traditional 
sort of tragic prophecy, but even then, there are aspects of his language that do not fit neatly into a 
standard, prophetic model. There is no plot-driven reason that Tiresias needs to share his 
prophetic knowledge about Haemon’s death, and it seems clear that Creon would suffer the loss of 
his son regardless. Tiresias has already revealed that the gods disprove of Creon’s action. His 
inspired prophecy serves no narrative purpose other than to cast the tragic outcome in a more 
fatalistic light, but what it does do is blur the distinction between a prophecy and a curse, and 
perhaps also add an additional psychological aspect to Creon’s grief. These points direct our 
attention toward the inherently subjective position that the prophet is in and the ways that even 
factually accurate communication is still fundamentally shaped by non-syntactic features like 
context and the motivations and animus of the speaker.  
In the end, of course, none of this really matters to the plot. The implications of precisely 
how Tiresias delivers his words are not a subject of scrutiny within the play, and no one revisits his 
speeches to reinterpret what he said. As with the Ajax, there are ambiguities here, but they remain 
unexplored. Why include them, then? Though my subsequent case studies in this chapter will help 
answer this question more fully, we can see from these first two examples that Sophocles has a 
persistent interest in prophecy, ambiguity, and language, and that this interest permeates plays that 
are not primarily concerned with misunderstood prophecy. Even so, prophetic language in these 
plays is carefully crafted and presented in ways that examine questions of meaning and how it 
arises. Even non-oracular speech still presents an opportunity for Sophocles to explore issues of 
language, and the gravity and the foreignness of prophetic language makes these prophecies a 
particularly apt place to look at how language and context interact to generate meaning. 
 
Odysseus the Sophist: Rhetoric and a Prophecy in the Philoctetes 
The Philoctetes presents a different sort of prophecy from what we have seen so far, in that 
 174 
it deals with a magical item.315 Further, Helenus’ prophecy seems to be less of a statement of how 
things will be and more a set of instructions for how to obtain a desired outcome (as in the Electra). 
Helenus seems to have prophesied that Troy will not fall without the bow of Philoctetes, or 
something to that general effect. I use seems here because, as I will explore in this section, our 
account of this prophecy is filtered through the most unreliable conduit—Odysseus—and 
Odysseus’ account of the prophecy shifts to suit the situation. While none of this should come as a 
surprise to anyone who is familiar with Odysseus’ famously πολύτροπος nature, his behavior and 
his keen control and manipulation of language has a great deal to offer this examination of 
prophetic language. Given the intellectual climate in which Sophocles is writing, Odysseus clearly 
evokes sophistic rhetorical teachings (or at least the claims that were made about sophists by those 
who opposed their teachings).316 He makes the weaker argument the stronger, advances a sort of 
moral relativism, and provides a very persuasive argument, though he is certainly unconcerned with 
the truth of his words. Here, we have a mortal agent consciously manipulating language so as to use 
ambiguity to his advantage. In pragmatic terms, this is a noncooperative conversation, and 
Odysseus serves as a useful contrast to ambiguous oracular language. Odysseus disregards 
pragmatic convention for the purpose of misleading Neoptolemus, whereas (as I have argued) the 
gods’ purposes are inscrutable. 
As I noted with the Electra, the instances of prophecy in the Philoctetes highlight some of 
the more complex aspects of language. Odysseus provides more information about the prophecy 
given by Helenus over the course of the play. Though scholars have noted Sophocles’ tendency 
toward the late addition of new prophetic information,317 I do not think that we can simply dismiss 
this evolving prophecy as a Sophoclean literary habit. Further, unlike Zeus’ shifting and evolving 
oracle in the Trachiniae, Helenus’ words here do not demonstrate the seemingly supernatural 
characteristic of being entirely distinct yet entirely true in all their incarnations. Instead, we see 
Odysseus carefully choosing his words and including and excluding different details as they advance 
his overall purpose of persuading Neoptolemus. We have here a distillation of sophism and a sort of 
                                                   
315 On magic and magical items, Tambiah’s scholarship has been very useful for conceptualizing how ritual and magical 
items function from an anthropological perspective. In particular, see Tambiah 1979 and 1990.  
316 For a treatment of the political aspects of this play and Euripides’ version, see Scodel 2009, who concludes that this 
play offers a reflection on the possibilities of leading an ethical public life (something connected to politics, but not in 
the explicit way that Euripides’ version seems to have been).  
317 See Segal 2000: 156 on this (he notes also that both Kranz 1921 and Schwinge 1962 comment on this). See also 
Lloyd-Jones 1972 (on Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1917), Kraus 1991, and Davies 1991.  
 175 
sophistic bogeyman; Odysseus’ character here provides Sophocles an important opportunity to 
explore sophistic rhetoric. Sophocles’ engagement with sophistic theories has been noted before,318 
and it should come as no surprise that Sophocles is engaging with a wider range of sophistic 
arguments here. This play is Sophocles’ most explicit engagement with sophistic theories of 
language, but, as I have argued, Sophocles is in fact concerned with these theories throughout his 
plays.  
Though Odysseus’ rhetoric within this play deserves its own thorough examination, I will 
be limiting my focus here to the times when he describes the prophecy of Helenus. As with so many 
of Sophocles’ other plays, issues and anxieties about language crystallize nicely around divine 
speech, since divine speech is presumed to be infallible (if properly understood), and so issues of 
meaning, interpretation, and comprehension take on greater weight. There are three major 
versions of the prophecy that Odysseus relates, the first of which comes very near the start of the 
play: 
66                                                   εἰ δ᾽ ἐργάσει  
μὴ ταῦτα, λύπην πᾶσιν Ἀργείοις βαλεῖς.  
εἰ γὰρ τὰ τοῦδε τόξα μὴ ληφθήσεται,  
οὐκ ἔστι πέρσαι σοι τὸ Δαρδάνου πέδον. 
66-69 
But if you do not do these things, you will heap 
grief upon all the Argives. For if the bow of this 
man is not taken, it will not be possible for you to 
sack the Dardanian plain.  
 
This prophecy is invoked to support Odysseus’ initial instructions: “You need to trick his 
life away by uttering contrivances” (τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ / ψυχὴν ὅπως δόλοισιν ἐκκλέψεις 
λέγων, 54-5),319 which may well be the “something new, which you have not heard before now” 
(τι καινόν, ὧν πρὶν οὐκ ἀκήκοας, 52) that Odysseus warned Neoptolemus that he might hear. 
These instructions are, of course, a thoroughly Odyssean plan, but we can see immediately why 
Odysseus felt the need to provide this preface, with reminders about how Neoptolemus is only 
there to serve Odysseus (ὡς ὑπηρέτης πάρει, 53). Despite Odysseus’ description (γενναῖον, 51), 
this is not a particularly γενναῖος act for Neoptolemus to undertake, in a literal sense. Odysseus is 
presumably appealing to Neoptolemus’ sense of duty and honor, as γενναῖος often evokes, but it 
                                                   
318 Rose 1976 is a seminal work on this front, and he revisits many of his arguments in greater detail in Rose 1992. 
Odysseus’ rhetoric in particular invites comparison with sophistic teachings (cf. Blundell 1987, Worman 1999 and 
2002). For a specifically political look at the rhetoric in this play, see Scodel 2009.  
319 This line contains something of a pun, since βιός is the word both for a bow and for life. By “tricking away his life,” 
Odysseus alludes both to the bow and to his life and livelihood. This is made far more explicit at line 931 
(ἀπεστέρηκας τὸν βίον τὰ τόξ᾿ ἑλών), but we have a much subtler version of the joke here. See Schein ad 931 for 
more on this, and Heraclitus fr. 48 for what seems to be a joke (or a bon mot) on the same point: τῶι οὖν τόξωι 
ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος. This line also allows Neoptolemus to understand ψυχήν metaphorically (as in his 
livelihood) and overlook the fact that stealing Philoctetes’ bow while leaving his stranded on Lemnos will absolutely kill 
him.  
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more directly suggests “true to one's birth or descent.”320 If we recall Achilles’ famous rebuke of 
Odysseus at Il. 9.312-3 (ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν / ὅς χ᾽ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ 
ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ), we are reminded of exactly how distasteful deception is likely to be to 
Neoptolemus.  
It is in this context that Odysseus first mentions the prophecy, to help persuade 
Neoptolemus to undertake this deceptive strategy. The terms seem straightforward enough: if the 
bow is not captured (εἰ γὰρ τὰ τοῦδε τόξα μὴ ληφθήσεται), Neoptolemus will not be able to 
capture Troy (οὐκ ἔστι πέρσαι σοι τὸ Δαρδάνου πέδον). On a strict, logical reading, this does 
not imply that the bow is the only thing that needs to be captured. The bow’s capture could be a 
necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) prerequisite for Troy’s capture. 
At this point, it is worth returning to Chapter 1 and the prophecies in the Trachiniae. 
Those prophecies, I argued, are not malicious, but simply operate in a linguistic realm that is not 
strictly governed by pragmatic rules. When Zeus phrases an oracle in terms of a disjunctive, he 
implicates (from the human perspective) that it is an exclusive or and one of two outcomes will 
happen, but (critically) not both. Zeus is not necessarily malicious, then, but simply communicating 
in a language devoid of many of these pragmatic principles, and his uses of or are just as likely to be 
inclusive or exclusive, since the tools mortals use to distinguish between those are all contextual, 
pragmatic cues. With Odysseus, we have a similar situation, except Odysseus is not a god. When he 
uses misleading syntax, he is aware of what he is doing and how his words will be perceived. We 
must see his word choice here as a careful avoidance of liability. He is not technically lying, though 
his words will have the effect of a lie.  
When Neoptolemus invokes his honest heritage at 88-91, it is clear that Odysseus needs to 
persuade him more, since Neoptolemus makes the very reasonable suggestion that he would prefer 
a more honorable option, and he is willing to take the bow by force instead of deception.  
88 
 
90 
ἔφυν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐκ τέχνης πράσσειν κακῆς, 
οὔτ᾿ αὐτὸς οὔθ᾿, ὥς φασιν, οὑκφύσας ἐμέ. 
ἀλλ᾿ εἴμ᾿ ἑτοῖμος πρὸς βίαν τὸν ἄνδρ᾿ ἄγειν 
καὶ μὴ δόλοισιν·  
88-91 
For I am naturally inclined not to accomplish 
anything by wicked contrivance, I am inclined that 
way and, from what they say, so was the one who 
sired me. But I am ready to take the man by force, 
and not by treachery.  
This, it would seem, meets the only criterion of the prophecy that Odysseus has mentioned, since 
the bow will be captured. In fact, this seems to be a much better interpretation of ληφθήσεται, 
since Neoptolemus proposes taking the bow by force. Odysseus’ scheme, it would seem, would 
                                                   
320 LSJ s.v. γενναῖος 
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result in the bow being given (δοθήσεται), albeit under false pretenses. Further, Odysseus has 
already referred to the bow as invincible (τῶν ἀνικήτων ὅπλων, 78), strongly suggesting that the 
bow itself is the critical element of this prophecy. Neoptolemus’ proposed solution seems as if it 
should be a viable one.  
Here, Odysseus slowly shifts the terms of his plan. Instead of simply deceiving Philoctetes in 
order to take the bow, now Neoptolemus is told to take Philoctetes himself (λέγω σ᾿ ἐγὼ δόλῳ 
Φιλοκτήτην λαβεῖν, 101). Neoptolemus does not immediately question this shift, as he instead 
asks why it is better to take him by a trick (ἐν δόλῳ) than to persuade Philoctetes and take him that 
way (πείσαντ᾿ ἄγειν), willingly. As the conversation progresses though, Neoptolemus returns to 
this shift in the prophecy’s terms:  
 
112 
Νεοπτόλεμος 
κέρδος δ᾽ ἐμοὶ τί τοῦτον ἐς Τροίαν μολεῖν; 
 
Neoptolemus 
But what does it profit me that this man comes to 
Troy? 
Odysseus replies with what Schein calls the “oracular present,” which “authoritatively regards a 
future event as present.”321  
 
113 
Ὀδυσσεύς 
αἱρεῖ τὰ τόξα ταῦτα τὴν Τροίαν μόνα. 
Odysseus 
This bow alone takes Troy 
The ensuing exchange seems somewhat disjointed, when read on the surface, though the eventual 
outcome of the conversation is clear: 
 
114 
 
115 
 
116 
Νεοπτόλεμος 
οὐκ ἆρ᾽ ὁ πέρσων, ὡς ἐφάσκετ᾽, εἴμ᾽ ἐγώ; 
Ὀδυσσεύς 
οὔτ᾽ ἂν σὺ κείνων χωρὶς οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνα σοῦ. 
Νεοπτόλεμος 
θηρατέ᾽ οὖν γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἴπερ ὧδ᾽ ἔχει. 
Neoptolemus 
But then am I not the one who—like you said—
will capture Troy?  
Odysseus 
Neither could you without it, or it without you 
Neoptolemus 
Then it would be worthy of pursuit, if that is 
indeed the case. 
This exchange is best explored in terms of the implications in each line, as the flow of the 
conversation is not entirely clear, and the role of Philoctetes at this point is convoluted and 
obfuscated: 
Neoptolemus 
But what does it profit me that this man comes 
to Troy? 
Odysseus 
This bow alone takes Troy  
Neoptolemus 
But then am I not the one who—like you 
said—will capture Troy?  
Neoptolemus 
Whoa, wait a second, why do I care if 
Philoctetes comes to Troy? Don’t I only need 
the bow? 
Odysseus 
This bow taketh Troy, I say unto you.  
Neoptolemus 
                                                   
321 Schein ad 113, citing Smyth §1882 
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Odysseus 
Neither could you without it, or it without you 
Neoptolemus 
Then it would be worthy of pursuit, if that is 
indeed the case. 
Right, so if I have the bow, I take Troy, yeah? 
That’s what you said earlier… 
Odysseus 
You cannot capture it without the bow, nor 
the bow without you. 
Neoptolemus 
So I definitely need to get that bow then.  
By line 120, we can see that Neoptolemus is eager to follow Odysseus’ instructions, as he 
exclaims “Well then! I will do it, getting rid of all shame! (ἴτω· ποήσω, πᾶσαν αἰσχύνην ἀφείς). 
His questions about his own role in the prophecy are not entirely answered though. Will Philoctetes 
need to come with the bow? Odysseus very likely realizes at this point that Neoptolemus likes the 
idea that this is his heroic moment, and that he alone will receive δύο δωρήματα (117). If 
Philoctetes is to bring the bow to Troy, then Philoctetes will share in this glory. Odysseus, we see, 
sidesteps this issue for the time being, and continues to speak in cryptic, oracular-type language 
(αἱρεῖ τὰ τόξα ταῦτα τὴν Τροίαν μόνα, 113; οὔτ᾽ ἂν σὺ κείνων χωρὶς οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνα σοῦ, 115). 
Again, nothing he says is a lie, but he is also not conveying the full prophecy at this point. He turns 
the conversation away from Philoctetes and back to Neoptolemus’ own role in this heroic quest, 
effectively distracting Neoptolemus from any question of Philoctetes without actually answering 
Neoptolemus’ question at line 112. 
The next time that this prophecy appears, it is embedded under several layers of deception 
and presents deep interpretive challenges. The false merchant includes this account in the midst of 
a complex, metatheatrical scene. Throughout this scene, he weaves truth, known mythological 
accounts, and clear fabrications together in a way that makes it impossible to separate the different 
elements. While we cannot get to an underlying “truth” through all the artful rhetoric and the 
deceptive and manipulative content of this speech, we should certainly understand him as a 
mouthpiece of Odysseus. Many of the lines that the false merchant delivers are aimed at both 
Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, though the two men are meant to take very different meanings from 
the same words. With this in mind, the account of the prophecy is particularly hard to interpret. It 
seems that Neoptolemus is not aware of the full prophecy before this point, and that he knows only 
what Odysseus has told him. This account will be “news” to both Philoctetes and Neoptolemus:  
603 
 
605 
 
610 
ἐγώ σε τοῦτ᾿, ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀκήκοας, 
πᾶν ἐκδιδάξω. μάντις ἦν τις εὐγενής, 
Πριάμου μὲν υἱός, ὄνομα δ᾿ ὠνομάζετο 
Ἕλενος… 
ὃς δὴ τά τ᾿ ἄλλ᾿ αὐτοῖσι πάντ᾿ ἐθέσπισεν 
καὶ τἀπὶ Τροίᾳ πέργαμ᾿ ὡς οὐ μή ποτε 
I will explain everything to you thoroughly, since 
perhaps you have not heard. There was a certain 
noble seer, a son of Priam, named Helenus… 
He prophesied everything else to them [the 
Achaeans], and told them that they would never 
sack the towers of Troy unless, after they persuaded 
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πέρσοιεν, εἰ μὴ τόνδε πείσαντες λόγῳ 
ἄγοιντο νήσου τῆσδ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἧς ναίει τὰ νῦν. 
603-6, 610-13 
this man with their speech, they led him from this 
island where he is living now.  
Philoctetes, unaware that the merchant is in fact an agent of Odysseus, has no reason not to take 
this account at face value. Neoptolemus, however, might well question its veracity, since he is aware 
that both he and the false merchant are playing parts within a broader deceptive stratagem. Much 
of the rest of what the false merchant has said have been lies up to this point,322 and there is no 
reason to trust that this account is not another manipulative tactic originating from Odysseus. 
Nonetheless, Neoptolemus does not suspect that this might be a lie, or at least he does not let on if 
he does.  
At this point, we have seen a version in which the bow alone is sufficient to take Troy, a 
version which hints at Philoctetes’ presence being necessary, and a version which explicitly states 
that the Greeks need to persuade (πείσαντες λόγῳ) Philoctetes to come to Troy with them,323 
with no actual mention of the bow. Persuasion, it should be noted, is precisely what Odysseus told 
Neoptolemus would never work—hence, the necessity of deception. Schein (ad 603-21) notes that 
“Helenos’ (reported) words...re-energize the intrigue and challenge an audience or reader to 
consider (1) whether Od.’s deception, motivated up to this point wholly in human terms, may have 
divine backing.” He is quite right, but this passage also invites the opposite response, because there 
are so many levels of deception and the audience is left in as much confusion as Neoptolemus. At 
this point, we do not know how truthful Odysseus has been and how much of this prophecy is 
simply Odysseus presenting his own agenda as a divinely ordained one.324 
Before dissecting this any further, it will be helpful to see what happens to this prophecy in 
the rest of the play. To begin, I will look at the future versions that come from Odysseus himself. 
The first time that Odysseus modifies this prophecy at all is at lines 981-3:  
981                                                      τοῦτο μέν, 
οὐδ᾿ ἢν θέλῃ, δράσει ποτ᾿· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὲ δεῖ 
στείχειν ἅμ᾿ αὐτοῖς, ἢ βίᾳ στελοῦσί σε. 
He will never do that, not even if he wants to. 
In addition, you must come with it, or they will 
send you with violence.  
                                                   
322 As Schein (ad 542-627) has noted, many of these mythological aspects do not seem to be the traditional accounts of 
the Greek heroes. From our perspective, at least, a great many of the mythological accounts sound like lies, though 
there is the possibility that these are mythological variants that are otherwise lost to us. We can confidently say that 
these are less popular versions of these myths and that the audience would be skeptical, at the very least, about the 
accuracy of these accounts. 
323 Persuasion is, of course, a vague term and could perhaps be understood euphemistically. I am here thinking of the 
sort of dialogue given to mafiasi in movies, as in “an offer he can’t refuse,” in which the recipient of that offer is 
“persuaded” by the threat of violence lurking directly behind those words.  
324 For more on the complexities of this scene and the difficulties it presents to the audience, see (following Schein) 
Østerud 1973, Greengard 1987, Easterling 1997b, Falkner 1998, Payne 2000, Budelmann 2000.  
 180 
Here, Odysseus insists that Neoptolemus will not return the bow to Philoctetes, but that it is also 
critical that Philoctetes accompany the bow. Despite whatever Odysseus may have said earlier—a 
point to which I will return shortly—his actions suggest that both Philoctetes and the bow are 
necessary to take Troy. Otherwise, there is no reason Odysseus would need to worry about taking 
Philoctetes, a man who personally hates him, who smells terribly, and who is prone to loud and 
painful bouts as a result of his infection.  
However, at lines 1054ff., we have a different account that would seem to contradict this: 
 
1055 
 
 
 
 
1060 
ἄφετε γὰρ αὐτόν, μηδὲ προσψαύσητ᾿ ἔτι. 
ἐᾶτε μίμνειν. οὐδὲ σοῦ προσχρῄζομεν, 
τά γ᾿ ὅπλ᾿ ἔχοντες ταῦτ᾿· ἐπεὶ πάρεστι μὲν 
Τεῦκρος παρ᾿ ἡμῖν, τήνδ᾿ ἐπιστήμην ἔχων, 
ἐγώ θ᾿, ὃς οἶμαι σοῦ κάκιον οὐδὲν ἂν 
τούτων κρατύνων τῇδ᾿ ἐπιθύνειν χερί. 
τί δῆτα σοῦ δεῖ; χαῖρε τὴν Λῆμνον πατῶν. 
ἡμεῖς δ᾿ ἴωμεν. καὶ τάχ᾿ ἂν τὸ σὸν γέρας 
τιμὴν ἐμοὶ νείμειεν, ἣν σὲ χρῆν ἔχειν. 
1054-1062 
Release him, and do not take hold of him any 
longer. Let him stay. We have no need of you, 
since we have this bow. For Teucer is here with us, 
and he has this skill, as am I, who think that I 
would ply it in no way worse than you and direct it 
[sc. in no way worse than you] with my hand.  
What need have we of you? Enjoy walking around 
Lemnos! 
But let us get going, and perhaps your prize will 
afford honor to me—the honor which you ought 
to have.  
Taken at face value, this would seem to suggest that Philoctetes’ physical presence is not required, 
and that any skilled archer could wield Heracles’ bow. This whole passage smacks of a bluff, 
however, as Odysseus makes a loud and insulting show of how little Philoctetes actually matters and 
what Philoctetes’ future looks like, if he refuses to leave Lemnos with them. The last two lines of 
this speech emphasize this, as Odysseus suggests that perhaps he will receive Philoctetes’ γέρας, 
rubbing salt in his proverbial wound. Though this bluff feels somewhat transparent, especially after 
Odysseus’ previous statement, Philoctetes clearly does not feel that way, and the thought of 
Odysseus proudly displaying Philoctetes’ cherished bow is clearly too much for him to endure, 
since he bursts out dramatically: 
1063 οἴμοι· τί δράσω δύσμορος; σὺ τοῖς ἐμοῖς  
ὅπλοισι κοσμηθεὶς ἐν Ἀργείοις φανῇ; 
1063-4 
Alas! What am I—wretch—to do? Are you to 
appear among the Argives, decked out with my 
weapons? 
If we understand this exchange to be little more than an effective bluff, then we are left with the 
conclusion that Philoctetes must accompany his bow to Troy. This is reaffirmed by Odysseus’ later 
claim that he will forcibly carry Philoctetes (who is now without his bow) to Troy: 
1296                     σάφ᾿ ἴσθι· καὶ πέλας γ᾿ ὁρᾷς, 
ὅς σ᾿ ἐς τὰ Τροίας πεδί᾿ ἀποστελῶ βίᾳ, 
ἐάν τ᾿ Ἀχιλλέως παῖς ἐάν τε μὴ θέλῃ. 
1296-8 
Know it well! And you see me nearby, me who will 
send you into the Trojan plain by force, whether 
the child of Achilles wants me to or not.  
Odysseus, it would seem, knows that Philoctetes and his bow must both be present at Troy, and he 
must also have known this from the start of the play. The different versions that he shares at 
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different points throughout the plot are simply his own estimations of the most expedient version to 
share at any given time, which is entirely unsurprising behavior for Odysseus.  
Backtracking a bit, we can trace Neoptolemus’ own understanding of this prophecy, which 
seems to be largely informed by what Odysseus has told him. Odysseus rightly understood that 
Neoptolemus would be much more willing to participate in this scheme if he stood to gain 
personally from the deception. Though Neoptolemus feels that deception is intrinsically 
dishonorable, he eventually succumbs to Odysseus’ persuasion because he feels that he stands to 
gain much more honor than he will lose. In terms of net honor, Odysseus succeeds in framing his 
plot as an overall gain. Neoptolemus’ reaction to the suggestion that he might receive a mere part 
of the glory suggests that he will not be receptive to this idea, which leads Odysseus to change the 
topic and avoid having to mention Philoctetes’ role in any greater detail. The suggestion certainly 
made an impression on Neoptolemus though, since the question of Philoctetes’ role informs his 
next mention of this prophecy, which comes when Neoptolemus is talking to the Chorus and 
preparing for his first encounter with Philoctetes.  
Here, Neoptolemus seems to have inferred a great deal on his own, based on what he has 
heard so far: 
196 
 
 
 
200 
οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς οὐ θεῶν του μελέτῃ  
τοῦ μὴ πρότερον τόνδ᾽ ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ  
τεῖναι τὰ θεῶν ἀμάχητα βέλη,  
πρὶν ὅδ᾽ ἐξήκοι χρόνος, ᾧ λέγεται  
χρῆναί σφ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶνδε δαμῆναι. 
196-200 
It is not possible that this is not done by the 
care of one of the gods, so that he does not 
aim the unconquerable arrows at Troy earlier 
than that time arrives, at which is it said that 
Troy is fated to be conquered by them.  
For this conclusion to make sense, Neoptolemus must have reached a series of intermediate 
conclusions. What he knows for sure up to this point is that the Greeks need to get Philoctetes’ bow 
(66-69) and that both Neoptolemus and the bow (but not necessarily Philoctetes) are needed for 
the capture of Troy (115). For Neoptolemus’ words here to make sense, the logical flow here must 
be something to the effect of: 
● The bow is invincible 
● The bow is necessary for Troy to fall 
● Philoctetes wields the bow and no one can take it from him in a fight (because it is 
invincible) 
● Philoctetes and the bow are, in effect, one entity 
● As long as Philoctetes is on this island, Troy cannot fall (because the bow cannot go to 
Troy) 
● Since Troy is fated to fall by the bow (and, by extension, Philoctetes), then Philoctetes must 
be a tool of fate and/or the gods and his delay here must be part of some divine plan for 
when Troy should fall. 
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This logical chain explains why Neoptolemus infers that Philoctetes’ sad plight is part of a divine 
plan and why he is no longer preoccupied with the question of whether Neoptolemus will be the 
only man necessary to capture Troy.  
As Odysseus realized would be necessary for his continued participation, Neoptolemus can 
continue to think that he will get all the glory. As noted earlier, Odysseus has conspicuously 
reiterated Neoptolemus’ own role in taking Troy every time that he is forced to share more about 
Philoctetes’ role. Odysseus clearly knows that the only reason Neoptolemus is willing to engage in 
behavior that he finds morally distasteful is because he thinks that he will gain more glory for 
himself by taking Troy than he will lose by engaging in deception. Odysseus cannot know how 
Neoptolemus values each quantity of glory, though, and any significant change to this equation 
could prove very risky. As such, Odysseus must be careful about asking Neoptolemus to engage in 
any more elaborate acts of deception and he must also be careful about revealing anything that will 
lessen how much glory Neoptolemus stands to gain from the Sack of Troy. By carefully managing 
the context in which Neoptolemus learns about any changes to this plan, Odysseus can make sure 
that Neoptolemus only learns small pieces of new information at one time. This allows him to 
control the balance of glory gained and glory lost (i.e., if he suggests that Philoctetes might get a 
little more glory than Neoptolemus initially thought, and Neoptolemus starts to balk at this plan, 
then Odysseus can adjust his strategy so as not to lose Neoptolemus’ cooperation completely). This 
also ensures that Neoptolemus only learns as much new information as he can rationalize at any 
one time. Although a severe, abrupt change in plans might be too much for Neoptolemus to 
rationalize effectively, he demonstrates that he is able to craft a new narrative that accounts for 
small changes to the facts as he knows them.  
It is precisely this process of rationalization that allows Neoptolemus to shift slowly toward 
accepting that Philoctetes will somehow be necessary.325 Although the Chorus does not share his 
opinion, Neoptolemus begins to think about alternatives that account for all the things he thinks he 
knows about the bow and Helenus’ prophecy. At this point, Neoptolemus begins to speak in 
                                                   
325 We should not discount his sympathy and pity for Philoctetes here. Neoptolemus is clearly uncomfortable with the 
deception and exploitation of Philoctetes, and this must make Neoptolemus more receptive to sharing glory with him. 
Giving Philoctetes some portion of glory would compensate him, in some sense, for his suffering and alleviate his pain. 
Neoptolemus’ noble character would, it seems, incline him to be more amenable to sharing glory in light of these 
considerations than he would otherwise be.  
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hexameters,326 indicating his own mental state, as he begins thinking about what the prophecy could 
actually say:  
 
840 
ἀλλ᾿ ὅδε μὲν κλύει οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὁρῶ οὕνεκα θήραν 
τήνδ᾿ ἁλίως ἔχομεν τόξων, δίχα τοῦδε πλέοντες. 
τοῦδε γὰρ ὁ στέφανος, τοῦτον θεὸς εἶπε κομίζειν. 
κομπεῖν δ᾿ ἔργ᾿ ἀτελῆ σὺν ψεύδεσιν αἰσχρὸν 
ὄνειδος. 
839-43 
Though he doesn’t hear anything, I see that we 
capture the prey that is the bow in vain, if we set 
sail without this man. For his is the garland, he 
whom the god said to bring. And it is a shameful 
reproach to boast about deeds that are not 
accomplished, with lies.   
Finally, we see the form of the prophecy that Neoptolemus has constructed.  
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ὅμως δὲ λέξω· Ζῆνα δ’ ὅρκιον καλῶ· 
καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐπίστω, καὶ γράφου φρενῶν ἔσω. 
σὺ γὰρ νοσεῖς τόδ’ ἄλγος ἐκ θείας τύχης, 
Χρύσης πελασθεὶς φύλακος, ὃς τὸν ἀκαλυφῆ 
σηκὸν φυλάσσει κρύφιος οἰκουρῶν ὄφις· 
καὶ παῦλαν ἴσθι τῆσδε μή ποτ’ ἂν τυχεῖν 
νόσου βαρείας, ἕως ἂν αὑτὸς ἥλιος 
ταύτῃ μὲν αἴρῃ, τῇδε δ’ αὖ δύνῃ πάλιν, 
πρὶν ἂν τὰ Τροίας πεδί’ ἑκὼν αὐτὸς μόλῃς, 
καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐντυχὼν Ἀσκληπιδῶν 
νόσου μαλαχθῇς τῆσδε, καὶ τὰ πέργαμα 
ξὺν τοῖσδε τόξοις ξύν τ’ ἐμοὶ πέρσας φανῇς. 
ὡς δ’ οἶδα ταῦτα τῇδ’ ἔχοντ’ ἐγὼ φράσω. 
ἀνὴρ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐκ Τροίας ἁλούς, 
Ἕλενος ἀριστόμαντις, ὃς λέγει σαφῶς 
ὡς δεῖ γενέσθαι ταῦτα· καὶ πρὸς τοῖσδ’ ἔτι, 
ὡς ἔστ’ ἀνάγκη τοῦ παρεστῶτος θέρους 
Τροίαν ἁλῶναι πᾶσαν· ἢ δίδωσ’ ἑκὼν 
κτείνειν ἑαυτόν, ἢν τάδε ψευσθῇ λέγων. 
ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐπεὶ κάτοισθα, συγχώρει θέλων. 
καλὴ γὰρ ἡ ’πίκτησις, Ἑλλήνων ἕνα 
κριθέντ’ ἄριστον, τοῦτο μὲν παιωνίας   
ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν, εἶτα τὴν πολύστονον 
Τροίαν ἑλόντα κλέος ὑπέρτατον λαβεῖν. 
1324-47 
Nevertheless, I will speak. I call on Zeus of Oaths. 
Know these things, and write them within your 
mind. For you suffer from this painful sickness 
from divine fortune, after you drew near to the 
guardian of Chryse, who defends the unroofed 
sanctuary, that hidden snake who keeps guard.  
And know that relief will never come to this painful 
disease, not while the same sun rises in this place, 
and sets again in that, until you come—yourself, of 
your own free will—to the Trojan plain and, when 
you meet the Asclepiades, who are with us, you are 
relieved of this disease, and—together with the 
bow and with me—you are shown to have sacked 
the towers. 
How I know these things are this way, I will tell 
you. For there is a man with us, captured from 
Troy, Helenus, the best of seers, who clearly says 
that these things must happen. And in addition to 
these things, he says that Troy will necessarily be 
taken completely in this present summer. 
Otherwise, he willingly gives himself to be killed, if 
he lied in speaking these words.  
Since, then, you know all this, concede willingly. 
Indeed, this further addition will be fine, to be 
distinguished as the best one of the Greeks! First, 
to come to healing hands, and then, after you take 
Troy, the cause of much groaning, to win the 
highest glory! 
All that Neoptolemus has heard about the prophecy up to this point has come from 
Odysseus and the false merchant. The account that he gives here includes many details whose 
origins are unclear. Neoptolemus has built on his earlier conclusion that the gods must have caused 
                                                   
326 Kitto suggests instead that the hexameters are Sophocles’ way of signaling the veracity of these lines. We should 
believe Neoptolemus’ argument at lines 839-42, he argues, because hexameters are the meter of oracles, and so the fact 
that Neoptolemus speaks in hexameters subtly signals to the audience that his words are true (Kitto 1956: 119). He is 
quite right to associate hexameters with oracles, but I maintain that he comes to the wrong conclusion about what this 
oracular meter indicates. Rather than conveying a message from Sophocles about these lines’ veracity, Neoptolemus’ 
use of hexameters here indicates that Neoptolemus is vouching for the prophetic legitimacy of these lines. That is to 
say, Neoptolemus switches into a weighty, prophetic meter because he thinks that he has determined the actual content 
of the prophecy (however, see the Introduction for a discussion of actual versus literary metrical conventions for 
oracles). Neoptolemus conveys his confidence through a metrical shift, but the audience can choose whether to see this 
as well-founded (or ill-founded) confidence.  
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Philoctetes to be bitten by a snake, and he has added several more details. Now, Neoptolemus is 
firmly convinced that Philoctetes’ only hope of a cure is to come to Troy, where Asclepius’ sons can 
heal him. This addition is at first unexpected, since the Asclepiades have not been mentioned 
before now. Further, we hear that Philoctetes must come of his own volition (ἑκὼν), something 
that did not seem important to Odysseus earlier, when he threatened to take Philoctetes by force. 
Further, Philoctetes will be considered the best of all the Greeks (Ἑλλήνων ἕνα κριθέντ᾽ ἄριστον, 
1344-5) and he will be an integral part of Troy’s capture, which will take place in the current 
summer (τοῦ παρεστῶτος θέρους). All of this is new information which is attributed to Helenus, 
but which Neoptolemus cannot have learned over the course of this play. 
Others have resolved this situation by simply writing it off as being for “dramatic effect” or 
an effective device for advancing the plot and building suspense. I do mean to deny that this scene 
does all of these things, but rather to suggest that—particularly given Sophocles’ pervasive interest 
in prophecy and oracles—we can and should scrutinize this speech more closely before concluding 
that it is merely a means to enhance dramatic effect. Further scrutiny leaves us with two possible 
explanations: either Neoptolemus has cause to believe that what he says here is true, or he has 
decided to present an argument that is designed to be as appealing and persuasive as possible to 
Philoctetes. On the latter reading, Neoptolemus has internalized the lessons from Odysseus and, 
while he has no way of knowing if what he says is true, he knows that Philoctetes will find the 
promise of this sort of immediate glory appealing, and so he shapes his account accordingly. This is, 
after all, the best possible outcome of the events in the play, and Philoctetes will get everything he 
could possibly want: healing, glory, rescue from Lemnos, and on top of everything else, 
Neoptolemus has upset Odysseus, which would appeal even more to Philoctetes. This explanation 
is a somewhat more cynical and pessimistic reading, but it is a reading that resonates deeply with 
the fears and anxieties in 5th century Athens. There are ample similar examples from a wide range 
of authors that depict a young, noble man being corrupted by an older, rhetorically savvy, morally 
ambiguous figure.327 While there is much to suggest that Neoptolemus is in fact virtuous and 
committed to an ethical approach in the second half of this play, the text does not preclude the 
possibility that Neoptolemus has carefully crafted his words here with his audience in mind.  
The more complicated reading here allows for an entirely virtuous Neoptolemus, as the rest 
                                                   
327 These anxieties were not limited to Socrates, but the charges brought against him, of corrupting the youth, certainly 
echo these concerns. 
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of the play would suggest. On that reading, Neoptolemus again reasons his way into an explanation 
which takes all the facts into account, and also accords with his own beliefs about the gods. On this 
reading, we begin with the things that Neoptolemus (trusting that Odysseus has not lied to him) 
knows about Helenus’ prophecy at this point in the play: 
1) The bow must come to Troy in order for Troy to be captured 
2) Philoctetes also must come to Troy in order for Troy to be captured (though it need 
not be of his own volition, since Odysseus was willing to take him by force) 
To this, we can add the things that Neoptolemus has already concluded on his own: 
3) The gods are responsible for Philoctetes’ infection and abandonment on Lemnos 
4) The gods have decreed that Troy will fall (at a determined time—this summer) 
To these facts, we should now add some fundamental beliefs that Neoptolemus seems to hold: 
5) Philoctetes’ wound is so extreme that an extreme cure (i.e. healers with special healing 
abilities) is necessary 
6) The gods are just and powerful 
7) The only acceptable outcome is one that is achieved through noble and honorable 
actions 
 
This allows Neoptolemus to draw a set of conclusions that form the basis of the prophecy he 
relates. The only way to fit all of these facts into one coherent narrative is to infer that if the gods 
have made Philoctetes into an agent of their own divine judgment of Troy, they ought surely to 
heal a man whose infection was a part of their divine plan. Though there is no evidence within the 
text of this play to suggest that the gods behave in the ways that Neoptolemus thinks they do, he 
nonetheless demonstrates a belief in a divinely-ordained world. The best possible way to make sense 
of the seven points above is to infer that the gods want Philoctetes to be healed (because they are 
just, and justice demands ending the pain they inflicted on Philoctetes), which can only happen at 
Troy (where the Asclepiades are), and that the gods want Troy to fall (because justice demands 
punishing Troy for Paris’ actions). In light of all this, the only morally good way to make all of these 
things happen is to persuade Philoctetes to come willingly. This leaves the issue of when these 
things will happen, which cannot be entirely rationalized in this way, but it is not a huge leap to 
assume that the prophecy will be fulfilled once the terms are met. That is to say, once Philoctetes is 
healthy and at Troy, with his invincible bow, then all the requisite elements are in place and Troy 
can be captured. If we understand τοῦ παρεστῶτος θέρους in the sense it occurs in Thucydides, 
as the campaigning season, we are left with a fairly innocuous assumption on Neoptolemus’ part: if 
you come with me (as I feel sure you will, since it accords with all these divine plans), Troy will fall 
in this season (i.e. pretty soon).  
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As I have suggested about the previous plays in this section, I do not think that there is a 
right or wrong interpretation here. Instead, I would like to focus on the ambiguity itself and suggest 
that it is purposeful, and that Sophocles is intentionally leaving this an open question. The more 
palatable reading here (though it requires quite a lot more interpretive work to make it logically 
coherent) is that Neoptolemus remains true to his straightforward, honest nature and resists the 
corrupting influence of Odysseus. This reading gains a great deal of support from the end of the 
play, in which Heracles appears and offers a divine perspective on the events that have transpired.  
In the only extant Sophoclean example of a deus ex machina, Heracles resolves the play’s 
conflict and in the process, clears up exactly what the future holds. Here, the information is not 
conveyed through Odysseus, so if we were looking for an accurate version of the prophecy, 
Heracles might be our best option, though he does not claim to be recounting what Helenus said. 
Nonetheless, we have an accurate account of the future, and we can assume (at a minimum) that 
whatever Helenus said does not contradict Heracles’ version: 
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καὶ σοί, σάφ’ ἴσθι, τοῦτ’ ὀφείλεται παθεῖν, 
ἐκ τῶν πόνων τῶνδ’ εὐκλεᾶ θέσθαι βίον. 
ἐλθὼν δὲ σὺν τῷδ’ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς τὸ Τρωικὸν 
πόλισμα πρῶτον μὲν νόσου παύσῃ λυγρᾶς, 
ἀρετῇ τε πρῶτος ἐκκριθεὶς στρατεύματος, 
Πάριν μέν, ὃς τῶνδ’ αἴτιος κακῶν ἔφυ, 
τόξοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι νοσφιεῖς βίου, 
πέρσεις τε Τροίαν, σκῦλά τ’ ἐς μέλαθρα σὰ 
πέμψεις, ἀριστεῖ’ ἐκλαβὼν στρατεύματος, 
Ποίαντι πατρὶ πρὸς πάτρας Οἴτης πλάκα. 
ἃ δ’ ἂν λάβῃς σὺ σκῦλα τοῦδε τοῦ στρατοῦ, 
τόξων ἐμῶν μνημεῖα πρὸς πυρὰν ἐμὴν 
κόμιζε. καὶ σοὶ ταὔτ’, Ἀχιλλέως τέκνον, 
παρῄνεσ’· οὔτε γὰρ σὺ τοῦδ’ ἄτερ σθένεις 
ἑλεῖν τὸ Τροίας πεδίον οὔθ’ οὗτος σέθεν 
ἀλλ’ ὡς λέοντε συννόμω φυλάσσετον 
οὗτος σὲ καὶ σὺ τόνδ’. ἐγὼ δ’ Ἀσκληπιὸν 
παυστῆρα πέμψω σῆς νόσου πρὸς Ἴλιον. 
τὸ δεύτερον γὰρ τοῖς ἐμοῖς αὐτὴν χρεὼν 
τόξοις ἁλῶναι. τοῦτο δ’ ἐννοεῖθ’, ὅταν  
πορθῆτε γαῖαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς· 
ὡς τἄλλα πάντα δεύτερ’ ἡγεῖται πατὴρ 
Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ηὑσέβεια συνθνῄσκει βροτοῖς· 
κἂν ζῶσι κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται. 
1421-1444 
And for you, know this well, it is owed to suffer this, 
and to make your life well-famed, from these 
sufferings. After you go with this man to the Trojan 
city, first you will be healed from your mournful 
disease, distinguished as the first in virtue out of the 
army, and Paris, who is the cause of these evils, you 
will rob him of life with my arrows, and you will sack 
Troy, and having received the best items from the 
army, you will send home spoils to your home, to the 
heights of Oeta, your fatherland, to your father 
Poeas.  
And those things you receive as spoils from that 
army, bring a remembrance of my bow to my pyre.  
And these things I counsel are for you also, child of 
Achilles. For you are not strong enough to take the 
Trojan plain without this man, nor him without you, 
but as two lions partnered, you must guard him and 
he must guard you. But I will send Asclepius to Troy 
for the healing of your sickness, for it is fated to be 
taken a second time by my arrows. And know this: 
when you sack the land, be pious toward the things 
of the gods, since Father Zeus considers all other 
things to be secondary to them. For piety does not 
die with mortals. Whether live or die, piety does not 
pass away. 
If we were not sure about what to make of Neoptolemus’ previous speech, he is now 
vindicated by the words of the divine Heracles. Though we cannot know with any certainty what 
Helenus did or did not say, since all of his words have been filtered through Odysseus, the best 
reading here seems to be that Heracles is transmitting a different yet complementary prophecy. On 
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several different points, Heracles echoes Neoptolemus’ words (shown below), suggesting that any 
inferences that Neoptolemus made on these points were correct, whether or not Helenus included 
any of them in his original prophecy.  
Neoptolemus Heracles 
κλέος (1347)  εὐκλεᾶ (1422) 
καὶ τοῖν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐντυχὼν Ἀσκληπίδαιν / 
νόσου μαλαχθῇς τῆσδε (1333-4) 
ἐγὼ δ᾽ Ἀσκληπιὸν / παυστῆρα πέμψω σῆς 
νόσου πρὸς Ἴλιον (1437-8) 
καὶ τὰ πέργαμα / ξὺν τοῖσδε τόξοις ξύν τ᾽ 
ἐμοὶ πέρσας φανῇς (1334-5) 
Cf. Odysseus: οὔτ᾽ ἂν σὺ κείνων χωρὶς οὔτ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνα σοῦ (115) 
οὔτε γὰρ σὺ τοῦδ᾽ ἄτερ σθένεις / ἑλεῖν τὸ 
Τροίας πεδίον οὔθ᾽ οὗτος σέθεν (1434-5) 
Ἑλλήνων ἕνα / κριθέντ᾽ ἄριστον (1344-5) ἀρετῇ τε πρῶτος ἐκκριθεὶς στρατεύματος 
(1425) 
Neoptolemus’ piety is even implicitly included here, since Heracles ends with an admonition for the 
men to sack Troy while remaining reverent toward the gods (εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεούς, 1441). 
Heracles does not confirm all of the elements of Neoptolemus’ speech, but he does confirm enough 
that it makes Neoptolemus seem credible and generally dissuades us from questioning the rest of 
his account.  
To conclude, I take no issue with the dominant interpretation of this play, in which 
Neoptolemus resists the corrupting influence of Odysseus and instead takes a noble, honest course 
of action which is sanctioned by Heracles at the end of the play. We must recognize, however, that 
when closely examined, this reading requires either that we suspend disbelief and overlook some 
apparently logical gaps in the play or that we impute a great number of logical assumptions to 
Neoptolemus. I tend to prefer the latter option. However, my particular interest is that by tracing 
the accounts of Helenus’ prophecy, a different interpretation is also available—this alternative 
version suggests a much more cynical understanding of the play. When an infallible prophecy is 
entrusted to a rhetorically skilled man with a flexible moral compass, such as Odysseus, tricks of 
language begin to obscure and corrupt the truth. While all is set right in the end, with the arrival of 
Heracles, Neoptolemus’ speech at 1324ff. hints at a different potential outcome. This alternative 
(unrealized) account taps into many of the deep social anxieties in Athens at the time when this play 
would have been performed—anxieties about sophists, moral relativism, rhetoric, and the 
deceptive power of language. These tensions appear throughout, and deception and language are a 
pervasive theme of the play as a whole, but the prophecy is a place where these issues intersect and 
have great import. As I have noted about the other plays in this chapter, the stakes of these sorts of 
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linguistic questions are simply higher with prophecy, and prophecy is a markedly different sort of 
speech which attracts particular attention because of that difference. Prophecy in a range of forms 
turns out to be an ideal place to explore questions of language, precisely because prophetic speech 
is always true in some sense, but it can nonetheless give a very misleading impression—the inverse 
of words in the hands of Hesiod’s Muses (Theog. 27-8) or a well-trained sophist. Examinations of 
rhetoric and prophecy pair nicely together.  
 
Building a Prophecy in the Oedipus at Colonus  
I have saved the Oedipus at Colonus for last because it is different from the rest of 
Sophocles’ plays in several ways. This is one of the few extant plays of Sophocles’ which can be said 
to have a happy ending (a distinction shared only with the Philoctetes), and several of the other 
differences are intrinsically connected to this fact. Oedipus is not at tragic odds with the gods in this 
play, but instead he is a man who is transitioning toward something more than human. His 
blindness connects him to Tiresias and to prophecy, but we will see that, at least in some ways, he 
actually surpasses Tiresias as a prophet over the course of this play, since his transition does not end 
with his role as a prophet. Instead, he ends this play as a hero who transcends his own mortality. 
This play, unlike all the other extant Sophoclean tragedies, highlights effective communication 
from the gods that is not vague, ambiguous, or misleading. As such, it is a fitting play to conclude 
this chapter, since it features a successful and effective counterexample to the failed divine 
communication that has occurred in the other plays I have examined here.  
Before beginning with literary analysis, it will be worth looking at the historical and 
biographical details of this play, at least briefly. This play, perhaps more than any other, invites us 
to make connections between the events of the play and the poet’s life. This may be because this is 
one of only two plays for which we have a reasonably secure date,328 but even without a date, the 
content of the play would allow for a great deal of biographical speculation. I do not intend to 
engage with the specific details of these arguments, or the overarching issue of how much we can 
trust the biographical tradition, but these debates necessarily complicate any attempt to make sense 
                                                   
328 Though the performance date of 401 BCE is secure, it should at least be acknowledged that the date of composition 
is far less secure. Suggested dates range from 411 BCE (Campbell 1891: 209) to his death in 406/5 BCE. Though 
imprecise, there is nonetheless widespread consensus that the play was composed between 409 and 406 BCE. 
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of this play.329 This play is also the last of Sophocles’ plays, written late in his life, and it positions 
itself almost as a sequel to the Oedipus Tyrannus, though it is not exactly a sequel. These facts, 
especially when combined with the contemporary resonances for Athenian political and religious 
life, make for a complicated play that resists a simple interpretation. Further, since prophecies and 
oracles (and direct divine speech, as well as supernatural events) are woven throughout the entirety 
of this play, my analysis here will necessarily be longer and more chronological than the other 
sections of this chapter have been.  
 
Lines 84-110: A New Oedipus and a New Oracle 
A useful starting point will be the presence and impact of Apollo’s words throughout this 
text. Very early on, this play generally situates itself in relation to the Oedipus Tyrannus. Though 
this play is not properly a sequel to the Oedipus Tyrannus, this version of Oedipus calls to mind the 
Oedipus from the Oedipus Tyrannus, particularly when he addresses the Eumenides and asks for 
their cooperation in fulfilling Apollo’s oracle—a particularly detailed and elaborate oracle: 
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110 
ὦ πότνιαι δεινῶπες, εὖτε νῦν ἕδρας 
πρώτων ἐφ’ ὑμῶν τῆσδε γῆς ἔκαμψ’ ἐγώ, 
Φοίβῳ τε κἀμοὶ μὴ γένησθ’ ἀγνώμονες, 
ὅς μοι, τὰ πόλλ’ ἐκεῖν’ ὅτ’ ἐξέχρη κακά, 
ταύτην ἔλεξε παῦλαν ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ, 
ἐλθόντι χώραν τερμίαν, ὅπου θεῶν 
σεμνῶν ἕδραν λάβοιμι καὶ ξενόστασιν,  
ἐνταῦθα κάμψειν τὸν ταλαίπωρον βίον, 
κέρδη μὲν οἰκήσαντα τοῖς δεδεγμένοις, 
ἄτην δὲ τοῖς πέμψασιν, οἵ μ’ ἀπήλασαν· 
σημεῖα δ’ ἥξειν τῶνδέ μοι παρηγγύα, 
ἢ σεισμόν, ἢ βροντήν τιν’, ἢ Διὸς σέλας.  
ἔγνωκα μέν νυν ὥς με τήνδε τὴν ὁδὸν 
οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως οὐ πιστὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν πτερὸν 
ἐξήγαγ’ ἐς τόδ’ ἄλσος. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε 
πρώταισιν ὑμῖν ἀντέκυρσ’ ὁδοιπορῶν, 
νήφων ἀοίνοις, κἀπὶ σεμνὸν ἑζόμην  
βάθρον τόδ’ ἀσκέπαρνον. ἀλλά μοι, θεαί, 
βίου κατ’ ὀμφὰς τὰς Ἀπόλλωνος δότε 
πέρασιν ἤδη καὶ καταστροφήν τινα, 
εἰ μὴ δοκῶ τι μειόνως ἔχειν, ἀεὶ 
μόχθοις λατρεύων τοῖς ὑπερτάτοις βροτῶν.  
ἴτ’, ὦ γλυκεῖαι παῖδες ἀρχαίου Σκότου, 
ἴτ’, ὦ μεγίστης Παλλάδος καλούμεναι 
πασῶν Ἀθῆναι τιμιωτάτη πόλις, 
οἰκτίρατ’ ἀνδρὸς Οἰδίπου τόδ’ ἄθλιον 
εἴδωλον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γ’ ἀρχαῖον δέμας. 
84-110 
Dread-eyed goddesses, since the first place in this 
land where I have bent my knee is your seat, do not 
be unkind to me and Phoebus—who, when he 
prophesied those many terrible evils, he told me 
that this would be my resting place, after a long 
stretch of time, for me when I came to the land that 
would be my final home, where I would find a seat 
of the Semnai Theai, a refuge for foreigners, and 
there I will round the final bend of my long-
suffering life, dwelling as a benefit to those who 
welcomed me, but destruction for those who sent 
me off, who drove me away. He shared this with 
me, that there will be signs of these things, either 
an earthquake or some sort of thunder, or the 
lightning of Zeus. Now I recognize that along this 
journey, some trusty omen from you has assuredly 
led me to this grove. For I would never have met 
you first, otherwise, in my travels—me, sober, and 
you, who are without wine, and I would never have 
sat on this sacred seat which is unworked by men. 
Then, goddesses, in accordance with the words of 
Apollo, give me some end and some closure to my 
life. Unless I seem in some way to be of less worth, 
toiling ever in my woes which are the most extreme 
of all mortals.  
Come, sweet children of ancient darkness! Come, 
you who are called Athens, after Pallas, the most 
honored city of all, take pity on this wretched shade 
                                                   
329 See Markanantos 2007: 1-21 and 30ff. in the context of this play. See also Scodel 2012 on Sophocles’ biography 
more generally.  
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of the man Oedipus. For this is indeed not the 
former body of mine.  
The audience, at this point, must determine how closely this play relates to the Oedipus 
Tyrannus. On the one hand, Oedipus describes his past woes in a way that certainly suggests a 
connection, with τὰ πόλλ᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἐξέχρη κακά (87), but this oracle is fundamentally 
incompatible with the story of the Oedipus Tyrannus. This oracle is worded in a clear and readily 
intelligible way, which already distinguishes it from Apollo’s oracles in the Oedipus Tyrannus. 
Further, it would be almost impossibly strange to think that Oedipus received this additional 
oracular information and yet somehow omitted it completely for the entirety of the Oedipus 
Tyrannus.  
I point these inconsistencies out, not in the interest of pedantically criticizing these lines, but 
rather to highlight the interpretive decisions that the audience needs to make at the start of this 
play. How much of this Oedipus’ backstory can they supply from the Oedipus Tyrannus? How 
many of Sophocles’ mythological innovations should be assumed at the play’s open?330 What sort of 
relationship should we imagine between this Oedipus and this Apollo? Does Oedipus still think that 
Apollo has brought about his terrible fate? Does he feel any sort of antipathy toward the god?  
To return to the prophecy, we can see that Apollo seems to have told Oedipus about this 
respite (ταύτην παῦλαν, 88), which will involve “a seat of the Semnai Theai, a refuge for 
foreigners, and there I will round the final bend of my long-suffering life, dwelling as a benefit to 
those who welcomed me, but destruction for those who sent me off, who drove me away.” This 
παῦλαν will be accompanied with some sort of sign from Zeus (earthquake, thunder, lightning). 
Oedipus concludes that his presence in the grove of the Eumenides, on the prophesied seat, means 
that he has found his final resting place. He then beseeches the Eumenides to give him some sort of 
πέρασιν and καταστροφήν of his life, according to Apollo’s proclamations (κατ᾽ ὀμφὰς τὰς 
Ἀπόλλωνος, 102), unless he does not seem worthy of their blessing, since he has been brought 
low by his trials and misfortunes (εἰ μὴ δοκῶ τι μειόνως ἔχειν, ἀεὶ / μόχθοις λατρεύων τοῖς 
ὑπερτάτοις βροτῶν, 104-5).  
We have, then, the basic terms of this oracle, but we must immediately address the tension 
here between the authority and power of the Eumenides and Apollo. If Apollo says that Oedipus 
                                                   
330 See Markantonatos 2007: 21ff.  on the degree of innovation which this play may involve (with bibliography). I tend 
to think that a great deal of this plot is Sophoclean innovation, though as Scodel 1984: 107 notes, the legend is not 
entirely unattested, as it is mentioned at Eur. Phoen. 1705–7 (though the authenticity of these lines has been 
questioned). 
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will reach the final turn of his life (ἔλεξε…ἐνταῦθα κάμψειν τὸν ταλαίπωρον βίον, 88, 91), then 
perhaps the cooperation of the Eumenides is not necessary. However, it seems that the cooperation 
of the Eumenides is very much necessary, given how much Oedipus tries to ingratiate himself to 
them. It is worth noting here that, as in so many other oracles that I have examined in this chapter, 
the actual terms of this oracle do not prove particularly important. This play serves to establish 
Oedipus as a cult hero and to provide an aetiology for his connection to the Eumenides—though 
the details of this connection are not entirely clear,331 the audience could well have assumed that 
Oedipus would find favor with the Eumenides throughout the course of this play. The question of 
the play, then, becomes one of how he would find that favor. 
That being said, it is still worth exploring how Oedipus presents Apollo’s oracle, since there 
is no reason why Apollo and the Eumenides need ever have been in tension. Lines 101-5 highlight 
these competing sources of authority, lest we overlook this potential source of conflict. How, then, 
to make sense of this strange oracular formulation? A possible solution here is to understand Apollo 
as offering a sort of oracular conditional: if you are accepted in death in the grove of the Eumenides 
(as further terms, we might specify “if the Eumenides allow it” and “if the Athenians allow it”), 
then you will bless that land and curse Thebes. On this reading, we must understand ἐλθόντι (89) 
and in particular οἰκήσαντα (92) as circumstantial participles with conditional force.332 This 
requires moving away from a more temporal reading, as we see in both Jebb’s “on reaching my 
goal in a land…there I should close my weary life, with profit, through my having fixed my abode 
there, for those who received me” and Lloyd-Jones’ “when I came to the land that was my final 
bourne…I should there reach the goal of my long-suffering life, bringing advantage by my 
settlement to those who had received me.” Instead, we must understand this to mean something 
more akin to “if I came to my ultimate land . . .there I would cross the finish line of my long-
suffering life, a profit to those who accepted me, if I made my home there.”  
As I noted above, this all proves to be a moot point, since all these things do happen, as 
                                                   
331 See Scodel 2006 on the cult worship at Colonus. The Semnai Theai were undoubtedly worshipped there, though 
she notes that the religious lore was likely obscure to the audience of this play. She concludes that it “is thus likeliest 
that Sophocles combined a local legend of Oedipus' death with a local cult of the Semnai, deliberately evoking the 
more famous cult of the Areopagus” (Scodel 2006: 73).  
332 This reading is not dependent on a conditional sense for ἐλθόντι, but really only οἰκήσαντα, though the χώραν 
τερμίαν does seem at least somewhat contingent on the Eumenides and the Athenians allowing it to be τερμίαν for 
Oedipus. That can be satisfactorily resolved by understanding τερμίαν to be proleptic, as Jebb suggests (ad loc.), but a 
conditional reading provides a reading that is at least as good, if not better, and which provides a certain symmetry with 
a conditional οἰκήσαντα. 
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Apollo’s oracular prediction suggested that they would. Before moving on, however, I would like to 
note a few things about this presentation of Apollo’s oracle. First, we have several terms that are 
best understood proleptically. The setting of this opening scene is a location that is described as 
τερμίαν (89) and a ξενόστασιν (90). From the very opening scene, this play is oriented toward its 
inevitable outcome, in which the land will be Oedipus’ final resting place.  
Second, as scholars have noted,333 this play is steeped in intertextuality. The most obvious 
intertext is Oedipus Tyrannus (and, to a lesser degree, Antigone), to which I will return. It is also 
worth noting that this play is situated mythologically before Aeschylus’ Eumenides, though it was 
staged chronologically after. This means that, although the audience was undoubtedly familiar with 
the plot of Aeschylus’ Eumenides, in the mythical world of this play, the Eumenides are not yet 
integrated into the Athenian cult landscape. In light of this, it is curious that they are named as τὰς 
πάνθ᾽ ὁρώσας Εὐμενίδας at line 42, though the Stranger does concede that they go by other 
names elsewhere (ἄλλα δ᾽ ἀλλαχοῦ καλά, 43). As the potential conflict between Apollo and the 
Eumenides does not ever materialize, we are also reminded of Aeschylus’ version. A mythical 
generation or two before Orestes, Colonus already seems to have domesticated or somehow 
appeased the Semnai Theai. While Colonus is clearly associated closely with Athens in this play, the 
role of the Eumenides here raises interesting intertextual questions.334  
As a final point, we have a very different sort of oracle than we saw in the Oedipus 
Tyrannus. Returning to the question of intertextuality, I would like to suggest that we may not have 
a different oracle, per se, but rather a different Oedipus. Oedipus is at the edge of death (a liminal 
place in which prophetic powers often appear), and due to his imminent apotheosis as well as his 
characterization as a prophet throughout this play (e.g., 452-4, 1075, 1080, 1425, 1516, et al.), 
Oedipus is no longer fully mortal. As a prophet of sorts, he does not have any trouble interpreting 
oracles, which is to be expected from a prophet. In this sense, this version of Oedipus is not 
incompatible with the Oedipus of the Oedipus Tyrannus, though the differences between the two 
versions of Oedipus are striking, as they were surely meant to be. For my purposes, the most 
significant difference between the two Oedipuses is found in an examination of how Oedipus 
interprets and interacts with the oracles that occur throughout this play. 
                                                   
333 See chiefly Markantonatos 2002 and 2007.  
334 On this point, see Scodel 2006. Sophocles is not overtly challenging Aeschylus’ account, but his account does 
obviate and undermine the events of the Eumenides. If the Semnai Theai are already worshipped in Colonus, then the 
appeasement of the Furies and the establishment of the Areopagus is less significant.  
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Lines 335-420: Ismene and the New Oracles 
It is with Ismene’s arrival that we see a new oracle introduced. She brings τοῖς νὺν 
μαντεύμασιν (387). The content of these latest oracles is: 
389 
 
392 
σὲ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ζητητὸν ἀνθρώποις ποτὲ 
θανόντ’ ἔσεσθαι ζῶντά τ’ εὐσοίας χάριν… 
ἐν σοὶ τὰ κείνων φασὶ γίγνεσθαι κράτη. 
389-90, 392 
That you will one day be sought after by the 
people there, dead and living, for the sake of 
their safety… 
They say that their power will rest in you.  
 
Here, we start to see the content of these oracles, though we also see the same convoluted 
transmission process that has occurred with oracles in other plays (in particular, the Ajax, where 
the line between Calchas’ prophetic words and the words of the messenger is not at all clear). The 
subject of φασὶ remains ambiguous, as does the referent of κείνων. Jebb understands φασὶ as an 
impersonal “it is said,” and Lloyd-Jones’ “they say that their power will depend on you” retains a 
great deal of the ambiguity in the English. If there is a specific subject, the options would seem to 
be the θεωροί who conveyed these prophecies (introduced grammatically only at 413, but already 
known to Ismene, and perhaps supplied by her), οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι (presumably the Theban 
people as a whole), or (admittedly, less likely) just Creon and Eteocles or even Eteocles and 
Polynices. To further complicate the line, the use of κείνων instead of ἑαυτῶν should mean that it 
refers to a different group of people than the subject of φασὶ, and to complicate it yet further still, 
οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι holds two different possibilities with it, since it could refer to the Theban people 
now, or the future Thebans. I do not know of any parallels which would indicate whether “current 
Thebans” and “future Thebans” are grammatically felt to be different enough that one could be 
the subject of φασὶ and the other could be the referent of κείνων (in which case, the sentence 
could read “The current Thebans say that the power of the future Thebans will depend on you”). 
Context suggests that the only options for a referent here are οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι (present and 
future) and Creon and Eteocles. This generates ten possible combinations for this single line (I have 
omitted the groups of Thebans, future and present, but their inclusion would increase the number 
to fourteen): 
 
Subject of φασὶ Referent of κείνων 
Impersonal οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι 
Eteocles and Polynices 
Creon and Eteocles 
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Θεωροί οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι 
Eteocles and Polynices 
Creon and Eteocles 
οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι 
Eteocles and Polynices 
Creon and Eteocles 
Creon and Eteocles οἱ ἐκεῖ ἅνθρωποι 
Eteocles and Polynices 
Creon and Eteocles 
I tend to think that Ismene means that the μαντεύματα (or perhaps the θεωροί — she 
does not seem to make a distinction between the two) say that the power of Creon and Eteocles 
depends on Oedipus, simply based on context. The language allows for many other interpretations 
though, and we cannot definitively rule any of these out, except for the two that are disqualified on 
grammatical grounds (they are crossed out above). As with so much of this play, however, the 
audience might well hear this line and understand it to be about Thebes as a whole, since that 
would be a far more politically resonant meaning for fifth-century Athenians. However, the 
linguistic and grammatical details have no bearing on the plot of the play and this complicated line 
can be glossed over, in large part. The specifics will, in the end, turn out to be somewhat 
unimportant. It is enough to know that someone said that Thebes’ power will depend on Oedipus’ 
grave. On those grounds, it is tempting to conclude that any close scrutiny of the language here is 
irrelevant, since the play’s plot ignores these questions. However, Sophocles’ language is precise 
and careful and, in other contexts, he consciously and carefully deploys verbal ambiguity. It would 
be foolish to think that this ambiguity is included accidentally or haphazardly, simply because the 
plot does not hinge on the proper interpretation of these words. As with the other ambiguous 
prophecies, a part of Sophocles’ interest seems to be in exactly how language gives rise to 
ambiguity and how people then make sense of that ambiguity (a kind of unfolding and refolding of 
potential meanings that takes place at the intersection of syntactic and pragmatic conventions).  
At this point, it is unclear how much of the oracle Oedipus actually understands. Ismene 
has told him that Thebes will want him θανόντ᾽ … ζῶντά τ᾽ εὐσοίας χάριν. Oedipus seems not 
to have fully grasped the import of the oracle, since his response (τίς δ᾽ ἂν τοιοῦδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς εὖ 
πράξειεν ἄν;) picks up on the agency suggested by εὐσοίας χάριν. To have such agency, he 
thinks, he must surely be alive. This exchange as a whole does not flow very smoothly unless we 
supply some additional content to make sense of this exchange, as Oedipus seems to realize that 
this oracle has more to do with his death than his life. This process begins at line 393 (ὅτ᾽ οὐκέτ᾽ 
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εἰμί, τηνικαῦτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ εἴμ᾽ ἀνήρ;), which must be understood as a concise expression of a much 
longer mental process. We should understand that line to be expressing something akin to: “Ah, 
hang on, you mentioned ‘they’ll want you dead…’ (σὲ τοῖς ζητητὸν ἀνθρώποις ποτὲ / 
θανόντ’). So, all of this is about me, but once I’m dead? I’ll be man indeed, once I no longer 
exist?” His concern cannot stem from fear or surprise about his death, since he is well aware that 
his death is imminent. Instead, his concern must stem either from alarm at the possibility of not 
dying where Apollo foretold or (and this option seems more likely, given the context here and his 
mention of being an ἀνήρ) that if he only achieves glory after he is dead, then it will not actually 
benefit him in any way. To this, Ismene’s response (νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ᾽ ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ᾽ 
ὤλλυσαν) must be understood as a similarly condensed expression that conveys a more elaborate 
message of this sort: “Yes, and this doesn’t diminish your role or your honor—you are and will be 
an honored man. Don’t despair. Things are turning around for you—this is good news!” Oedipus 
has a better understanding of the prophecy at this point, but there is still a great deal that he does 
not know about these new prophecies from Apollo.  
As Ismene shares more about this prophecy, she blurs the line between the oracle—which, 
presumably, she transmits verbatim—and her own interpretations and observations. She goes on to 
tell Oedipus what events are about to transpire and specifies that Creon will arrive soon, with the 
intention of controlling Oedipus’ grave without allowing him back into his homeland. This is not a 
part of the oracle, but is the proposed Theban response to the content of the oracle (τούτων 
χάριν): 
396 
 
 
399 
καὶ μὴν Κρέοντά γ’ ἴσθι σοι τούτων χάριν 
ἥξοντα βαιοῦ κοὐχὶ μυρίου χρόνου.  
… 
ὥς σ’ ἄγχι γῆς στήσωσι Καδμείας, ὅπως 
κρατῶσι μὲν σοῦ, γῆς δὲ μὴ ’μβαίνῃς ὅρων. 
396-7, 399-400 
Know that because of these things, Creon will 
come to you soon, not after a long time 
… 
So they can place you near the Cadmean land, so 
they can control you, but you will not cross over 
the boundaries of the land 
Here, she provides the Theban solution to the (not yet fully explained) terms of the oracle: the 
Thebans will attempt to put Oedipus near Thebes so they can control him without him actually 
being in Thebes. All that Oedipus has heard so far is that he will be ζητητὸν (both in life and 
death) and that some sort of power will depend on him (ἐν σοὶ). He has, quite naturally, concluded 
that Thebes will want to possess his body—what other outcome would result from them seeking 
him for the power that rests with him? Ismene has to clarify that Thebes has a different plan. 
Oedipus here must reconsider what he thinks he knows, which we see playing out in line 401: ἡ δ᾽ 
ὠφέλησις τίς θύρασι κειμένου; “But what benefit is there from me laying in a foreign land?” is the 
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culmination of all the assumptions that Oedipus has made.  
To clear up this confusion, Ismene needs to elaborate further, and provide some of the 
details of the oracle that she has not yet shared. She explains that the issue is the safety of his tomb, 
not its possession. That is to say, his bones do not seem to be some sort of magical talisman that will 
keep Thebes safe and victorious by their presence in the city. Instead, the tomb needs to be 
protected from any sort of violation that could occur in the future: 
 
402 
 
 
 
 
405 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
410 
Ἰσμήνη 
κείνοις ὁ τύμβος δυστυχῶν ὁ σὸς βαρύς. 
Οἰδίπους 
κἄνευ θεοῦ τις τοῦτό γ’ ἂν γνώμῃ μάθοι. 
Ἰσμήνη 
τούτου χάριν τοίνυν σε προσθέσθαι πέλας 
χώρας θέλουσι, μηδ’ ἵν’ ἂν σαυτοῦ κρατοῖς.  
Οἰδίπους 
ἦ καὶ κατασκιῶσι Θηβαίᾳ κόνει; 
Ἰσμήνη 
ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐᾷ τοὔμφυλον αἷμά γ’, ὦ πάτερ.  
Οἰδίπους 
οὐκ ἆρ’ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ κρατήσωσίν ποτε. 
Ἰσμήνη 
ἔσται ποτ’ ἆρα τοῦτο Καδμείοις βάρος. 
Οἰδίπους 
ποίας φανείσης, ὦ τέκνον, συναλλαγῆς; 
Ἰσμήνη 
τῆς σῆς ὑπ’ ὀργῆς, σοῖς ὅταν στῶσιν τάφοις. 
402-411 
Ismene 
Your tomb, if it does not receive honors, will 
weigh heavy on them. 
Oedipus 
Someone might learn that just by using their 
brain, without the god. 
Ismene 
It is for this reason that they want to place you 
nearby their land, and not where you would 
control yourself. 
Oedipus 
Will they even cover me over in Theban dust? 
Ismene 
Kindred bloodshed does not allow it, father.  
Oedipus 
Then they will never control me! 
Ismene 
That will weight heavy on the Cadmeans. 
Oedipus 
When what conjuncture has come to light, 
child? 
Ismene 
By your anger, when they come up against your 
tomb! 
Ismene has begun by redirecting the attention to his tomb—if his tomb is not honored properly 
and does not receive due rites (ὁ τύμβος δυστυχῶν), then it will be a serious problem for the 
Thebans (ὁ σὸς βαρύς). Oedipus here assumes that his body will now be interred in Thebes, as 
Jebb notes.335 Oedipus is unconcerned that this conflicts directly with the previous prophecy about 
finding his final resting place in the grove of the Eumenides, so long as this new oracle has come 
from Apollo. Apollo, it would seem, can overrule himself without any concerns about impiety. If 
Oedipus’ fate has changed, as Ismene has suggested that it has, then he can hope that perhaps he 
can return to Thebes after all. This must be the source of his confusion, since he cannot understand 
                                                   
335 Jebb (ad loc.) traces this process nicely: “He is thinking of a restoration to his Theban home (395) … ‘They will 
suffer,’ she replies, ‘if your tomb is neglected.’ Oedipus does not see the force of this answer: he still infers (from 
θανόντα in 390) that, whatever may be his doom in life, he is at least to be buried at Thebes…Remark that he was 
supposing Apollo’s former decree (91) to have been cancelled by this later one (389). He now sees that the new oracle 
does not cancel the former, but merely confirms it in one aspect, viz. in the promise of ἄτην δὲ τοῖς πέμψασιν (93).” 
 197 
what Thebes would stand to gain from merely burying him near Thebes, which would not fulfill the 
oracle as he understands it. Ismene recognizes his hope that he will return to Thebes, and gently 
introduces ὁ τύμβος, as a way of segueing into the news that he will never be able to return to the 
home from which he has been exiled.  
After the gentle mention of ὁ τύμβος, Oedipus points out that of course Thebes will have 
problems if his grave is mistreated. For Thebes to neglect the grave of their former king would be 
impious, but that impiety would only be compounded by Eteocles’ and Polynices’ failure to honor 
their father’s grave. He does not need a god to tell him what basic religious reverence dictates, he 
tells Ismene. Built into this rebuke, however, is his persistent assumption that his grave will be in 
Thebes. If Thebes is responsible for his grave, he reasons, then his grave must surely be in Thebes. 
Ismene must again intervene and point out that this is precisely why they want to bury him nearby, 
so they can oversee his grave and make sure that it is not defiled and that its rites are not neglected. 
In death, then, Oedipus would not be able to exact any sort of revenge on Thebes, which must 
surely be the implication of μηδ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἂν σαυτοῦ κρατοῖς (405). This exchange only properly 
makes sense if Oedipus’ wrath and even agency can be averted if Thebes protects and tends to 
Oedipus’ grave—the grave alone, not Oedipus’ shade.  
This is when Oedipus realizes that Thebes does not mean to bury him in his native soil (ἦ 
καὶ κατασκιῶσι Θηβαίᾳ κόνει;), which is prohibited by τοὔμφυλον αἷμά.336 Oedipus now 
realizes that Thebes is attempting only to control him and not to honor him—he refuses Thebes 
with the line οὐκ ἆρ᾽ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ κρατήσωσίν ποτε, drawing out the import of all this. Thebes is 
only concerned about controlling him, which he has now understood. This portion of the 
conversation comes almost full circle, as Ismene tell him that this will be Καδμείοις βάρος (409), 
which echoes her use of κείνοις…βαρύς at line 402. Finally, this piece of the puzzling oracle is 
clear.  
In this scene, Ismene explains this oracle in a very slow, piecemeal fashion. As traced in this 
passage, her assumptions and expectations are not the same as those of Oedipus. She knows the 
oracle and in her haste to share the most important elements of it, she omits relevant details. When 
                                                   
336 One might here note that this firm policy on τοὔμφυλον αἷμά does not get evenly applied to deaths in the 
Labdacid family, since Eteocles is not denied burial after he kills Polynices. There are, of course, many plausible 
reasons that might explain Creon’s apparent hypocrisy, and many other reasons why one should not treat separate 
tragedies as though they are part of one overarching, internally consistent mythic plot continuum. Leaving aside all 
these arguments, I will note only that neither Oedipus nor Ismene sees any problem with this claim about τοὔμφυλον 
αἷμά. 
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Oedipus misunderstands, she recognizes his (flawed) inferences and she corrects him, explaining 
what went wrong with his assumptions and guiding him to the correct interpretation. This is a rare 
moment when an oracle is accurately and effectively conveyed, and it stands in stark contrast to so 
many other instances of failed communication that surround oracles in Sophocles. We might think 
that this is really communication between two mortals, and effective communication is not so 
noteworthy when it involves two mortals, but in the lines which immediately follow this passage, 
this oracle is explicitly connected to Apollo and Delphi: 
 
412 
 
 
 
 
 
415 
Οἰδίπους 
ἃ δ’ ἐννέπεις, κλυοῦσα τοῦ λέγεις, τέκνον; 
Ἰσμήνη 
ἀνδρῶν θεωρῶν Δελφικῆς ἀφ’ ἑστίας. 
Οἰδίπους 
καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν Φοῖβος εἰρηκὼς κυρεῖ; 
Ἰσμήνη 
ὥς φασιν οἱ μολόντες ἐς Θήβης πέδον. 
412-5 
Oedipus 
These things you are saying…from whom did 
you learn what you’re saying, child?  
Ismene 
From men, theoroi; from the Delphic hearth.  
Oedipus 
And Phoebus really said these things about me? 
Ismene 
That’s what the men who came back to the 
Theban land say. 
This is precisely the sort of situation which, in the Oedipus Tyrannus, would complicate and foil 
effective communication. Oedipus and Apollo have a very different, more cooperative relationship 
in this play, however, which heightens the contrast between oracular communication in these two 
plays.  
As we move into the rest of this play, I will suggest that the critical difference is that 
Oedipus—nearing, as he is, the moment of his death—is moving toward a sort of superhuman 
status, and this is the reason that oracles are no longer so misleading for him. As I will show in the 
following passages, Oedipus regularly described as a prophet in this play. Unlike in the Oedipus 
Tyrannus, when Oedipus was overtly hostile to Tiresias and prophets in general, this Oedipus has 
become more like a prophet himself, and as a result, he is able to process and understand divine 
language in a way that only Sophoclean prophets (but not mere Sophoclean mortals) are able to 
do. 
Oedipus, Prophecy, and Curses 
There is ample speculation about what meaning we should take from the end of the play. 
Was Oedipus apotheosized? Did he die? While I do not intend to stake a firm claim on these 
questions, it is worth noting a few uncontroversial things about the Oedipus myth. We know that 
Oedipus received hero cult and that he was closely associated with the Eumenides, though this is 
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only attested at the Areopagus.337 It is clear, however, that a superhuman Oedipus is not without 
precedent.  
In the context of this play, Oedipus is more explicitly likened to a prophet. His tomb will 
have some sort of protective power, but while he lives, he is described as having special interpretive 
powers. First, Oedipus describes himself as τῆσδέ τε / μαντεῖ᾿ ἀκούων and συννοῶν τε 
θέσφατα παλαίφαθ᾿ (452-4). Later, Oedipus describes himself with προμνᾶταί (1075) and 
μάντις εἴμ᾿ ἐσθλῶν ἀγώνων (1080), in addition to disavowing any accusations that he might be a 
ψευδόμαντις (1095). Further, Antigone refers to Oedipus’ words with μαντεύμαθ᾿ (1425) as well 
as ἐθέσπισεν (1428). Finally, Oedipus is able to recognize the sign that his death approaches (τοῦ 
μόρου τεκμηρίῳ, 1510), which he describes as coming from the gods themselves (αὐτοὶ θεοὶ 
κήρυκες ἀγγέλλουσί μοι, / ψεύδοντες οὐδὲν σῆμα τῶν προκειμένων, 1511-2), and which 
consist of thunder and lightning coming directly from Zeus (1514-5). Finally, Theseus describes 
Oedipus with πολλὰ γάρ σε θεσπίζονθ᾽ ὁρῶ (1516).  
Taken together, we have a picture of Oedipus as both a seer in the older mode, as an 
interpreter of natural signs (thunder and lightning), as well as an interpreter of oracles and a giver 
of prophecy. Whatever interpretive failings he may have had earlier in his life, Oedipus now has 
clear access to a wide range of communications from the gods. We might be tempted to argue that 
this Oedipus is simply a different Oedipus character from the Oedipus of the Oedipus Tyrannus, 
and his ability to effectively understand divine communication is not so much a departure from his 
younger self as simply a feature of an entirely different character. As I noted earlier, questions of 
continuity and intertextuality are difficult to answer definitively, but I have argued, and will 
continue to argue, that this new and different Oedipus is the result of his proximity to death. He 
can understand oracles now because he is at the end of his life, which gives him a prophetic power. 
To strengthen this reading, I would like to examine another sort of speech which is also common 
among people nearing their deaths—curses. That Oedipus can not only interpret divine 
communication but also invoke curses suggests that his relationship to language has transcended 
that of a normal mortal in a way that is characteristic of people in the liminal space between life and 
death (cf. Heracles at the end of the Trachiniae).  
At lines 1370-1396, Oedipus curses his sons with the following speech, which provides the 
                                                   
337 For an overview of potential cult associations of Oedipus (though one which supposes a broader cultic range than 
what I am convinced of), see Edmunds 1981. See also Henrichs 1993.  
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standard mythological precedent for the story of the Seven against Thebes: 
1370 
 
 
 
 
1375 
 
 
1380 
 
 
 
 
1385 
 
 
 
 
1390 
 
 
 
τοιγάρ σ’ ὁ δαίμων εἰσορᾷ μὲν οὔ τί πω 
ὡς αὐτίκ’, εἴπερ οἵδε κινοῦνται λόχοι 
πρὸς ἄστυ Θήβης. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὅπως πόλιν 
κείνην ἐρείψεις, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αἵματι 
πεσῇ μιανθεὶς χὠ ξύναιμος ἐξ ἴσου. 
τοιάσδ’ ἀρὰς σφῷν πρόσθε τ’ ἐξανῆκ’ ἐγὼ 
νῦν τ’ ἀνακαλοῦμαι ξυμμάχους ἐλθεῖν ἐμοί, 
… 
τοιγὰρ τὸ σὸν θάκημα καὶ τοὺς σοὺς θρόνους  
κρατοῦσιν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίφατος 
Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίοις νόμοις. 
σὺ δ’ ἔρρ’ ἀπόπτυστός τε κἀπάτωρ ἐμοῦ, 
κακῶν κάκιστε, τάσδε συλλαβὼν ἀράς, 
ἅς σοι καλοῦμαι, μήτε γῆς ἐμφυλίου  
δόρει κρατῆσαι μήτε νοστῆσαί ποτε 
τὸ κοῖλον Ἄργος, ἀλλὰ συγγενεῖ χερὶ 
θανεῖν κτανεῖν θ’ ὑφ’ οὗπερ ἐξελήλασαι. 
τοιαῦτ’ ἀρῶμαι, καὶ καλῶ τὸ Ταρτάρου 
στυγνὸν πατρῷον ἔρεβος, ὥς σ’ ἀποικίσῃ, 
καλῶ δὲ τάσδε δαίμονας, καλῶ δ’ Ἄρη 
τὸν σφῷν τὸ δεινὸν μῖσος ἐμβεβληκότα. 
1370-92 
Therefore, the god looks at you, not yet how he will 
soon, if these troops move toward the Theban city. 
For it is not possible that you will topple that city, 
but before that you will fall, stained with bloodshed, 
and your kindred brother just the same. I hurled 
these curses at you before, and I call them down to 
be my allies now… 
Therefore, these [sc. curses] overpower your 
supplication and your thrones, if in fact justice is 
seated with Zeus, according to the ancient customs. 
But you, be gone, spat out by your father, and 
fatherless now, vilest of the vile, taking these curses 
with you, which I invoke upon you, that you never 
conquer your native land with the spear and you 
never return home to low-lying Argos, but you die 
by kindred hand and kill the one by whom you were 
driven out. I pray such things, and I call on the 
hostile paternal shadows of Tartarus, that it might 
resettle you there. I call on these goddesses, and I 
call on Ares, who cast this terrible hatred into you 
both.  
This passage walks a fine line between a curse and a prophecy. Oedipus presents it very much as a 
curse, using ἀραί (1375, 1384) and ἀράομαι (1389) rather than a more neutral word to describe 
his utterances. To emphasize this vocabulary further, even though Ἄρης is not necessarily 
etymologically related to ἀραί, the use of Ἄρη at 1391 echoes these curse words and highlights 
that in this instance, his ἀραί will turn into Ἄρης.  
However, what Oedipus calls curses are instead described by Antigone as prophecies 
(μαντεύμαθ᾿ at 1425), and Polynices’ response features another instance of etymological play. 
Though he refers only to Oedipus’ wish or desire (χρῄζει, 1426), χρῄζω is etymologically related 
to χράω and at least one ancient thought that χρῄζει should be understood as χρησμῳδεῖ here.338 
He does not explicitly call Oedipus’ words a prophecy, but there are clear echoes of prophetic 
language here. Antigone reiterates this language in her response, referring to Oedipus’ words as οἷ᾿ 
ἐθέσπισεν (1428). 
This distinction persists, with some variation, throughout the rest of Antigone’s 
conversation with Polynices. He maintains that he has no option but to lead an army against 
Thebes, knowing full well that it will mean his death. Though Antigone attempts to dissuade him, 
lamenting that he is rushing off to a foreseen death (ὁρμώμενον / εἰς προὖπτον Ἅιδην, 1439-40) 
                                                   
338 See schol. vet. ad 1426: χρῄζει ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ χρησμῳδεῖ. It is also worth noting that χρῄζω is used once, by 
Euripides, as a by-form of χράω, at Hel. 516 (of Theonoe). 
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and at least implying that he might be able to avoid this fate if he acts differently, she cannot prevail 
upon him. His language here moves from εἰ χρή (1441) to ἃ μὴ δεῖ (1442) to ἐν τῷ δαίμονι 
(1443)—to Polynices, this is an outcome which he is powerless to avoid.  
I have no interest in delving into the always sticky, insoluble question of fate and free will, 
but I am interested in the two distinct descriptions used for Oedipus’ words. Prophecies and curses 
are both powerful types of language, and the two seem to merge into one in the form of Oedipus, 
as he approaches death. He utters a curse and then, as the play progresses, is seen to have 
prophesied the curse’s fulfillment. It can be no mere coincidence that this extraordinarily powerful 
command of language occurs to a character who had so famously been a victim of language. This 
play offers a sort of redemption for Oedipus’ character and it is entirely appropriate that his heroic 
end features a linguistic heroism that represents an inversion of his linguistically-tragic past.  
 
602ff.: Oedipus Triumphant 
Before returning to the oracle(s) woven through this play, let us briefly recap which details 
have already been revealed.  
Oedipus has been told (by Apollo) that he will 
A. die in a place sacred to the Eumenides, where he will  
B. benefit the people of the land where he dies and  
C. bring ruin to those who exiled him 
 
Further, Apollo told him that  
D. there will be signs of these things (σημεῖα δ᾽ ἥξειν τῶνδέ, 94). 
 
Once Ismene arrives, Oedipus learns that messengers were told (also by Apollo) that 
Oedipus will be desired by the Thebans because 
E. The safety of Thebes will depend on him because 
F. Thebes will suffer if they attack the land in which Oedipus’ tomb resides (σοῖς 
ὅταν στῶσιν τάφοις, 411) 
With that in mind, let us now turn to the conversation between Oedipus and Theseus. 
Theseus is initially quite sympathetic to Oedipus’ plight, since Theseus too lived a great deal of his 
life in exile from his homeland. It is only when Oedipus explains that he is asking for burial in 
Attica, but that his request is actually a somewhat bigger request than it initially seems, that 
Oedipus explains the full significance of the oracles to Theseus. This is not, however, just a 
recapitulation of what we have already heard. Instead, Oedipus adds more information about the 
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oracles: 
616 
 
 
 
620 
καὶ ταῖσι Θήβαις εἰ τανῦν εὐημερεῖ 
καλῶς τὰ πρὸς σέ, μυρίας ὁ μυρίος 
χρόνος τεκνοῦται νύκτας ἡμέρας τ’ ἰών, 
ἐν αἷς τὰ νῦν ξύμφωνα δεξιώματα 
δόρει διασκεδῶσιν ἐκ σμικροῦ λόγου· 
ἵν’ οὑμὸς εὕδων καὶ κεκρυμμένος νέκυς 
ψυχρός ποτ’ αὐτῶν θερμὸν αἷμα πίεται, 
εἰ Ζεὺς ἔτι Ζεὺς χὠ Διὸς Φοῖβος σαφής. 
616-23 
If things are now friendly and fine between you 
and Thebes, a great stretch of time brings forth 
many days and nights, as it passes, in which they 
will break asunder the harmonious pledges on 
some minor account. And then, my sleeping and 
buried corpse, cold by then, will drink their 
warm blood, if Zeus is yet Zeus and his son 
Phoebus is unerring. 
Here, we see a synthesis of at least five of the six points laid out above. Though the oracle 
that the Thebans received suggests that Oedipus could conceivably be buried anywhere, 
prompting Creon and Polynices to seek him out, the oracle that Oedipus personally received from 
Apollo limits his options. The logical conclusion that accounts for all these (with the exception of 
point D) is that there will come a time when Thebes will attack Athens and at that time, Oedipus’ 
grave will protect Athens and ensure their victory over Thebes. This much could be inferred from 
the facts that Oedipus already possesses, but none of the specifics could. There is no reason that 
this foretold conflict need happen in the distant future, as suggested by μυρίας ὁ μυρίος / χρόνος 
τεκνοῦται νύκτας ἡμέρας τ᾿ ἰών and οὑμὸς εὕδων καὶ κεκρυμμένος νέκυς / ψυχρός. However, 
when Theseus and his men chase after Creon’s men, what the Chorus envisions is something very 
close to a battle between Athens and Thebes, even though Theseus does not confirm the extent of 
the conflict. Is Oedipus wrong, then, about how these oracles will fit together?  
We are left, at this point, with two possibilities: on the most basic level, either Oedipus is 
wrong or he is right. The implications of Oedipus being mistaken would change the overall tone of 
this play significantly—if Oedipus is not endowed with special knowledge and vision, and some sort 
of quasi-divine status, then what are we to make of any of the play? If Oedipus is not reliable in this 
moment, then does this call other claims of his into question? If the ending is not an endorsement of 
the actions and decisions of both Theseus and Oedipus, then we are left with a play that 
approaches deconstructionist nihilism, where there is no message in this play and traditional piety is 
something of a sham. Such a play would be both absurd and fascinating in a very postmodern way, 
but it seems fundamentally incompatible with all that we know about Sophocles. I address this 
possibility first, in the interest of dismissing it quickly. 
That leaves us with the more palatable possibility that Oedipus is right. In this case, Thebes 
will indeed come up against his grave in the distant future, which necessitates that the whole 
Thebes-Athens conflict in the play must not “count,” in terms of the oracles, since this conflict 
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certainly does not match the description Oedipus provides.339 Athens does prevail, but not because 
of Oedipus (or, not because of the power inherent in his bones and his grave, at any rate). Perhaps 
it is because Oedipus is not yet dead, and there is no grave against which to make a stand? Or 
perhaps Creon’s unambiguously villainous choice to kidnap Antigone and Ismene does not 
properly constitute an act on behalf of Thebes as a whole (thereby not ending the current state of 
εὐημερεῖ καλῶς). This is, I think, the strongest reading: this conflict within the play can serve to 
foreshadow future conflict(s) between Athens and Thebes without invalidating the specific details 
contained in Oedipus’ prediction.  
This brings us back to the question of how Oedipus knows what he knows, since the level of 
detail he includes is more than mere reason and logic could have produced. Although, as noted in 
the previous section, Oedipus is certainly described as a prophet in many places throughout this 
play, up until this point, we have seen no evidence of prophecy, per se. Though it is no small task to 
effectively understand an oracle from Apollo, all of his knowledge about the future has come from 
oracles and not from his own prophetic vision. It is only in his conversation with Theseus that we 
finally see such prophetic abilities, as he moves beyond the knowledge that he could have rationally 
acquired from these two accounts of oracles.  
Oedipus acts in this same prophetic role at the end of the play, after he recognizes the 
thunder (occurring first at 1456), which is the sign that his imminent death is approaching. At this 
point, Oedipus explains the final culmination of these oracles: 
1520 
 
 
 
 
1525 
 
1533 
χῶρον μὲν αὐτὸς αὐτίκ’ ἐξηγήσομαι,  
ἄθικτος ἡγητῆρος, οὗ με χρὴ θανεῖν. 
τοῦτον δὲ φράζε μήποτ’ ἀνθρώπων τινί, 
μήθ’ οὗ κέκευθε μήτ’ ἐν οἷς κεῖται τόποις· 
ὥς σοι πρὸ πολλῶν ἀσπίδων ἀλκὴν ὅδε 
δορός τ’ ἐπακτοῦ γειτονῶν ἀεὶ τιθῇ.  
… 
χοὔτως ἀδῇον τήνδ’ ἐνοικήσεις πόλιν 
σπαρτῶν ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν·  
1520-5, 1533-4 
I, without the touch of a guide, will now lead you to 
the place where I must die. Do not ever show this to 
any person—not where it is hidden nor in which 
area it lies—so that this, by always being near you, 
may be a defense, superior to many shields or 
foreign spears. 
… 
Thus, you will dwell in this city, which will never be 
assailed by the sown men.  
For a blind man to walk unassisted is remarkable on its own, and the messenger too comments upon 
this fact (ὑφηγητῆρος οὐδενὸς φίλων, / ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν πᾶσιν ἐξηγούμενος. 1588-9). He 
instructs his daughters as they perform final rituals for him and he gives them religiously-tinged 
                                                   
339 On this point, and how this scene can anticipate the future conflict between Thebes and Athens, see Scodel 1984: 
“Ironically, the prediction Oedipus gives for a remote future is fulfilled within the play. Oedipus himself is the cause of 
dispute between Thebes and Athens, and the dispute is settled in a battle which both guarantees the result of the future 
contest and foreshadows it” (Scodel 1984: 117). 
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prohibitions (μηδ᾽ ἃ μὴ θέμις / λεύσσειν δικαιοῦν μηδὲ φωνούντων κλύειν, 1642-2). Everything 
about his final moments, from the direct address from a god (1625ff.) to his mysterious 
death/disappearance (ἀλλ᾽ ἤ τις ἐκ θεῶν πομπὸς ἢ τὸ νερτέρων / εὔνουν διαστὰν γῆς 
ἀλύπητον βάθρον, 1661-2), is marked as more than human. He is a priest orchestrating his own 
rituals and a blind seer with no need of eyes (reminiscent of Tiresias) who has interpreted and 
augmented the oracle of Apollo (correctly, this time!) and brought about its fulfillment.  
Conclusions at Colonus  
Several things emerge from this analysis of divine and prophetic language. Though this is 
not properly a sequel to the Oedipus Tyrannus, it is impossible to read this play without the 
Oedipus Tyrannus coming to mind. When we juxtapose those two versions of Oedipus, we see that 
the Oedipus of Oedipus at Colonus is a more pious man who no longer comes into conflict with the 
will of the gods. We can understand this to be the result of years of suffering and aging and learning 
(i.e. we are dealing essentially with the same man as from the OT, but he has matured piously) or 
we can understand this as an entirely new version of Oedipus who is conspicuously different from 
the version of Oedipus from the OT. Either way, this Oedipus is able to understand oracles from 
Apollo effectively and to function as a prophet; rather than be in direct conflict with Tiresias over 
the meaning of oracles, Oedipus has instead taken on many of the attributes of Tiresias.  
This play features an oracle that is revealed in a piecemeal fashion, as so many other 
Sophoclean oracles are. However, in this instance, communication proceeds precisely as it should. 
Oedipus blends these discrete oracles into one outcome, using his privileged access to the gods in 
combination with what he has already learned about these oracles. He uses his own logic and 
intellect to combine these different oracles, but he now does so in a pious and accurate way. When 
his reason conflicts with what a god has said, as is the case when he talks to Ismene about the new 
oracles, Oedipus reassesses and corrects his interpretation, but he does so from an assumption that 
the oracles are undoubtedly accurate. If logic and an oracle seem to be in conflict, he does not 
discount the oracle-giver or the oracle itself (as the Oedipus of the OT does). Instead, he finds an 
interpretation that accommodates the oracle and its infallibility. On one level, then, this play offers 
an endorsement of piety and religious reverence, which accords with the picture of Sophocles 
found in the biographical tradition. However, in revisiting what is (nominally) the same character, 
but one in which oracular communication results in actual, accurate understanding, Sophocles 
invites us to reflect on what happened differently this time around. As in nearly all the plays in this 
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chapter, there are subtle elements surrounding the presentation and comprehension of oracles 
which direct us to think about language itself and how communication and comprehension 
function. These linguistic, oracular features are not necessary to the plots of these plays, suggesting 
that there is some other reason or reasons for their inclusion. 
 
Overall Conclusions 
Unlike the Trachiniae and the Oedipus Tyrannus, the five plays that I have examined in this 
chapter all feature oracles in ways that are less central to the plot. The plots of these plays do not 
hinge on a misunderstood oracle, but they nonetheless feature some sort of prophecy or oracle. My 
purpose in this chapter was to lay out the oracles and prophecies in these other plays and to 
examine what these plays have to contribute to the linguistic picture that the Trachiniae and the 
Oedipus Tyrannus have painted. At times, these plays echo and reinforce linguistic features that we 
saw in the first two chapter, but in other places, these plays serve to flesh out how other types of 
language work—types of speech which were not thoroughly explored in the Trachiniae or the 
Oedipus Tyrannus. In broad terms, these plays all demonstrate the convoluted process of language 
transmission. Oracles and prophecies all originate from a place of truth, but as soon as that truth 
begins to be mediated in language, the language corrupts and alters divine truth. Characters (often 
unconsciously) bring their own preconceptions, agendas, and aspirations to bear on language and 
they exploit nodes of ambiguity in order to relate a prophecy in a form that appeals to them (as in 
the Ajax and perhaps also the Electra). At other times, prophecies are shaped willfully and used 
manipulatively (as in the Philoctetes and perhaps also the Electra). We see prophecy wielded as a 
weapon, as in the Antigone and the Oedipus at Colonus, where prophecies are nearly 
indistinguishable from curses.  
As we look at these plays, we can see how Sophocles addresses complications around 
language. Though the Trachiniae addresses language that aims at conveying facts, there are other 
modes of communication. Two people can intend to engage in a cooperative conversation, but they 
might still fail, for a variety of reasons. The speaker might intend to connote something, while the 
listener may apply very different assumptions and come to an entirely different conclusion. 
Sophocles does address this, however, and we see that good faith attempt at communication will 
result in a back-and-forth process through which meaning will eventually emerge, as it does when 
Ismene and Oedipus discuss the new oracles about his death in the OC. Beyond more complicated 
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instances of cooperative communication, there are instances of uncooperative conversation. We 
play linguistic games, we lie, we manipulate, and we use imprecise language. All these situations are 
addressed, in some capacity, in the plays of Sophocles. By highlighting these different situations, 
Sophocles forces his audience to give more thought to the mechanisms that they intuitively 
understand, as native speakers of Greek.  
By looking at prophecy throughout the full extant Sophoclean corpus, we can see the 
breadth of Sophocles’ engagement with language and ambiguity. This breadth complements the 
depth explored in my first two chapters, and lays a useful foundation for drawing conclusions about 
Sophocles’ overarching interest in prophecy, ambiguity, and linguistics. 
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Conclusion 
After examining each play individually, it is finally possible to view them collectively. 
Though our sample size is admittedly woefully limited,340 it is still striking that oracles or other 
types of prophecy occur so reliably in the extant corpus. What might explain this, especially in cases 
where the oracle is not central to the plot? 
To answer this question, it is worth briefly revisiting the conclusions of the previous 
chapters. In looking at the Trachiniae, I argued that the oracles from Zeus are not necessarily 
deceptive. Instead, the oracles are communicated in speech that is syntactically accurate, but which 
entirely disregards the pragmatic rules that govern human communication. The tragic outcome of 
the play is a result of humans applying pragmatic conventions to a type of communication which 
entirely disregards those conventions. Moving to the Oedipus Tyrannus, I argued that the apparent 
malice of Apollo need not be understood as malice at all, but could instead be read as another 
instance of mortals applying the wrong rules to divine communication. Using the genre of riddles as 
a way to approach this play, I looked at the pragmatic conventions which govern non-
straightforward modes of communication, such as riddles, and the importance of realizing which 
set of linguistic rules to apply to language in order to properly understand that language. In solving 
the famous Riddle of the Sphinx, Oedipus proved that he can effectively employ the “rules” of 
riddle-solving, but when approaching oracles, he does not know that he needs to apply a specific 
set of linguistic rules. By failing to do so, he misunderstands the oracle. He is, however, helped in 
his misunderstanding by Tiresias, whose words frustrate and anger Oedipus until he is not in an 
emotional or mental state to believe Tiresias when Tiresias tells him the truth about his identity. 
When viewed in tandem with Apollo’s divine communication, this play provides two different ways 
in which communication can fail. With Apollo’s words, we see how ambiguous language can be 
misinterpreted—when ambiguity allows for multiple interpretations, a listener can easily choose the 
wrong meaning, particularly when they have an emotional reason to prefer one meaning to 
                                                   
340 Using a relatively conservative estimate of 115 plays written by Sophocles, these seven plays constitute approximately 
6% of Sophocles’ total output (though it would be a mistake to think that these seven represent a random sampling of 
Sophocles’ plays).  
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another. We also see, with Tiresias’ words, how context and psychological elements can drive 
miscommunication—if a listener imputes malice to a speaker, the listener is unlikely to think that 
the speaker is making a good faith effort at communication and can instead interpret true words as 
lies. Between these two plays, we see two different, complementary models of how language works. 
The Trachiniae provides a simpler model of how pragmatic principles shape communication, and 
the Oedipus Tyrannus examines more complex types of speech, and types of speech which are not 
aimed at the straightforward communication of facts.  
In Chapter 3, I detailed the ways in which Sophocles provides more instances of prophetic 
language which highlight other ways language can function. These examples serve to complement 
and expand upon the linguistic features on display in the Trachiniae and the Oedipus Tyrannus. 
Whereas the multiform oracle in the Trachiniae was equally true in all its forms, rendering 
questions of transmission moot, the Ajax raises these issues and does not properly resolve them (we 
are never sure what exactly Calchas said and what the messenger or Teucer supplied). The 
Philoctetes goes even further, as Odysseus is entrusted with Helenus’ prophecy. As the prophecy 
shifts throughout the play, the audience is acutely aware of the ways in which Odysseus, the 
consummate sophist, is manipulating language and the prophecy in order to corrupt Neoptolemus 
and succeed in bringing Philoctetes and his bow back to Troy. Here, the transmission and use and 
misuse of language are impossible to ignore, even though no harm actually comes from all this, 
since Heracles arrives to set things right. For an audience anxious about sophistry, however, 
Odysseus’ persuasive rhetoric would sound familiar and alarming.  
The Electra, meanwhile, draws our attention to the importance of context. Without 
knowing what Orestes asked Apollo, we cannot know that Apollo condones Orestes’ actions. 
Orestes may well—either consciously or unconsciously—be transmitting Apollo’s words faithfully, 
without transmitting his meaning. Without knowing the full context of the oracular inquiry, we 
cannot know if Orestes is manipulating Apollo’s words, which raises the possibility that Orestes 
might be using an oracle to advance his own political agenda. Though the play does not dwell on 
this question, and the answer to the question is entirely irrelevant to the plot of the play, this 
nonetheless taps into the motif, familiar from the historians, of politicians appropriating oracles for 
their own gain.  
Finally, these plays address a much broader range of language than we saw in either the 
Trachiniae or the Oedipus Tyrannus. Even in a narrow examination of oracular and prophetic 
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language, we see willful deception (Philoctetes), ambiguity of attribution and the problems inherent 
in reporting speech (Ajax), the ambiguity introduced by imprecise wording (Electra), and speech 
acts and curses (Antigone). Further, our attention is drawn at times to the different modes of 
prophecy; in both the Antigone and the Oedipus at Colonus, we see a clear distinction between 
divination from natural signs (birds and thunder, respectively) and the sort of purely linguistic 
prophecy that oracles dispense. We see failed attempts at communication and a counter-example of 
how communication can take place effectively (Oedipus at Colonus). Although we see verbal 
ambiguity in the Ajax, the Electra, and the Philoctetes, the ambiguity is never resolved, and the plot 
is entirely unconcerned with that ambiguity. In a sense, the ambiguity is there precisely to be 
ambiguous, and the questions it raises are more important than the answers (which are never 
provided).  
We are still left, however, with the question of “why?” Why include ambiguity? Why make 
oracles such a locus of linguistic exploration? Why provide language which can be understood in 
multiple different ways if the actual meaning of that language does not actually matter? By raising 
these questions and examining how language can generate both meaning and ambiguity, Sophocles 
focuses our attention on language itself. When he was writing, there was a great deal of anxiety 
about language, rhetoric, and the teachings of sophists and rhetoricians were widespread in Athens. 
Language itself became an object of study, and as things like “making the weaker argument 
stronger” were being taught, and there were deconstructionist currents which were gaining 
strength. Though we have long recognized that Plato challenged these intellectual trends, 
Sophocles is not often seen to be doing the same thing. However, when we look at these seven 
plays, Sophocles has some surprisingly sophisticated ideas about how language works, even if he 
does not present them in treatise form.  
I began this examination with the Trachiniae because it offers the least complicated 
presentation of Sophocles’ ideas about language. Though this play has been read as a 
deconstructionist work, such a reading ignores the fact that Sophocles also reconstructs, so to 
speak. Although he does point out how syntax can generate misunderstanding, Sophocles does not 
suggest that there are no rules to language, or that there can be no effective communication. 
Rather, he points out that the rules that govern communication are more complex than we 
immediately recognize. We hear a disjunctive oracle and we all intuitively understand it the same 
way Deianeira does. When the “twist” is revealed, we also see how it could mean something other 
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than we first thought. Though Sophocles was obviously not aware of Grice’s conversational 
maxims, they do provide a useful formal framework to discuss how and why this phenomenon 
occurs. Context and other non-syntactic elements fill in the gaps that syntax leaves open. Language 
is not a paradox, but instead a very complex system.  
To conclude, Sophocles is primarily concerned with his dramatic craft, and I do not mean 
to suggest that the “point” of his plays is to present a linguistic treatise. However, because oracles 
are a place where gods convey information to mortals, meaning is particularly important in oracular 
speech. Further, since it is a sort of liminal, non-human speech, Sophocles is afforded a great deal 
more flexibility when crafting divine communication. Gods are not limited by human speech 
conventions, so divine speech is an ideal place for Sophocles to create artificial scenarios in which 
communication fails in some way. By creating scenarios in which communication fails, either 
because an implicitly understood pragmatic principle is not observed by a god or because a mortal 
deceptively exploits the pragmatic assumptions of their audience, Sophocles highlights the 
pragmatic elements of communication. Taken together, these pragmatic principles constitute a 
theory of language that underlies much of Sophocles’ work. In the face of the sophistic challenges 
to traditional ideas of language, Sophocles puts forth his own defense of language which rests on his 
nuanced understanding of the non-syntactic facets of language.  
A conception of Sophocles as an engaged intellectual is one of the major contributions of 
this study, to my mind. Sophocles’ linguistic innovation has been explored before, but primarily in 
a somewhat narrow sense. Long 1986, for instance, offers a brilliant study the neologisms found in 
Sophocles, and he argues convincingly that Sophocles is particularly semantically innovative (and 
more semantically innovative than Euripides). In a 2006 volume edited by de Jong and Rijksbaron 
(Sophocles and the Greek Language: Aspects of Diction, Syntax and Pragmatics), an impressive 
array of scholars further advance our understanding of Sophocles’ linguistic skill and practice. 
Though this is hardly an exhaustive selection, it does represent a strain of scholarship which 
acknowledges that Sophocles not only thought deeply about language, but that he contributed to 
literary and intellectual history in ways which have not been fully appreciated in the past.  
By revisiting the issue of prophecy in Sophocles in light of pragmatic theory, we can 
understand that Sophocles uses divine communication as an opportunity to explore some of the 
most nuanced and complex aspects of communication. Rather than acquiesce to sophistic claims 
about language, Sophocles resists a deconstructionist understanding of language and uses oracular 
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speech as a place to display his own ideas about language. The artificial linguistic exempla he 
creates (using the flexibility afforded him by liminal and supernatural speech, which need not 
conform to any human conventions) draw attention to the different ways that listeners make sense 
of complex speech. By presenting audience members with linguistic puzzles that they are intuitively 
able to understand, Sophocles directs the audience’s attention to their innate linguistic instincts. 
These instincts go well beyond semantics, and Sophocles is in fact making a brilliant pragmatic 
argument, though not in so many words. By using the tools provided by pragmatic linguistic theory, 
though, we are able to approach a small but consistently present element of Sophocles’ plays—
oracles and prophecies—and use them to gain a better understanding of these plays as well as of 
Sophocles’ own interests and contributions to the intellectual debates of the 5th century.  
 
Next Steps 
In the future, this project would benefit from considering the specifics of Sophocles’ 
intellectual context. As I note above, Sophocles is writing in the midst of intense social and 
intellectual upheaval. His own interventions in these debates can only be fully appreciated when 
viewed against these contemporary linguistic and philosophical debates. The most useful places to 
begin such additional study are, to my mind, the Sophists and Presocratics, Herodotus, 
Thucydides, and Plato. Of the numerous of thinkers who are included under the “Sophists and 
Presocratics” category, Heraclitus, Protagoras, and Democritus seem to be the most relevant to a 
linguistic discussion, since our evidence suggests that all three were deeply interested in language. 
Protagoras, of course, cannot be viewed without addressing Plato’s depiction of Protagoras—in 
fact, Plato is also a useful, if problematic, source for the teachings of Heraclitus. In particular, his 
Cratylus engages with philosophies of language as well as Heraclitean ideas concerning flux. In a 
separate vein, Herodotus and Thucydides are both very concerned with the ways that language can 
be used, misused, understood, and misunderstood. The themes which occur in both men’s works 
are a reflection of deeper societal concerns which also manifest in Sophocles’ own work.  Future 
study will need to treat this complicated web of evidence carefully, but there are a great many 
points of contact between these thinkers and Sophocles’ own linguistic ideas, and such a study 
would lead to a much better understanding of intellectual debates (and intellectual exchange) in 
the 5th century. It would also enhance our understanding of the extent to which Sophocles was an 
active and innovative participant in these debates.   
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Appendix A: Uses of ἢ . . . ἤ 
The vast majority of uses of ἢ . . . ἤ are exclusive uses, as one might expect when thinking 
pragmatically about how or is used and the implicatures that are generally applicable. A great deal 
of linguistic scholarship has examined the question of or and the inclusive and exclusive ways that it 
can be used and how a speaker can implicate a certain meaning and how a hearer can infer certain 
meanings.341 The theoretical linguistic underpinnings of this debate are outside the scope of my 
project, but by taking an inductive approach, we can see a great deal about how this construction is 
used in Greek literary sources.  
Leaving aside many instances that defy simple classification, in a study of over 400 uses of 
the disjunction, looking at examples from Homer up through Euripides and Sophocles, exclusive 
uses represent approximately 80% of the examples that can be neatly classified.342 Some of these 
are particularly useful for a discussion of the Trachiniae, and I will return to them later. First, 
however, I will lay out some other uses of ἢ . . . ἤ in Greek. For the purpose of this examination, I 
am only looking at instances of ἢ . . . ἤ (and not uses of ἤ in isolation or in combination with other 
particles, such as ἥτοι . . . ἥ or ἥ . . . ἢ καί343) and I have attempted to remove instances where ἢ . . 
                                                   
341 Hurford’s Constraint (Hurford 1974) is the starting point for a great deal of work on these topics. It notes that “the 
joining of two sentences by or is unacceptable if one sentence entails the other; otherwise, the use of or is acceptable” 
(Hurford 1974: 410). See Chierchia et al. 2001, Singh 2008, Chierchia et al. 2008, Yoon 2009, and Meyer 2014 for a 
series of studies on Hurford’s Constraint and how negation and disjunction combine with one another to give rise to 
different presumptive meanings.  
342 In Seven against Thebes, for example, the messenger says Polynices and his allies swore an oath to either take 
Thebes by force or die and cover the earth with their blood (ὡρκωμότησαν ἢ πόλει κατασκαφὰς / θέντες 
λαπάξειν ἄστυ Καδμείων βίᾳ, / ἢ γῆν θανόντες τήνδε φυράσειν φόνῳ, Septem 46-8). In this case, the two 
options are understood to be mutually exclusive—the men do not think that they will both die and take Thebes. In this 
instance, we have a truly exclusive or. A similar use occurs later in the same play, when Megareus is described as either 
defeating Eteoclus or dying in the attempt—but clearly not both (ἀλλ᾽ ἢ θανὼν τροφεῖα πληρώσει χθονί, / ἢ καὶ 
δύ᾽ ἄνδρε καὶ πόλισμ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδος / ἑλὼν λαφύροις δῶμα κοσμήσει πατρός, Septem 477-9). A thorough list of all 
such examples would be far too long, since this usage represents the overwhelming majority of the occurrences of ἢ . . . 
ἤ in Greek. 
343 Smyth does not seem to think that the difference between ἢ . . . ἤ and ἥτοι . . . ἥ or ἥ . . . ἢ καί has any bearing on 
the inclusive or exclusive nature. The most relevant observation is that ἥτοι . . . ἥ may be used instead of ἢ . . . ἤ when 
the first item listed is more probable (§ 2858). Similarly, he notes that ἢ καί “is often used where ἤ would suffice” (§ 
2862). For ἤ in isolation in alternative questions, or in combination with πότερον, see § 2656-7, 2860. Smyth concludes 
that the repeated ἢ . . . ἤ serves “to connect the two members more closely” (§ 2856), but nothing about the nature of 
the disjunction implied. As to indirect alternative formations involving ἤ, he does note that πότερον . . . ἤ “may denote 
that the second alternative is more important than the first,” whereas εἰ . . . ἤ “indicates that the second alternative is 
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. ἤ is not functioning in the way that either/or does in English, but is instead joining three (or 
more) discreet items with a simple “or” between each element. Often, as I will demonstrate, this is 
not an easy determination to make and the semantic functions of ἢ . . . ἤ are somewhat ambiguous. 
For simplicity, I will limit myself here to examples whose context allow us to determine the inclusive 
or exclusive nature of the “or” in some fashion (based either on a discernable intent of the speaker 
or a discernable interpretation by the hearer—in more formal terms, the implicatures or inferences 
involved). I recognize that these examples are selectively chosen and not a representative sample of 
all of the instances this construction is used in Greek. My intent here is not to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the uses of ἢ . . . ἤ in Greek but rather to illustrate the available semantic range that is 
can have and to establish the difference between the semantic and pragmatic range that this 
disjunction can exhibit in different contexts.  
I have split up the uses of ἢ . . . ἤ which are not clearly exclusive into broad categories, for 
the purpose of analysis. These are not always neat and distinctly separate categories, but I think 
they prove useful as a framework. I will attempt to lay out the relevant pragmatic framework that 
governs some of these categories as I lay them out.  
 
Inclusive (or Predominantly Inclusive) Uses of Or 
1. Prayer Language  
The first category that I will argue is truly inclusive are the fossilized uses that occur in 
ritual language and prayers.344 This includes two slightly different uses of ἢ . . . ἤ. The first set are 
uses of “word or deed,” as in example 1.1 and 1.2 below. The second type are those that occur in 
lists of pious or dedicatory acts (1.3 and 1.4). Examples of both types are provided: 
                                                   
preferable or more probable” (§ 2675a, c). These are not directly relevant to the examples I am looking at, however, 
since these are specifically indirect formulations and I feel confident that excluding these instances does little to impact 
my study of ἢ . . . ἤ. Interesting, but also only tangentially relevant, is the rare substitution of ἢ . . . τέ instead of ἢ . . . ἤ 
that Smyth notes at § 2982. Overall, Smyth does not comment on the exclusive or inclusive nature of any variation on 
these disjunctions, but the nuanced difference between ἢ . . . ἤ and other combinations does not seem to make a 
substantive difference in the inclusivity or exclusivity. 
344 For a more detailed look at ritual and prayer language, see Depew 1997 for a thorough overview. Miller 1986 
provides a discussion of the hypomnesis element of prayers, in which the suppliant reminds the god of past service(s) 
rendered or piety shown. Graf 1991 and Festugière 1976 also discuss the reciprocal exchange aspects of prayer. 
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1.1 Ζεῦ πάτερ εἴ ποτε δή σε μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα  
ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ, τόδε μοι κρήηνον ἐέλδωρ 
Il. 1.503-5 
Father Zeus, if I have ever helped you among the 
immortals, in word or deed, accomplish my desire 
for me345  
1.2 ἠέλι᾽, αἴδεσσαί με θεὰν σύ περ, εἴ ποτε δή σευ  
ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἴηνα 
h.Cer. 64-5 
 
Helios, regard me as a goddess, if I have ever, in 
word or deed, warmed your heart and spirit. 
 
1.3 Ζεῦ πάτερ εἴ ποτέ τίς τοι ἐν Ἄργεΐ περ πολυπύρῳ  
ἢ βοὸς ἢ οἰὸς κατὰ πίονα μηρία καίων 
εὔχετο νοστῆσαι, σὺ δ᾽ ὑπέσχεο καὶ κατένευσας,  
τῶν μνῆσαι καὶ ἄμυνον Ὀλύμπιε νηλεὲς ἦμαρ  
Il. 15.372-5 
Father Zeus, if anyone in Argos, rich in wheat, 
ever prayed to return home, burning the fat thigh-
bones of a cow or a sheep for you, and you nodded 
and assented, remember them and ward off the 
pitiless day, Olympian one 
 
1.4 κλῦθί μευ, αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, Ἀτρυτώνη,  
εἴ ποτέ τοι πολύμητις ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν Ὀδυσσεὺς  
 ἢ βοὸς ἢ ὄϊος κατὰ πίονα μηρί᾽ ἔκηε, 
τῶν νῦν μοι μνῆσαι, καί μοι φίλον υἷα σάωσον,  
μνηστῆρας δ᾽ ἀπάλαλκε κακῶς ὑπερηνορέοντας  
Od. 4.763-6 
Hear me, unwearying child of aegis-bearing Zeus, 
if the many-wiled Odysseus ever burned fat thigh-
bones of a cow or sheep for you in his halls, 
remember them now and save my dear son and 
ward off the terribly overbearing suitors 
 
 
A close parallel to this, though it is not strictly a prayer (since Telemachus addresses Nestor 
and Menelaus with these words) employs the same basic structure as part of the beseeching 
request: 
1.5 λίσσομαι, εἴ ποτέ τοί τι πατὴρ ἐμός, ἐσθλὸς Ὀδυσσεύς, 
ἢ ἔπος ἠέ τι ἔργον ὑποστὰς ἐξετέλεσσε 
δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχετε πήματ᾽ Ἀχαιοί, 
τῶν νῦν μοι μνῆσαι, καί μοι νημερτὲς ἐνίσπες. 
Od. 3.98-101 and 4.328-31 
I pray, if ever my father, noble Odysseus, 
accomplished anything that he promised to you, 
either some word or deed, in the Trojan land, 
where the Achaeans endured great woes, 
remember that now, I beg you, and tell me the 
truth.  
 
These uses at least suggest an inclusive interpretation of ἢ . . . ἤ—it would be a very strange 
strategy to invoke two pious acts, of which only one had actually been completed by the suppliant. 
The import of these prayers is certainly intended to be something to the effect of “Zeus (or Helios 
or Athena), I have served you in both these ways, please grant my prayer.” The choice of words 
couches these prayers in proper deference for the gods, but there would be no reason to call to 
mind the thighs of animals that had never actually been sacrificed to Zeus (thereby calling to mind 
sacrifices that Odysseus or the Achaeans had specifically not performed for Zeus) and we should 
understand this as an inclusive use of ἢ . . . ἤ, though perhaps a fossilized and formulaic use that is 
not entirely illustrative of more natural uses of ἢ . . . ἤ. 
                                                   
345 This passage echoes Achilles’ initial request at 1.394-5 (ἐλθοῦσ᾽ Οὔλυμπον δὲ Δία λίσαι, εἴ ποτε δή τι / ἢ ἔπει 
ὤνησας κραδίην Διὸς ἠὲ καὶ ἔργῳ), though his formulation fits less neatly into the category of prayers, since he is 
specifying language to be used by Thetis when propitiating Zeus, but I am not comfortable calling his address to his 
mother a prayer, even though she is a divinity.  
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It is worth noting that the broad phrasing is fairly standard for prayers (i.e. “If ever I have 
pleased you in any way . . .”), but that does not undermine the basic rhetorical strategies in play 
here.346 It is useful to examine other ways that this formulaic language is used, including in other 
prayer contexts: 
1.6 Σμινθεῦ εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ᾽ ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,  
ἢ εἰ δή ποτέ τοι κατὰ πίονα μηρί᾽ ἔκηα 
ταύρων ἠδ᾽ αἰγῶν, τὸ δέ μοι κρήηνον ἐέλδωρ  
Il. 1.39-41 
 
Sminthean, if ever I pleased you by placing a roof 
on your temple or if I ever burned fat thigh-bones 
for you, of bulls and goats, accomplish my desire 
for me. 
1.7 κλῦθί μευ αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη,  
εἴ ποτέ μοι καὶ πατρὶ φίλα φρονέουσα παρέστης 
δηΐῳ ἐν πολέμῳ, νῦν αὖτ᾽ ἐμὲ φῖλαι Ἀθήνη·  
Il. 5.115-7 
 
Hear me, unwearied child of aegis-bearing Zeus! 
If ever you stood by my father in fierce battle, 
with kindly thoughts toward him, now be kind to 
me as well, Athena!  
 
as well as when requests are made between mortals (here, Hecuba to Hector and Hecuba to the 
Trojan people): 
1.8 Ἕκτορ τέκνον ἐμὸν τάδε τ᾽ αἴδεο καί μ᾽ ἐλέησον  
αὐτήν, εἴ ποτέ τοι λαθικηδέα μαζὸν ἐπέσχον· 
Il. 22.82-3 
Hector, my child, heed these things and take 
pity on me, if I ever offered my breast as a 
comfort to you 
 
1.9 ὄψεσθε Τρῶες καὶ Τρῳάδες Ἕκτορ᾽ ἰόντες,  
εἴ ποτε καὶ ζώοντι μάχης ἐκνοστήσαντι  
χαίρετ᾽, ἐπεὶ μέγα χάρμα πόλει τ᾽ ἦν παντί τε 
δήμῳ.  
Il. 24.704-6 
 
Come, Trojan men and woman, to see Hector, if 
you ever rejoiced to see him coming back from 
battle, while he was still alive, since he was a 
great source of joy for the city and all the 
people.  
Lang usefully schematizes the different sorts of prayers into several categories.347 She 
identifies this sort of prayer language as a single category of da si dedi/da quia dedi, correctly 
                                                   
346 This is, I think, unlike the impulse behind prayers such as we see at Ag. 160-2 (Ζεύς, ὅστις ποτ᾽ ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ᾽ αὐ-
/τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, / τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω, “Zeus, whoever he is, if this is pleasing to him to be called, I 
invoke him with this name”) or the general tendency to invoke a range of gods, to make sure the correct one is invoked 
(cf. the Chorus’ address to a wide range of gods at OT 151ff.). In those sorts of moments, the person praying is 
covering all their bases, so to speak, with the implicit assumption that there is no particular harm in invoking extra gods 
or invoking a god by additional names, as compared to the potential risks of not effectively obtaining the god’s help 
because the address was deficient in some way.  
347 Lang 1975 provides an outline of the types of communication humans use in relation to the gods in Homer and splits 
the non-conversational communication (i.e. prayers) into categories of do ut des, da et dabo, da si dedi/da quia dedi, 
and da quia dedisti. For purposes of comparison, only her da si dedi/da quia dedi category is directly relevant. In this 
category, she places several of my examples above in addition to Chryses’ prayer to Apollo at Il. 1.39-41, which has a 
great deal in common with these other examples (as noted above), though it does not involve the use of ἢ . . . ἤ. In this 
broader category of da si dedi/da quia dedi, she also places things like Agamemnon’s prayer to Zeus at Il. 8.236ff. and 
10.432ff., though these are somewhat different rhetorically, since they do not invoke the “if ever I . . .” language, 
though they do all call on past services rendered to the god as a rationale for why the god should heed their prayer 
now.  
Reminiscent of the examples above are the sort of “εἴ ποτε” uses that are oriented toward the divinity addressed, such 
as ὡσεὶ κυβερνήτας σοφός, ὑμνοάνασ-/σ᾽ εὔθυνε Κλειοῖ / νῦν φρένας ἁμετέρας, / εἰ δή ποτε καὶ πάρος 
(Bacchylides 12.1-4) and εἴ ποτε καὶ προτέρας ἄτας ὕπερ ὀρνυμένας πόλει / ἠνύσατ᾽ ἐκτοπίαν φλόγα πήματος, 
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recognizing that the practical effect of the language elides the difference between “if” and 
“because.” While a literal interpretation of these passages does offer these justifications in terms of 
if something happened, they are surely meant to convey the sense that the person speaking did do 
these things in the past. The force of if seems either purely rhetorical (since one does not properly 
make demands of gods) or else somewhat transferred. That is to say, the occurrences must have 
happened (one would not likely have forgotten if any service or sacrifice had been performed—it 
only strengthens a prayer to mention things that did happen, not conspicuous failures to act). The 
judgment—if we are to imagine that any sort of a judgment is presupposed in this language—must 
be more about the recipient’s actions and perceptions, and not the actions of the person praying.348  
The examples above which invoke “word or deed” seem to be a special sub-group, in that 
the boundary between word and deed is not a clearly delineated one. Thetis’ prayer to Zeus 
(example 1.1) is a particularly illustrative example, since we know at least something about a 
moment that she is invoking with this prayer, since Achilles makes a specific request of her that she 
certainly seems to follow (1.386-412, with a particular resonance at lines 394-5). Achilles asks her to 
remind Zeus of the time when she was the only god who warded off shameful destruction from him 
(ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι, 398). Her actions here involve both releasing Zeus from the chains in 
which he was bound (ὑπελύσαο δεσμῶν, 401) as well as summoning Briareus up to Olympus 
(ἑκατόγχειρον καλέσασ᾽ ἐς μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον, 402). We are not given a great deal of 
information as to how she called Briareus to Olympus,349 but the language used to describe what 
she did seems to map neatly onto both word (καλέσασ᾽) and deed (ὑπελύσαο). I hesitate to give 
too much weight to this scene as an example of a clearly “inclusive or,” however, because it is quite 
easy to imagine a situation in which speaking leads to action or is indistinguishable from an active 
intervention and a single event could be both a word and a deed (speech acts as a broad category 
come readily to mind here). As such, I will do no more than suggest that this formulaic “word or 
                                                   
ἔλθετε καὶ νῦν. (OT 165-6). These fall into Lang’s da quia dedisti category of appeals and are not directly relevant for 
examining the theory of mind involved in these other prayers and appeals.  
348 To look at the preceding examples again, I would argue that the real question in 1.1 does not concern the word or 
deed, both of which we are to assume occurred; rather, it concerns ὄνησα. The question is not whether the acts 
occurred, but whether Zeus thinks that he was benefited by Thetis’ actions (and if, by extension, he owes her anything 
in exchange). Similarly, in 1.2, if there is a question, it concerns ἴηνα. Both a word and a deed occurred, but Helios 
only owes Demeter any assistance if her words and deeds did actually accomplish their goal and warm Helios’ heart. 
While this line of reasoning does not map onto all of these examples (for instance, it does not apply to 1.4 at all), it does 
open up the interesting question of what sort of theories of mind underlie Greek piety and prayer.  
349 This scene is obviously far more complicated than I can adequately explore here. Willcock 1997 and Slatkin 1992 
both discuss this fraught scene in far greater detail.  
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deed” phrasing does complicate any interpretation that would like to take ἢ . . . ἤ as entirely 
exclusive.  
As a last note on prayer language, these examples all occur within the framing of εἴ ποτέ (if 
ever). If is, like negation, a downward entailing operator, which licenses certain constructions which 
would not otherwise be licensed.350 We should keep this in mind when considering the use of ἢ . . . 
ἤ more broadly, since there are specific linguistic features which might explain this particular 
inclusive use of or.  
 
2. Quasi-Hendiadys, Plausible Coexistence, and “Ideally Both” Uses 
Three other closely related categories that I have identified are instances in which ἢ . . . ἤ 
serves to create something very similar to hendiadys; examples of things that easily coexist (often 
things whose coexistence can easily be supported with ready examples); and instances in which 
either of two alternatives would be sufficient, but both would clearly be preferred. This often 
occurs with weapons and similar things. For examples, Homer regularly joins things like an arrow 
and a spear in this way (βλήμενος ἢ ἰῷ ἢ ἔγχεϊ ὀξυόεντι, “struck either by an arrow or a sharp 
spear,” Il. 8.514; αὐτὰρ ἐπεί κ᾽ ἢ δουρὶ τυπεὶς ἢ βλήμενος ἰῷ / εἰς ἵππους ἅλεται, “but when, 
either struck by a spear or hit by an arrow, he will leap onto his horses,” Il. 11.191-2). Similarly, 
this can refer to means of injury (ἢ βάλῃ ἢ ἐλάσῃ, “if someone should either throw or strike,” Od. 
17.279) or slightly less concrete “weapons” (more precisely, means of effecting harm): ἠέ τι 
τηΰσιον ἔπος ἔσσεται ἠέ τι ἔργον (“if there will be either some idle word or some idle deed,” 
h.Ap. 540). I start with these examples because many of these—particularly the examples in 
Homer—are some of the least exclusive examples, though they do represent a significant use of or 
in Greek. By this, I first mean that there is no reason why an injury by one of these types of 
weapons (say, an arrow) necessarily excludes the other, since they are closely linked to one another 
and multiple types of attacks can certainly afflict the same warrior. In Homer, at least, warriors are 
rarely wounded or killed by two different weapons, though there is no obvious reason why they 
could not be. Looking at the example from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, however, we see a much 
                                                   
350 See Chierchia et al. 2001: 160 on this point: “Scalar implicatures do not arise in downward entailing linguistic 
environments.” They conclude that the presence of a downward entailing operator blocks implicatures, which explains 
why ἢ . . . ἤ functions differently in this linguistic environment than it does in normal environments. For a more 
thorough discussion, see Appendix B.  
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broader use that recalls the prayer language from before. Here, idle words and idle deeds are not 
mutually exclusive and the poet immediately follows this line with ὕβρις θ᾽, ἣ θέμις ἐστὶ 
καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων (“and hubris, which is customary among mortals”), which seems to 
equate hubris with idle words and deeds as things that are quite likely to happen and need to be 
warned against. In this sense, given the broader context, the use of ἢ . . . ἤ seems to be inclusive, 
and context is the determining factor.  
Also in this category, as examples of quasi-hendiadys, I have placed things like the following 
passages: 
2.1 τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν 
ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ 
θεάματος 
Thuc. 2.39.1 
 
For we hold out our city as a public thing and 
there is no time when we use alien acts to 
prevent someone from either learning or seeing 
2.2 τίς γὰρ κόρην ἔρημον ἢ δάμαρτ᾽ ἔχειν  
ἢ παιδοποιεῖν ἐξ ἐμοῦ βουλήσεται; 
Heracleidae 523-4 
 
For who will wish either to take a destitute girl as 
a wife or to father children with me? 
2.3 ἢ τίνα μοῦσαν ἐπέλθω  
δάκρυσιν ἢ θρήνοις ἢ πένθεσιν; 
Helen 165-6 
 
What muse should I approach with either tears 
or dirges or mourning? 
All of these combine elements that certainly go closely together (learning and observing, wife and 
mother, tears and dirges) and cannot imply that one must occur at the exclusion of the other. The 
two alternatives are certainly meant to evoke different connotations in the hearers, but they cannot 
be understood as exclusive ors. For example, in 2.2, the maiden invokes the loss of her status as a 
wife first, and then as a mother. The two need not go together, but she here uses these to 
encompass and convey the hope of a good life (εὖ πράξειν, 521) that she can no longer attain. In 
this sense, the two are very much being used as an elaboration on the same idea and an exclusive 
interpretation would render this lament nonsensical.  
Closely connected with these example are those instances in which ἢ . . . ἤ joins two things 
that have existed in the past and whose potential coexistence may be particularly relevant or 
desirable in the context. These uses are common in Thucydides:  
2.4 εἴ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν 
προσληψόμεθα 
Thuc. 1.82.1 
 
If, in some way, we will augment our strength, 
either nautical or monetary 
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2.5 εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ εὐψυχίᾳ 
Thuc. 7.64.2 
 
If someone surpasses another, either in skill or in 
courage 
2.6 εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἢ τὰς προσόδους 
ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ ναυτικὸν τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα 
τὰ πλείω  
Thuc. 1.81.4 
 
For unless we defeat them with our ships or 
remove the means with which they maintain their 
navy, we will be hurt badly 
In 2.4 and 2.5, we have two examples of a construction to which we could reasonably add “or, 
ideally, both” to the sentence. In 2.4, Archidamus is counseling the Spartans not to be too quick to 
enter into war with the Athenians before proper preparations can be made. In discussing the allies 
that Sparta will need to obtain, he says that they will need allies—either Greek or barbarian—just 
so long as they augment their strength, either nautical or monetary [or, ideally, both].” In 2.5, 
Nicias is concluding a speech meant to rouse his men up before battle and he follows this line with 
“he would not do better to display it [his skill or courage or, ideally, both], in any other time, 
showing himself both to be a benefit to himself and a savior to everyone” (οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ 
μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἀποδειξάμενος αὐτός τε αὑτῷ ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι 
σωτήριος). In both of these scenarios, either of the two elements listed would be sufficient on their 
own, but both would clearly be the preferred option. Similarly, in 2.6, at least one of the two 
alternatives is necessary (to avoid being hurt badly), but the context surely suggests that both would 
be the preferred outcome. 
Finally, I would like to include the salient example from Iliad 1.150-151 in this category, 
since it presents a slightly different slant on this same question:  
2.8 πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν πείθηται Ἀχαιῶν 
ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ἶφι μάχεσθαι; 
Il. 1.150-151 
How should any of the Achaeans willingly obey 
your words, either to go on a journey or to fight 
with men? 
 
In this case, not only have ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι and ἀνδράσιν ἶφι μάχεσθαι coexisted in the past, but 
their coexistence is the backdrop against which the entire Iliad is set. While the rhetorical force of 
this line implies that neither will occur in the future, the two elements are not mutually exclusive 
and went very closely together in the very recent past. Implicit in his speech here is the sense that 
one of the two elements will be more salient at any given time. The two are not entirely exclusive, 
but (in an inversion of the “minimal sufficiency” example from before) neither of these things will 
happen. Here, we could supply something such as “much less both” to flesh out the meaning more 
fully: “How should any of the Achaeans willingly obey your words, either to go on a journey or to 
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fight with men . . . much less both?” On this point, it is worth noting that a question—rhetorical or 
otherwise—is a downward entailing operator, which affects how implicatures work. As with 
conditionals (see the examples in section 1, and several of the examples in this section), a question 
changes this into a different sort of linguistic context. 
Moving from things that certainly have coexisted, the next type of inclusive use I have 
identified is things that readily can coexist. There is a fine line between these two types of easy 
coexistence and I would not suggest that this is a firm distinction at all, but there does seem to be a 
different nuance to some of these examples. Because these examples are quite numerous, I will 
provide a more cursory treatment here. This use includes lists of prizes that heroes might receive. 
The hero will not necessarily receive all the items listed, and they will presumably not get all of the 
items at the same time, but it also does not preclude multiple items. As an illustrative example, I 
offer Iliad 8.289,351 in which Agamemnon praises Teucer’s fighting and promises him prizes from 
the sack of Troy:  
2.9 πρώτῳ τοι μετ’ ἐμὲ πρεσβήϊον ἐν χερὶ θήσω,  
ἢ τρίποδ’ ἠὲ δύω ἵππους αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσφιν  
ἠὲ γυναῖχ’, ἥ κέν τοι ὁμὸν λέχος εἰσαναβαίνοι  
Il. 8.289 
I will place a prize in your hand first after me, 
either a tripod or two horses with their own 
chariot, or a woman who would go to bed with 
you 
 
For a point of comparison, the prizes that Agamemnon offers Achilles (Il. 9.122ff = 9.264ff) include 
seven tripods (ἕπτ᾽ ἀπύρους τρίποδας, 122 = 264), twelve horses (δώδεκα δ᾽ ἵππους / πηγοὺς 
ἀθλοφόρους, 123-4 = 265-6), and seven women, including Briseis (δώσω δ᾽ ἑπτὰ γυναῖκας 
ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυίας / Λεσβίδας, ἃς ὅτε Λέσβον ἐϋκτιμένην ἕλεν αὐτὸς / ἐξελόμην, αἳ 
κάλλει ἐνίκων φῦλα γυναικῶν. / τὰς μέν οἱ δώσω, μετὰ δ᾽ ἔσσεται ἣν τότ᾽ ἀπηύρων / 
κούρη Βρισῆος, 128-32 = 270-4). These certainly could coincide in another situation, but they are 
also unlikely to in the context given. To effectively explain why this is unlikely, we much draw upon 
scalar implicature. If Agamemnon wanted to give him multiple prestigious prizes for his valiant 
fighting, there would be no obstacle to him doing so. As such, he would be perfectly capable of 
making the stronger claim (the scale in question here would be <and, or>, with and being the 
stronger item) that he would award Teucer a tripod and horses and a woman (as he does tell 
Achilles). Because he does not make a stronger claim, he implicates that he will not do so. Both 
                                                   
351 Another example is Od. 15.84-5 (ἠέ τινα τριπόδων εὐχάλκων ἠὲ λεβήτων, / ἠὲ δύ᾽ ἡμιόνους ἠὲ χρύσειον 
ἄλεισον). 
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Teucer and a hearer in the audience will—without additional extenuating contextual 
information—infer that Teucer will not get all three items.  
Closely related, we find a similar structure with lists of weather phenomena that can and do 
occur together.352 Also in this category (and very closely connected to some of the previous 
categories I outlined) are examples describing actions that go closely together, such as Euripides’ 
Heracles Furens 1025-7:  
2.10 αἰαῖ, τίνα στεναγμὸν 
ἢ γόον ἢ φθιτῶν 
ᾠδάν, ἢ τὸν Ἅιδα χορὸν ἀχήσω; 
HF 1025-7 
Ah, what groan or wail or song of the dead or 
deathly dance should I send forth? 
This instance verges dangerously away from the strict either/or uses that I have focused on and 
seems far more likely to simply be a string discreet items connected with ἢ (as opposed to ἢ . . . ἤ as 
a unit), but this sort of use occurs commonly enough that it is worth mentioning and it does have 
parallels that map more neatly onto the either/or type of usage.353 With these, I place instances 
from Pindar which serve as either a priamel (in which all the items are equally available and could 
coexist in one poem, but not this poem): 
2.11 εἰ δ᾽ ὄλβον ἢ χειρῶν βίαν ἢ σιδαρίταν ἐπαινῆσαι 
πόλεμον δεδόκηται 
Pind. N. 5.19 
If it seems best to praise either wealth or strength 
of hands or iron war . . . 
or other lists that are presented as being a somewhat exhaustive list (in that the use of ἢ . . . ἤ is 
meant to broaden the scope of “fortunate” that is introduced with εὐτυχήσαις): 
2.12 εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχήσαις ἢ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοις 
ἢ σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φραςὶν αἰανῆ κόρον 
Pind. I. 3.1-2 
If some man is fortunate, either in glorious 
contests or in the power of his wealth, and checks 
unending arrogance in his mind 
352 Examples include Il. 10.5-8 (ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἂν ἀστράπτῃ πόσις Ἥρης ἠϋκόμοιο / τεύχων ἢ πολὺν ὄμβρον 
ἀθέσφατον ἠὲ χάλαζαν / ἢ νιφετόν, ὅτε πέρ τε χιὼν ἐπάλυνεν ἀρούρας, / ἠέ ποθι πτολέμοιο μέγα στόμα 
πευκεδανοῖο) and Soph. OC 94-5 (σημεῖα δ᾽ ἥξειν τῶνδέ μοι παρηγγύα, / ἢ σεισμὸν ἢ βροντήν τιν᾽ ἢ Διὸς 
σέλας) 
353 For a similarly problematic example, see Alcestis 86-8 (κλύει τις ἢ στεναγμὸν ἢ / χειρῶν κτύπον κατὰ στέγας / 
ἢ γόον ὡς πεπραγμένων;). See also Helen 169-173 (εἴθ᾽ ἐμοῖς γόοις / μόλοιτ᾽ ἔχουσαι Λίβυν / λωτὸν ἢ 
σύριγγας ἢ / φόρμιγγας, αἰλίνοις κακοῖς / τοῖς ἐμοῖσι σύνοχα δάκρυα). For a less complicated example, see 
Phoenissae 1632-4 (ὃς ἂν νεκρὸν τόνδ᾽ ἢ καταστέφων ἁλῷ / ἢ γῇ καλύπτων, θάνατον ἀνταλλάξεται), which 
provides only two alternatives that need not be mutually exclusive, since both indicate a means of giving honor to a 
corpse.  
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In all of these (2.10-3.12), ἢ . . . ἤ is used to join related items in a way that broadens the scope of a 
discussion by identifying discreet members of a group that the speaker wants to call to mind. In 
2.10, this is a genre of lament—presumably only one of these laments is most appropriate to the 
situation and they cannot all be performed at the same time. However, the inclusion of all of these 
different items proves to be more of a rhetorical technique than an actual question by the Chorus, 
and it is meant to convey their deep anguish. By providing several alternatives, they ensure that 
they express the full range of their grief—whichever of those options is appropriate to the situation, 
that is what they want to perform. This is very much in keeping with the common practice of 
agonizing over the best term for something, but it also suggests that the exact underlying 
phenomenon that they would like describe requires multiple descriptors to convey it fully. The 
lamentation they want to perform can only really by understood by casting a wide semantic net, so 
to speak, that includes all the essential aspects of the underlying phenomenon. In 2.11 and 2.12, I 
would argue that we see a similar usage. These different alternatives are provided in order to cover 
a broad conceptual range. Pindar wants to make it exceedingly clear what “fortunate” means, and 
that requires some additional description that maps out the full concept. This does not necessitate 
either an inclusive or exclusive understanding of the ors being used here. Rather, I think that this 
represents something between the two—these are meant to produce something of a loose Venn 
diagram that approximates a discreet underlying concept that is difficult to convey (with language 
that cannot exactly express that precise meaning). Somewhere generally between the overlapping 
ideas expressed by στεναγμὸν and γόον and φθιτῶν ᾠδάν and Ἅιδα χορὸν is the actual 
phenomenon the Chorus wants to describe. This use does not fall neatly into an inclusive or 
exclusive reading, but allows for both, to some extent.  
Finally, there are a few assorted examples that suggest inclusive readings, such as Ajax 119-
120 (τούτου τίς ἄν σοι τἀνδρὸς ἢ προνούστερος / ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων ηὑρέθη τὰ καίρια; “Who 
could be found who is more prudent than this man, or more able to do what the situation calls 
for?”), in which a more prudent man could easily be better at serving the needs of the moment and 
an exclusive reading would be less plausible than an inclusive reading. The question that Athena 
poses is rhetorical and essentially contrafactual in nature—there is, in fact, no one who was 
προνούστερος or δρᾶν ἀμείνων τὰ καίρια, which is her whole point in asking Odysseus this. 
Similarly, at Antigone 663-5 (ὅστις δ᾽ ὑπερβὰς ἢ νόμους βιάζεται / ἢ τοὐπιτάσσειν τοῖς 
κρατύνουσιν νοεῖ, / οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἐπαίνου τοῦτον ἐξ ἐμοῦ τυχεῖν, “But whoever transgresses and 
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either violates the laws or thinks to command their rulers, he will not got praise from me”), 
violating the laws and commanding the rulers are compatible and this passage too suggests and 
inclusive reading. Finally, Bacchae 740-2 offers a gruesome scene that must certainly be understood 
as an inclusive use of ἢ . . . ἤ: εἶδες δ᾽ ἂν ἢ πλεύρ᾽ ἢ δίχηλον ἔμβασιν / ῥιπτόμεν᾽ ἄνω τε καὶ 
κάτω· κρεμαστὰ δὲ / ἔσταζ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐλάταις ἀναπεφυρμέν᾽ αἵματι (You would see either a rib or 
a cloven hoof, tossed all over. They were dripping, hanging from the trees, defiled with blood”). An 
observer could easily see both ribs and hooves, if they were able to keep looking at the scattered 
gore. They could potentially see one at any given moment, but a truly exclusive reading here is not 
possible.  
These are the most compelling examples of ἢ . . . ἤ being used in a way that is inclusive or 
potentially inclusive. Not all of these examples are definitively inclusive uses, but they do, to my 
mind, invite an inclusive reading. More importantly, they do not prohibit such a reading. These are 
also instances in which context does a great deal to determine the meaning of ἢ . . . ἤ, which is the 
crux of my argument in Chapter 1: the semantic range of ἢ . . . ἤ is not firmly established, and in 
certain contexts it can be inclusive, whereas it is clearly exclusive in others. This is the semantic 
ambiguity and context-determined meaning that Sophocles explores in the Trachiniae. 
Linguistically, these are all instances in which there is a downward entailing environment, which is 
significant because certain words (negative polarity items) can only occur in a downward entailing 
environment. There is not firm consensus about how downward entailing environments and 
negative polarity items relate to one another, and scholarship on this topic has tended to focus on 
living languages (see Appendix B for more on this), but there is reason to believe that the behavior 
of ἢ . . . ἤ might be explained by looking at the inclusive or, in Greek, as a negative polarity item.  
 
Neither Inclusive nor Exclusive 
3. “Or at Least” Uses  
The most interesting example of a use of or which cannot be classified neatly into an 
inclusive or exclusive category is a discrete subset of these examples which I have called 
“qualifying.” These include instances which are perhaps best rendered in English with “A . . . or at 
least B,” in which one of the two items that is being compared is a small section from within a larger 
group. The simplest instance of this is the type that we see in the following passages: 
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3.1 εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω . . . 
Thuc. 6.90.3 
 
If these things should go well, either all of them 
or at least the majority of them . . . 
3.2 ἢ ὅ γε μοῦνος ἐὼν ἢ καὶ σύμπαντες Ἀχαιοί; 
Od. 3.217 
 
Either he on his own, or all the Achaeans as well 
In both of these examples, ἢ . . . ἤ καὶ serves to join a smaller portion with a larger whole. The shift 
from ἢ to ἢ καὶ is significant, and the καὶ does a great deal of the work in producing the “or at 
least” reading. This is not the case with the following examples, which I have also classified as 
“qualifying” (and not inclusive or exclusive): 
3.3 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ᾽ 
ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν  
Thuc. 6.24.3 
 
for the older men, [they thought] that they would 
crush the places against which they were sailing, 
or at least their great force would suffer no defeat 
3.4 καὶ ἢν ἄρα ἢ κατεργασώμεθα αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀπράκτους ὧν 
ἐφίενται ἀπώσωμεν  
Thuc. 6.33.4 
  
and if we either overpower them or at least drive 
them away without having achieved what they 
came for 
3.5 ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται 
Ἀθηναίους 
Thuc. 6.34.1 
 
so we could make an alliance with them, or at 
least they would not welcome the Athenians 
In all of these instances, ἢ . . . ἤ serves to contrast one outcome with a lesser outcome that would be 
included within or outdone by the other option. For example, in passage 3.5, refusing to aid the 
Athenians is a subset of forming an alliance among all the Sicilians—for the rest of the Sicilians, 
allying with Syracuse would also include not helping the Athenians, but it is presumed to go beyond 
simply not aiding them.  
Here, it is worth mentioning Hurford’s Constraint and the linguistic scholarship 
surrounding this concept.354 Hurford’s Constraint was originally formulated as: 
The joining of two sentences by or is unacceptable if one sentence entails the other; 
otherwise the use of or is acceptable (Hurford 1974: 410). 
Subsequent work on this topic has produced more nuanced approaches, since Hurford was using 
sentences like John was born in Paris or France and Sarah is an American or a Californian as his 
examples of unacceptable constructions when he first formulated this concept. Since his initial work 
in 1974, scholars have raised many objections and modifications to Hurford’s Constraint. One of 
the most significant problems with this original formulation is that it does not account for sentences 
                                                   
354 See Appendix B for more detail on this point.  
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involving some or all, a construction which seems to violate Hurford’s Constraint (since all 
necessarily entails some) but which nonetheless occurs frequently. A (neo)Gricean approach dictates 
that a speaker will provide as much relevant information as they can, assuming that they are reasonably 
certain of the accuracy of what they know. “Some” then implicates “some but not all,” since a speaker 
would say “all” if they were able to. The complications inherent in this idea can best be seen though an 
example, since the linguistic framework I have used does not effectively account for a statement of this sort: 
Odysseus killed some of the suitors 
which could conceivably mean 
Odysseus killed some (but not all) of the suitors 
Odysseus killed at least some of the suitors [and I do not know whether he killed all of them].  
If an omniscient god or narrator speaks these words, we assume that the correct reading is that Odysseus 
killed some but not all of the suitors. If the speaker is a mortal character (say, Eurycleia), either of these two 
alternatives are viable. We can modify some to remove ambiguity, but we are then left with the constructions 
some but not all (which is, on certain interpretations, redundant, but not unacceptably so) or some or all, 
which seems to violate Hurford’s Constraint.  Multiple proposals have been suggested to effectively modify 
Hurford’s Constraint,355 which I mention primarily to show that this is a complicated and unresolved 
linguistic phenomenon.  
To return to the examples provided above, we have something which resembles an inversion of the 
some or all construction: all or at least some. When explicitly stated, with at least added, this construction is 
perfectly clear, but all or some is somewhat less clear, for essentially the same reasons listed above.356 For the 
general complexity surrounding these types of constructions, I have refrained from classifying these 
examples as inclusive or exclusive.  
 
4. Ambiguous Uses 
My final category of non-exclusive ors is a far less secure category. These last examples 
suggest an exclusive reading (for a range of different contextual reasons), but they by no means 
demand it. This will be a useful transition point into some particularly interesting examples of 
                                                   
355 For a non-exhaustive selection, see Spector 2003, Sauerland 2004, van Rooij and Schulz 2004, Spector 2006, 
Chierchia et al. 2009.  
356 Meyer 2014 is useful on this topic. 
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exclusive ors. The first subset of these examples consists of passages in which both alternatives 
could occur, but would often not be necessary. Many times, force is one of the two items presented, 
and there is an underlying assumption that if force were used, other means would not be necessary. 
However, in these sorts of instances, it would not be impossible for both to occur (one imagines an 
instance in which words include the threat of violence—the proverbial “offer he can’t refuse”—or 
in which words fail and then violence is used): 357 
4.1 ὅς μ᾽ ἐξοτρύνει παῖδ᾽ ἐμὸν πεῖσαι λιταῖς  
νεκρῶν κομιστὴν ἢ λόγοισιν ἢ δορὸς  
ῥώμῃ γενέσθαι καὶ τάφου μεταίτιον  
Supp. 24-6 
 
He encourages me to persuade my child with 
prayers to tend to the corpses, either with words 
or with the strength of his spear, and be the cause 
of the burial 
Similarly, there are a range of examples in which one of the two elements would be sufficient 
motive or explanation for events. Both certainly could be true, but either of the two alternatives 
would easily suffice. Examples of this usage include the following: 
4.2 τούς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν 
πραγμάτων γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι 
αὐτῷ διαφέρει· 
Thuc. 3.42.2 
 
Whoever contends that speech should not 
instruct actions, either that man is either lacking 
sense or he has some sort of private interest 
4.3 ἀλλά σευ ἢ κάματος πολυᾶϊξ γυῖα δέδυκεν  
ἤ νύ σέ που δέος ἴσχει ἀκήριον  
Il. 5.811-12 
 
But either some impetuous weariness has come 
upon your limbs or perhaps a spiritless fear holds 
you 
In passage 4.2, either stupidity or a personal interest in the matter would explain someone 
employing the argument in question, but history is rife with examples of people displaying both 
stupidity and greed while advancing flawed arguments. In passage 4.3, either fear or fatigue alone 
might explain Diomedes’ withdrawal from battle (though, in the context of the poem, we know that 
neither is the true explanation) but fear and fatigue are not mutually exclusive.358 As a final 
example, I would point to the following: 
                                                   
357 For similar uses, see also Thuc. 1.33.3 (ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν μηδὲ δυοῖν 
φθάσαι ἁμάρτωσιν, ἢ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἢ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι) and Soph. Phil. 593-4 (διώμοτοι πλέουσιν 
ἦ μὴν ἢ λόγῳ / πείσαντες ἄξειν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύος κράτος). I would also include Eur. Phoen. 1259-61 (ἀλλ᾽, εἴ τιν᾽ 
ἀλκὴν ἢ σοφοὺς ἔχεις λόγους / ἢ φίλτρ᾽ ἐπῳδῶν, στεῖχ᾽, ἐρήτυσον τέκνα / δεινῆς ἁμίλλης), in which wise words 
could combine with a spell—in this case, the spell functions almost in the same way as force, in the previous examples, 
since magic can be seen as a form of compulsion.  
358 To these examples, I would add the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 518-20 (ἀλλ᾽ εἴ μοι τλαίης γε θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον 
ὀμόσσαι, / ἢ κεφαλῇ νεύσας ἢ ἐπὶ Στυγὸς ὄβριμον ὕδωρ, / πάντ᾽ ἂν ἐμῷ θυμῷ κεχαρισμένα καὶ φίλα ἔρδοις), 
in which Hermes’ oath would presumably be strong and binding if he swore by nodding his head or if he swore on the 
Styx, but oaths are often sworn on multiple things (the Hippocratic Oath, for example, is sworn on Ἀπόλλωνα 
ἰητρὸν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν καὶ Ὑγείαν καὶ Πανάκειαν καὶ θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας. Similarly, Medea makes 
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4.4 δυοῖν γὰρ ἐχθροῖν εἰς ἓν ἐλθόντοιν στέγος,  
ἢ θάτερον δεῖ δυστυχεῖν ἢ θάτερον  
Ion 848-9 
 
For, with two enemies coming together under one 
roof, either the one must fare badly, or the other 
In passage 4.4, the gnomic nature of the line (if the line is not spurious) suggests that only one of 
the two enemies will suffer (and so the other would be victorious), but Eteocles and Polynices offer 
a counter-example in which both men can die, even if that is not the most natural reading of the 
line.  
 
Exclusive Ors 
Although there are many instances which allow for (or demand) and inclusive reading of ἢ . 
. . ἤ, the overwhelming majority of the instances I examined were clearly exclusive. My purpose 
here is to show that ἢ . . . ἤ can be used inclusively, but it would be disingenuous not to briefly 
discuss some noteworthy examples of exclusive uses. A large portion of these uses offer a basic 
choice between life and death, which are fundamentally irreconcilable. The most common 
instances take the form of Iliad 12.171-2: 359  
5.1 ὣς οἵ γ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι πυλάων καὶ δύ᾽ ἐόντε  
χάσσασθαι πρίν γ᾽ ἠὲ κατακτάμεν ἠὲ ἁλῶναι  
Il. 12.171-2 
These men will not willingly fall back from the 
gates, though they are just two men, before they 
either kill or are killed 
 
Other similar instances involve alternatives that are mutually exclusive for other reasons: 
5.2 δύ’ εἰσὶ τὸ πρόσθεν ὁδοί μοι· 
φροντίζω τούτων ἥντιν’ ἴω προτέρην·  
ἢ μηδὲν δαπανῶν τρύχω βίον ἐν κακότητι,  
ἢ ζώω τερπνῶς ἔργα τελῶν ὀλίγα  
Theognis 1.911-14 
There are two roads before me. I am thinking 
about which one I should take—either spending 
nothing and wearing out my life in wickedness or 
living pleasantly and accomplishing only a few 
things 
5.3 κἀν τῷδ᾽ ἀγὼν μέγιστος, ἢ κακὸν λαβεῖν  
ἢ χρηστόν 
Medea 235-6 
And the greatest struggle consists of this: either 
taking a good husband or a bad one. 
                                                   
Aegeus swear an oath on Γαῖαν Ἡλίου θ᾿ ἁγνὸν σέλας / θεούς τε πάντας, Med. 752-3) and this is not a strongly 
exclusive use of or. Similarly, at Thuc. 2.13.1 (ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ 
βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ 
διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῦτο), we see two different motivations which could easily work in tandem to explain 
Archidamus’ actions, though either would also be sufficient motive on its own. As well as Eur. IT 380-4 (τὰ τῆς θεοῦ 
δὲ μέμφομαι σοφίσματα, / ἥτις βροτῶν μὲν ἤν τις ἅψηται φόνου, / ἢ καὶ λοχείας ἢ νεκροῦ θίγῃ χεροῖν, / 
βωμῶν ἀπείργει, μυσαρὸν ὡς ἡγουμένη, / αὐτὴ δὲ θυσίαις ἥδεται βροτοκτόνοις), in which any single source of 
pollution would suffice to make someone impure, but there is no reason to rule out multiple sources of pollution (and, 
in fact, engaging in murder pairs easily with touching a corpse).  
359 This is a very common type of construction and occurs  
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All of these examples involve alternatives that are necessarily mutually exclusive. Other extremely 
common uses of ἢ . . . ἤ include alternatives of the “this or that?” variety: 
5.4 ποίαν ἢ ταύταν ἢ κείναν  
στείχω;  
Hec. 162-3 
 
Which way should I go, this or that? 
and of the “X or something else” form:360 
5.5 κομίσαντες ἐσκόπουν ὅπως μετριώτατα ἢ ὁμήρων 
λήψει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ καταπαύσουσι τὴν 
ἐπιβουλήν  
Thuc. 8.24.6 
 
They contemplated and considered the most 
reasonable way—either by taking hostages or by 
some other method—for them to put a stop to 
the plot 
Finally, there are a large number of instances (predictably, mostly in tragedy) that offer two 
different means of suicide, such as the following: 
5.6 ποῦ δῆτ᾽ ἐλήφθης ἢ βρόχους ἀρτωμένη  
ἢ φάσγανον θήγουσ᾽;  
Troiades 1012-13 
 
When, in fact, were you found hanging a noose or 
sharpening a sword? 
as well as time alternatives  
5.7 τί ταῦτα μοχθεῖς; συμφοραὶ θεήλατοι  
πᾶσιν βροτοῖσιν ἢ τότ᾽ ἦλθον ἢ τότε  
Andr. 851-2 
 
Why are you so distressed? God-sent misfortunes 
come to all mortals, either at one time or at 
another time 
These common categories either demand or very strongly suggest an exclusive reading.  
The instances I would like to examine more closely are the ones with more direct parallels 
to the cryptic oracle in the Trachiniae.  
5.8 δίδωμ᾽· ἑλοῦ γάρ, ἢ πόνων τὰ λοιπά σοι  
φράσω σαφηνῶς, ἢ τὸν ἐκλύσοντ᾽ ἐμέ 
PV 780-1 
 
I make this offer: choose what I will tell you—either 
your future sufferings or the one who will set me free 
5.9  ὁρᾶτε δ᾽ ὡς τρεῖς μία τύχη τοὺς φιλτάτους,  
ἢ γῆς πατρῴας νόστον ἢ θανεῖν ἔχει.  
IT 1065-6 
 
You see how one fate holds the three of us, most dear, 
to either return to our homeland or die. 
5.10  ὡς ἐγὼ μόνη  
οὐκ ἂν δυοῖν ἥμαρτον· ἢ γὰρ ἂν καλῶς  
ἔσωσ᾽ ἐμαυτὴν ἢ καλῶς ἀπωλόμην.  
Soph. Elec. 1319-21 
 
Since, on my own, I would not have failed at two 
things: for either I would have honorably saved myself 
or perished honorably. 
                                                   
360 Aristotle discusses this type of disjunctive at some length at De Interpretatione IX (the so-called “tomorrow’s sea 
battle” argument).  
 229 
5.11 οὐκ ἔστι. καὶ πρός γ᾽ ἐξελῶ σφε τῆσδε γῆς, 
δυοῖν δὲ μοίραιν θατέρᾳ πεπλήξεται· 
ἢ γὰρ Ποσειδῶν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἅιδου δόμους 
θανόντα πέμψει τὰς ἐμὰς ἀρὰς σέβων, 
ἢ τῆσδε χώρας ἐκπεσὼν ἀλώμενος 
ξένην ἐπ᾽ αἶαν λυπρὸν ἀντλήσει βίον.  
Hipp. 893-8 
 
It isn’t possible. And in addition, I will drive him out of 
this land, and he will be struck by one of two fates: 
either Poseidon will send him, dead, into the halls of 
Hades, paying heed to my curses, or else, driven out of 
this land and wandering over a foreign land, he will 
drink deeply of a miserable life. 
5.12 τοῖνδ᾽ ἑλοῦ δυοῖν πότμοιν  
τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ παῖδα σῷσον ἢ πόλιν.  
Phoen. 951-2 
 
Chose one of these two fates: either save your child or 
the city. 
5.13 μέγας γὰρ ἁγών, καὶ βλέπω δύο ῥοπάς·  
ἢ γὰρ θανεῖν δεῖ μ᾽, ἢν ἁλῶ τεχνωμένη,  
ἢ πατρίδα τ᾽ ἐλθεῖν καὶ σὸν ἐκσῷσαι δέμας.  
Hel. 1090-2 
For the contest is great, and I see two ways the scale 
can incline: either I must die, if I am caught scheming, 
or I must come home to my fatherland and save your 
skin too. 
 
In all six of these instances, the structure and import is similar to the oracles that Deianeira 
describes in the Trachiniae. All of these passages invite a straightforward, exclusive reading, just as 
Deianeira’s words do, and all of these allow for a riddling inclusive reading, if they were placed in a 
different context. In passage 5.8, Prometheus offers Io two alternatives, to which the Chorus 
responds “τούτων σὺ τὴν μὲν τῇδε, τὴν δ᾽ ἐμοὶ χάριν / θέσθαι θέλησον, μηδ᾽ ἀτιμάσῃς 
λόγου,” (782-3) at which point he relents. The “answer” to that disjunct is in fact “both,” but the 
response of the Chorus makes clear that this is not the natural or intuitive understanding of 
Prometheus’ offer. In passage 5.9, Iphigenia and Pylades and Orestes could—in a very differently-
structured play—die upon reaching their homeland. Similarly, in passage 5.10, one can imagine an 
interpretation in which death is revealed to be synonymous with salvation (in the same way that 
death is a respite from toils) and Electra’s two alternatives collapse into one meaning. In much the 
same way, Poseidon could destroy Hippolytus while he miserably wanders in a foreign land. 
Passage 5.12 presents slightly more difficulties, but Creon is a pure descendent of Cadmus and 
there is no explicit reason why he could not be sacrificed to save the city, thereby saving both his 
city and his son. All of these refer to a choice between two fates—and in passage 5.12, Tiresias is 
the speaker, lending a more prophetic authority to the words—but none of them prove to be 
deceptive. The most natural reading, with an exclusive use of or, turns out to be accurate.  
Passage 5.13 I include for slightly different reasons. This parallels a different element of 
Deianeira’s words. Here, Helen invokes the imagery of a scale (ῥοπή), which is the same word that 
Deianeira uses to describe Heracles’ two potential fates (Trach. 81). This passage is a useful 
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comparandum for what Deianeira thinks she is describing. Here, the two alternatives really are 
mutually exclusive and map neatly onto the scale imagery—only one side of a scale can incline and 
only one of the two fates will occur.  
These passages cast the strange oracles in the Trachiniae into much sharper focus—while ἢ 
. . . ἤ certainly can be used both inclusively and exclusively in a range of different ways in Greek 
literature, Deianeira’s words have much more in common with exclusive uses of or than with the 
inclusive uses. The natural interpretation of her words would align with the comparanda listed 
above and the actual meaning of her words, only revealed later in the play, stretches the logical 
meaning of ἢ . . . ἤ. It does not represent an unparalleled use of this construction, as I have shown, 
but it does require an unconventional and unnatural reading of the oracle—and one that Deianeira 
very clearly does not anticipate.  
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Appendix B: Linguistic Terms and Concepts 
Conventional Implicatures 
Horn defines conventional implicatures as “detachable but non-cancelable aspects of meaning that 
are neither part of, nor calculable from, what is said” (Horn 2006: 4). Potts 2007 offers a slightly 
modified version which is not significantly different. A few examples will make conventional 
implicatures clearer. 
The “classic” examples of conventional implicatures involve but, therefore, even, still, again, and 
possibly too.361 Potts adds words such as manage, fail to, and still.  
Even Odysseus finds that immoral. 
Entails: Odysseus finds that immoral. 
Conventionally implicates: Odysseus is the least likely to find something immoral. 
 
Achilles is saddened, but he won’t rejoin the fighting. 
Entails: Achilles is saddened. Achilles won’t rejoin the fighting. 
Conventionally implicates: We would expect that if Achilles is saddened, he will rejoin the 
fighting. 
 
Heracles managed to kill the hydra. 
Entails: Heracles killed the hydra. 
Conventionally implicates: It was difficult to kill the hydra, and Heracles exerted some 
effort to do so. 
 
Deeper Analysis of Implicature 
The following analysis depends on these sentences, which will be analyzed in greater detail than 
they were in the introduction.  
Subtypes of Implicatures (after Grice 1961: §3) 
1a Even KEN knows it’s unethical 
1b Ken is the least likely [of a contextually invoked set] to know it’s unethical 
                                                   
361 See Kripke 1977 on the question of too. As he notes, in many examples of too, the conventional implicature is so 
common as to be trivial.  
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2a [in a recommendation letter for a philosophy position] Jones dresses well 
and writes grammatical English 
2b Jones is no good at philosophy 
3a The cat is in the hamper or under the bed 
3b I don’t know for a fact that the cat is under the bed362 
 
Several key terms will be useful for a deeper analysis of these types of implicatures and inferences 
(and distinguishing the difference between the two categories). To begin with, the inference (1b) is 
only true if Ken does in fact know that it is unethical, but the same truth-conditional content 
expressed in a can be expressed in a way that does not generate 1b: “Ken knows it’s unethical 
(too).” This makes the inference detachable (since the inference can be detached from the 
utterance) but non-cancelable (because the inference cannot be canceled without contradiction). 
Looking at 2a and 2b then, we see a different sort of inference at work. This inference is 
non-conventional, in that it does not derive from the conventional lexical meaning of the words, but 
rather from the utterance of those words in a particular context. This inference is also cancelable, 
in that the inference can be canceled, either by explicitly correcting the inference (by adding, for 
example, “but I don’t mean to suggest that . . .”) or by changing the context in which the words are 
uttered. However, it is non-detachable, in that any other way of expressing the same content in the 
same context would yield the same inference.  
Looking now at 3a and 3b, we see a very similar situation. These inferences are also non-
conventional, cancelable, and non-detachable, but there is an important distinction: the context in 
which 2b is a valid inference is much more specific than the context of 3b. In fact, only a very 
specific context licenses 2b, which makes 2b an example of a particularized conversational 
implicature, whereas 3b is an example of a generalized conversational implicature. 
 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Maxims of Conversation 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Maxims of Conversation (Grice 1989: 26-7) 
Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange.”  
Maxims of Conversations:  
QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
                                                   
362 An equally valid implicature here would be “I don’t know for a fact that the cat is in the hamper.”  
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1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
QUANTITY: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of 
the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
RELATION: Be relevant. 
MANNER: Be perspicuous. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief. (Avoid unnecessary prolixity.) 
4. Be orderly. 
 
Here, I have excerpted several additional principles, from both Davis 2014 and Grice 1989. These 
were not directly relevant in much of my study of Sophocles, but they are important for broader 
pragmatic analyses of literary (and non-literary) texts. 
Principle of Style: Be stylish, so be beautiful, distinctive, entertaining, and interesting. 
Clear and simple prose—“just the facts, please”—can be boring, tedious and dull. We liven 
up our writing with figures of speech and other devices. In the process, we sacrifice 
perspicuity (violating Manner). We sometimes “embellish” a narration to make it more 
interesting (violating Quality) and delete boring or ugly details even when they are 
important (violating Quantity).24 
Principle of Politeness: Be polite, so be tactful, respectful, generous, praising, modest, 
deferential, and sympathetic. 
Speakers frequently withhold information that would be offensive or disappointing to the 
hearer, violating Quantity. Speakers often exaggerate in order to please or flatter, and utter 
“white lies” in order to spare the hearer's feelings, violating Quality. People pick “safe 
topics” (e.g., the weather) to stress agreement and communicate an interest in maintaining 
good relations—but violating Relation. Euphemisms avoid mentioning the unmentionable, 
but in the process violate Manner and Quantity.25 
Grice on False Information 
The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision of contributions which are genuine rather 
than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a 
                                                   
24 Davis 2014 
25 Davis 2014, drawing on Leech 1983 as well as directing readers toward Lakoff 1977; Brown & Levinson 1978; 1987; 
Horn 1989: 360; Matsumoto 1995: §2.4. Contrast Huang 2007: 37, fn. 12; Pinker 2007. Grice 1975:28, he notes, 
“acknowledges the Principle of Politeness, and suggests that it generates implicatures that are both nonsemantic and 
nonconversational.” 
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number of recipes for producing contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference 
between something’s being, and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of contribution at 
all. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information.16  
 
Q- and R-based Implicature 
The final theoretical concept that I would like to introduce is that of Q-based and R-based 
implicature. These are slight modifications to the concepts of implicature laid out thus far and stem 
from an attempt to combine the Gricean maxims into more succinct principles. These are based off 
of Zipf’s “speaker and auditor economies”26 and there are two fundamental principles involved27 
(drawing on Grice’s maxims, where Q refers to Quantity and R refers to Relation): 
Q Principle: Say as much as you can [given R]. 
R Principle: Say no more than you must [given Q]. 
Horn then follows this formulation with some elaboration: 
Q-based implicature is typically negative in that its calculation refers crucially to what could 
have been said but wasn’t: H infers from S’s failure to use a more informative and/or 
briefer form that S was not in a position to do so. R-based implicature involves social rather 
than purely linguistic motivation and is exemplified by indirect speech acts and negative 
                                                   
16 Grice 1989: 371, emphasis my own. 
26 Zipf 1949: 20ff. 
27 These principles are the result of a great deal of linguistic scholarship, but I am essentially taking Horn’s formulation 
of them, which was—as far as I know—the first attempt to systematize this (Horn 2006: 13). His chapter on 
implicature has the full synopsis of relevant scholarship and the history of debates about these topics. The versions I 
provide here are slightly modified from Horn’s original formulations by Meibauer 2006: 563 and Huang 2006, 2007: 
37–9 to exclude Quality from the Q principle. Horn’s formulation has the consequence that people violate the 
principle when they lie or use figures of speech and the stripped down version is often used more simply (Davis 2014). 
For the justification of these two principles from Grice’s basic maxims: “The Q principle is a lower-bounding hearer-
based guarantee of the sufficiency of informative content (’Say as much as you can, modulo Quality and R’); it collects 
the first Quantity maxim along with the first two ‘clarity’ submaxims of manner and is systematically exploited (as in the 
scalar cases discussed above) to generate upper-bounding implicata. The R principle, by contrast, is an upper-
bounding correlate of the Law of Least Effort dictating minimization of form (’Say no more than you must, modulo 
Q’); it collects the Relation maxim, the second Quantity maxim, and the last two submaxims of Manner, and is 
exploited to induce strengthening implicata” (Horn 2006: 13). 
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strengthening (including so-called neg-raising, i.e. the tendency for I don’t think that φ to 
implicate I think that not-φ).28 
 
Downward Entailment 
Gazdar31 noted that scalar implicatures seem to be suspended under negation, which led 
linguists to look more closely at how scalar implicatures are modified in different linguistic contexts. 
Horn suggested that it is not simply under negation that scalar implicatures are suspended, but in 
all downward entailing contexts, an idea developed at much greater length by Chierchia and 
others.32  
Downward entailment (opposed directly to upward entailment, unsurprisingly, though 
upward entailment is not particularly relevant to my arguments and I will not be looking at it in any 
great detail) is significant for a variety of linguistic reasons and is a very useful concept in my 
exploration of language and oracular communication in Sophocles. From a linguistic theory 
standpoint, however, it is a concept that is inextricably linked with polarity items and I will return to 
the broader concept of downward entailment once I have explored polarity briefly.  
Polarity items are words that can only appear in certain linguistic environments. These 
environments are characterized by their “polarity,” which can either be positive or negative. 
Positive polarity items (PPIs) are less directly relevant for my discussion, so I will focus instead on 
negative polarity items (NPIs). As one might imagine, a negative polarity item is one that only 
appears in a negative context. A negative context is known as the licensing context for an NPI. A 
licensing context is simply the linguistic context in which these types of words can occur. This 
distinction is made much simpler by some illustrative examples. 
Any(where/thing/body/one) and at all are common NPIs. The most common negative 
contexts (i.e. contexts which license NPIs) include basic negation as well as words that imply some 
                                                   
28 Horn 2006: 13 
31 Gazdar 1979 
32 Horn 1989: 23-4 introduces this idea without much elaboration. Chierchia 2004 provides a much more detailed look 
at this phenomenon. He modifies this conclusion slightly, to think about contexts that license any, as opposed to 
downward entailing environments more generally, on the grounds that downward entailment is a theoretical 
characterization of contexts, whereas any-licensing is an empirical criterion. While his argument is quite compelling, it 
also introduces a level of specificity and terminology that is unnecessary for this project and Horn’s original suggestion 
(as explored and generally supported by Chierchia) will suffice for my purposes. 
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degree of negation (verbs like doubt, dislike, prevent; adverbs like barely, seldom), questions (direct 
and indirect), and a range of other clause types (conditionals in particular) and many comparisons.  
For an example of this, consider the following exchange from The Big Lebowski (1998): 
The Dude: I don't see any connection to Vietnam, Walter. 
Walter Sobchak: Well, there isn't a literal connection, Dude. 
The Dude: Walter, face it, there isn't any connection. 
Here, the negations (don't see, isn't) license the NPI (any). It would be nonsensical to say “I see any 
connection to Vietnam” without the negations there. However, as we see in another exchange 
about Walter’s persistent references to Vietnam, a question can also license the use of an NPI.  
The Dude: What . . . has anything got to do with Vietnam? 
For a more colorful example, consider the NPI give a damn36. Joan Jett famously claimed: 
"I don’t give a damn about my bad reputation,"(”Bad Reputation,” 1980) but it would have been 
very strange indeed, for both semantic and contextual reasons, for her to sing “I give a damn about 
my bad reputation.” However, as noted above, a question generally licenses the use of an NPI, and 
“Ms. Jett, do you give a damn about your bad reputation?” is a perfectly plausible question.  
To return, then, to downward entailment, there is no firm linguistic consensus about 
whether downward entailment is enough to explain NPIs. In broad terms,33 downward entailment 
exists in contexts where there is a licensed inference from a set to a subset. In logical form, this 
means that a function (f) is DE if and only if: 
f(A) entails f(B) whenever B ∈ A 
                                                   
36 While not relevant to a discussion of Greek tragedy, where we will not find any Greek equivalents to colloquial, 
emphatic language, some of the most amusing (to my mind) NPIs to examine are idiomatic and colloquial phrases such 
as lift a finger, in the world, the hell (and its R-rated variant, the fuck), give/be worth a damn/a shit, etc. We can see 
how these phrases function similarly and require a negative context to license their (linguistically) appropriate use. 
33 This definition comes from Chierchia’s summary of Ladusaw’s seminal work on downward entailment in 1979, as 
does the subsequent logical form. 
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So to return to the examples above, contexts which license NPIs are essentially the same as 
downward entailing contexts (or similar enough that, for my purposes, the distinction can be 
overlooked without a problem). So, to take the easiest example, consider negation: 
A: Achilles does not like liars 
B: Achilles does not like Odysseus 
We know that Odysseus is a habitual liar, so Odysseus is a member of the larger set of liars. 
Negation is a downward entailing environment because A entails B. Any downward entailing 
environment will license inferences from the largest set to any smaller subset.34 Any environment 
that operates this way is called a downward entailing environment and, as I noted above,35 these are 
largely the same as environments that license the use of any, which is a simple test for downward 
entailment.  
 
Hurford's Constraint 
Hurford’s Constraint is the last discreet bit of linguistic theory that I will introduce here. In 
its original formulation, Hurford 1974 noted:  
Hurford’s Constraint: A sentence that contains a disjunctive phrase of the form ‘S or T’ is 
infelicitous if S entails T or T entails S. 
Put more simply, it does not make sense to say either of the following 
I want to see a play or a tragedy 
I want to see a tragedy or a play 
                                                   
34 The “downward” element refers to the smaller set in play in sentence B. This environment licenses inferences to a 
subset of the original claim. If we were to accept the Greek proverb, All Cretans are liars, then we could see how this 
would also operate—rather than a sub-set of 1 (Odysseus), we would have a subset of Cretans. We could then easily 
replace Achilles does not like Odysseus with Achilles does not like Cretans and it would still be entailed by sentence A. 
35 FN #### 
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In this case, play is S and tragedy is T. Because want to see a tragedy entails I want to see a play, the 
two sentences above are not felicitous (that is, they are not semantically and pragmatically 
appropriate, though they are grammatically acceptable).  
However, this observation has since been complicated quite a bit.29 For example, if we 
tweak the examples above slightly, we have a seemingly acceptable sentence: 
I want to see the first play or the second play or both.  
Strictly speaking, I want to see both plays entails I want to see the first play or the second play. 
Further complicating things, when we think about examples of the following sort: 
I want to see some or all of the plays 
we have a perfectly natural, intelligible sentence, but it seems to violate Hurford’s Constraint.  
Gazdar30 suggested a generalization to address this: 
A sentence containing a disjunctive phrase ‘S or T’ is infelicitous if S entails T or if T entails 
S, unless T contradicts the conjunction of S and the implicatures of S.  
To expand this a bit more, when I say I want to see some of the plays, I implicate that I do 
not want to see all of the plays, since I would simply say all if that were the better options. As such, 
scalar implicatures allow us to modify the original sentence to mean: 
I want to see some but not all of the plays or I want to see all of the plays. 
                                                   
29 Chierchia, Fox and Spector 2009 on the complications and an elegant solution to these complications, by integrating 
work on implicatures, including embedded implicatures, and where and when implicatures occur (Chierchia 2004). 
Much of this presentation of Hurford’s Constraint is informed by this article. 
30 Gazdar 1979. In response to this, Chierchia, Fox and Spector 2009: 3 argue the following:  
1) Hurford’s Constraint is correct as originally stated. 
2) All the apparent violations of Hurford’s Constraint involve the presence of an implicature computing 
operator within the first disjunct, ensuring that Hurford’s Constraint is met - hence the presence of a ‘local 
implicature’. 
They apply an exhaustivity operator that can be inserted and computed locally and argue convincingly that this 
provides a better solution to the apparent issues with Hurford’s Constraint as originally formulated and they reject 
Gazdar’s generalization as unnecessary and — in some situations — inadequate. I find their arguments quite 
compelling, but they introduce a great deal of detailed linguistic nuance that is not necessary for this project, since the 
few situations in which these distinctions matter do not come up in the course of any of my examples. As such, I will 
adopt Gazdar’s generalization as a simpler option. 
 239 
At this point, there is no issue with these overlapping categories and formulations of the “some or 
all” sort do not present a problem, from a pragmatic perspective.  
 
Glossary of Linguistic Terms 
The following terms were discussed in the Introduction but have been replicated here for ease of 
reference. Many of the examples here are the same  
Block: the process of overriding a pragmatic process that would otherwise occur.  
Entailment: Entailments can occasionally have the same basic content as implicatures, but they are 
generally distinct. A sentence can entail something, whereas a speaker implicates something. 
Entailment is the relationship between two sentences when one demands the truth of the other. For 
example:  
A) That urn contains the ashes of Orestes 
B) Orestes is dead 
Sentence A entails sentence B. If sentence A is true, sentence B must be true. This relationship has 
nothing to do with the utterance of the sentences or the speaker’s intentions or the context. 
Sentence A simply requires the truth of sentence B. 
Inference: Inferences are distinct from implicatures, though they are often conflated with them. 
The critical distinction here is that an inference is something that a hearer makes and an 
implicature is something that a speaker intends. A speaker can implicate something without the 
hearer making the intended inference and a hearer can infer something that the speaker did not 
implicate. In a world of perfect and complete communication, these ought to line up with one 
another, but the two terms describe opposite sides of unspoken communication.  
Detachable an inference is detachable if the inference can be detached from the utterance 
Cancelable: an inference is cancelable if the inference can be canceled without 
contradiction, either by explicitly correcting the inference or by changing the context in 
which the words are uttered 
Non-cancelable: an inference which cannot be canceled without contradiction 
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Implication: (what is implied) depends on semantic content (what actually is said). If a sentence is 
true, then what it implies is necessarily true. 
Implicature: an aspect of what is meant by a speaker that is not a part of what is said by that speaker 
Implicature (what is implicated) involves what is not said and depends on pragmatic elements 
instead. 
Conventional Implicatures: per Horn, these are “detachable but non-cancelable aspects of 
meaning that are neither part of, nor calculable from, what is said are conventional 
implicatures.” Potts 2007 offers a slightly modified version, but for my purposes, there are 
not significant differences between the two. These are implicatures which are not connected 
to or derived from the Grice’s Maxims or the cooperative principle. Conventional 
implicatures are part of the literal meaning of the words uttered.  
Conversational implicatures: These implicatures are derived in some sense from the context 
in which something is said. A conversational implicature can be either generalized (present 
in all contexts) or particularized (generated only in a specific context). A conversational 
implicature can also be a conventional implicature, in which case it is often referred to as a 
generalized conversational implicature. 
Scalar implicature: An implicature which is generated from Gricean maxims and which 
suggests that the speaker made as strong a claim as they felt they were able to make. As a 
result, the speaker implicates that, to the best of the speaker’s knowledge, they could not 
truthfully make a stronger claim.  
Presupposition: Presuppositions are also a feature of a sentence, but they work slightly differently 
from entailments. A presupposition involves a presupposed truth that is taken for granted. For 
example, That urn contains the ashes of Electra’s brother presupposes that Electra has a brother. 
Truth-conditional content: the conditions (of the world) under which the utterance is true. If the 
truth conditions obtain, the utterance is true.  
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